
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RAJENDRA PRASAD



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#### EDITORIAL NOTE

The Department of Philosophy organised an All India Research Scholars' Seminar in Philosophy, under the sponsorship of the University Grants Commission, from 27th April to 30th April, 1979, in the University of Poona. Research scholars from almost all the major University Departments of Philosophy participated in the seminar and made it an exciting and pioneering venture. About 28 papers on various aspects of Philosophy were presented and discussed during the sessions. Since it was found that the papers invariably achieved an appreciable level of excellence, it was decided that abstracts of the contributions should be published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Accordingly, we are now happy to announce that the abstracts of all the papers presented in the seminar are published as a joint number of the Students' Supplement for the January and April July (1980) issues of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly.

**EDITORS** 

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#### DETERMINISM, FREEDOM AND SOCIAL ACTION

In this paper an attempt is made to show that the twin concepts of determinism and freedom far from being diametric opposites, are found to intertwine and overlap forming myriad patterns of choice and restriction in human life. This view is illustrated in this paper with specific reference to some aspects of the concept of social action. It seems to us that it is at least one of the ways in which an abstract concept such as human freedom can be analysed in concrete terms.

In simple terms, social action refers to the action which is performed by an individual society. There are two theories of social action, one denying completely the inner aspect and the other maintaining that the inner aspect cannot be ignored at all. These two theories have been put forward by the psychologist B. F. Skinner and Alfred Schutz, a social philosopher.

Skinner being a behaviourist, emphasizes the observational aspects of man's action in society. The most significant feature of Skinner's theory is that man's behaviour can be studied "from outside", that is, externally. Since man is thrown into a certain situation, we can predict his actions. Man's behaviour is thus totally determined, by factors which are all observable. Though the 'internal' factors may be accepted by Skinner in so far as they are scientifically observable, his contention is that social actions does not have any element of indeterminacy in it. Thus according to this theory. "free action" is an impossibility and a myth.

This theory which supports extreme determinism cannot be totally accepted by us since we hold that the complexity of human behaviour is not taken seriously by this theory. Man is *much* more complex than just a mechanism. That human nature eludes rigid scientific observation and experimentation can hardly be denied. In the light of these difficulties, we shall now refer to another theory which acknowledges the efficacy of the subjective elements of social action.

The second theory of social action put forward by the social philosopher Schutz emphasizes that social action cannot be understood in purely objective or outer terms. He takes the "inside CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

standpoint". This refers to the role of the motivations in the creation of the 'social world'. The insistence here is on the *initiative* of the individual. The subjective 'understanding' (verstehen) develops an objectivity of its own. Though Schutz emphasizes the 'inner aspect' in understanding human action, he does not deny the objective aspects altogether. It is only because of the acceptance of the objective aspect that a description and explanation of social action is possible.

Our interest in Schutz's theory of the importance of the subjective aspect of social action is that it brings out the indeterministic (the freedom aspects) of human action. Further, he does not dispense with the deterministic elements in human life, for he clearly acknowledges the value of the objective aspects of social reality. The argument of Schutz's theory lends support to our own argument regarding determinism and freedom viz., that aspects of determinism and aspects of freedom are intertwined in human action.

We may also suggest that the illustration of our theory that we attempted in this paper with particular reference to the concept of social action can be elucidated by a brief reference to the social phenomenon of tradition. For, the deterministic as well as the freedom aspects of social action are clearly seen in the way in which tradition influences human life. Social action is thus explicable in terms of the ways in which the individual responds to the exposure to tradition. No doubt in some cases the response is in terms of a passive acceptance of the ideas and ideals and in some other cases the response may be by positively rejecting some (or all) of the ideas presented to him. Though the first type of 'response' may be said to point to the deterministic element in tradition and the second, the freedom element in the individual, we would like to emphasize that the freedom element cannot be ruled out altogether even in regard to the first in so far as the individual may consciously accept the ideas in the tradition.

Furthermore, the responses referred to above also indicate the contribution that an individual can and does make to the stock of ideas and ideals which 'modify' tradition. This means also that tradition is not something in which there is no contribution from the side of man. Whereas the outer aspects of tradition are found in value-configurations and belief systems, the inner aspects are CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar

found in the acceptance and rejection of aspects of it as also in the contribution made by the individual for the formulation and modification of tradition.

Thus we have tried to illustrate that the deterministic and freedom aspects of human life are made apparent when we reflect about the phenomena of social action and tradition. The coexistence of the determinism and freedom in man's life is especially seen as an obvious fact, when the focus is on man in Society.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras

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### ROUSSEAU ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND FREEDOM

In this paper I propose to consider the views of Rousseau on freedom and the legitimacy of a State as a pre-requisite for the possibility of a civil society in which only, according to Rousseau, political and moral freedom is possible.

Rousseau argued that the nature of human freedom has to be considered in its social context rather than as something which is attained as a consequence of Divine Grace. Christianity asserted the supremacy of religion and upheld that the fall of man was a consequence of original sin. Salvation could not be attained merely as a result of good works done or by merit but only through God's goodwill and grace. Moral virtue may exert some control in restraining the passions but is not enough to remove man's slavery to sin. In the Christian tradition of thought, man's emacipation is dependent upon God's grace.

Rousseau, on the contrary, maintained that for the possibility of moral action one need not seek divine providence but realize the possibility of a moral society. With a view to explain what it is for men to be social and moral and to project the weaknesses of his contemporary society, Rousseau posited a vision of man's past—the state of absolute independence in which human beings lived a solitary life and hence were physically and materially self-sufficient. In this state of nature man was a creature of instincts which allowed uninhibited satisfaction of his passions. Man was characterised by "amour de soi" i. e. self love and "commiseration" i. e. pity. These two emotions helped the primitive man to preserve himself as well as his species. As man was not living in a society, he was a moral being, his conduct could not be termed as good or bad because he had no obligations.

Man develops his faculties of reason, imagination and memory only by living in a society. By becoming a social creature man acts by reason and deliberate choice rather than by impulses. To do as one pleases is a counterfeit of freedom which is applicable only to savages, whereas moral freedom belongs to human beings who live in a society and come into close relationships with others. Rousseau sought to reconcile the autonomy of man with the social condition and political authority. Thus, he speaks not of liberal CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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freedom as done by Locke and Mill but of freedom which is realizable in a society.

For Rousseau, a free will and a will subject to moral law are one and the same. Contrary to Hobbes who argued that man must choose between being free and being ruled. Rousseau believed not only that the above two can be reconciled but also argued that it is not possible to speak of freedom without order. Authentic freedom can only be attained in a civil society. People can be free only if they retain sovereignity over themselves, by making the laws and freely assenting to follow these laws. Obligation to follow these laws is not bondage but is a compulsion which springs from the sense of moral duty. Unless freedom and order are interdependdent human beings cannot realise the potentiality of morally selfgoverning persons. Thus the problem for Rousseau was to form a kind of society in which no one obeys anybody else but himself. Rousseau introduced social contract as the solution to this problem.

Under this pact each individual would be required to give up himself and his rights unconditionally to the whole of the community. Since everyone would give himself to all, no one gives himself to anyone. In other words, individual interests are subordinated under the general-will.

Rousseau explained moral obligation in terms of one's genuine interest i. e. what one ought to do is what is really in my interest to do. The general-will expresses what each individual would will if he saw what his real interests were. People try to follow their interests without really knowing them. Thus, a person who is ignorant or a person who wishes to enjoy the privileges of citizenship without fulfilling his duties will be compelled to do his duty by the body politic, till he freely assents to perform his duty. It is for this reason that Rousseau argued that a civil society is not possible without a state. An ignorant individual might not be able to distinguish between evil and good, and in such cases the state is justified in forcing the individual to conform to the general-will.

Some of the interpreters of Rousseau have maintained that Rousseau's writings are ambiguous, inconsistent and contradictory. It will be relevant to mention here that while reading Rousseau's writings one might fall into the error of confusing the conceptual with the empirical. When for example, Rousseau was talking of general-will he was not referring to any actual society but an ideal CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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society which he had visualised. Though Rousseau did not pay much attention to the question of ways and means through which the possibility of sach a society could be realised. But inspite of such ambiguities there is no doubt that Rousseau was a critic of his contemporary social and politicel institutions for he regarded them to be stifling for the basic human nature. He believed that the evils that we see in human nature could be eradicated by changing the socio-political intitutions.

In his early writings Rousseau described the natural man as living a solitary life and thus, there was no need to compare oneself with others and strive for recognition. Unlike the self sufficient natural man who lives in himself, modern man lives outside himself, basing his life on opinion on rather than on nature, that is, on what others expect him to be rather than on what he really is. In a society the natural self-love is transformed into selfishness (Amour propie) which is the source of vanity and greed.

Taking into consideration this explanation of man and society one may be tempted to conclude that Rousseau was suggesting that the society is necessarily corrupt. But this will be a misinterpretation of Rousseau. Instead of labelling society as necessarily corrupt, Rousseau on the contrary, had visualized a social and political order in which there would be equality of dependence accepted by all, in which laws would be recognised by everyone as being just. Rousseau made a clear-cut distinction between the natural independence and the equal dependence as willed by the rational and moral beings yet both were the conditions of uncorrupted man.

Rousseau was against the type of society which offered neither security nor freedom nor equality to its citizens and he wanted a society in which all are treated equally so that no one has to 'sell himself' and no one should be so powerful as to 'buy another' person. To establish such an equality, a body-poiltic based on general-will was required. Thus, for Rousseau moral freedom was only possible in a civil society, one could benefit more from Rousseau's thought had he specified the ways in which such a society could be achieved.

Department of Philosophy, Punjab University, Chandigarh

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### THE CONCEPT OF FREFDOM ACCORDING TO JOHN DEWEY AND BERTRAND RUSSELL

It is generally supposed that the chapter on fundamental rights in the constitution of a country alone makes all human beings in that country, free. But here two contemporary philosophers, viz., John Dewey and Bertrand Russell give us altogether different view as to the constituents and the methods of achieving freedom. They have not reduced freedom to the constitutional guarantee. For both Russell and Dewey freedom is that state of life which enjoys mastery over the physical world and purity in human nature. Freedom is something which has to be achieved in and through the human nature.

According to John Dewey the love of freedom is inherer t in human nature. When human freedom is oppressed by state, or by Church, or by any person, the impulse for freedom is stirred and the encountering begins. Freedom is a complex term which involves man's mastery over economic matters, political and social issues, and also in moral and religious faiths. Science has revolutionised man by giving him knowledge of himself and knowledge of the physical world. With scientific knowledge alone, he can achieve freedom since it enables him to have mastery over himself and the physical world. Freedom in religion and morals does not mean to observe the customary taboos; but morals and religion has to serve the purpose of changing and imporving human conditions. This is why democracy and science have replaced divine right theories of kings and enlightened the prejudiced common man. According to John Dewey love of power and the search for econonomic profit are the hurdles to the freedom of every individual. An individual who possesses these does not enjoy freedom and does not allow the other to have freedom. He becomes, in other words, anti-humanist. Democracy is the protection against such antihuman institutions and anti-humanists. After democracy, science was humanised. Democracy and science are the two means through which man has to achieve freedom and protect it.

According to Bertrand Russell fear as a psychological phenomena, is the enemy of freedom. Those human beings who have accomplished great things are definitely those who have conquered

#### KHADER NAWAZ KHAN

fear. One has to live with the spirit that aims at creative values better situations and happier human relations. According to Russell three factors cause fear in an individual. The evils due to physical nature—death, pain, disease, old age and natural calamities; secondly evils due to defects in character-ignorance, lack of will and violent emotions. Thirdly, the evils due to the personal domination of an individual over the other. This is called tyranny of an individual to control the rest of the human beings. This may be called as the evil of power. The method of combating fear which occurs through physical nature, bad character and tyranny of man is as follows: Physical evils can be encountered by applying science; evils of character can be rectified by education and the evils of power can be rectified by reformation in political and economic fields. Capitalism is the root cause which enslaves man. It has to be replaced by socialism. According to Russell the only human relations that have value are those that are rooted in mutual freedom wherein there is no domination and no slavery. amidst man and man or man and woman.

Deptt. of Philosophy S. V. University
Tirupati.

Khader Nawaz Khan

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## GANDHI'S THEORY OF TRUSTEESHIP:

The main concern of this pape; is to assess the efficacy of Gandhi's theory of trusteeship as a means and non-violent non-co-operation as a method to social change in the economic sphere. Since Gandhi's death, India and the world has vastly changed and in this changing situation how far his theory of trusteeship is practicable to achieve his goal of socialism or communism?

The following are some of the factors that shaped Gandhi's theory of trusteeship.

(1) The multi-class character of the national independent movement in which all Indians irrespective of their class affiliation had to be mobalised. (2) The unregulated private enterprise which was prevalent in India and the Western countries during his time. (3) His mistrust of the state power, to supress capitalism and to regard collectivism as an ideal solution. (4) His non-violent creed which prevented him to accept forcible seizure of wealth from the rich. (5) His essential belief in the inherent goodness of man which made him to hold that capitalists are not beyond redumption. (6) His unshakable faith in the efficacy of non-violent non-co-operation or Satyagraha as a method to change the attitude of the rich.

Gandhi provided the institution of trusteeship as a compromise between private enterprise and state controlled enterprise. He felt that the inequality of wealth and exploitation created by private enterprise, as well as, the violonce and loss of freedom caused by state enterprise would be eliminated under his trusteeship.

Gandhi, like Marx, believed that exploitation cannot be ended unless the exploited realize the pangs of exploitation, and achieve strength by combining with their fellow beings to constitute a class of exploited, refusing to co-operate with evil, thereby demonstrating their power to the exploiter.<sup>1</sup>

Although, Gandhi believed in the efficacy of change of heart of the exploting class, yet he was not prepared to wait till the capitalists exercise their choise and proposed the technique of non-

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violent non-co-operation to the exploited class to usher his concept of trusteeship in society.<sup>2</sup> Gandhi thought that the only alternative to trusteeship would be a bloody revolution and put before the capitalists to make a choise between class war and trusteeship.<sup>3</sup>

Gandhi's approach to classless society is based on the theory of 'class harmony' between capitalists and workers, between landlords and peasents. Let us examine how far his theory of 'class harmony' is effective to realise his ideal of classless society or Ramarajya?

Gandhi's theory of 'class harmony' presupposes the existence of classes. As the essence of a class is to compete with other class, existence of classes presupposes, the existence of class contradictions. As long as exploiters and exploited coexist, we can neither avoid class conflict nor reach the goal of classless society on the basis of 'class harmony'. Therefore Gandhi's ideal of classless society on the basis of class harmony is a myth. Hence classless society can be achieved not by creating equality between classes—a utopian conception—but by the total abolition of the classes themselves.

The failure of Gandhi's idea of trusteeship in practice is inevitable due to the following factors:

(1) Gandhi understimated the egoistic, selfish and acquisitive nature of man under capitalist system, who cannot easily respond to ethical stilmuli. (2) He overestimated the moral capacity of the poor and down-troden masses of India, to bring moral transformation in the attitude of the exploiters through his technique of non-violent non-co-operation. (3) He failed to understand the mechanism and dynamics of the capitalist and zamindari systems, which gives enormous political power to the owning class to defend their riches. (4) Unlike Karl Marx, Gandhi underestimated the influence of environment or the economic system under which people function and emphasised more and more on the transformation of the individual soul. (5) He could not understand the implications of a 'humanitarian capitalist' which is a contradiction in terms.

As predicted by Gandhi, the failure of trusteeship may be naturally lead to a bloody revolution in the country. As Gandhi sanctioned direct action by the state, in case a non-violent move-

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be lhi vement proves ineffective to implement trusteeship, it is up to the present day state to abolish private property by constitutional means or to face a bloody revolution by the masses.4

In conclusion, we may say that the conditions that led to the origin and development of Gandhi's theory of trusteeship are quite different from the needs and conditions of the present day society. As 'practice is the test of fitness' to Gandhi, we need not stick to all his ideas if they are not practicable today. Though his means may be disputed, his aims and ends must receive most earnest attention. If Gandhi happend to be with us today, certainly he would have changed some of his outdated ideas in the pursuit of his experiments with truth, as the existing social order is based on many evils like corruption, greed for money and power, exploitation and oppression which are certainly alien to Gandhi's concept of Truth.

"Shouting slogans from the roof of a house cannot make revolution.

Do little, little dirty work and win the confidence of the people."

Andhra University, Waltair Visakhapatnam Y. V. Satyanarayana

#### NOTES

- 1. Refer the view of Gandhi, Harijan, 28-7-1940.
- 2. Ibid., 1-3-1935.
- 3. M. K. Gandhi, Constructive Programme, pp. 20-21.
- 4. Refer the views of Gandhi, Young India, 28-11-34.

# ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A NATURAL FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL EQUALITY

This paper aims at grounding equality among men, i. e. social equality, on a philosophical anthropology. The anthropological type suggested here consists in a reformulation of the concept of natural man. The reformulation empalsizes the capacity-dimension rather than the propensity dimension of man. To reach its end the paper poses itself in direct oppositon to Prof. R. Dahrendorf's1 view that inequality among men is a universal feature of human society. The anthropological type suggested in the paper shows that society is a natural outcome of the human being's natural capability to recognize the other as an alter-ego. In other words, mans' dialogic nature is at the root of the rise of a human community. Now if any particular social item (e. g. equality, fraternity, inequality, hierarchy, etc.) is shown as irrelevant to the nature of man (either in terms of its basis on it or deviation from it), it is due to a false objectivity of society. logy owes to the deification and reification of society, i. e. transformation of society as a human organization into a non-human or superhuman organiztaion. The split between 'natural' and 'social' or 'human' and 'social' is because of such deification and reification (in fact, we philosophers do make a distinction between human and social equality). This critique of society points to an ethico-telelogical aspect of the concept of natural human. Prof. Dahrendorf's contention presents us with the image of man totally performance—oriented in terms of conformity with or deviance from social sanctions. But our critique of social ontology itself brings us back to the natural soul of man-competence-oriented. Certain inconsistencies in Prof. Dahrendorf's argument have been shown in the paper.

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Gautam Biswas

#### NOTES

1. Ralph Dahrendorf (1969): "On the origin of inequality among men", in Andre Beteille (Ed.), Social Inequality-Selected Readings, Penguin Paperback, pp. 16-42.

## M. N. ROY'S CONCEPTION OF DIALECTICAL AND MECHANISTIC MATERIALISM

Dialectical Materialism, says Roy, in his Marxist phase, was the synthesis of all that was valuable in human history from Thales to Hegel. The Dialectics has destroyed Hegel's Idealism and reinforced materialism and made it invincible. It was the strength of Marxist materialism over the earlier Mechanistic Materialism. Thus, in this Marxist phase he observes: "The inclusion of Dialectics made Marxist Materialism triumphant, 'as the inevitable cutcome of the entire process of intellectual development, ever since the dawn of history." 1

Furthermore: "Dialectical Materialism is the greatest human heritage, and that it is the quintessence of human knowledge."2

While writing on Materialism, during his Humanist phase, Roy's views on Dialectical Materialism are just opposite to the above. According to him the greatest weakness of Marxist materialism is its adulteration with Dialectics. Pointing out its weaknesses he says, "While modern scientific knowledge reinforced the empirical foundations of the Materialist philosophy, by associating it with Hegelian Dialectics, Marx seriously weakened it."

Continuing his criticism of Dialectics, Roy observes: "The basic error in the philosophical thinking of the founders of Dialectical Materialism was confusion of logic with ontology."4

Thus criticising Dialectical Materialism in his later period, Roy agrees with the pre-Marxian Materialism of the 18th century in one way and supporting the Humanistic Materialism of Feuerbach which Marx had criticised. "The fascination for Dialectics", says Roy, drove youthful Marx to reject to scientific Naturalism of the 18th century, as Mechanical and unhistorical." According to him the French Enlightement accepted the creative role of man. But Dialectical Materialism accepted more or less a fatalistic view of history.

In this way, Roy, in his Humanist phase, has not given a proper place to Marxian Dialectics in his new philosophy which is inseparable from Marxian Materialism because he again criticises ...2

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it as: "Marxist Materialism is dogmatic and unscientific.." 6 Another reason for criticising the Dialectical Materialism is: "The foundation of Marxist Materialism was not matter, as conceived by science and philosophy, ever since the time of Democritus; it was man's relation with matter. Again, an essentially idealist position."

So far we have considered Roy's criticisms of Dialectical Materialism. Now one shall see the distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Mechanistic Materialism which was supported by him in his humanist phase.

No doubt, Mechanistic Materialism was an important development in philosophy in understanding the nature. In fact, it was a progressive step of thinkers and a death blow against idealism. The Mechanists are really Materialists in full sense. They extended their principles to the realm of mind and society and used the same principles in the scientific investigations of the nature. They want to include man and all his spiritual activities in the mechanistic system of the natural world. Thus they reeduced man to the level of a machine.

Now let us consider the main assumptions of Dialectical Materialism. We know that the world is full of change. For example, night follows days and day follows night. The seasons succeed each other. People are born, grow old and then die. So, there is nothing which is not unalterable. This means that change is everywhere. Every thinker therefore, recognises that change is an omnipresent fact. In Dialectics we can find that everything is in constant motion which is interdependent. The motion is caused by the inner contradictions and conflict. Thus, according to Dialectics matter is not inert as the mechanists regard. For the Mechanists, motion is caused by the application of external forces. But to Dialectics it is inside the matter.

Because of its simplicity the Mechanistic Materialism may be agreeable to some extent but it was criticised by many. Nature does not seem to be as completely determined as they thought. Recent studies have given more importance to the concepts like novelty, possibility, becoming and so on. The recent developments in the modern scientific knowledge seem to confirm the Dialectical Materialism rather than Mechanistic Materialism. In

support of Dialectical Materialism C. H. Waddington observes: "As I understand it, the basic idea of modern physics, quantum Mechanics, and the Theory of Relativity, do actually describe the world in terms of process and not in terms of static things. Certainly in biology, a field which I know more about the process view (what is called Dialectical Materialism as opposed to Mechanical Materialism) is more or less unavoidable."

The modern scientific developments do not support the Mechanistic materialists standpoint. Roy, who in his Marxist phase upheld the dialectical materialist position as against the mechanistic materialism yielded to the later position in his anxiety to develop his new philosophy of Radical Humanism which gives a prominent place to the concepts of rationality, morality and freedom-which are inherently constant elements in human nature.

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S. S. Satyanarayana

#### NOTES

- M. N. Roy Materialism, 1st ed., Renaissance Pub. Ltd., Calcutta, 1940, p. 226.
- 2. Ibid., p. 239.
- 3. M. N. Roy, The Marxian Way, Vol. II, No. 4.
- 4. Ibid.,
- 5. M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, Renaissance Pub. Ltd., Calcutta, Vol. II, p. 184.
- 6. Ibid., p. 188.
- 7. Ibid., p. 187.
- 8. Waddington, C. H., The Scientific Attitude, West Dragton Middleses Ponguin Books, 2nd rev. ed., 1948, p. 100.

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### CAN D-N MODEL BE JUSTIFIED ?

Explanation is as much a basic concept in science as are matter, space, time etc. The use of the notion of explanation is not only basic in the field of science, but also has its remification in other disciplines of inquiry. In order to understand the wider application of the notion of explanation three levels may be distinguished. The first is that of common sense, the second is semiformal and the third is purely formal. Here we are not concerned with the first and third levels of use of the notion. My present effort is concerned with second level (in the field of Physical Science). This second level is known as Deductive nomological model of explanation. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim are the propunders of this deductive form of explanation. In a nutshell, the structure of a scientific explanation (as pointed out by H—O) can be summarized in the following scheme:

Explanans: L: General law,  $(L_1, L_2...L_n)$  deductively

follows as C: Statement of antecedent conditions (Ca Cb,..Ck)

Explanadum: E: Statement of the empirical phenomenon to be explained.

H-O lays down four conditions of adequacy.

I (R<sub>1</sub>) The explandum must be a logical consequence of the explananas.

(R<sub>2</sub>) The explanans must contain general laws and these must actually be required for the derivation of the explanandum.

(R3) The explanans must contain empirical content.

II Empirical condition of adequacy.

(R<sub>4</sub>) The sentence constituting the explanans must be true.

Hempel and Oppenheim clearly state the distinction between what they called 'objective' i. e. logical aspect and what they called 'Subjective' i. e. pragmatic aspect of explanation.

The logical aspect is that which is concerned with the statements occurring in any proffered scientific explanation and the CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Raja Jaip logical relation between those statements. The logical requirements are (1) the explanandum must be shown a deductive consequence of the explanans, and the sentence occurring in the explanans must be true. These are impersonal, objective requirements. They are not at all concerned with subjective, pragmatic sense of explanation.

However, this 'model' has been criticised by a number of philosophers and scientists.

- Condition R<sub>1</sub> has been attacked as an unrealistic limitation on the character of good explanation.
- II. The requirement that at least one general law be included in the explanans is challanged on the ground that certain actual explanation does not include general law.
- III. It is argued that even if we suppose that the kind of explanation by reference to law is a sound explanation, it is merely a redescription of the phenomenon to be explained.

All these comments are based on (1) their different account of notion of explanation (2) and the mistaken assumption of the scope of explanation. H—O concept of explanation can be defended as follows:

(1) In answering the first point it may be argued that one cannot cite a single antecedent condition without calling upon some general law (2) when answering the second point the usual Hempelian answer is that a confusion of two types of explanation inductive, statistical and deductive, lies at the heart of the matter. (3) In reply to the lil point, it might be said that it is much more than a redescription of the phenomena.

It appears on the one hand, that to find out the 'rational recostruction' without looking at the subjective process of science, is in accordance with the function of the philosopher of science as a meta-study of science. On the other hand, any meta-study is itself philosopoical in character.

Rajastan University, Jaipur.

Yogesh Gupta

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# TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTION OF NYAYA THEORY OF ANUMANA

Nyāya theory of anumāna is very unpopular in the modern times. There may be several reasons for this. Perhaps not too neat procedure and its inability to handle certain complicated types of arguments have been the main reasons. This paper tries to hint at the possibility of its reconstruction which will make it comparitively simple, handy and more adequate.

Pramāṇa is a source of correct knowledge for Naiyāyikas, and they consider anumāna as one of the pramāṇas. Conclusion of anumāna must be in categorical form and must be true. Tarka is not a pramāṇa as the conclusion of it will be a conditional statement.

Anumana is defined in Manikana in this way: Vyaptivishistapakśadharmatājñānajanyam iñānamanumiti. given is: The mountain has fire; because of smoke; whatever has smoke has fire, like a kitchen; this has smoke, which is pervaded by fire; therefore, (this) has fire. The mountain is the paksa, the fire is the sadhya and the smoke is the hetu in this example. The presenc: of the Fetu in paksa is called paksadharmata. Sapaksa is one which has the similar instance of paksa e. g kitchen, and vipaksa is on where there is always the absence of similar instances of pakśa e. g. lake in the above example. To suppose that the mountain and kitchen are similar with respect to fire is a mistake, for in that case we are presupposing the knowledge of fire on the mountain which is in question to be proved. If at all sapaksa and vipakśa have some relevance to anumana, then it has to be defined as: A sapakśa is one in which hetu is present and vipakśa is one in which the hetu is absent.

Sādhya is the predicate of the conclusion, therefore it has to be a concept as we cannot predicate a name to something. The same point is clear from the nature of vyāpti, because there should be universal unconditional concomitence between hetu and sādhya, and this is possible only if sādhya is a concept. Hetu also has to be a concept as it is predicated of paksa in the upanaya.

The conceptual relationship between hetu and sādhya is called vyāpti. The five requisites of a good hetu are redundent. To

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#### NYAYA THEORY OF ANUMANA

think that upanaya is the application of vyāpti is a mistake, it has to be treated as the instance of hetu.

The five ways of establishing a vyāpti are nothing but the five ways of discovering the conceptual relationaship which two concepts in our use have. Anvaya, vyatireka and vyabhīcāragraha are not very reliable ways as they are based on sense experience though they hint at the possibility of such a conceptual relationship. Upādhinīrasa, tark) and sāmānyalakśaṇa are the reliable ways.

If two concepts have some conceptual relationship, then they must be one of the two: samavyāpti or viṣamavyāpti. A vyāpti between two concepts of equal extension is called samavyāpti, and a vyāpti between two concepts of unequal extension is called viṣamavyāpti.

It is not appropriate to call udāharņa a universal proposition as the, e can be universal propositions which do not express a vyāpti, though a vyāpti has to be expressed in the form of a universal proposition. The importance of giving an example in udāharaņa is to show the vyāpti is not hollow or based on stipulative definition. We can maintain only last three avayava of an anumāna without affecting the logical rigor.

Hetvābhāsas are material fallacies and not formal fallacies, therefore, it will not interest a logician. The classification based on the psychological or epistemological factors regarding how vyāpti is arrived at does not interest a logician. Similarly the classification of anumāna based on the nature of vyāpti does not serve any logical purpose as the rules and techniques of anumāna will remain the same.

The opinion of philosophers that Nyāya logic is partly inductive and partly deductive is based on misunderstanding. It is neither inductive nor deductive in nature. Nyāya logic is an inference from particular to particular through a vyāpti. Therefore, the charge that the conclusion is not something new is not applicable to Nyāya logic.

Reconstructed theory of anumana comes to this: There must be four elements in an anumana, namely, paksa, sadhya, hetu and vyapti. Paksa is the subject of the conclusion, sadhya is the predicate of the conclusion, hetu is the predicate of paksa in upanaya,

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and vyāpti is the conceptual relationship between hetu and sādhya which can be samavyāpti or viṣamavyāpti. There can be viṣamavyāpties in two ways: (1) hetu is less wide and the sādhya is more wide in extension; (2) sādhya is less wide and hetu is more wide in extension. The second kind of viṣamavyāpti cannot be made use of in an anumāna. The anumāna consists of only three propositions, namely, udāharana, upanay and nigamana.

It is possible to extend the anumāna consisting of three propositions. That can be done in two ways: (1) We can combine many anumānas and have an anumāna of many propositions. (2) We can introduce many vyāpties in an anumāna. In such a case if there are two vyāpties in an anumāna, then at least three concepts will be involved; and if they are concepts with the same extension, then any one concept can be sādhya, and any other concept can be hetu; and if viṣamavyāpti is involved, then the concept having the least extension will be hetu, and so on in an assending order, and the concept with the widest extension will be the sādhya. And in such an anumāna there will be as many udānaraṇa with examples as many vyāpties.

It is possible to define vyāpti conditionally and accomodate even hypothetical arguments. We can develop the logical connectives as well, so as to accomodate compound propositions as avayavas of an anumāna.

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P. R. Bhatt

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### THE CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE

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The main aim of this paper is about the terms and propositions of inference. In the first half of my paper I clearly distinguished between Nyāya terms of inference to that of Aristotelian syllogism. The three necessary terms of Nyāya inference are pakṣa, sādhya and hetu, pakṣa is the subject of inference.sādhya is the object of inference and hetu is the ground of our knowledge of the object of inference. It is through the knowledge of the reason in the subject and its invariable relation to the inferable object, the inference of the sādhya as related to the pakṣa becomes possible.

These three terms of inference correspond respectively to the things denoted by the minor, major and middle terms of Aristotelian syllogism. That is, it may be said that these are not merely terms as such but the real objects denoted by these terms. It is wrong to translate pakṣa, sādhya and hetu as minor, major and middle terms. The proper equivalents in Sanskrit for these terms would be respectively pakṣavācakaśabda, sādhyavācakaśabda and hetuvācaka śabda. What correspond in Aristotle's syllogism to pakṣa, sādhya and hetu of anumāna are therefore not the minor, major and middle but the things which they respectively denote.

Then I explained the extension of the terms hetu and sādhya. When we say that all men are bipeds the hetu 'man' has a narrower extension than the sādhya biped because no man is non-biped whil there are bipeds other than man. This shows that from a thing of having a narrower denotation we can validly infer the thing having a wider denotation but not vice-versa. The hetu and sādhya can be of equal extension.

We find the same thing in Aristotelian theory also. According to Aristotle, it is not the comparative extension of the terms that is the determining of criterion of the respective terms in the syllogism. The terminology major middle and minor seems to have been originally suggested by the fact that in a syllogism in the first mood of the first figure, the predicate of the conclusion generally has the widest extension. He must have tried to have some method of apparently determining the major term without reference to the conclusion.

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Then we pass on to the five avayavās of inference. Most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians accept the five constituents of inference. The syllogism starts with an assertion which states what is to be established. Since the assertion is not a proved fact, the hearer expects the hetu or the reason. If there is any doubt in the reason it can be removed by udāharana. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika still insist that before the conclusion emergs in the mind of the hearer another step is necessary namely upanaya. The fifth and the final step of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syllogism is called Nigamana which is the restatement of the proposition as established. This process of inference which is meant for others is called "the five membered syllogism of Indian Logic" in contrast to the three membered syllogism of Aristotle

The most obvious distinction is the different number of premises. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syllogism does not go against the spirit of the Aristotelian syllogism that the premises related by the three terms produce the consequence. Both syllogisms are equally valid processes of reasoning and the conclusion in one is as much syllogistically drawn as in the other. The only difference between the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians and Aristotle is that whereas the former stresses on the restatement of the problem as being proved or rather a final statement of the proof of the problem.

In fact, our discussion of the structure of the five membered syllogism and its comparison with the Aristotelian syllogism reveals that there is neither repetition nor redundancy, since each of the members has a distinct role to play towards the common goal of logical demonstration. Hence to maintain that the second and the fourth members are the same is not at all right and this criticism does not establish the right case for a three membered syllogism. In the second place, it is not also right to say that the proposition and the conclusion are essentially the same. Because there occurs the reiteration of the object i. e. a certainty with regard to the conclusion is brought out. It is for the purpose of bringing out this conviction that we have Nigamana of Nyāya Vaišeṣika logic.

S. V. University Tirupati.

M. Ramachandra Reddy

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# DILEMMA OF INFERENCE AS PRESENTED BY CARVAKAS AND RESPONDED BY JAYANTABHATTA.

Jayantabhatta refers to some Cāravākas, who reject that inference can be regarded as an authentic means of knowledge. Cārvākas' argument present a dilemma of inference, which can be stated as follows:

- (1 If inference is made from particular to particular then the universal link between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not stated in such inference and therefore this kind of inference cannot be sound.
- (2) If inference is made from universal to particular then as the conclusion about the particular is already contained in the universal vyāpti statement, the inference becomes superuflous.
- (3) Though the inference from universal to particular is valid, still the universal vyāpti statement which is a premise of such inference cannot be proved to be true.

While answering the dilemma, Jayanta makes two types of arguments. Under the first type he tries to argue that we have to make inferences every now and then and many times we also get true conclusions. This type of argument really does not answer the Cārvāka-criticism because though we have to make inferences every now and then, and many such inferences are later on verified to give true conclusions, it does not follows that the inferences with true conclusions can be proved to be sound.

Under the second type of arguments Jayanta tries to give his theory of induction and tries to show that the authentic inductive reasoning is possible. Jayanta accepts that merely the observation of co-existence and co-absence cannot amount to the cognition of vyāpti, but according to him the observation gives rise to a kind of mental perception of vyāpti. But if vyāpti-statement is a statement from mental perception and perception is regarded as pramāṇa, then just as we have a verification-procedure for checking an observation-statement, Jayanta should be in a position to provide a similar verification-procedure for the inductive reasoning. But

in fact we cannot 'verify' universal statement as we can verify the particular observation-statements.

A way-out of this problem of inference if at all it is a way-out, seems to be that the practical importance of inference is not denied, but the value of an inference is partly judged by the logical and material strength of that inference and ultimately by the later empirical verification or falsification of the conclusion. Thus the experience should not only be regarded as the basis of all knowledge but also the justificatory principle of all knowledge.

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Pradeep P. Gokhale

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## ARTHAPATTI

The paper seeks to explain and evaluate whether Arthapatti is an independent Pramana.

Arthāpatti does not seem to function in the domain of cognitive epistemology. It, rather, seems to function in the domain of justificatory/explanatory epistemology. Naiyāyikas seems to have been led to subsume Arthāpatti under Kevalvyatireki Anumāna on the count that both of them are significant in cognitive epistemology. This view is not acceptable to Mīmāmsakas.

Arthapatti cannot also be equated with hypothesis, disjunctive syllogism or enthymeme nor can it be equated straightforwardly with semantic-implication.

Arthapatti has something to do with semantic-gap that leads to inconsistency. Semantic-gap forces us to bring in requisite additional information no matter given to us through description or through aquaintance to remove inconsistency. Once such inconsistency is removed, conjunction of old and new premisses together semantically implies the conclusion.

The controversy between Kumārila and Prabhākara regarding Arthāpatti is not regarding independent status of it. It seems to centre around three points—

- (a) could the additional information be descriptively given?
- (b) must it be objective and if so, why? and
- (c) what are the marks of objectivity of such an information?

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#### DEFINITION OF CAUSE

In this paper I have limitted myself only to the definition and explanation of 'cause'.

Traditionally we have always defined cause to be that event which temporally precedes the event said to be the effect. Obviously this definition of cause is inadequate in itself and needs further qualification. For, not any event which precedes the effect-event in time is the cause of that effect. What then, is that extra qualification, required to differentiate a causal process from such a non-causal process? The various answers given can be broadly classified into two categories, viz. the regularity theories ( after Hume) and the necessity theories. The two view points have led to the major controversy regarding the problems about causation. The regularity theory holders, on the one hand, hold that, when a similar type of event E is always seen to be preceeded by another similar type of event C and never otherwise, then C is the cause of the event E. On the other hand, the necessity theory holders hold that apart from mere regular sequence there is also a natural necessity involved in the causal process so that the cause must be followed by the effect.

However, bypassing this controversy between the two view points, we find that usually both the regularity theory holders and the necessity theory holders agree on one point, viz. that the cause 'precedes' the effect in time. Hence whatever their individual explanation of the causal process, traditionally we find philosophers admitting that causes precede their effects in time. But now even this view is under attack by phillosophers like Richard Taylor. Taylor gives the example of a loccmative pulling a caboose and tries to show that cause is often contemporaneous with the effect. Taylor however does not commit himself to the position that all causes are contemporaneous with their effects. He merely stresses the point that it is completely mistaken to analyse causal connection in terms of precedence of the cause over the effect since this is clearly false. If both causes and effects are often contemporaneous it would be arbitrary what we called the cause and what the effect. But since it is not so there must be smoething extra in one statecf-affairs by virtue of which it is a cause of the other state-of-affairs. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Taylor's definition of cause is then as follows: A true interpreted statement of the form '8 A was the cause of B" means that both A and B are conditions or sets of conditions that occurred; that each was, given all other that occurred, but only those, both necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of the other; that B did not precede A in time; and that A made B happen by virtue of its power to do so.

But this last qualification means nothing more than A produced B or A caused B. The word "power" does nothing but make the definition of cause circular. Therefore, Taylor would conclude that there is absolutely no other conceptually clearer way of putting the matter except by the introduction of mere synonyms for causation.

I cannot however agree with Taylor's view of contemporaneity of cause and effect. An explanation of cause in terms of Mill's sufficient and necessary conditions ought to be satisfactory. It rids our causal language of animism and at the same time analyses "cause" in terms which are not synonyms of the term. According to Mill, a cause can be defined as the sufficient condition for the production of the effect.

I think that this kind of analysis simplifies the matter, because now we do not call one factor the 'cause' and all others conditions in this analysis, but hold that all factors are causally relevant to the occurrence of the effect. Hence taking Mill's account, we can propose to give a purely mechanistic explanation of causation which will also do away with the thesis of contemporaneity of cause and effect. In fact there are so many factors about even a simple observation that is still completely beyond our comprehension and often immesurable that it is very simplistic and grossly unfair to draw conclusions like "a cause is contemporaneous woth its effect, because we do often see it to be ". If we take pains to give a mechanical explanation of a whole causal process we can talk about various stages in a process of change even if the change be so quick as to be temporally contemporaneous for all practical purposes of observation. In examples like reflection in a mirror, the movement of a see-saw, apparently the cause is contemporaneous with the effect. But we know that in the former case, light travels at a speed of 186000 miles per second and it takes some minute fraction of a second for the reflected light to enter the retina

and cause the image. In the latter case also we can talk of the transmission of motion. We have to admit causal chains. Otherwise there would not be continuity in any process, everything would happen at the same instant or the same time. Words like "continued existence" or "measurement of time through change would be meaningless.

However the question that 'why' sufficient conditions lead to the occurrence of the effect is a different problem altogether and calls for a different kind of answer. But for the present purpose of defining a 'cause' and differentiating it form an effect the answer through sufficient conditions should be satisfactory. Also the explanation of causal chains or causal processes becomes easier by the admission of innumerable stages which can be hypothetically increased in number if need be.

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## ON JAYANTA BHATTA'S NOTION OF MEMORY (SMRTI)

(1)

Apart from Jainism which considers memory (Smrti) to be an indirect instrument of valid knowledge (paroksa pramana), all other schools of Indian philosophy agree in holding that knowledge derived from memory is not valid (prama). But we have to guard here against a possible misunderstanding. To say that memory-cognition is non valid (aprama) is not to say that it is necessarily invalid (bhrama, viparvaya). An invalid cognition like erroneous perception of silver in a piece of glittering shell. according to Nyāva, can never be successfully acted upon (prayrttivisamvāda). But the fact that a number of successful activities of our every day life are prompted by memory is a sure indicating that not all cases of memory-congition are totally invalid (bhrama) in the manner of shell-silver illusion, though some of them could possibly be so. For this reason Naivavikas make a distinction between true (vathartha) and false (avathartha) cases of memory. But the point to be carefully noted in connection with this distinction is that even an instance of true memorycognition (vathartha smrti) is not accepted as valid (prama). The purpose of this paper is to consider the grounds on the basis of which Jayanta Bhatta, a reputed Naiyavika, rejects the validity (pramatva) of knowledge derived from memory.

(11)

In his magnum opus, Nyāya-Mañjari, Javanta Bhatta is confronted with the problem of the validity of memory in connection with his refutation of the Bhatta Mimamsakas' definition of valid knowledge (prama). In the opinion of the Bhattas, the knowledge of an object which is somehow known to us already cannot be called pramā in the technical sense; because the term 'pramā' or valid knownledge, according to them, should strictly be confined only to those cases of cognition the objects of which were not cognised before ( a grhitagrāhi ). Jayanta finds this definition too narrow (avyāpta) and as opposed to it he establishes by elaborate arguments that a grhitagrāhi cognition, it e., knowledge of an CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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object cognised before, may with equal propriety be regarded as valid (prama). If this be so, an opponent of Jayanta might argue the recollectional knowledge (smrti) of a previously perceived object being grhitagrāhi in nature, would turn out to be a case of pramā,—a position which all the Naiyāyikas including Javanta himself would not admit. Thus Jayanta's admission of grhitagrahi cognition as prama and his denial of the validity of knowledge derived from memory appear to be two mutually incompatible propositions both of which cannot be maintained at the same time. But with ingenious philosophical decretive Jayanta comes out of this apparent dilemma by saying that the character of being grhiugrāhi of valid knowledge has no bearing on the determination of the validity or non-validity of memory; and the question whether knowledge derived from memory is valid or not has to be decided on different grounds.

According to Jayanata, memory-cognition is to be treated as non-valid (aprama), not because it is grhitagrahi knowledge, but because it is not arthajanya, i. e., not caused by its correspoding object.1 To the question—why memory is said not to be caused by its object -Jayanta has a two-fold answer. In the first place, the object of memory is not physically present before the knower at the time of its recollection.2 Secondly, it is possible to have memory-knowledge of those objects which have been destroyed long ago. The fact that one remembers one's father after the latter's death whose body has been cremated to ashes conclusively proves that knowledge originating from memory cannot be caused by its object. It is, on the other hand, caused by the impressions of the object ( Samskārajanya ) which were left on the soul during the direct perception of the object in the past. This is the reason which leads Jayanta to conclude knowledge derived from memory is not pramā.

Now, it is evident from the discussion above that the strength of Jayanta's argument rests on the assumption that all cases of valid knowledge (prama) must necessarily be caused by their objects (arthajanya). But an opponent of Jayanta might challenge the truth of this assumtion by pointing out to an instance of knowledge which is obviously not caused by its object and is yet regarded as pramā by Jayanta and other Nyaya thinkers. The inferential cognition ( anumiti ) of a past object which exists no longer is an example of

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amā tion le of such a knowledge. From the perception of muddy whirlpools in a brimming river one may infer that there had been heavy rain sometime ago on the upper region of the mountains from where the river flows down to the plain. This inference of past rain cannot be caused by rain itself which does not persist any longer and so it cannot be treated as valid in consonance with Javanta's line of argument. But Javanta himself admits the validity of such inferences of past non-existent objects. So the onus lies on him to account for their validity. Javanta is of opinion that even the inferences of past objects are caused, in a way, by the objects themselves which are still present there in the form of dharmi, i. e., a substratum qualified by its dharmas or characters. In the given example of the inference of past rain form the perception of swollen river, the paksa of the inference, i. e., the river, is the dharmi which is qualified by its dharma, the waters of rain. In fact, it is "the dharmi river as qualified by rain-waters" (nadyākhya evadhormi vrstimat) which constitutes the proper sāddhya of the said inference. And though the past rain is no longer there, rainwaters persist in the ( dharmi ) river which is the cause of the inferential cognition of past rain. From this Jayanta concludes that the inference of past objects also is arthajanya and hence to be treated as a case of prama.3

Failing to rebut Javanta his opponents take a fresh line of attack by appealing to what is known as pratibha in Indian philosophy. It is a kind of knowledge which is not sense-born and yet is characterised by immediacy and freshness. It is, to a large extent, synonymous with the concept of intuition in some of the western systems. By way of illustrating this kind of knowledge Jayanta says: if I have a hunch that my brother who lives abroad will come home tomorrow and if this hunch subsequently turns out to be true, it is known as pratibhā. But a legitimate question can be raised here—is this hunch also caused by its object. (arthajanya)? The answer to this question must be in the negative, since how can an event which is yet to happen (viz., my brother's future coming) be the cause of its knowledge in advance?4 Hence intuitional knowledge of this kind does not appear to be arthajanya, though it is admitted to be valid (prama) by Jayanta and some other Nyāya thinkers. But does it not go against the fundamental contention of Jayanta that all cases of valid knowledge must necessarily be casued by their corresponding object?

In order to answer this objection, Jayanta tries to prove the arthajanyatva of intuitive knowledge and its consequent validity in a very peculiar way. He says that the intuition of my brother's coming tomorrow is apprehended as future, not as present; and my brother is the object (viṣaya) of this apprehension. And the very fact that my brother as an object exists (vidyamāna) somewhere, though in a distant place, is quite sufficient to produce within my mind an intuitive knowledge of his future coming. All intuitions (prātibha jñāna) are thus caused by their objects (artha janya) and are to be regarded as valid.<sup>5</sup>

But an objection may be raised here, viz., that if a remotely located object is capable of producing an intuitive knowledge of its future happening, then we have to admit on the same ground that an object existing in a distant place or country is equally capable of producing a memory-cognition of its own by virtue of its mere existence over there. But this amounts to saying that memory is arthajanya: and the whole case of Jayanta that knowledge derived from memory is not valid since it is not caused by its object seems to break down on this point.

Having anticipated this objection Jayanta tries to dispose it of in the following way. He first draws our attention to those cases of memory which arise independently of their objects, since their objects are past and non-existent. A son's memory of his father after the father's death and cremation is an example. Jayanta then argues that if in one case it is admitted that memory can arise without being caused by its object, then for the sake of parity of reasoning we have to observe the same principle everywhere; that is, we have to admit that even those cases of memory the objects of which still continue to exist somewhere are not caused by those objects. In other words, the existence of an object is not a necessary precondition for the arising of memory. Jayanta thus concludes that knowledge derived from memory is not arthajanya and therefore should not be treated as a case of pramā.

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#### NOTES

- 1. Na smṛṭerapramaṇatvam gṛhītagrāhitākṛṭam | Api tvanaṛthajanyatvam tadapṛāmaṇyakāraṇam || Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañ jari, ed. by Pancānana Tarkavāgīśa, Vol. 1 (Calcutta University, 1939), p. 175.
- Nanu kathamanarthajā smṛṭiḥ?
   Tadārūdhasya vastunastadānīmasattvāt.—Ibid., p. 178.
- 3. Nadyākhya eva dharmī vrstimaduparitanadeśasamsargalakṣanena dharmena tadvānanumīyate visistasalilapūrayogitāt. Sa cānumānagrāhyo dharmī vidyata eveti nanarthajamanumānam.—*Ibid.* p. 178.
- 4. Katham tarhi pratibhamanagatarthagrahi śvo me bhrata aganteti pratyakṣamarthajamiṣyate bhavadbhih.—*Ibid.*,
- 5. Tatra deśantare vidyamanasya bhratuh śvo bhavyagamanaviśesah tasyaiva tathaiva grahanam. Tena ca rūpena grhyamanasya satastasya jnanajanakatvamityarhajameva pratibham.——Ibid pp. 178-79.
- Smaranantu nirdagdhapitrādivisayamanapekṣitārthameva jāyamānam dṛṣṭamityanyatra deśāntarasthitārthasmarane tadarthasattvamakārana meva.—Ibid, p. 179.

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## A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF SAMAVAYA

In this paper I propose to examine the Nayaya concept of Samavāya. Samavāya is, according to Nyaya-Vaiśesika, an indiependdent Padartha. It stands for a special kind of relation that is found existing within an entity, and that relation is said to be eternal and one. In what sense is this relation eternal? Nyāya points out that the relation between the parts and a whole ( avayaya and avayavin) is eternal. The relation between parts and whole, it seems, would demand a systematic arrangement which to my mind would constitute the essence of the samavaya as a padartha. Hence the Nyāya axiom is: "parts + systematic arrangement of the parts = whole."

The idea of 'systematic arrangement' introduced here in order to understand the Nyāya position regarding part-whole relation has some significant implications. First, a whole is produced out of parts not just by chance, i. e. the parts-the material causes of the whole, do not produce the whole automatically. Secondly, systematic arrangement introduced between parts and the whole prevents parts being totally identical with or totally different from the whole. Parts themselves when arranged produce a whole. So the whole is not just a sum total of its parts. Similarly the whole being totally dependent on the systematically arranged parts has no existence apart from these parts. This links well with the Nyaya position of arambha-vāda. Thirdly, the arrangement of parts under a design or system causes parts to lose their identity. The design being dominant a whole is not viewed as a sum total (samūhālambana jñana) but its knowledge is a well-ordered unity (viśista jñana).

Some writers think that samavaya is an internal realtion the parts being in themselves related to a whole. But this view does not seem to be justified in the context of the Nyaya logic. The whole having no idenpendent existence cannot be a term in any relation, internal or external. Similarly parts qua parts have no independent existence outside a whole; therefore they in their own right cannot be a term in the part-whole relationship. They would acquire the status of parts only within what I have called a systemmatic arrangement Dontal Gurthiskang Tollennen Hapawas would be

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## THE CONCEPT OF SAMAVAYA

just particular self-contained entities and a whole would be just non-existent.

Samavāya is different from samyoga. The former consists in parts being arranged systematically; the latter consists in two things being present together. Samyoga is not recognised as an eternal relation by Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, because in the case of samyoga both the entities exist separately. This is not the case with samavāya, because samvāya relation is a special relation within an entity and that relation is essential.

But if samyoga exists in the samyogi-dravyas by the relation samavāva, then it has been pointed out that samavāya would need another samavaya to exist in the samyogi. This leads to infinite regress. This criticism coming from Vedanta does not seem to be well-founded and perhaps does not do justice to the Nyāya position. Sankara further argues : If samavaya is to be regarded as identical with its karya and karana, would it not be better and briefer to regard the kārya itself as identical with the kārana? From this Sankara tries to prove that the cause and its product are not related by samavaya but by the relation of identity (tadatmya). This criticism is based on the misconception of samavaya being identical with cause and effect. Actually no relation can be identical with the terms it relates. The question of the relation of a relation to a term is meaningless because the relation is not an entity in the sense in which the terms are entities. When the parts are supposed to be the cause of the whole, the parts must be placed under systematic arrangement. Therefore parts as parts cannot be identical with the whole.

We can say that whole is not identical (bheda) with and not different (abheda) from its parts. This means that the negation of identity is not the same as the affirmation of the difference and the affirmation of difference is not the negation of identity. When the whole is said to be non-different from its parts it does not mean that the whole is identical with the parts. This, in fact, is the uniqueness of samavāya and therefore it has been given a status of padārtha.

The Buddhists deny the existence of a whole as something different from its parts. The Buddhist position will reduce whole to mere appearance and the entire concept of relation, samavāya CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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or any other, would become unrealistic. Nyāya is not prepared to accept this position as the Buddhist criticism is based on an ontology not acceptable to Nyāya.

In the field of epistemology also the concept of samavāya plays a significant role. When we perceive a whole it is not that we do not perceive also the parts in it. But the parts as parts do not become the objects of perception; they are perceived within an arrangement. So the arrangement itself is a direct object. This is the reason why some Naiyāyikas have held that samavāya is perceivable. On the other hand, those who deny the perceptibility of the 'systematic arrangements of the parts' argue that samavāya does not exist as the other padārtha, viz. dravya, guṇa and karma, so we cannot perceive samavāya but we infer it.

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# THE PROBLEM OF MEANING AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF UPANISADIC-TEXTS.

The problem of meaning is as old as philosophy. Almost all the schools of Indian philosophy have dealt with all the aspects of the problem. The problem itself has many different aspects.

First, it may be asked what is the meaning of a word; that is, what is padartha.

Secondly, there is the problem of the meaning of a sentence.

Thirdly, there is the distinction between primary meaning and secondary meaning.

According to some schools of philosophy, particularly the school of Alamkāra, a word of sentence sometimes may have a third meaning, namely, the suggested meaning. The philosophers of ancient India have elaborately dealt with all these problems and other problems which are directly or in-directly connected with them. Thus the problem of meaning covers a very important area of Indian philosophy.

With regard to the problem of meaning of words there are many different views. According to the Naiyāyaikas, a word means the sum total of the universal—the Individual and the Configuration. The emphasis, however, differs from case to case, and while in some case, the context reveals the Individual as the more emphasied content in others the sense of the universal appears as the more relevant fragment and in yet others the configuration seems to be more important.

The author of Nyāya Sūtra says, Jātyākṛtivyaktayaḥtu-padārthaḥ. A word may mean jāti, that is universal, or ākṛti, that is, form or vyakti that is the individual. For example, when one says that 'cow is a useful animal' it is the universal cow or cowness which is meant by the word cow. When it is said 'bind that cow'—it is individual cow which is meant by the word cow. When again a child who plays with a toy cow is aksed to show his cow—it is the form of the cow which is meant by the word. The word cow may refer to any of the three according to the context in which the word is used.

Though the Sāmkhya system has not explicitly dealt with this problem in any of its works, still according to most scholars it CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

subscribes to the view that a word means an individual. For Sāmkhya does not admit any universal in the Nyāya—Vaiśeśika sense.

The Nyāya view is strongly opposed by the Mimāmsakas. The latter are known as jāti-Śakti-Vādins, that is, upholders of the theory that a word means the Jāti. So, according to this view, the the word cow means the universal cowness, when an individual cow is referred to by the word cow the meaning is taken to be secondary. Or, in other words, it is said that a word means an individual by lakṣaṇā. What lakṣaṇā means will be made clear later on.

The Vedānta, in general, subscribes to the Mimāmsā theory of meaning. It also holds that a word primarily means jāti. Of course, Vedānat does not recognise jāti as an eternal entity subsisting in all individual instances of the class. It, rather holds a conceptualistic view of jāti. But on the whole the Vedānta view is closely similar to the Mimāmsaka view on the subject.

The relevance of the theories of meaning to Vedanta becomes very clear when we come to the question of interpretation of the Upanisadic texts. Each of the Upanisads consists of a number of sentences which setforth the docterine of Brahman. On the surface the different texts of the Upanisads seem to be in conflict with one another. The philosophers of the Vedanta school, however, think that the Uapnisads or each a coherent theory regarding the Brahman and its relation to finite individuals and the world of our experience. So, the question of interpreting the apparently conflicting or incoherent sentences of the Upanisads arises. Those texts have to be interpreted in such a manner as will make them coherent with one another expressing a consistent theory of the world and reality. Again, such interpretation presupposes some theory of meaning in the light of which the texts are to be explained. It is in this manner that the theories of meaning become relevant to the Vedanta.

We may, here, develop the point with reference to the interpretation of the famous Upanisadic sentence "Tattvamasi". From the stand point of Advaita—Vedānta the statement is an expression of the identity of jīva and Brahman. But different schools of philosophy have put forward different interpretations of this statement. The dualist who believes that jīva is different from Brahman public parais the user tempe Calegorica Hangwar Thouart-

his". From this point of view the words' Tattvam' are taken to mean "Tasya-tvam" that is, "His thou". But the Advaita-Vedānta takes the words as Tat and Tvam and then asserts an identity of the two. But behind this interpretation there lurks a problem. If the word "Tat" in the sentence means Iśwara who is an omniscient and omnipotent being, and the word 'Tvam' means jiva who is a limited and imperefet being, how can there be any identity between the two? So, the sentence has to be interpreted in a correct manner and Advaita Vedānta does this in the light of its theory of lakṣaṇā. How this is done is hriefly discussed below.

Vedanta, like various other systems of philosophy, draws a distinction between Vācyārtha and Laksyārtha, Vācyārtha means the primary meaning of a word. As for example, the word 'Ganges' means the stream which is known by that name. Laksyārtha means the secondary meaning which any word brings to our mind indirectly through its connection with the primary meaning. Thus, in the sentence "Cowherds live on the Ganges"-'Gangayam Ghosah"—the word Ganges cannot obviously mean the river or the flow. It makes no sense to say that the cowherd lives on the flow of the river. Therefore, the word Ganges, here, should be taken to mean the bank of the river which is closely connected with it. In understanding the meaning of the sentence if the primary meaning of any word seems inappropriate then the secondary meaning has to be accepted in order to make the sentence meaningful. As the primary meaning of the word Ganges cannot make any sense in the sentence under consideration we are compelled to have recourse to the secondary meaning, that is, the bank of the river. Such secondary meaning is called laksyartha. The Alamkara school of Indian philosophy admits a third kind of meaning called Vyangyārtha or suggested meaning. In the interpretation of poetry we have to fall on the suggested meaning, that is, a meaning which cannot be literally derived from the poetic sentences. Philosophical schools like Nyāya, Mimāmsā and Vedanta do not recognise the suggested meaning as an independent kind of meaning. They are of opinion, that the suggested meanings somehow follow from the literal meaning or the secondary meaning.

The Vedanta recognises three kinds of laksanā, namely Jalodaksanā political aksanā. The Jalodaksanā Domejahallaksanā. The

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word Jahat means leaving or giving up. Jahallaksanā, therefore, means a kind of secondary meaning which is obtained by entirely giving up the primary meaning in a case. For example, the sentence the cowherd lives on the Ganges is taken to mean that the cow-herd lives on the bank of the Ganges. Here, the primary meaning of the word Ganges is completely left aside and the secondary meaning, namely, the bank of the Ganges is meant. In Ajahallaksanā, the primary meaning of the word under consideration is retained in the secondary meaning. For example, the sentence 'Mañcāh Krośanti' (the platform is angry) means that the men on the platform are angry. Hence the primary meaning of the word mañcah is not given up, but is included in the secondary meaning namely, man on the platform. The third kind of seconary meaning is illustrated by such sentences as "so'yam Devaddattah". Here the word 'sah' means one characterised by pastness, and 'ayam' means one characterised by presentness. In English we may translate them as 'that' and 'this'. Both qualify Devadatta. Now, how can that Devadatta or past Devadatta be identical with this or present Devadatta? Therefore, the conflicting adjectives are abandoned and pure Devadatta, that is, Devadatta as such is meant by the sentence. This is called Jahada jahallaksanā, because here parts of the words "this Devadatta" and "That Devadatta" are given up and a part is retained. Otherwise, the sentence does not yield any intelligible meaning.

How this concept of lakṣanā in general and Jahadajahal-lakṣanā in particular is relevant to the interpretation of Vedānta texts becomes clear when we come to the interpretation of identity in sentences like 'Tat-Tvam-Asi' which states the identity of Jīva and Brahman. Such identity is understood by way of Jahada-jahallakṣanā. The word 'Tat' means God or a consciousness characterised by omniscience, omnipotence, infinitude etc. The word 'Tvam' again means Jīva, which is a consciousness characterised by limited knowledge and power. From these two concepts the incompatible portions are dropped and pure consciousness is retained as the meaning. So, both Jīva and Brahman are ultimately identical, being of the nature of pure consciousness. As this meaning does not follow directly or literally from the sentence we must resort to lakṣanā. Thus the theory of lakṣanā occupies a very important place in Vedānta philosophy.

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# THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION IN LOGICAL POSITIVISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A. J. AYER

In this paper I have briefly dealt with "The Principle of Verification" in logical positivism, confing myself to the doctrine of A. J. Ayer. I have attempted to show, how logical positivists misinterpret the function of philosophy which ultimately led them to depict a distorted picture of reality. In fact, logical positivists claim themselves as geniunely scientific and anti-metaphysicians, but ultimately they retained all the metaphysical elements into their philosophy. This shows what a philosopher claims to be doing and what he actually does. To show that logical positivist philosophy is a pseudo-scientific one. I have discussed certain aspects in brief.

#### Introduction

Positivism claims to be an empiricist philosophy, i. e. a philosophy which holds that all knowledge comes through experience and that nothing can be known in the light of pure reason or intuition independent of experience. Nevertheless, positivism employs its own method in interpreting experience and knowledge. And these principles lead to the negative conclusions that we can never know anything of the real objective world. Experience according to them is only sense-experience. For them, a material object is nothing but a "logical construction" out of sense-data. Positivists hold that, if we are scientific, we can formulate ideas which serve to correlate the sense-data through which we receive and observe things. The positivists have elaborated various theories about the nature of thinking, knowledge, truth, scientific truth and language corresponding to this doctrinre. What is wrong with them is that their denial that knowledge based on experience reflects objective reality existing independent of experience leads to their creating new idealist systems and to their disrupting and falsifying scientific thought. Now let us take up a recent trend in the positivists sciences' known as logical positivism.

## Logical Positivism: Objectives of the Movement

Logical positivism claims to be an extreme form of empiricism.

Its exponents claim that their philosophy is confined to the analysis CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

of logic of language. The Vienna Circle from which logical positivism originated attempts to justify its position by claiming to stand for "scientific and logical" foundations. Logical positivists claims to derive their philosophy from "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In fact, the "Logical positivism" is nothing but a continuation of the idealist outlook of Berkeley and David Hume.

## Elimination of Metaphysics

Logical positivists claim that their main contention is to root out metaphysics from their philosophy, which they could not. 'Metaphysics' according to them, deals with super-sensible reality. But 'metaphysics' means anti-dialectical way of thinking owing its one-sidedness and subjectivism in cognition. Ayer states in his book "Language, Truth and Logic" that there are only two kinds of meaningful statements those of mathematics and logic which are deduced from the fixed premises (analytic) and synthetic statements based on empirical investigation, propositions of any other kind are meaningless or quite literally nonsensical. According to Ayer, metaphysical statements belong to neither class-they are neither factual nor tautological and are, therefore, meaningless. In this way they try to eliminate mentaphysics. To judge the meaningfulness of a statement, they introduced the "principle of verification" as a criterion.

#### Principle of Verification

Ayer in his book "Language, Truth and Logic" writes as follows:

"The principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful. A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable".1

Ayer claims this is sufficient to exclude 'metaphysics' from the possibility of verification. Regarding 'analytic' statements Ayer holds they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the principle since they are verbal. The principle is applicable only to the 'synthetic' statements, which are empirically verifiable. The principle of CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangni Collection, Hardward of

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verification had the effect of directing attention upon language, i.e. on 'Logic of Language'. The metaphysical statements were criticised not on the grounds that they state something dubious or false, but on the grounds that they comprise of words together in what critical scrutiny revealed to be senseless ways, so that these statements were unverifiable and therefore state nothing. In this way, the criticism of metaphysics is therefore based on the critical analysis of language. But if we apply this criticion to the "principle of verification" the, principle itself is unverifiable, since it belongs to neither of the class, i. e. analytic and synthetic.

## Emotive Theory of Ethics

If the principle of verification, thus is applied to the ethical statements, then it will logically follow that they are meaningless. To avoid this conclusion, Ayer says that these statements are not significant in the sense in which scientific statements are significant, but simply they express emotions or feelings. Ayer claims that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, so that one cannot test the validity of the ethical judgements, they are mere pseudo concepts. For this Ayer offers an explanation: Since the ethical statements cannot be verified in any sort of sense-expetience, they are pseudo in their nature. But they failed to realise that value statements are not natural but social characteristics of actions and are determined by the social import of the actions. So that they cannot be seen or touched, but can be determined in terms of social relations existing in the society.

#### Conclusion

Logical positivists interpreted knowledge in a way that knowledge is the knowledge of objects of sensations obtained through sense-experience. If they want to interpret in a right way, they have to accept the materialist position that knowledge is obtained through the practical experience of man in this objective material world. The function of philosophy according to them is analysis of language and the principle that the meaning of a statement is given by its mode of verification in experience painstakingly explains that to describe the world in terms of "perceptions and sens data" in the correct way. This kind of metaphysical way of interpreting philosophy compels people to ignore philosophy as a speculative doctrine. This kind of attitude towards philosophy will be rectified CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

only when we realise that philosophy, is a science of general laws of being i. e. of nature and society.

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#### NOTES

1. A. J. Ayer "Lauguage, Truth, and Logic," second Edition p. 47.

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## NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND DEFINITION

In this paper I will like to argue that any attempt at defining any term without committing naturalistic fallacy must fail; or, in other words, no real definition of a term is possible without committing naturalistic fallacy. This I will show, firstly, in particular context, i. e. of ethics and then I will try to generalize it. Moreover, it can be argued that if we want to avoid naturalistic fallacy then we cannot define any given term in any real sense of definition.

The main problem is: Can we define a given term or word x? This was the problem for Moore in a particular context and after that, for R. B. Perry. Moore was trying to define the word 'good'; Perry was trying to define the word 'value'. Moore arrives at the conclusion that we cannot define 'good', as 'good' is a simple quality, whereas Perry says that value can be defined without committing Naturalistic fallacy. Now, the question is whether the attempt of Perry has been successful. It is, of course, true that the grounds for these different conclusions are different in these two thinkers. We will discuss this question a little later.

Now, I will like to maintain that in defining any term 'x' either we are giving criteria of 'x' or we are giving meaning of 'x' or we are giving both. And if we are not doing any of these, then, in the real sense of definition, we are not defining it. For example, when a Hedonist says 'pleasure is good', he is giving a criterion of good, and it is because with that he is defining 'good' in terms of pleasure. In the same way one may give a definition of 'good' in terms of pleasure. In the same way one may give a definition of 'good' in terms of the meaning of 'good' as, 'to be good means to be pleasant' and that also will be regarded as a definition of 'good'. Here, we are giving the meaning of 'good' but not the criterion of 'good' as it is possible that a person who knows the meaning of 'good' does not know the right criterion for applying it. Even though he can say, 'the best hockey stick is the one with which I can miss the ball most often'; and in saying that he will be using the term 'good' correctly; yet it is possible that one who knows the criterion of good finds the same stick bad.

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So far as 'meaning' and 'criteria' are concerned, R. M. Hare has discussed this at length in his book, "Language of Morals.' According to his view it is possible that one knows the meaning of a word and does not know the criterion for the application of that word and vice--versa. So, 'meaning' and 'criteria' are two different things for him.<sup>2</sup>

Now, we can define any term in two ways: either with the help of some other words which belong to the same domain or in terms which are outside that particular domain to which the term belongs. Now, If it is the first case then we are not supposed to commit the naturalistic fallacy. While, if it is the second, then we are certainly committing naturalistic fallacy. So, naturalistic fallacy can occur at three levels: critertion level, meaning level or at both criterion and meaning level. An example of Naturalistic fallacy at meaning level would be to say that 'to be good means to be pleasant.' Naturalistic fallacy at criterion level would be 'to be good is to be more evolved.' And, naturalistic fallacy at both meaning and criterion level would be as 'value is any object of any interest' which is committed by R. B. Perry.

I have pointed out earlier that the definition should be either in terms of meaing or in terms of criterion or both. According to Moore, Hedonists are committing the naturalistic fallacy and evolutionists are also committing the naturaliatic fallacy as when Spencer says 'to be more evolved is to be good.' At this point V. K. Bharadwaja<sup>3</sup> in his book 'Natuaralistic Ethical Theory' has pointed out that Spencer is not committing the naturalistic fallacy. For him, in saying 'to be good and is to be more evolved', Spencer is not giving the definition of good but he is giving the criteria of good and in giving criteria he is not committing the naturalistic fallacy. I think, for Bharadwaja, to give the criteria is not to give the definition. He says, "What he is saying is only this that in order to assert that a certain conduct is good, you have to use the criterion of evolution. Spencer's theory thus, offers a criterion of judging conduct as good or bad, and not a definition of 'good' or 'bad'.4 But in my opinion, whenever we are giving a criterion for the use of any term, we are defining it in a sense and in that sense only Spencer is committing naturalistic fallacy. So, as far as commitment of naturalistic fallacy is concerned Moore is right, though way in witch he argues is perhaps and to seconce darway.

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#### NATURALISTIC FALLACY AND DEFINITION

The basic question is: Does Naturalistic fallacy arise only in the context of giving meaning? My submission in this context is, naturalistic fallacy can consist in all the three alternatives which I have pointed out earlier i. e. either in giving meaning or in giving criteria or in giving both. So, it is clear that Spencer is committing naturalistic fallacy even though he is giving criteria. As he gives definition in the sense of criterion of 'good' (which is an ethical predicate) in terms of criterion which themselves are non--ethical in character.

According to Moore,<sup>5</sup> "When a man confuses two natura objects with one another, defining the one by the other, if for instance he confuses himself, who is one natural object, with 'pleased' or with 'pleasure' which are others, then there is no reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But, if he confuses 'good' which is not in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with regard to 'good; marks it as something quite specific, and this specific mistake deserves a name because it is so common."

If we generalize this, then the fallacy will consist in where we define a word which belongs to a certain domain in terms of words (meaning, criteria or meaning and criteria both) which belong to a different domain. It does not matter what name one gives to this fallacy. But it is true that the difference between meaning' and 'criteria' was not seen by Moore, which is later on pointed out by Hare. We have seen that a definition may either commit naturalistic fallacy or not commit it. And, naturally, we prefer the definition which does not commit the naturalistic fallacy But, my submission is that in so defining a term we will always land ourselves in an absurd position, because we have to have two parts in the domain (definiens and definiendum). Definiendums can be finite or infinite. If we have infinite concepts in our domain, then, we are going in an infinite regress. And, if we have finite con cepts, then, we will be in circularity. So, in the first case, when we want to define a word in terms of the same domain then, of course, We are not committing naturalistic fallacy but it will lead to either circularity or infinite regress. Therefore, this type of definition will always lead us to be will be will be will always lead us to be will b

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Moreover, in both these alternatives we are not defining the term. In a sense what we are doing is what is usually called reduction. So, in this sense, no real definition can be given. Definition can only be given by committing the naturalistic fallacy. As, when we say 'good means to be pleasure', we are giving the meaning of the term 'good' which belongs to the ethical realm in terms of 'pleasure' which belongs to the natural realm. It is clear that we are committing naturalistic fallacy and at the same time it is a definition of 'good' in our sense of 'meaning'. So, according to my view, if one wants to give a real definition of any concept then he has to commit the naturalistic fallacy. And, if one neither wants to commit the fallacy nor wants to commit the fallacies of cricularity or infinite regression then he will not be able to define any concept and he will have to accept the position that no real definition of a term can be given.

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#### NOTES

- 1. Hare R. M., The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952.
- 2. Ibid. p. 108.
- 3. Bharadwaja V. K., Naturalistic Ethical Theory, Univ. of Delhi, 1978
- 4. Ibid pp. 93-94.
- 5. Moore G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968. p. 13.

## THE ARGUMENT FROM MASSIVE REDUPLICATION AND IDENTIFYING REFERENCE TO PARTICULARS

Strawson in his book 'Individuals' attempts to lay bare the most general features of our conceptul structure. The most general features are particulars and universals. Material bodies and persons occupy the central place among the particulars in general and concepts of other types of particular are secondary to them. His aim is to establish and explain the status of the particular as the paradigm logical subject that it has completeness which others lack.

Strawson advances two criteria to test the knowledge of a particular of material body or person. These are identification and reidentification. Here identification presupposes a pair of speaker and a hearer, the speaker refers indentifyingly to a particular and the hearer tries to identify, on the basis of description made available to him. Successful identification is always done only in demonstrative cases whereas in cases of non-demonstrative identification there is a possiblity of identification-failure. Several objects with similar appearances may answer the description. This is the argument from massive reduplication which according to Strawson threatens the possibility of identifying reference. Strawson gives two replies to this argument and thinks that the argument does not have any practical or theoretical force.

I propose to examine Strawson's replies to the argument and see if anything further can be said in this regard.

Strawson distinguishes basic particulars from private and dependent particulars according to the criterion of identification. Private and dependent particulars depend for their identification on the identification of basic particulars. Leaving apart the case of private and dependent particulars, identification is always done through names or descriptions or both. But names should be capable of being substituted by suitable descriptions on demand. Hence ultimately we depend on descriptions in purely general terms alone. When we consider the descriptions given in purely general terms there is the difficulty of massive reduplication and identification failure. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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The two replies given by Strawson are that it is practically baseless to argue like this and that there is a theoretical answer available to this theoretical problem.

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Strawson argues that it is practically baseless because it is not necessary to know whether the identifying reference applies uniquely. All that is required is that the speaker and the hearer, both should know of a particular to which the description fits. But the condition is that both should know only one particular and that the hearer's particular is the same as the speaker's particular. But the difficulty in this reply is that it is not possible to pick up a particular on the strength of speakar's description of the particular. Much here depends on hearer's prior knowlede and his power of extrapolation. Hence something other than the description-something extraneous—is necessary for successful identification. Hence the reply does not seem as practical as it claims to be. Strawson admits this later on and says that the reply concedes too much.

The theoretical reply 'That the non--demonstrative identifying reference could be linked up to some or at least one demonstrative reference, that the two (hearer and the speaker) being currently engaged in speech--activity must have a common spatial and temporal axis from which all else could be measured and thereby identyfyingly referred to' is also not satisfactory. But this reply brings in demonstrative and egocentric terms in order that non-demonstrative identifying reference is possible. Hence the reply ultimately denies the possibility of non-demonstrative identifying reference to particulars in fear of massive reduplication. This is way I do not see how a theoretical solution is available. If anything is achieved, it is achieved for demonstrative identification which is not being challenged here at all, though demonstrative identification is not free from difficulties.

But let us analyse the difficulties. Actually we do make identifying reference to particulars and it is possible to know what the speaker refers to through not always without error.

The difficulty is that when we make an identifying reference to a table not sensibly present, with the help of purely general terms, then we make use of only the essential minimum which is taken into account at the time of forming the cencept. The accidental features care for soil to minimum the removement Help of the description of the content of t

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## THE ARGUMENT FROM MASSIVE REDUPLICATION

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nce eral is enription of an object by general terms it is not possible to come back again to an object with accidental features. We can come only to the essential minium which we represented in the concept of the class to which that particular belongs. Hence it is not possible to come to the individual objects from the description of the features of the concept for that would determine the entire extension of the concept without in any way individuating the particulars belonging to that class.

There should not be a sense of loss here nor the ghost of massive reduplication has any force, for that is the very process we adopt in the formation of a concept. Whenever a speaker makes an identifying reference to a table or a man, he names the object by the essential minimum that we do understand by the term and at the same time calendars, maps and such other co-ordinate systems are utilised at a sophisticated level to individuate one particular from another. We should admit frankly that non-demonstrative identifying reference is not possible. The replies offered by Strawson are not logical replies.

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## LAZEROWITZ'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

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The curious feature of the irresolvability of Metaphysical contraversies prompts Professor Lazerowitz to do elaborate researches in the nature and character of philosophical problems.

Lazerowitz's recurrent theme in his metaphilosophical studies is that metaphysical philosophy presents itself to us as one of the deepest sciences, which it is not. As against the scientists and there experimental methodology which strives to reach at universally standardized results, metaphysicians only agree to differ with each other. They are pathetically involved in a state of endless debating. Theories which are conclusively established according to some seasoned metaphysicians, are essentially mistaken according to equally mature and competent ones. Metaphysics and its problems are essentially enigmatic and riddlesome.

Maintaining that Metaphysical propositions have no truth values at all and that they are paradoxical in nature which can be equally plausibly argued for and against, Lazerowitz underlines that we are naturally drawn to the conclusion that metaphysical problems have no solution at all.

Lazerowitz develops a hypothesis to explain the irresolvability feature of the metaphysical theories. After cogently arguing that metaphysical propositions are neither empirical nor a priori propositions nor literally meaningless sentences as logical positivists advocats, Lazerowitz offers another hypothesis for resolving metaphysical deadloks.

A Metaphysican alters the ordinary use of the key metaphysical terminology when he formulates any type of metaphysical theory, "We may say that a Metaphysician is being linguistically creative, not wrong". When metaphysicians busy themselves in a fierce dispute, they are not contending about the truth-claims of their respective philosophical positions. The dispute is not a factual one. Metaphysicians orguing and counterarguing for and against some metaphysical postions like (1) Time is unreal, (2) Matter does not exist, (3) Nothing changes and (4) Ultimate reality is transcendental, have, as a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a factual of the coordinary of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the ordinary use of the coordinary was a matter of fact, altered the or

## LAZEROWITZ'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

accordence with their respective positions to "take sides in philosophy". Each maintains its metaphysical position without any fear of being refuted because "Positions taken have no cheoritical refutation."

Thus a philosophical theory pretends to describe something important about the world, but, in fact, a philosopher alters the structure of language and tailors the linguistic concepts to suit his special needs. Also, deep down, there is a subjective though unconcious orientation of the psychological needs of a philosopher wich determines the nature and character of a philosophical system.

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#### NOTES

1. The Structure of Metaphysics, p. 63.

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#### THE SQCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE—A PHENOMENO-LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The introduction of phenomenology as a method for approaching concretely 'lived experience' (Lebenswelt) into sociology of knowledge gave the latter discipline a new turn. The sociology of knowledge is the doctrine according to which we do not acquire our knowledge, opinions and beliefs in a vacuum, but in a social and political atmoshpere; that which is taken to be true and especially which is not only taken to be true but also self-evident, is conditioned by these social and political conditions, and our interests and dispositions, which are really products of the sociopolitical conditions.

Probably, since the sociology of knowledge had its origin in the writing of Marx, Weber and Mannheim, who were all sociopolitical thinkers, it was mainly concerned with the analysis of the 'existential determinants' of the so-called social and political ideologies or certain historical events. The phenomenologist does not belive in reducing sociology of knowledge to the sociology of scientific knowledge. He would argue that it is our own 'lived experience'—our 'commonsensical beliefs' and our behaviour towards our fellow creatures—that needs to be analysed from a sociohistorical perspective. Our everyday life is worth studying because it is reality per excellence.

The growth of the phenomenological school within sociology knowledge had a laudable effect: it helped in sobering down, and possibly arrest the ascendance of Reason in Western thought in general, its total application in all spheres of life and, in the words of Max Horkheimer "its present reified domination." It constituted another major onslaught against the spirit of scientism. For the first time a group of thinkers became aware as to the fact that the relevance and importance of 'commonsensical' knowledge in doing a sociology of knowledge cannot and must not be undermined. G. E. Moore expressed throughts very much akin to this when he declared that instead of searching for 'the real' in the form of some esoteric substance or an ephemeral thing in itself let us first find out what is 'real' according to 'the common man'—a person who has not become entangled curakdotaofii Cpheidusophicatijargon'.

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However, one may ask: how for is the programme undertaken by the phenomenological sociologist of knowledge plausible? I feel that he fails to see that an unbridgeable schism between the world of commonsense and the world of science is not really there. Yesterdays' advanced science filters down to the masses and becomes today's natural, and may be 'common', way of seeing the world. Our expresinces in everyday life is being constantly acted upon and moulded by a medley of variegated factors. Further, notwithstanding Moore' sincere efforts at defining 'commonsense,' it conitnues to be a word which reveals extreme elasticity. While at one end it gets closer and closer to science, at the other end it merges into the world of imagination, religious ecstacy and myth. The position of the phenomenologist is closely akin to that of the intuitionist: although one does not agree with him, one cannot even refute him.

Indeed, it would be interesting to do a sociology of knowledge of the various forms of sociology of knowledge as 'found' in different periods of time: In the first place why was a sociology of ideologies replaced by a sociology of the secinces, which again made way for a sociology of everyday knowledge? Was it due to certain socio-historiacl factors? To the latter question my reply would be in the affirmative. The phenomenological sociology of knowledge came up at a time when the importance of Reason in almost all spheres of human activity became terrifyingly great. A sociology of knowledge with a phenomenological coloring succeeded in directing our attention to the importance of everyday experience and the 'everyday world'. But this too was only for a while.

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Nivedita Dutta

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#### LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS: A CRITIQUE

Following the early chroniclers, the modern historians of Indian thought also appear to adopt a non-historical order of ideological development. This order is usually described as the 'logical' development of ideas. Entire schools of thought are supposed to logically precede or succeed other schools and logical development is supposed to take place within particular schools too. This largely unexpressed but nonetheless deepseated assumption calls for a close scrutiny because it has subtly coloured and even pre-determined our understanding of India's ic'cological evolution. The present paper is a small beginning in that direction.

The early medieval work on which most current histories of Indian thought are based-Madhava's Sarvadarsanasaingrahais confessedly biased in favour of one particular line of thought. No wonder that, in utter disregard of actual, historical development and the factors responsible for it, it posits an order of development going from what Madhava regarded as the least orthodox to the most orthodox. This tendency has prompted historians to arbitrarily determine the order of evolution within differnte schools too. Thus, it is customary to speak as if the Theravada, Hinayana Sarvastitvada and Mahayana are the three consecutive stages of the development of Buddhist thought. Writres seem to feel-and some admittedly that there is some kind of logical necessity underlying and informing this sequence.

One cannot be wholly certain as to what precisely the expression 'logical development' implies and whether it means the same thing to everyone. Yet, in view of its significance, one must attempt an analysis, however incomplete.

At all events, logical development must involve an element of unavoidability characterstic of deduction. This also invests it with the nature of an apriori and analytic statement. That is to say, when an idea is declared to have logically evolved out of another, the intention is to stress the essential indebtedness of the former to the later. There are certain elements in a given situation which can develop in one and only one direction, and that direction is the the direction of logical development. Since this certainty is preexisting, one should be able to forcast the direction, maridwar

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Whether the employers of the expression 'logical development' realised it or not, they have been guilty of a kind of category mistake. They have imagined apriori and analytic factors in a matter of fact. Moreover, they have allowed thier own bias to conjure up apriori elements. Reverting to the example of Buddhism, one is reminded of the stages of development set forth in Vacaspati's well-known work Bhāmati (2:2, 18). Not only that he has treated subjective idealism as a logical growth out of pluralism-realism and also as the logical basis of absolutism, he has averred that while the pluralists-realists (Theravadins and Sarvastivavadins) were of low intellect, the Yogācāra subjective idealists were of middling intellect and only the Sunyavadin absolutist were of sharp intellect. It does not need any great insight to see where Vācaspati's own sympathies lay and why he has distributed his compliments so unevenly. Modern historians, regarettably, do not appear to exercise enough critical vigilance. They have unquestioningly adopted the order set forth above, without worrying about the fact that this is totally unacceptable and even unknown to the Budhist chroniclers themselves. A sizable and influential section of the modern writers itself had pronounced sympathies with idealistic absolutistic line of thinking.

History—ideological or otherwise—belongs to the spehre of facts and not of theoretical constructions. A recorder of ideas held by different thinkers in the past must set out those ideas as dispassionately and objectively as possible. It is not his job to pass value judgements. Incredible though it may sound, term 'logical development' itself has become more of a value judgement than a statement of fact. An alleged logical evolute comes to be equated with more advanced.

It was time that India's ideological tradition was dealt with scientifically to ensure that our own subjective factors do not come in the way of our full understanding of any set of ancient and medieval tenets. There is no inevitability characterising historical development. It should be realised that logical development can be only uni-directional. There can be no going back to the earlier positions in logical evolution. In real life, however, one is free to go in any direction one choses to. Ideas have developed not according to inherent logical laws but according to the individual predilections of the individual predilections of the individual collection, Haridwar

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In brief, this is a plea to use the expression 'logical development' with great deal of critical awareness. Historians of ideas should not employ it in the same manner in which it is employed by the uninstructed. It may have a lose meaning in common parlance, but in philosophy there can be no justification to adhere to that lose meaning.

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## THE KIERKEGAARDIAN TREATMENT OF TIME

Kierkegaard's notion of time is dynamic, wherein self passes through the different stages of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious.

What is it to be aesthetical? Kierkegaard ansewers this query by saying that it is immediacy which contitutes the aesthetical mode of existence. He identifies aesthetic immediacy with childhood.

The dominant feature of this sphere of existence is desire. Gradually desire is separated from its object. The slumbering aesthetic self awakens at some particular moment and it demands a higher form of life. At the reflective stage, by revealing numerous possibilities, reflection compels self to avoid every sort of self-constituting decisions. At the ethical stage of Existence, the goal of one's ethical striving is the actualization of self. It is nothing but the choice of oneself. At the religious stage of existence The ethicist has only one goal: self-realization. Kierkegaard makes use of two fundamental Christian doctrines sin and incarnation. Only a forgiven sinner can attain immortal bliss.

Temporality of the stages of Existence can be interpreted in terms of the dynamic temporality of Kirekegaard and as a passage from the objective spatialized time to what is known as the *lived time*.

Thus the aesthetic lives either in the present or in the past er in the future. Each moment of time is segregated from others and thereby the interrelationship and the internal coherency among the three dimensions are ignored. The serial drawback of the ethicist, is his extreme self-centredness.

For Kierkegaard the eternal is the qualification of existence which transfigures the temporality of self. The paradoxical relationship arising at the intersection of time and eternity may not kill time but it does suffocate time constantly.

The underlying thesis is that Kierkegaard proposes the statges of existence on account of the possibility of self realization and the medium conceived for it is nothing but time. The Kierkegardian self is active and hence self-actualisation is possible only in terms of a progressive temporality.

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## C. G. JUNG ON THE PSYCHICAL ROOTS OF RELIGION

The present paper aims at giving an analytic and reflective account of the Psychical roots of religion as discussed by C. G. Jung.

The word 'Psychical' is generally used as anti-thesis of physical. The word 'Psychological' is designed as affecting the mind. Jung is emphatic in asserting the reality of psyche for he says that psyche has as much reality as the outer world. According to him, religion is the totality of apriori thoughts and behaviour which are common, universal, permanent and powerful forces. They exist as modes of thought and tendencies of human Psyche

The individual develops his personality by successfully adapting oneself to outer and inner demands in the first half of life. It is with the process of individuation man comes into grip with the forces and 'realities' of one's own psyche. Hence reference to unconscious becomes important. Jung has mainly given the idea of two kinds of unconscious—personal and collective unconscius. According to him the basis of religion is collective conscious. The activities of collective unconscious are called as primordial images. But this does not mean that religion is the religion of our ancestors. Religion is the outcome of refined primordial images.

According to Jung, the aim of human life is to acquire wholeness. There are four stages which are involved here: (1) experiencing the shadow, i. e. the dark aspects of one's life, (2) projection (3) identification, and (4) assimiliation.

At the and arises the symbols of mandalas which represent the psychic totality itself. Jung traces the development of the historical models of mandala experience.

The mandala experience shows that the individual has become a true 'whole' and its realisation brings peace to the individual.

According to Jung religion is largely a subjective affair of an individual. He rejects western theism and adopts the religion of self realisation which is the Vedantic religion.

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## MITWELT AND EIGENWELT IN HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

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Emphasis on an understanding of the image of man as the basis for Theory and Therapy is characteristic of Humanistic Psychologists. Man's ways of interacting with himeslf (eigenwelt) as well as other people (mitwelt) have been of special concern to Humanistic Psychology. In their effort to analyse and study the Image of man from the view of individual's subjective experience, they have proposed several dimensions as primary structures of Human existence. One can see in these structures the consistent Humanistic emphasis on the significance of Human Relationship; without them we are not Human Beings. Hence, every facet of living may be considered in terms of the Relationships that his self establishes with himself and his fellow men.

Mitwelt as a primary structure of the Human existence involves other people but in a particular form. The purpose is to expand one's subjective experience by forming sincere, genuine relationships with another person through sharing his experiences, feelings and thoughts. This structure can be best understood when we consider the problem of Inter-relationships and Man with others.

Eigenwelt is another structure of the Human existence and it is best characterized in its relation to oneself or Himself. Humanistic psychologists believe that the science of Psychology and depth psychology have ignored this important structure of the Human existence. This category or structure can be best perceived only when we become involved in discussing the problem of Autonomy, Freedom Creativity, Authenticity and Man's present condition of existence.

Finally we may note that Humanistic psychology may not discover any new solution but can only become a real analytic of life in our capacity to communicate to one another. It is that in which man is again seeking to come to his True self, wanting to work constructively with the help of Religious and Moral principles. Moreover in it man may find solutions to his present unrest and anxiety.

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#### A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD IN SHANKARA—VEDANTA

The terms real and unreal have been the central problems of all metaphysics.

Shankara does not accept any of the views on reality as advanced by thinkers of different schools of Indian philosophy. According to him a thing is real if it is not contradicted by later experience. The real is what does not give up its nature, what does not change, what maintains itself. That is aid to be real of which our consciousness never fails, and that to be unreal of which our consciousness fails. Only that which is not made, which has not been produced by action, can be said to be absolutely real and eternal. That is real which exists for itself and is an end in itself. Svārtha is the word used by Shankara to indicate this self-justifying nature and which for him is identical with the absolutely real.

Keeping the given tests in the mind "only a self-conscious reality can be said to be absolutely real." Brahman or the self, the sole reality, is pure being, immutable and eternal. The self, the Atman alone is the light that exists for itself.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the world of not-selfwhich fulfils Shankara's criterion of reality. World-appearance cannot be said to be real because it is contradicted. It is found non-existing at the dawn of right knowledge, the whole world of not-self is for the sake of the self which alone is the eternal selfsubsistent reality. An unconscious reality cannot exist for itself.

According to Shankara's conception of causality, effects are "non-existent and false" and have "no substantiality". Vivarta is regarded as the "merely change" or "illusory change" or "modification of any substance as of the rope into the snake."

But the world-appearance is not unreal like hare's horn. It is true for all practical purposes. Shankara claims some sort of reality even for error and illusion. Vedantic acceptance of Vyāvahārika world does not mean a duplication of reality. Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika are not to be considered as existing side by side of that former exists all postating was the considered.

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Shankara uses some different cateogry for the world. World is illusion in the sense that it is neither real, nor unreal, nor both. Dreaming experiences, are said to be illusory when they are contradicted by waking experience, and waking experiences are said to be illusory when they are contradicted by the true or ultimate reality.

Nāgārjuna, by applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence (Pratītyasamutpāda) tried to prove the falsity of the world. Shankara does not use logical dialectic to prove the world-appearance as false but simply admits its falsity because the Upaniṣads proclaimed the Brahman as the ultimate reality. For the former, there was no basis of false creation anywhere. But Shankara maintained the view that Brahman is the basis on which world-appearance depends, for, even illusions require something on which they could appear.

Many objections are given in connection with Shankara's conception of the falsity of the world.

Venkata refutes the principle of the falsity of the world. He urges that we admit that the world is false because it is different from the Brahman. But there may be different realities. He holds that if Brahman is real then its negation would also be real. The falsity of the world cannot be proved by logical proofs, for, these fall within the world, and would therefore be themselves false.

But Shankara has already solved the problem by introducing the distinction between commonsense view and the philosophic view. The Vyāvahārika reality of the world is unobjectionable, but its reality cannot be established on the Pāramārthika plane.

Madhava Mukunda's criticism looses its importance when it is mentioned that in the philosophy of Shankara indefinability does not mean that it is impossible to be described. It only means that it is neither Brahman (real) nor other than Brahman (unreal) nor both.

N. B. Chakraborty presents a dilemma against Shankara's conception of the falsity of the world. He asks the question, Is falsity itself real or false? If falsity itself is false, then the world is rather confirmed as real. If falsity itself is real, then the reality of the world is not sublated for "this falsity itself is the phenomenon,

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of the world and even if one item of the world is real then Advaitism cannot hold that entire world is false." If falsity of the world is not sublated then this falsity, at least, is real and from this, reality of the world can be easily proved.

But this objection does not hit the target because Shankara does not admit reality and falsity as contradictory. Contradictory of reality is unreality (Asat) which cannot appear at all. A false thing appears, so it is other than Asat. Therefore, the falsity of the world does not imply the reality of the world, and non-duality of the ultimate reality remains intact.

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#### MAN AND RELIGION

The present era is known as the science-era where in all walks of life science has been given the primary importance, since it is proved to be useful in bringing about the human welfare. However, this itself has led to sidetrack religion, philosophy arts and literature.

The scientific progress has influenced religion and its impact more than any other concern of human life. So man's faith in religion has started vanishing. Science has now occupied the place of religion in human mind for faith and reverence with its rapid progress. Yet the man from the west, whose life fully governed by science and technology, is now fade up of the mundane pleasures and enjoyments. He is seeking for some religion and spiritualism which could give him mental satisfaction,

Some philosophers hold that religion is really a code of conduct of human life through which man attains the knowledge of good and and evil deeds. Religion impels man to pursue for happiness instead of to strive for pleasures. It also provides foundations for our ideal family, ideal society and ideal nation.

Man gets satisfaction out of surrendering himself before somebody. It further becomes a regular practice of his life and thus regular practice itself is religion.

Religion is and has been a force in human life right from the primitive stages. It has disciplined man's life according to certain principles. It is this force out of which there emerges education, ideal society and human culture.

Man and religion are intimately related on a deeper level. This relation is not limited just to knowing the world and the God but also concerned with establishing an identity between man and God. The virtues like love, compassion, service, sacrifice etc. emerge in human life through religion and it is through the same religion that evils like hatred, malice, anger etc. are eradicated.

Although we are not paying much heed to the significant role of religion in our life due to the influence of science, in our subconscious we SOP have lath in religion. Religion has entered into

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human life through the impressions of ages and it cannot go away so easily. There remain some goals of human life still not achieved by science. They could be achieved by religion alone and so man will keep faith in religion for his future.

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THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS:

The main aim of this paper is to evaluate critically the views of Ayer as to the status of metaphysical propositions. Since Ayer's stand on metaphysical propositions is the result of his uncritical acceptance of: (1) The basic division of propositions into analytic and synthetic and (2) the principle of verifiability. Let me assess the views of Ayer in the following way:

1. His internal consistency with regard to the division of propositions and 2. Relavance of (1) to the present trends in the existing philosophical circles.

The naive positivism that one can find in William of Ockham¹ anticipated Hume's distinction between relations of ideas—("analytic" in the terminology of Kant) and matters of fact ("synthetic" in the terminology of Kant).

The sole criterion as to the truth or falsity of the first is "the mere operation of thought" and of the second "through experience."

It seems that Ayer, not satisfied with his basic division of propositions which itself is enough to eliminate metaphysics from meaningful discourse, attempt to derive a principle from an analysis of factual meaning and the outcome is the "Principle of verifiability". An application of this principle, both in its "strong" and "weak" forms<sup>2</sup> deprives metaphysics even of its "probable" nature and hence puts an end to such propositions, Ayer contends, either as meaningless or nonsense or both.

Rejected by critics like A. C. Ewing<sup>3</sup> as itself a metaphysical principle, the principle of verifiability, has emerged once again under the scientific cloak is Feigl's classification<sup>4</sup> of five types of sentences or expressions as (1) Logically true sentences (analytic) (2) Logically false sentences (contradictions) (3) Factually true sentences (4) Factually false sentences and (5) emotive expressions without cognitive meaning.

It is useful to make a note of the following views: (1) The Idiosyncracy Platitude<sup>5</sup> (2) The Principle of Indeterminacy Translaction of Indeterminacy I

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An analysis of (1) and (2) points out that Ayer's dichotomy is highly untenable. I register mainly four criticisms on the basis of an analysis of the above (1) and (2) from negative as well as positive aspects.

On the negative aspect, it may be pointed out that: (i) There cannot be any clear-cut division of analytic and synthetic statements and (ii) principle like the principle of varifiability is itself "reduplicating" or "illuminating".

On the positive aspect, I bring out, (i) it is not the case as Ayer contends that some sentences are meaningful and others are meaningless by the application of some kind of Ockham's razor. On the contrary, "every statement has its own sort of meaning", and all statements must be analysed in such a way so that hidden meaning in the use of language could be brough to light.

(ii) Any statement could be established as true by making some adjustments in that system without taking the particular observational elements involved in it.

Before making a final assessment on Ayer's position, let me examine the controversial aspect of the following two theses:

- (1) "All philosophy is a 'critique of language"7
- (2) "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world"8
- In (1), I find an argument which holds that the proper task of philosophy is (i) analysis of language and (ii) an analysis of the words in use.<sup>9</sup>
- In (2), Strawson attempts to show the possibility of a descriptive metaphysics in contrast to a revisionary metaphysics, where the latter depends upon the former.

Both Ayer and Wittgenstein are right in holding the view that misuse of language is the origin of metaphysical problems, which Kant would accept in terms of misuse of categories. However, they go wrong in failing to see the "regulative" aepect of metaphysics in the sense that it can set the limits to coherent thinking. What Wittgenstein and Ayer miss, Strawson gets the clue from Kant to construct the most basic several features of experience. Though Kant-orpeologic Communication of the construction of the simul-

# THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS

taneously tries to establich a basis of metaphysics, a science in the sense of giving a base for basic structure of experience.

Dr. S. R. U. A. S. in Philosophy Madras S. Balakrishnan,

#### NOTES

- 1. Paul Edwards, Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 295.
- 2. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 56.
- 3. Mind (NS), Vol. 45. 1937, pp. 347 ff.
- 4. Feigl, The meaning of positivism, Perspectives in Philosophy, Ed. Beck (R. N.), p. 364.
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- 6. Paul Edwards, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 7, p. 54.
- 7. Wittgenstein (L), Tractatus, 4,0031.
- 8. Strawson (P. F.), Individuals, p. 9.
- 9. "... the meaning of a word is its use in the language", Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 43.

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# THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HEGEL'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND'.

I have delineated for study in this paper the notion of intersubjectivity offered by Hegel in the Introduction to the section on 'Self-consciousness' in the 'Phenomenology of Mind'. Since the Cartesian notion of the self forms the the starting point for all modern conceptions of individuality and corresponding notions of sociality, Hegel's argument for a completely different notion of self-defining subjectivty is extremely important as an alternative model.

The importance of self-consciousness can hardly be overestimated since it is the decisive first stage in the self-realisation of the knowing subject. Hegel is concerned here with the existence of a being at the centre of life, who becomes conscious of this life as the very condition of its existence, creating and generating through this self-consciousness a history which it makes and which it can rationally comprehend.

In the the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness, the subject emerges as the measure determinative of all objectivity and enters'into the native land of truth' Thus the accent shifts from the distinction of subject and object regarded as external to each other to the distinction of subject and object conceived as present or immanent in the same concious being. 'Self-consciousness is reflection out of the bare being that belongs to the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return out of otherness' In the dialectic of consciousness the tension lay between a certain norm of knowledge and what we actually are able to know in attempting to fulfill it. With self-consciousness the dialectic concerns itself with the idea we have of ourelves i. e. what we claim to be and what we actually are.

The previous pages of the Phenomenology are described as those in which 'the truth is for conciousness something other than itself', and the dialectical process which revealed their inadequacy was that in which 'the concept of this truth vanishes' Self-consciousness is then contrasted with its predecessor: 'What did not come of hour in the contrasted with its predecessor: What did not come of hour in the contrasted with its predecessor: What did not come of hour in the contrast of the cont

be the case, namely a certainty which is the same as its truth, for certainty is itself the object and consciousness is itself the truth.'4 Thus the root of self-consciousness lies in the notion of what Hegel calls our 'certainty of self', a concept which designates both our notion of ourselves as well as the state for which we strive. Human beings strive for an external embodiment which expresses them and are frustrated in this aim when the realities on which they depend in order to be, reflect something alien to them. Certainty of self is the confidence that everything on which we depend is not alien to us, that we are 'at home' in it. Since we are beings who live in a continuous relation with external reality, and rely on it in order to exist, any notion of selfcertainty makes certain claims on this reality. But if a given notion of self-certainty not only remains unfulfilled but is incapable of being realised in the given state of the surrounding world, then the action out of this idea is contradictory; it frustrates what it meant to fulfill. Our 'truth' cannot match our 'certainty'. We have then a dialectic in which our self-certainty plays the role of 'standard' and our 'truth' is matched against it. If they are in principle not in accord with each other, then as in the case of knowledge, the standard must change.

Our self certainty is something which passionately engages our attention and when our truth negates this and moves us onto another scenario of self-certainty, this transition is accompanied with a tremendous amount of pain and struggle. We arrive at the next stage not by refuting the previous self certainty as by creating a new situation for ourselves. This new situation is the consequence of attempting to act out a certain idea of ourselves which leads to an undermining of our original self-conception.

What is characteristic of self-certainty is that the subject is capable of self-differentiation: 'I am I's. Although the starting point of the new dialectic is essentially tautological, it leads to what Hegel considers the very heart of self-certainty, namely the notion of desire and life. In what follows I attempt a reconstruction of the Hegelian account of this dialectic.

In self-consciousness the external world apprehended by consciousness does not completely vanish but merely loses its otlogogeneral configuration independent reality. It is

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recognised as being only a moment of self-consciousness, a product of abstraction unable to exist by itself. The external sensible world must both exist independently for self-consciousness and yet the essence or truth of self-consciousness is to remove any external object, to maintain its unity with itself',6 to have only itself for an object. The way that self-consciousness resolves this paradox is by preserving the world but by removing its external character. It makes the world its own, it takes possession of it. Thus self-consciousness mainfests itself as desire.

Every act of consciousness involves the duality of subject and object, for consciousness is always consciousness of something which is not consciousness itself. So on the one hand Hegel insists one the ontological necessity for the independence of the external world. However, he also insists on the integrity of the self which is the negation of dependence on something other. There can be no strategy of retreat into ourselves as purely spiritual selves which does not take into account that we are ontologically dependent on somehing other. Self-consciousness is thus mediation and it is this which expresses the relation between desire and its object. Thus the unity and self-certainty of the subject are always conditioned by negation.

In its immediate form self-consciousness is desire and the object which it confronts is nothing other than the object of its desire. Consciousness in this case is identical with life and the individual moved by desire does not consider the object of his desire as something essentially alien. The object confronted by self-consciousness is no longer the 'thing' of perception but something which takes on life itself since it is expressive of those purposive beings who act upon it and change it, so that self-consciousness possesses in its object an image of itself.

Hegel now shows how the notion of the other self is intrinsic to the notion of self consciousness thus portraying a notion of the individual at direct variance with the atomistic solipisism which characterised mainstream Enlightenment thought. Most commentators of the Phenomenology have found the transition to the intersubjectivity of the self as dubious as the movement to the introduction of the notion of desire in terms of Hegel's problection of the notion of desire in terms of Hegel's problection of the notion o

dialectical evolution. Yet the analysis of the Constitution of inter-subjectivity is intrinsically credible.

The nature of desire is such that it is unappeasable and though it may capture, use and even physically destroy its objects it still requires the presence of these objects for its expression and satisfaction. Self-consciousness expresses itself as desire in order to do away with externality, but instead by requiring such a world to overcome it ensures both the continued existence of this world and further desire. The end of desire would be the end of human beings. But in fact this is not the case; new desires arise endlessly. So human life oscilates between being for another which is totally foreign to it, and having incorporated this, being before nothing at all.

The self, as a being which depends on external reality can only arrive at integrity if it discovers a reality which could undergo a standing negation, whose otherness could be negated without its being abolished. This negation of otherness without self abolition is only present in another human conscionsness. So that the basic desire of self-consciousness can only be fulfilled by another self-consciousness.

For the subject to be fully at home in the external reality he is dependent or, this reality must reflect back to him what he is. In the dialectic of desire the subject is faced with harsh externality which must be either destroyed by consummation or incorporated; what is needed is a reality which will remain and which will yet abolish its own foreignness, in which the subject can nevertheless find itself. This it can only find in other human beings insofar as they award it recognition as also being human.

The the desire of life becomes the desire of another desire, or rather, in view of the necessary reciprocity of the phenomenon, human desire is always desire of the desire of another. The self's desire must perpetuate itself and this it can only accomplish if its object is also desire, a desire at once identical with its own desire and alien to it. Each exists only through this reciprocal recognition: 'They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another.' 7

All the conditions of human existence, or as Hegel puts it, of self-consciousness of life, are contained in the need of desire for recognition in another desire, or in intersubjectivity which is the CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

MADHU SARIN

sole means by which consciousness of life may become something other than a reflection of this life. This is the real fulfillment of self-consciousness because it is the real 'unity of oneself in one's other-being,' 8

Hegel however has shown that self-conciousness or desire only emerges from universal life in the encounter with another self-conciousness. Although life appears to it in the form of this other self-conciousness, to the extent that it is an external manifestation of itself it must negate this seperation.

In as much as it is a living being, the self is unavoidably a determinate object for another in whom it is reflected as an object. This condition of being for another is unbearable and yet it is the condition of the self's being in the world at all. Each self-conciousness seeks the death of the other because each one wants to suppress his limited representation for the other and demands to be recognised by the other as pure being for itself. However a resolution of the life and death struggle cannot be sought in the death of the other for then the negation has again been a simple or a natural one whereas what is needed is a standing negation, one in which the opponents' otherness is overcome, while he still remains in being. It is at this point that Hegel introduces the dialectic of Lordship and bondage which may be considered a mythical representation of the historical recognition of the self in its relation with others. This does not concern us here since it is adequate for the purpose of this paper to show that the newly emerging ego must be seen as part of an essentially social relationship.

Dept. of Philosophy. Delhi University.

Madhu Sarin,

#### NOTES

All references to 'The Phenomenology of Mind' is to the J. B. Baillietranslation, published by Harper Torchbooks, N. York, 1967.

- 1. p. 219.
- 2. p. 219.
- 3. ibid.
- 4. p. 218.
- 5. p. 219.
- 6. p. 221.
- 7. p. 229.

8. p. 230. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar 9

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
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## PHILOSOHPY, DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL CRISIS\*

I am thankful to Professor R. Balasubramanian and the organising committee for inviting me to preside over the inauguration of this year's session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Started by Professors S. Radhakrishanan, A. R. Wadia and others over half a century ago, the congress has been providing a valuable forum for an annual coming together of teachers of philosophy in our universities and colleges, for interchange of ideas and mutually acquainting themselves with what is being done in this country in the different areas of their subject. I am glad this session on the eve of a new decade - the 1980s - is meeting under the auspices of the Institute of Advanced Study in Philosophy of one of our oldest and premier universities, which has for a little over a quarter century done splendid work in translating and loyally expounding Advaita Vedanta and Saiva Siddhanta classics of unmatched profundity and lasting value. May I share with you all the hope that under Professor Balasubramanian's leadership this Institute will now march ahead devoting itself to a critical and comparative evaluation and constructive development of the seminal philosophical ideas in these ancient systems, which have a great deal to contribute to the techniques of the soul?

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I may be permitted to utilise this occasion for briefly expressing my views on a couple of problems which are of momentous contemporary importance to the people of this country, – problems on which philosophy can shed much light, to which it can possibly suggest alternate solutions, if it takes the help of other humanistic, social and natural sciences, and to which these latter appear incapable of providing effective solutions when not inspired by it.

A philosophy of this sort cannot be what Schopenhauer called "professors' philosophy by philosophy-professors", but an actual and effective philosophy which grasps the great facts of the time

<sup>\*</sup>Speach delivered while presiding over the Inauguration of the 54th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Madras, December 27,1979

and understands and affects present-day life in its inmost depths It must be aware of the predicaments, protests and aspirations of humanity. An exclusive study and exposition of past wisdom and transmission of it to present generation, an imitative continuation of what is thought and said elsewhere, or repetitive technical and specialised work interlinking abstract ideas or analysing ordinary language, cannot make us conscious of our present condition nor articulate an authentic idiom of our social and political existence. Philosophy must spring from our individuality, which is spiritual as well as corporeal, and from our culture, which is social, politi cal and economic. It must not be confined to a realm of its own. but take into account matters of public concern. Nourished by tradition, made productive by new insights, discoveries and investigations, while it may find justification for some of the components of a tradition or features of existing institutions, it should outline alternative futuristics, formulate new patterns of thought and conduct and inspire new endeavours. Making everyday life and experience meaningful, it must make our efforts as individual and social beings more fruitful. Philosophy must become an important element of society and state and in alliance with other sciences capable of laying down the norms and rules by which they may be directed, if they so choose. The unfortunate separation of philosophy from practical problems should be abolished and connection a established between speculative theoretical and the methodological investigation and concrete tasks of personal, political and economic development. A purposeful quest in practical politics and economics for the good life and a better society is impossible with out a theoretical generalisation of the tremendous problems with which concrete reality confronts us and a theoretical concept of the right ordering of society. Democracy, wrote De Tocqueville, cannot endure without a religion and philosophy; and not only Marx and Lenin, but also Dewey have asserted that there cannot be social reconstruction without a philosophy guiding it. temporary India is without praxiology1 based upon philosophy. That is our failure.

A political and social role for philosophy is not alien to Indian tradition. Vyāsa not only effectively intervened a number of times in the higher politics of kauravas and pandavas, but

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bequeathed to us sadharana Dharma and Raja Dharma along with moksa Dharma. The foremost Buddhist philosopher Nagar juna did not isolate himelf meditating on Emptiness, but wrote the Suhrllekhā and Ratnāvalī to guide the Satavāhana emperor, and was his practical adviser too. The Jaina philospher Hemacandra influenced the powerful Chaulukyan king Jayasimha, and was his successor Kumarapala's spiritual and political guide. It is said his influence on politics "may still be indirectly felt in India to the present day ". Vidyaranya, head of a monastic establishment and one of the most brilliant exponents of Advaita Vedanta inspired two reconverts from Islam to Hinduism to establish the kingdom of Vijayanagar. These three-Buddhist, Jaina and Hindu-while being metaphysicians and writers on moral philosophy used to give practical directions to kings on matters of state. Like them, a philosopher to have on authentic standing in actual life must deal with the problems of the time. apprehend economic, social and political realities and must seek to influence society thrugh acts or ideas; they must at least make clarificatory, if not profound and far seeing, pronouncements on important questions of the day.

#### II

The most imporatant question for independent India was identified by its two greatest leaders twentyfour years ago. On November 13, 1945 Gandhi wrote to Nehru: "The real question, according to you is how to bring about man's highest intellectual, economic, political and moral development. I agree. In this there should be an equal right and opportunity for all". Yet, a multidisciplinary approach inspired by philosophy has not so far been made to tackle the problem of an integral development of man and society in India. The reasons for this are two.

First, although political economy was considered by J. S. Mill, "a fragment of a greater whole, a branch of social philosophy interlinked with all the other branches", and by Nassau Senior, its first professor at Oxford, as one of the moral sciences, very soon it not only separated itself from politics and ceased to be a branch of social philosophy or one of the moral sciences, but became independent and usurped the rest of the social sciences, as Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel College, feared it would when

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it was admitted into Oxford's curriculur 1. Within a hundred years a stage was reached when a leading economist J. M. Keynes could declare in 1930 that economic necessity compels us to value means above ends and prefer the useful to the good, to pretend that "fair is foul and foul is fair", for "foul is useful and fair is not", and to have avarice, usury and precaution as our gods for another hundred years. According to Keynes' prognostication only about 2030 A. D., when he expected everybody to be rich, there could be a return to religion and traditional virtue and once more valuation of ends above means and preference of the good to the useful2. While Keynes envisioned an utopia to be brought about by economic progress divorced from religion and morality, by 1972 when the first report of the Club of Rome was published, growth economics was replaced by scarcity economics and a doomsday syndrome and consequent apocalyptic hysteria manifested themselves. It is now realised that there would neither be utopia nor doomsday in the forseeable future, and also that economics alone cannot provide a panacea to the world's troubles. E. H. Phelps Brown rightly pointed out that the contribution of economics in the last 25 years to the solution of the most pressing problems of the times has been small.3 Once again it is seen, as it was by Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen, that the primary human motives are not economic, but sociological. Economics can legitimately and usefully operate only within the framework of social and moral philosophy. While the central theme of Wassily Leontiff's report on development for the UN and Jacques Lesourne's report on the same subject for the OECD is that it is political and socio-economic constraints, not physical scarcities, which will limit the prospects of growth in the next half century, it is encouraging that the more recent latter report gives a lot of space to "Values" and thinks it is possible that "post-materialist" choices may gain ascendency over "materialist" options. sense of belonging to, self-esteem and self-realisation may prevail over the desire to always consume more and more. But the Indian State has so far exclusively based its planning on economics and has sought economic growth. It has ignored philosophers totally, and has been only dimly aware of the possibility of utilisation of social scientists other than economists and statisticians for purposes of planning. Indian philosophers by not concerning themselves with public affairs have caused others to PHILO

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believe that philosophy has nothing to do with social and national life. Both must see that war and peace, equality and justice, freedom, social and political institutions, revolution and science raise philosophical issues. Philosophy must challenge the assumuptions and goals of planning and formulate them afresh, while economics and statistics must realise that development involves philosophical questions like 'What is the good life? What is the just society?" Only philosophy in close cooperation with other social sciences, science and technology can successfully plan for and achieve integral development. Every development planning team as the economist Benjamin Higgins wrote, should include a philosopher. "Without a clear concept of the philosophy of development, the team becomes a simple ad hoc mission"4. But a philoosopher without a broad acquaintance with other branches of knowledge and with concrete realities and without a desire to improve human living conditions, will have no role to play in such a team.

Second, the earlier prevalent conceptions of development were exclusively dominated by an economic and statistical approach.

(i) Development was considered to be synonymous with economic growth based on a comparison of the GNP per capita of a country with that of a highly developed country. concentration was on rapid growth and maximization of output. But this resulted in the stagnation of the incomes of the great majority of people, an appreciable improvement in the income of the most privileged social groups and the marginalisation of the masses. Nor was the gap in GNP reduced. example, in 1972 the GNP per capita in USA was 5,590 and in 1977 it was 8, 550 while in India in 1972 it was 110, and in 1977 it was 150. In 1977 after so many years of planning, among the 37 LICs of the World India occupied the 22nd place, only 15 countries were poorer than India. In the foreseeable future its GNP will not come anywhere near either the GNP of the industrialised countries (whose average GNP in 1977 was 6, 980) or of the centrally planned economics (whose average GNP in 1977 was 1160) and one cannot even guess when, if at all, unemployment in India will drastically come down, for at the end of 1978 there were 126.78 lakhs registered unemployed. Yet, the report of the Pearson Commission on International Development (1969) and the World Bank's World Development Report (1979) prescribe more or less the same strategies: agricultural and industrial growth, exports, and population control. The latter report has one new point viz. emphasis on improving performance in rural economy as the key to rapid employment expansion and swifter alleviation of poverty. But these cannot abolish the gross inequality and absolute poverty in LICs. An extroverted, mechanistic, neo malthusian growth based on statistics cannot remove these evils.

(ii) This leads us to what may be termed the human resources approach which places equal emphasis on the maximization of output as well as of employment. It seeks a strategy which would increase output by utilizing the unemployed and underemployed more effectively and which would develop human resources along with urban and rural sectors. Human resources development is conceived as preparation of a labour force, nonformal education and increse in rural oriented programmes. This means training a greater number and variety of workers in more diversified programmes and stimulating employment in hitherto neglected sectors. This too is development towards a cash economy wherein work role is the key to individual status and participation in the goods of society. It is essentially economic approach, and employment creation is an economic criterion like the GNP growth. Total employment in a vast LIC would mean non or under utilization of technologies and economics of scale essential for success 'in international competetive markets. Only the latest technologies could generate the production and income which would create jobs for all.

But such technologies are less labour-intensive and highly expensive. How can a LIC afford them? Besides, such technologies and proper work-organization can produce more than is needed by all. So, why create more and more jobs instead of rearranging society so that all may share what can thus be produced, if at all a LIC can manage to afford the latest technologies and adopt proper work-organization methods?

(iii) At last in 1970 the UN Internstional Development Strategy for the II UN Development Decade proclaimed that "the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing

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opportunities to all people for a better life. --- Qualitative and structural changes in society must go hand in hand with rapid economic growth." It perceived that both social justice and productive efficiency required equitable distribution of income and wealth within a nation and among nations. This conception makes a progress over the other two, as it gives importance to equalisation, for just as liberty was the great moral imperative in the 19th century, in our time it is equality. Its added merit is that it recognises the importance of quality of life. This approach is almost the antithesis of the first. The first enjoined concentration on growth hoping that equitable income distribution would somehow follow, while this enjoins concentration on equitable distribution in development hoping that obstacles to rapid growth will be overcome gradually. Though certainly a more humane approach, it is not radical enough; because it does not appear to grasp the cause of underdevelopment.

(iv) The world Development Report (1979) of the World Bank states that " the economic health of the industrial countries is a key determinant of the growth prospects of developing nations", because the former are the principal markets for the exports of the latter and the main suppliers of external capital and technology for the latter (p. 4). So, the Report admits, the progress of developing countries partly depends on the international climate for world output trade and capital flows (p. 113) but others have shown that the former mostly if not wholly, depends on the latter. This means the economy of one group of countries conditions the development and expansion of another; there is, in other words, a relationship of interdependence among the countries of the world such that while some develop, others can only reflect their expansion. Underdevelopment has been produced by the dependence (not only economic. but political, intallectual and technological) of some dominated countries on the domianating countries, which exercise domination over the former directly or indirectly. Some Latin American thinkers were perhaps the first to recognise this fact.

Celso Furtado, a leading economist of South America, thinks underdevelopment was the result of "the technical processes and the international division of labor commanded by the smaller number of societies that espoused the Industrial Revolution of

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19th century." Thus development and underdevelopment are the two aspects of the same historical process involving the creation and spread of technology. This way of thinking pleads for a autonomous development process in the underdeveloped countries Its "primary motivating factors" would be: "technical progresscapital accumulation - structural modifications due to demand and profile changes". A reverse of this sequence would constitut a dependent development process. As technical progress " is principally a matter of the quality of the available human factors." "the developmental level of a country is a function of the sur total of the investments made in human factors." So, according to Furtado, "the point of departure of the study of developmen should--- rather (be) the horizon of aspirations of the society in question."5 This presupposes a philosophy which denies the right and destiny of a group or people to impose their domination over others, and affirms the right of all to liberation from domination, and self-determination. It expresses human solidarity of individuals as well as of people with one another, and affirms the complete and concrete living man.

J.F. Lebret put it beautifully: Development is thus a progres from a less human to a more human condition, and to have more in order to be more. (c. p. "Populorum Progressio") This is implied in Marx's idea in this Mss. that man is to be defined by what he is and not by what he has; and it can be traced to Hegel As another French writer expressed, development is mental and social change which is achieved to the extent it prepares the way for reciprocity of consciousness through reciprocity of service (Francois Perroux). Influenced by Marxist and Existentialish thought (especially Sartre, Fanon and Memmi), S. S. Adotev has defined development as "a stage in the unending creation of mankind by man, As such, it is intimately linked with every aspect of human activity, from economic growth to man's interpretation of life and his value judgements. "6 Considering the basic cause of underdevelopment to be cultural alienation, Adotevi thing cultural and national rebirth to be essential for development.

To sum up, morality must enter into the process of development; it is inappropriate to stop with the positing of goals, leave it to the politicians and planners to achieve them, and then passible judgements on the means by which they seek to achieve them.

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Choices and strategies relating to development must be determined by our conception of values. We must plan for real well-being and not prepare or perpetuate what Paul Ricoeur called an "inhuman design for quantitative well-being." All this is not profoundly original. Fiftyfive years back, L. T. Hobhouse defined "social development as the development of men in their mutual relations.", identified it with ethical development, and described it as "advancing fulfilment".7 One of the greatest anthropologists of our time, Claude Levi-Strauss, has observed that in India because of the non-availability of the basic conditions of life and the tremendous inequality which prevails, the human dimension has been destroyed and there is a permanent repudiation of the concept of human relations.8 It should be our task to find out whether this is a fact, if so to what extent, and suggest a remedy if necessary. In the words of an ancient Indian text development should be: prāna-ārāmam, mana-ānandam, śāntisamrddham (fulness of life, bliss of mind, and plentitude of peace). Let contemporary Indian Philosophy clarify these concepts and suggest ways of realising these ideals in life.

#### III

Visitors to ancient India from Megasthenes through Fa-hien and I-tsing to Hsuan-tsang found much in Indian life, thought, character and institutions, which they liked, admired and praised; and certain aspects of these commended themselves to visitors to medieval India such as Alberuni, Bernier, Tavernier, Ibn Batuta, Abdur Razzak, Varthema and Nuniz. But visitors to contemporary India like Levi-Strauss, Arthur Koestler, Ronald Segal, V. S. Naipaul, David Selbourne and Gunter Grass return back with more or less disgust and contempt. While Naipaul's condemnation of present-day Indian civilization as a "wounded" one, because it is, according to him, intellectually benighted, spiritually decadent and artistically imitative, is, of course, a grossly intemperate and unjust exaggeration regarding the civilization of a country which occupies in the world the first place in intelligence, the third in scientific and engineering manpower, the fourth in atomic energy and the tenth in the industrial front,9 why is it that every critically observant and informed foreign intellectual goes back from India today with a low opinion of its economo, political order and peoples' character and with the belief that its future is uncertain; and perhaps hopeless? Can it be attributed to prejudice? On the other hand, has any Indian visitor of the same sort to Europe, America, the Soviet Union, China or Japan, returned back with a similar feeling of disgust and contempt and a sense of hopelessness regarding any of those countries? If not, what is the reason for it? Is it just colonial mentaility, inferiority complex, or some other subjective feeling?

In 1965 appeared Ronald Segal's The Crisis of India in which he forecast a terrifying future for India. A few days ago one of our most perceptive journalists (Dr. G. K. Reddy) wrote about the present Indian crisis which, according to him, contained all the elements of a crisis of character, of purpose and of confidence, and which defied a precise definition because "it is largely a surface phenomenon of declining values in a politically permissive atmosphere ".10 If a "crisis" is defined as a situation the contradictions and incongruities of which cannot be resolved without bringing about changes which will lead to a new type of social order, it is not surprising that India has been in "crisis" for quite a long time. It will not be resolved till a new type of social order arises. But as one of our most distinguished economists, Professor D. T. Lakadwala, pointed out, " at this time we seem to have a paralysis of national will and do not seem prepared to pull ourselves out of the depressing situation11. Nothing short of total national regeneration can resolved this crisis.

On August 14 this year a high dignity expressed deep concern at the stresses and strains to which the "noble ideals of morality and conduct in public life have been subjected in recent times," and regretted that "never before had principles been compromised and basic values of life threatened with such contempt." On December 14 he pontificated in a broadcast: "Let us rise above petty considerations and bear in mind that in the ultimate analysis national interest is above everything else——— Let us subordinate short term gains to our long term national interest. "On November 30, another high dignitary voiced his "disgust" with "the happenings in the country" and announced: "The country is sunk. We have to salvage it." Now let us not ask to what

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try at extent these very important persons themselves have risen above the considerations of caste community and region and have set worthy examples to others, remembering the Upanisadic admonition that only the irreproachable actions (anavadvāni karmāni), the good deeds (sucaritāni), of elders are to be revered and practised and not the others. An ailing physician may diagnose rightly and prescribe the proper medicine; and one's practice need not necessarily conform to one's good precepts. In this case the analysis of the situation by these VIPs appears to be correct and the country can be 'salvaged' only by following their sound advice, viz., putting national interest above everything else. This can be done only when to use Confucian idiom-virtue is renovated.

Now ours, unfortunately, is a soft state, a Kleptocratic society and a chrematistic culture. These have to be transformed. It is the task of moral and social philosophy to find Some of the ways already the way or ways for doing this. suggested may be briefly mentioned.

(i) As Simone Weil wrote, it would not be sufficient to merely direct the people towards the good, they have to be provided with necessary motives for realising it. Otherwise it would be like lighting an oil lamp without putting oil into it. "A method for breathing inspiration into a people" has to be found if a nation has to be regenerated. Motives for effective action must be created through an educational method inspired by the conception of a certain form of human perfection. The unique source of salvation and greatness for a nation lies, according to her, in regaining contact with its genius in the depths of its distresss. A true conception of greatness, a proper sentiment of justice, devaluation of money and religious inspiration would lead us to a worthy conception of human perfection. For this one must have the strongest possible roots in the wide universe and this would be possible when the spiritual nature of work is realised, and this in turn is possible if one is rooted really, actively and naturally in the life of a community<sup>12</sup> (ii) Sir Richard Livingstone thought virtue can be inculcated through moral education, which is "impossible without the habitual vision of greatness" (Whitehead) which we find in the Bible, literature and history; but then, he added, virtue is to be acquired only by practising it

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(Aristotle). (iii) While Kant equated being moral with being a rational and free being who follows rules in a rational discri minating manner, Hegel believed that man could be made more by making spiritual nature habitual, which, for him, meant renunciation of oneself and doing obedient service to the social whole. In recent years R. S. Peters took over the Kantian ide and discussed how to develop an autonomous type of character by initiation into the traditions of traditional thought, and Scheffer discussed how to achieve person modification (his jargon for personal transformation) by getting one to behave according to norms. (iv) Herethe question which Myrdal raised is relevant can there be intellectual and moral conversion-a change in attitudes-without changing social institutions? He thinks this is the basic dilemma and challenge of Indian politics. It may be recalled that while Gandhi thought that the individual's internal transformation and his moral and spiritual improvement should come first and that thereby the social environment could be changed, Nehru held that the social environment must first be changed and that only then can the moral man be achieved. Consequently Gandhi spoke of non-violent conversion and Nehru of coercion 13 Schweitzer's ideas are closer to Gandhi's. Ethical and spiritual progress must only be an internal process; institutions and science can not contribute to them. The individual is the sole agent for restoration of civilization. Individuals must think independently, produce new spiritual-ethical ideas and work for their diffusion. When unobtrusive general changes take place in the dispositions of many individuals and thereby a new tone of mind comes into being in them, Schweitzer' thinks, it will gradully influence the collective. Free, thinking men can be the pioneers of progress; they should, he says, think out ideals, then fit them to the realities of life in such a way they influence most effectively the circumstances of the time.

(v) P. A. Sorokin carried on a good deal of research and bestowed much thought on the moral transformation of man and man-made universe. This can be achieved, he concluded, by changing human egos, values and group affiliations, and by control of the conscious and unconscious biological drives by adaptation of the techniques of (a) Yoga, (b) Christian monasticism and (c) secular brotherhood communities or altruistic groups

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lapticism oups. He has his own practical plan to realize the ideal of pacified humanity, as a number of others have. (vi) Most drastic and innovative of all is the behavioural technology of B. F. Skinner. This consists in conditioning the human being who is now free to be agressive, immoral and destructive. When appropriately conditioned he would be free only to love, care, and be sympathetic and compassionate; and the capacities for these are his natural endowment, his genetic inheritance. Skinner thinks it is possible and desirable to design a new world and new culture This, of course, is possible only by replacing humn freedom with benevolent control over man, his conduct and his environment. Such a world may not be liked by us, but it will be by those who live in it.14 In addition to modification of environment, this way of thinking finds nothing wrong in physically and chemically intervening into the central nervous system in order to transform a human being into one who is only capable of being good. Whether behavioural technology is possible on a largescale and whether it is desirable and moral,-these are again questions which philosophy must tackle.

The question whether moral education is of any use in our society deserves discussion. Knowledge of moral rules of conduct does not entail their being followed; only in authoritarian societies where they are strictly enforced their knowledge is effective. Only by participation in social life and work can moral traits be acquired; and the only effective way of moral instruction is to learn by living. This the view of Dewey and Froebal, almost similar to the Aristotelean view already mentioned. Studies by Hartshorne and May, Havinghurst and others and Hendry showed that there was little correlation between moral education and moral behaviour; and Kohlberge's investigation makes it doubtful whether moral character can be instilled as a good habit by training. What then is the solution ? I have indicated these various issues to show that it is possible for us to engage ourselves in new lines of work which are of great relevance in solving the present national crisis.

I am delighted this session of our Congress is being presided by professor S. S. Barlingay. He has made important contributions to logic, social philosophy and analysis of concepts, and has endeavoured to be a Gandhian not only in theory but in life. He has helped in establishing and running peoples' colleges in the ol Nizam's state, and has the great distinction of building up the philosophy department of Poona University as the leading one is Western India. Undoubtedly he is one of our most eminer colleagues. Under his presidency this session should prove to be a highly successful one.

Department of Philosophy Andhra University Waltair K. Satchidananda Murti

#### NOTES

- 1. "a general theory of efficient action"
- 2. Keynes, "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren" (1930), in Essays in Persuasion (1932).
- 3. Presidential Address to the Royal Economic Society,
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- Obstacles to Development in Latin America, New York, 1970. pp. XVI, 139, 197, 136.

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- 6. A Critical Look at Development Some Young People's Views, Unesco 1973. Adotevi is e Dahomian sociologist and man of letters.
- 7. Social Development, London, 1924, pp. 76, 89, 87
- 8. Tristes Tropiques, Penguins, 1976, pp. 183. 174, 171.
- 9. This was the position in May 1978.
- 10 The Hindu, December 2, 1979.
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- 12. The Need for Roots, Boston, 1955.
- 13. J. Nehru, An Autobiograpoy, London, 1958, pp. 521-3-551.
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#### \*THE EMERGENCY-THE WAY OUT

It is indeed presumptuous on my part to write on the Emergency: I am so far away from the centre of things. However, to be far away from the centre of things need not be a disadvantage. And though I have views different from those generally held in certain circles, in conversations with individuals and groups, I have been able to provoke discussion and thought, and sometimes even a certain degree of persuasion. It is these factors that have made me bold enough to put in writing my understanding of the Emergency.

#### (1) Some general considerations:

The understanding of the pre-Emergency situation, the Emergency situation, the continuation and development of the Emergency and the end of the Emergency are interrelated and not only in one direction. Not only does the past enable us to understand the present and the future, but the developments in the future have a bearing on our understanding of the past and also the reality of the past. If so, the way we develop the future is important in deciding what we shall make of the situation from the pre-Emergency period to the end of the Emergency.

#### (2) The Pre-Emergency situation:

All the sections of the society—the businessmen, the bureaucrats, the professionals, the politicians (the Prime Minister also was aware of this, and even if she wanted to do something about it, could not do anything about it; or did not know what to do about it) and the people—were corrupt. In fact with corruption went affluence and honour; and with honesty, hardship and ridicule. Every section wanted some other section to be honest. No section dared to be uncorrupt first lest it should lose its power and position.

However, the pressure of circumstances had created a situation in which the system could not absorb the ever increasing numbers of new entrants to the system. This development

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presented a two-fold opportunity; an opportunity for understanding; an opportunity for action. The development of the situation to the breaking point crystallises the situation and makes it less difficult to identify the roots of the trouble. The development also gave an opportunity for mobilisation of discontent and action. However, understanding and action need not go together. Those who understand need not act; and those who act may have wrong understanding, or may have no understanding. If action is without true understanding; it will be, whatever one's intentions, merely fishing in troubled waters; and it is very unlikely that it will bring about improvement. It may happen, though that its unintened concequences may be improvement or a serious worsening of the situation. And this is what happened in the context of our pre-Emergency situation.

#### (3) The mobilisation of discontent:

The situation was understood as one of corruption in high places spreading downwards to all levels and in all aspects of life. It was not asked why there was corruption in all places, or if it was asked, the answer was perceived to lie in the corrupt persons in high places. The problem therefore, was to remove the corrupt persons from high places; and replace them by honest people. (It was forgotten that many of the corrupt people today were honest at one time, and therefore it was not asked: how long will the new people remain honest?) The temptation to make the best of the opportunity to mobilise the discontent was so great, that a consideration of these questions was thought to be unnecessary. And, therefore, the opportunity was seized to mobilise the discontent. This is what J. P. did, and with his prestige and personality he was to mobilise the discontent. The mobilisation having been achieved, it did not produce the desired result. Along with other factors, it only brought on the emergency. Even if it was not clear then, it should be clear now that the movement was wrong both in practice and theory.

#### (4) The causes of the failure:

#### (i) The practical aspect:

Whatever the subjective sincerity and honesty of some of the leaders of the movement (and some of them indisputably had these,) in terms of public morality they did not know what was

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needed to fight corruption. First, in order to ask others to be uncorrupt, one should make oneself uncorrupt in some way. Second, the demand to make oneself uncorrupt should not demand too much; it should be a demand which many could fulfil, for example, the demand to give up one's bogus ration units; the demand to give up one's foreign watches. This sort of thing would create a mass awareness and a climate which would lead on to further developments. Instead, the leaders of the movement, J. P. among them, were very eager to get results and they accepted whatever kind of support they could get without examining its bonafides.

### (ii) The theoretical aspect

However, the greater failure was in understanding the basis of corruption – that the society had lost consciousness of even the minimum objectives of its many institutions – educational, economic and social. In this situation, it is not easy to distinguish between what is corrupt and what is uncorrupt: Anything could be presented as corrupt or as uncorrupt according to one's interests and inclinations. For example, one might argue that one should select a teacher with high sophistication and the latest information, and on the other hand one might argue that such sophistication would be frustrating both to the teacher and the studnts. Thus, it was not the objectives of the institutions that provided the frame work within which selfinterest was sought rather the self interest conceived in the narrow and immediate sense was the frame work; and the objectives of the institutions had only a nominal place, or at best, a marginal place.

(iii) On account of the foregoing factors, the movement became an agitation with no power to improve, but a great power to disrupt. This provided the authorities with considerable justification for drastically dealing with the situation.

#### (5) The Emergency:

(i) Apart from the judgement of the Allahabad High Court there was sufficient justification for the declaration of Emergency. The judgement of the Allahabad High Court greatly increased the power of the agitation to distrupt, and made it imperative in the interests of the State and the Society as a whole. This judgement

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is independent of the motive of the Prime Minister in declaration the Emergency (One's judgement of the motives of the PM was depend on several factors.) To serve her own interests could have been the sole or the main motive of the Prime Minister Equally well, her sole or main motive could have been to seen the interests of the State and the Society. Very likely, both the motives were present, not merely existing side by side by organically interconnected in a complex way. Surely, to theoretical or the practical political point of the debate is completed to the debate is completed.

- (ii) But what right did the Prime Minister have to declar the Emergency, if she was herself a part of the corrupt system and perhaps its leader? (At least, she could not preve corruption.) But who or what provides such a right? The right was provided by the readiness to seize the opportunity; or rather to make situation into an opportunity and the acceptance of a the risks that go along with it; and by the fact that there was one else ready to seize the opportunity or to accept the risks.
- (iii) This right was further strengthened by the enunciation of the twenty-point programme. It is true that it was a something very new. What was new was that the programme mollised attention on some of the minimum objectives the social should attain. Also, the machinery of the State and, to a smeathent of the party was set in motion towards the fulfilment of the programme. Thus the Emergency, the use of force, focus attention on the minimum objectives of the Society, and mel need which the agitation against corruption failed to meet a creating a moral awareness of these minimum objectives.
- (iv) As part of the twenty-point programme, measures had been taken which have brought about very welcome relit welcome to almost all sections of society (the most importal exception being the intellectuals); and worth while results had followed in the economic and the social fields.

### 6 A. The objections to the Emergency or the Problems of Emergency.

However, the welcome to the Emergency is not universand objections have been raised to it on several grounds.

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### (i) On the ground of the negation of democracy.

The most serious objection to the Emergency has been that it has meant the suspension of fundamental rights, the negation of democracy. But this objection should not be accepted at its face-value; it needs to be examined. The fundamental rights never functioned as democratic rights - the right to participate in the articulation of the consciousness of the society, and thus to help in the formulation of the policies of the state and other institutions and to give direction to them. This was done. if at all, marginally. Rather, the fundamental rights were used to gurd the interests, at best of the fifty millions as against the interests of the 550 millions; that is to guard the interests of those who were benefitting from the system, from the conspiracy. The elite of this country - the intellectuals, the administrators, the exicutives, the businessmen, the industrialists, and the politicians - have salvaged their conscience by speaking about the poor of the country, and have feathered their nest by framing policies which do not keep the poor of this country even remotely in mind. This is the system and the conspiracy. Consider the developments in various fields like education, agriculture, transport, industry housing and this should become very clear. Whatever might or might not have been the subjective intentions, objectively the fundamental rights functioned as a cover for the interests of the few. There is no reason to believe that the restoration of these rights will lead to any different resultsthis is said not to advocate a long or permanent suspension of the rights, but to point out that the way out of the Emergency is not through the restoration of the fundamental rights.

### (ii) On the ground of deleterious effects.

The Prime Minister was brought up in a certain tradition, and therefore, she may not have dictatorial intentions; but the country may not be in such a happy position on future occasion. Other parties and their leaders may use this precedent to establish dictatorial governments. The effect of the Emergency on the younger generation is also likely to produce similar trends.

### (iii) On the grounds of the misuse of the Emergency.

There is a grave danger that the emergency will be misused to settle the personal scores, prejudices and conflicts. This is not CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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only a danger, but actuality, and one can argue only about in extent.

### (6) B. Considering the objections.

- (i) To answer the second objection first, one must clarify and understand the circumstances which led to the declaration of the Emergency. There was an absence of conciousness of the minimum objectives of the society. Only the existence of such or similar conditions would justify the imposition of such restrictions—not only now, but also in the future. This must be clearly understood and emphasised. (The possible misuse of antibiotic should not prevent us from using them when the real need ha arisen.)
- (ii) Fundamental rights can function democratically only within a framework of objectives for the various institutions, ever a framework of competing objectives. When that does not exist by tradition or reflection, the fundamental rights become the instruments of the self-interest of a small minority
- (iii) There can be no doubt about the need to minimise the misuse of the emergency powers for settling personal scores, etc and means must be devised to attain that purpose.

### (6) C. The real objection

If the imposition of emergency is justified if the risks of the Impositions of the emergency are less than the risks of not imposing the emergency—then the objections we have considered are not good objections. The real objection to Emergency could be to the manner of its operation. If its operation makes it more necessary, then its operation is objectionable. If its operation makes it less necessary, then it is not objectionable. To make the emergency unnecessary, it is enough that the programme of the Emergency be fulfilled; it is much more important that the people should be involved in the fulfilment of the programme and become conscious of, besides their personal ends, the objectives of institutions.

In so far as its operation is fundamentally based on the bureaucracy and the police, the people will have to accept their authority and force will determine the objectives of the society and the social institutions. This will not develop the moral aware-

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ness of the society; and so the Emergency will continue to be necessary. If this is not to happen, ways and means have to be faund to associate the people with the fulfilment of the programme and the formulation of the objectives of the society and the social institutions. This will impose on people the discipline of the objectives, and not of the authority of the bureaucracy or the police. This will put the various sections of the society to the test regarding their sincerity in transforming the system. How s this to be brought about?

### (7) How to make the Emergency unnecessary?

(i) Association of the people in the enforcement of the Emergency:

There must be ways in which people can take an active part in the enforcement of the emergency situation and the achievement of the objectives of the emergency situation. This would mean the undertaking of such voluntary programmes as the surrender of bogus ration units; the boycott of smuggled goods the prevention of waste say in hostels; the development of right attitudes towards social and economic offenders; the social disapproval of large families and so on. It would also mean the devising of ways and means by which a check could be exercised also on the malpractices in the very enforcement of the emergency—letting people off or letting them off lightly for financial or other considerations; as also continuing the corrupt practices that have existed so far. He would indeed be bold who could say that these have disappeared, or even that they will disappear in course of time. Nonetheless, these need to be checked.

(ii) The need for formulation of goals of other Institutions:

To create an awareness of the goals of institutions and to foster people's participation, it is necessary to formulate programmes of educational, economic transport and other institutions with reference to the minimum objectives they should attain (just as the twenty-point programme has done in economic matters for the State). The reasons for emphasising the minimum objectives are—

(a) That even the awareness that institutions have objective has been lost,

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- (b) There will be some agreement about the minimum objectives, and
- (c) The attainment of these objectives will lay the foundations of these institutions for further development. For example, in the case of education, instead of formulating the ideal objectives; it would be worth while to formulate minimum objectives; say, a limited determined attempt to make our problems the content of our education. (This has to be distinguished from making only our data the content of "their" problems)

### (iii) The difficulties

However, there are difficulties in bringing about the two result mentioned above in this section. I shall mention, what according to me are two important difficulties. One is that those who are enjoying the powers of the Emergency, may deny participation to the people for one reason or another. But in the final analysis it will be for the perpetuation of the Emergency or the perpetuation of their own power. And it is this that is the real and the most serious misuse of the Emergency, and not the misuse involved in settling personal scores.

The other important difficulty is on account of the attitude of the intellectuals. The intellectualist understanding of the Emergency is negative; and according to them nothing much can be done unless the fundamental rights are restored, elections take place (may be under new constitutional safeguards) and the situation is normalised. Until such time as this takes place, the only thing that they are prepared to do is to grumble. But to think that this is the way out of the emergency, as I have tried to say, is a misunderstanding. It is a noncommittal response seeking to have advantage of both the worlds—opposing supporting. In reality is neither, and is likely to lead to confusion and disaster. It is the surject way to either military dictatorship or chaos or both.

What is more, the intellectuals must realise what they ow to the society something more than grumbling. In all honesty they should either oppose the emergency or support it. If the want to follow the former course, they must begin their planning though I think it is unlikely that they would succeed in getting

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any mass support. If they want to support the Emergency, then they must turn the twenty-point programme into a people's programme. Whichever of these two courses is adopted, it will clarify the situation. What are the issues the government is concerned with—its own power or the programme? What are the supporters of the government concerned with—the bandwagon or the programme? What are the critics of the government concerned with—slogans or the programe? This crystallisation will help the country to face its problems with purpose and confidence.

### (8) The Programme

If I am right, then the most fruitful course, is to create a minimum programme in various fields and institutions. In this, the Sammelan of the Acharyas caniplay no small part.\* And even in the implementation of the programme they have a role to play. By accepting this role, they can create a consciousness of the minimum objectives of institutions; they can restore the moral foundations of the community; they can help create a situation where the Emergency will have become unnecessary. Surely, this is the best way both of supporting and of defeating the Emergency. (For some further considerations on the programme Please see the appendix.)

### 9. Some general considerations once again:

The entire exercise of writing this paper presupposes that our problem is basically at the level of society and not at the level of the State. It is true that the state and the society are inseparably interelated. However, it is also true that a community's ills may be primarily due either to the ills of the society or to the ills of the State. And our understanding also which is the primary factor will determine the remedy we seek. In my view, our ills are primarily not of the State; therefore, changes in the state machinery or its operations are not likely to meet the situation. In my view, our problems are primarily of the society. If this is so, the Emergency, which operates mainly on the state power, can meet the situation only for a very short period. For a more

<sup>\*</sup> It was the consensus of the Acharyas that stimulated me to put down these thoughts on paper.

fundamental and long term change, the changes must be brough about with public support. If I am right, then the Acharyas and intellectuals have a very important role to play. The role the play will determine not only what the future will be but also what the past will be.

#### AN APPENDIX:

#### Some further remarks on method:

I am very conscious of the fact that I have not worked out; programme; and without a workable programme my whok argument is seriously affected. One reason I have not done so is that I cannot do so except perhaps in the field of education only in the field of education, do I have an intimate knowledge to be able to give a programme. Here I shall give some main points of a programme in higher education, and work out a mon detailed programme later on.

- (i) The most fundamental problem in our education is to orient its content towards our problems. This does not mean giving Indian content to somebody elses' problems. A true perception of our problems requires both an understanding of the present situation and an understanding of the future one is striving for. (It is important to point out that the understanding of the present and the understanding of the future are not independent but organically related and they mutually influence and even determine each other.)
- (ii) About the future we are striving for there are two important questions:
- (a) are we planning a future for 600 millions or for 16 millions?
- (b) are we envisaging the future inevitably in terms of the contemporary West or is there an alternative? The answers to these two questions are not independent of each other.
- (iii) Whatever the answers; orienting the content of our syllabi is not a mechanical problem, but a creative problem. One cannot order people to be creative, but one can facilitate creativity. This can be done by introducing at the post-graduate

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f our One eatiduate level experimental courses directed towards attaining the orientation. Such experimentation should be with reference to only one or two subjects. This will mean flexibility in the planning and sanctioning of such courses.

- (a) It is important to note the limited nature of the experiment. It is to be there only at the postgraduate level. It is not to be with reference to the entire course, but only one or two courses. The power to do good is in any case limited for many reasons; this approach reduces the almost unlimited power to do harm.
- (b) If the thinking behind this proposal is right, in the absence of the right orientation, other proposals for reform either lose their point or become mere diversions and evasions; e. g. the proposals for the semester system, the examination system, the M. Phil. programme, the Multi-disciplinary and the interdisciplinery programme and so on. Thus the programme of rojentation has to be limited in this sense also.
- (c) Yet, this is only the beginning. The experiment could be expanded in two important directions. One, at the end of a year the teachers of courses that fall into a group should be brought together to discuss and plan out essays or a book. makes material available even for our undergraduate courses. Two; when certain successes are gained; the number of experimental courses can be increased.
- (d) It has the great merit that the orientation should not begin with a view to embarass the government. In this situation of mutual loss of credibility, attempts have to be made so that credibility is re-established. Where this point is not borne in mind, there are bound to be misgivings about the practicability of any programme to involve people in a voluntary programme.
- (iv) Even in the field of education, we have discussed here only one proposal to bring out some general features which it is necessary to keep in mind.

Karnatak University, Dharwar-3.

K. J. Shah,

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## THE PURUSHARTHAS IN THE LIGHT OF CRITICAL THEORY

### Introduction

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The present essay is an attempt at formulating a possible understanding of the doctrine of the four puruharthas in the light of the basic principles of Critical Theory as found in the work of Jurgen Habermas, particulary in his "Knowledge and Human Interests". Since what it hopes for is the suggestion of a new perspective on an old philosophical conception, I would like to make it very clear at the outset, that, as the discussion stands at present I would not like to claim interpretative validity for what I do. I believe that a re-study of the texts may, perhaps, even substantiate the views I would like to be considered; but I do not want to make that claim here and now. If the conception is found philosphically acceptable perhaps, one could undertake such a textual re-study, afterwards; I would, hence, like to examine the philosophical credibility of the proposed conception. A similar prefatory remark concerning critical theory is in order. Here again I am not expounding or interpreting the texts of Habermas as they exist; I do not want to make that sort of claim with regard to critical theory either; I just want to make use of the formulation of the philosophical problem suggested by Habermas and I alsoi believe that if the doctrine of the purusarths is formulated under the auspices of the Critical Theory, so to say then it seems to me we can more easily come to see the relevance of the doctrine. course, I am not suggesting that this is the only way, or even the best way, of bringing the relevance of the conception into focus-Also I do not want to suggest that this attempt would in any way assimilate the Indian doctrine to Critical Theory; Critical Theory is not the active catalyst which brings the classical Indian conception to life and relevance; rather, I belive that in the process the contours of Critical Theory also might change it also may acqire a new relevance in the process of reciprocal illumination, such that, afterwards when one begins to carry on the discussion of Critical Theory, one may perhaps increase the depth of its insights. But one thing I firmly believe namely that at this level, it is

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possible to hope for a reciprocal illumination and re-vitalization of some classical Indian and some contemporary western image of man.

According to Habermas, one of the fundamental tasks facing us at the level of theory of knowldge is to work out a new conception of the proper relationship between knowledge and human interests; negatively, this task takes the form of a critique of instrumental rationality, but positively, one can hope to have such a new theory of reason and cognition only on the basis of a philosophically articulated conception of man, of human nature. which would provide a foundation to the sought- for essential relationship between knowledge and human interests. In this, the epistemological task the working out of an adequate theory of rationality presupposes a foundation in philosophical anthropological conception of man. But, he holds, we also have to face a third task, or a third aspect of our fundamental task, namely, an ontological one. As he shows in "Theory and Practice" there is, at one level, a secret or hidden affinity between the classical Greek conception of Theory and the positivistic conception of value neutral rationality; both of them presuppose an ontological objectivism - the view that there is an independent order of nature, of facts, which is objectively there independent of human interests and that the task of theory is to achieve as adequate a comprehension of this objective, independent world order as possible. He argues that this classical objectivism is the source of the demand for the separation of knowledge from life interests, for given that there is such an ,objective order independent and self sufficient, it would follow that the introduction of interests would only allow an element of subjectivity, or anthropomorphism into the life of reason. Reason, if it is to be adequate to the comprehension of such an independent order of things, must undergo a catharsis of pur ification from all impulse desire or interests. Habermas now argues that we must, at the ultimate level of images of the world, displace the objectivism and in its place, work out an ontology of constitution of the objective world by way of the interests of reason; we must, in other words take a turn towards tr a nscendental philosophy of the type of Kant.

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I now wish to use this three fold formulation of the philosophical task as the basis for developing a perspective on the doctrine of purusharthas. If the above analysis is accepted as a point of departure then we have to formulate our problems at three levels: at level of philosophical anthropology, we must sketch out a view or conception of man, which at the level of theory of knowledge would provide us with a theory of rationality which would formulate in a proper and adequate manner the relationship of knowledge and human interests. On the basis of such epistemological analysis of the constitutive role of interests, we can, at the ontological level, take up the project of Critique, i. e. work out a theory of the transcendental constitution of the world of experience by way of these knowledge-constitutive interests If this is the formulation of the structure of our philosophical tasks, I suggest that we may begin to work out the theory of purusharthas in such a way that it provides us a basis for the solution of these tasks. If and when this is done, the doctrine of purusharthas would not be, any longer, a mere incidental or secondary insight, but would become the ground of the possibility of any adequate philosophy, Eastern or Western.

Men, it is said, are distinguished from other natural beings in as much as men are species-beings. In this idea of a species-being, two things are involved. Firstly individual men are members of the class or species men, but secondly, not only do they have a class membership, but they also have an awareness of their membership, of their species character. Individual men know themselves as human. This awareness of their humanity is not, however, an awareness which they have apart from or in addition to their awareness of themselves. On the contrary, their sense of identity is made possible only because they have this sense of species-being. The self consciousness awareness of being a person, the idea of personal identity is possible only in terms of an acceptance, recognition and life with others.

This identity, therefore, is an achievement and not an innate or instinctive possession. Also, this achievement while it is experienced in cognitive terms as the self – awareness of an individual, is yet something which is materially grounded in their actions and interactions with nature, with others and with themselves. The sense of identity, the awareness of self reflectives

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personhood is something which is shaped and formed by 1 structures of life. Men have to shape themselves as humani their interaction with the external world, in their social an communicational intercations with others and in the experience of power, domination and subjugation. Work, Interaction and Power are the contexts which shape and structure the identifi and self awareness of human beings; but these contexts are no to be taken as separate and forming the identity of huma subjects serially rather, they are to be taken as a total an simultaneous gestalt of formative forces. Indeed, it is this compresence which defines a form of life as human. too are under the nature imposed necessity of having to comet terms with the exigencies of their environment; similary, the also have a sort of togetherness or herd life and they too at subject to the ravages of predation. But what constitutes the human form of life as human is the interpenetration, the Men's dealings will simultaneity of these formative influences. nature are not merely a biological or natural metabolism will objects, but as work precisely in so far as this exchange will nature is mediated by way of social relationships and social understandings. The order of communication, the moral order enters into the order of material exchange and transforms it into work as labour. Similary, the moral or cultural order too not experienced as an "angelic "or free and unfettered proces of mutual recognition and respect. It also is mediated by the inequalities and divisiveness imposed by the production relation thereby shaping the peculiarly human experience of exploitation deprivation and social injustice. Each context as it were form and is formed by the others and thus by their simultaneous co presence gives a distinctive categorial specificity to huma experience. Similarly the sheer clan of being alive is als transformed into a specifically human mode of experience, whe mere life gets conceptualized and acknowledged in moral culturs terms as a value, when men seek not merely life, but good life The distinctiveness, the peculiar humanity of our experience therefore the result of the formative influnce of the contexts.

These are purusarthas in the sense of being transcendentall priori constitutive grounds of a from of life that can be regarded as human. They are not merely empirical motivations of motivations of motivations.

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but, rather they constitute our distinctive humanity. We are men only in so far as our experience and life are grounded in these formative contexts. Hence to recognise any being as human is to consider him under the form of these orientations, as a being who sees himself in terms of a striving after these, as one who recognises in himself the authority of these. They are the grounds of the possibility of our humanity and it is they, in their simultaneity, which distinguishes us as men, as human. I said, "in their simultaneity" because in every one of our actions and experiences. they are all constitutively involved. To sunder one from the other is precisely to negate it as a purusartha, as a human constitutive orientation. Kama without artha, dharma and moksa, for instance, would not be human happiness or pleasure but would define merely the life of animal impulse. What makes Kama a human aspiration is precisely the mediation by the rest. forms of mediation may differ from one purusartha to the next for instance, the way in which Kama enters into moksa would be different from the ways in which it enters into dharma or artha; similarly there would be different forms of mediation and one can indeed begin to sketch out a fascinating phenomenology of these mediations. Such a phenomenology may provide the ground work for a new philosophical anthropology but for the present I merely wish to emphasise the necessity of mediation with respect to each one of the purusarthas.

The doctrine of the purusarthas, in this understanding, is to be taken as the conclusion of a transcendental mode of argument; given the distinctively human form of life, we ask regressively, as to the grounds of its possibility. An experience and form of life could be recognisably human only in so far as it is understood as determined by the structure of these four-fold aspirations. Only in so for as we recognise the authority and pull of these aspirations, can any effort or desire or want or wish could be In this sense, the pursarthas are the regarded as human. grounds of the possibility of human life. This means to that they are constitutive of us, they are the arthas which are recognisable as peculiarly human.

But understood in this sense what they define is the transcendental a priori framework of human life and to this extent, considered purely in their purely a priori or 'formal' aspect, they CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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lental! garde of me have a universality and necessity about them. All forms of experience and effort in so far as they claim to be human, must be formed by them: it would be a transcendental impossibility (not of course, a logical impossibility or a contradiction) to conceive of human beings to whom they would have no appli-In this sense, they have a strict universality necessity about them like the kantian categories. But this does not mean that the particular content or significance which goes into them the specific 'material' interpretation of this framework also must be necessary and invitant. Indeed, the content is variable and relative contingent upon a host of other historically determined factors, social, cultural and temparamental. To be more specific, all men, merely by being human, experience terror repression, violence and coercion and all men also have the dream and pursuit of emancipation. The experience of bondage and the idea and aspiration of emancipation are indeed one of the framework principles of our common humanity such that if we were to meet with a man who has never felt the burden of the one and the longing for the other, who has known no terror nor hope, I think it would be an extremely uncanny encounter. Such a one would fill us with an unnameable anxiety and unease. But this does not at all prevent different men and different groups of men having different ideas about bondage and emancipation. The context which goes into the form may have a wide range of variability. Some may see bondage as being in thrall under cosmic forces, others in terms of social oppression and tyranny and yet others may see it in terms of dark, inner compulsions within the self. Similarly, the content of the emancipatory passion also would show a very rich diversity and variability. But for all that, the forms are invariably constitutive of our humanity. with the other purusarthas; they are the framework principles which constitute or define the specifically human mode of being in the world.

If this is so, then they must also be the grounds of our the int cognitive powers and capacities. They must be the human The co structural contexts which give orientation to knowledge - they to are the matrix for the knowledge - constitutive interests. Kami interest Artha, Dharma and Moksa ground the aesthetic, the technical, the I.P. Q moral communicational and the emancipatory interests of reason,

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But here we must be careful to avoid a misleading linearity which may tempt us to think of the purusarthas as conditioning the forms of reason as a cause determines or conditions an effect. Reason is not a mere faculty or instrumental capacity of men; being their essence, there is nothing in human beings which is untouched by it. There is no mere brute impulse or animal drive or instinct in man. For Reason being the form or essence of a living, human individual, it is present even in the life of impulse and desire. Even human sensibility is a formed sensibility, which has been shaped by the pure forms and categories of the under standing. Sense experience is not a mere raw, non - rational encounter with objects, but is a product of the constitutive role of the subject. Hence impulse and desire also show the stamp of the constitutive productivity of reason. We can never understand man as an animal with rationality added; he is a different kind of totality is which the fact of reflective consciousness leaves nothing else unaltered: the feelings, desires and even the instinct for self-preservation of a reflective being must be different from those of other animals. This is what we must accept if we take seriously the view that reason is man's essence. But then, we cannot think of the purusarthas as some how separate and apart from rationality. If it is true to say that the purusarthas ground the interests of reason, it is equally true to say that the purusarthas are forms of reason also. But this reason is ofcourse not the instrumental rationality of means end calculations, but it is reason as constitutive. The purusarthas are not apart from reason, but they exemplify the fourfold way in which reason constitutes our humanity. I suggest that the doctrine of the purnsarthas may be looked upon as the phenomenology of constitutive reason.

The relationship between knowledge or reason and interests must be understood differently from the way of pragmatism. For pragmatism has a conception of reason and intellect as essentially a problem-solving power or capacity, and accordingly f ou the intervention of reason is seen merely in its technical role. uman The conception of reason is still an instrumentalist one. In order they to distinguish our present conception of knowledge and on Kams interest, we may distinguish between the regulative and ca does al, the I. P. O ... 3

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tive role of interests. The difference from pragmatism they do is not merely that it has a less comprehensive or one-side causal n conception of practice and action, but rather that in so far a subject's knowledge is seen in instrumentalist terms, the conception practice itself would be vitiated or distorted; a comparison with simple a the Kantian critique of empiricism may be in order here. Kan of a var did not merely hold that the empiricists have a partial or incom cultural plete picture of human experience to which certain rational ele a recogn ments of the understanding must be added; rather his point wa experien that in so far as experience itself presupposes certain nonemitare frag rical conditions of its possibility, the empiricists have a categosi unity an ally inadequate conception of experience itself, Similarly her only the too, the point to note in connection with pragmatism is that popportu conception of practice and not merely its conception of theor merely a s defective.

But to return to the major implications of our analysis, for a to have been suggesting that each one of these orientations see ever constitutively present in our experience such that we must se of sensi them as compresent formative influences. No experience would s context of experience merely exemplifies one purusartha i moral p isolation; for purposes of theoretical analysis, we may have speak as if each one of them could act in isolation; we may have mislead by this distinguishability into taking them to speeded to mislead by this distinguishability into taking them to needed separable presences or powers. But this is to confuse the order of the o analytical distinction with the order of real powers. In reality, awarene every one of our experiences, all the four orientations are activablects and it is this conjoint action that gives a specific 'humanity' training our experiences, they shape our experiences as constitutiformatic gestalts.

I have already stressed this point, but now we can mol Giv onto another. Not being merely objective or causal powers, bappropr orientations upon thought and action, being interests of reason existing they become operative only in so far as there is a recognition, possibil awareness of their presence and authority over our lives. Itland m only in so far as the subjects recognise these orientations a subjects are the d them legitimacy can they function in their constitution arrange Dike the power of language, their power and authorithan ce moral com ends upon a subjective recognition and appropriation, it they do not act behind the backs of human subjects, like blind sale causal necessities but they become effective only in terms of the far a subject's own formation of the will.

ion d This subjective recognition and appropriation in turn is no n wit simple act of theoretical insight; it depends upon a conjuncture . Kan of a variety of factors and circumstances, individual and socioncom cultural. For one thing, there must be an opportunity for such al ele a recognition, an objective possibility for seeing our lives and It was experiences in the round, as it were. In so far as our experiences nemriare fragmented and we live in different wolds, with no sense of egosi unity and totality of our form of life, in so far as we experience y her only the serial order of our lives, we would not be having even an that i opportunity or occasion for the comprehension of totality. But theor merely an objective possibility or situational opportunity must be matched with a certain sensitivity of reflection, a certain capacity lysis: for a totalistic comprehension, a kind of imaginative capacity to ions see every experience in terms of all the four contexts. This kind nust se of sensitivity demands at once a certain purity and charity which nce would see the component of moksa in every one of our actions, a tha i moral perception which would see its dharma element, a realistic have and mundane intelligence to be sensitive to its artha dimension may and lastly an aesthetic taste and sensibility for its kama element, Such a multiformed sensibility and plasticity of understanding is needed for the subjective recognition of the constitutive presence of the orientations. But this kind of sensititive and discriminating awareness has to be nurtured and developed in the individual e acti subjects, for it depends upon equipment skills and learning and nity training, and lastly there is also the question of motivation, of the stituth formation of will - this, fundamentally is a matter of life acceptance, a yea-saying to the form of our lives.

Given the objective and subjective conditions of the full ters, happropriation of these orientations, it could be seen that no reasof existing social system or arrangement of life allows us the full tion, spossibility of such a recognition; all systems of social life cripple wes. It and mutilate such recognition and thereby dehumanise the ons assubjects, but there are relative possibilities of a particular social stitutifarrangement giving us more of an access to such a recognition without than certain other social arrangements. To the extent it does oriation, it would be preferable as a more humane order of life.

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I have been suggesting that we must look upon these interests, not merely as regulative for our life and thought, but constitutive of our experiences. In conclusion, I would like say something more about this constitutive function. Sur interests are said to be knowledge - constitutive, firstly became they function as criteria of relevance or significance. Minimalh they act as the standards of what is proper and appropriate in context. But they also function constitutively in so far as the determine the type of concepts and categories with which articulate the problem. The orientations function with regard to inquiry as criteria of conceptual and categorial formulation. By the doctr the interests of reason also function, at the third level, as stan as a nati dards of warranted assertability, as criteria of justification; the so lar as determine the proof procedures as well as the type and meaning they nec of tests. They thus determine the rational acceptability of the rity; the different claims. But merely to see the constitutive role of the whose in interests upto this point and not take up the question of the independent constitution of the objects of experience would be to leaves being in residue of fundamental arbitrariness about it. For if the object form of are beyond the pale of these interests, if they are untouched by finds full them, then it would appear that these interests in so far as the structure influence reason only take it further and further away from prefigure truth. If the interests are merely so many influences upon out thinking and if the objects of knowledge are independent of subject is them, then it would appear that we must overcome the distor the mora ting effects of these subjective prejudices. In such terms the and no would only be sources of error and bias, something like Bacon's made po idols. But these interests, I have been claiming are knowledge certainly constitutive and it would appear that they can be so regarded sense of only if they are constitutive of the objects also.

But it may be felt that if reason is to be seen as constituting the objects also, then it might be thought that we are back in 3 philosophy of Absolute Idealism. But not really so, if we keep the essential turn of the Kantain philosophy at this critical point Kant's commitment to the things in themselves is, I had argued elsewhere, not an, irrational and irrelevant 'dogmatic' prejudice, but it precisely provides the ground for affirming the transcendental constitutive role of reason as he understands it. As I put it elsewhere, the doctrine of the things-in-themselves is a kind of meta-transcendental safeguard.

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It is this which prevents the relapse into a dogmatic specuinter lative idealism. For Kant, human reason was constitutive, no but ? doubt, but he saw reason in its a priori purity, as unconnected liket with interest. Hence his final conception of man suffered a basic Suc flaw or distortion; for Kant, man is a transcendental subject ecaug with natural functions. I suggest that if we take the purusarthas imall as knowledge-constituting interests, we can have a conception of e in: man as natural subject with transcendental functions. s the ich t

I would finally like to explain, at least schematically, how ard 1 n. By the doctrine of purusarthas may suggest this conception of man stan as a natural subject with transcendental constitutive functions. In ; the so lar as our specific human essence is shaped by kama and artha eaning they necessarily naturalise the subject who is under their authoof the rity; the human mode of enjoyment is possible only for a being of the whose impulses and needs find their fulfilment by way of objects of the independent of subjective impulse and need. Man is a natural eaver being in the double sense of a being whose nature itself takes the bjects form of desire and need and also in the sense of a being who ed by finds fulfilment in objects existing independently of him. The s they structures of this natural character of the human subject are from prefigured in kama and artha.

n out The transcendental constitutive function of this natural nt of subject is revealed in dharma, which I take to be the symbol of istor the moral communicational order, the order of meanings, values ther and norms. The order of communicational understandings is con's made possible by man's capacity for language. Language is edge certainly a capacity or power of natural subjects. Both in the rded sense of requiring a sensuous medium and in the sense of its discursive character, languages is an attribute of natural subjects, but in its operation, language contsitutes the world of human experience; it builds a distinctively human world over the basis of the order of things as they are in themselves2; it shapes the world of human meaning end experience by means of its symbolic powers, such that with the power of speech and communication man distances himself from the rest of creation; in a sense, the world of human experience, thought and action is a constituted world. It is this constitutive aspect of communicational cational reason that stands for the transcendental function; or to put it in terms of the doctrine of purusarthas, dharma is pivotal and crucial for it modutates kama and artha on the or hand and moksa on the other. It is in this sense that dhard could be said to be a parama purusartha but we must also not that a being who experiences the demands of the moral orders the context of need and toil cannot find fulfilment only in the moral order; such a one must also have a dream of emancipation

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#### NOTES

- 1. I owe the recognition of the importance of this point to personal dix ssions with Prof. K. J. Shah,
- 2. For the constitutive role of language please see Prof. S. S. Barlingay "Morld" I. P. Q. Vol. V. No. 2, 1978, I am also thankful to him for further personal discussions concerning this point.

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# AFFECTIVE ANALYSIS OF NORTH INDIAN RAGAS: A METHODOLOGICAL INQIRY

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Experimental Psychology and such other disciplines are today paying greater attention to arts in general. Various art-forms and modes of artistic expression are being examined and analyzed objectively. This has considerably reduced unnecessarily and disproportionately mystified areas of thought. In a small measure Musicologists in India are pursuing the same methods with reference to problem like meaning of Music, (Deva and Virmani, Sangeet Natak, 10, P. 54) 'Form in Music' (Deva and Nair, Sangeet Natak 2 p. 105), Rightly, these attembts have not been claimed to be exhaustive, and no conclusions are put forward as final. I however feel that the crucial question of methodology is to be discussed afresh before such attempts are made on a larger scale. There are some important considerations which necessitate the present advocacy for a methodological review.

Firstly, experimental psychology when confronted with valuational aspects, starts with a handicap if its valuational assumptions are not relevant enough. Affective analysis of any artistic activity starts by assuming that certain enquiry—objects are artistic. This basic assumption naturally sets the tone of the whole process. It is in this regard that North Indian (hence forth referred to as Hindustani) Ragas are to be comprehended with utmost possible conceptual precision before they are subjected to any investigation. A proper conceptual decision prior to the use of methods of experimental psychology is a precondition that must be fulfilled.

Secondly in itself 'Music' is too broad a category to justify undifferentiated application of similar methods irrespective of the nature of music involved. No doubt music is Universal in certain aspects. But it is so only at a highly abstract level. The level is too abstract to warrant application of the same objective methods of experimental Psychology in every case. Unless qualified by ethnomusicological particularity, Universality of the method is too broad and hence deceptive. Hence, the methods used

by Western Musicologists will have only a limited universal validity. This is so because experimental Psychology as applied to arts involves, as said earlier, an initial conceptual decision regarding the valuational aspect of the phenomenon.

In the light of these general remarks let us examine the problem referred to in the title of the paper.

Affective analysis is analysis of the behaviourial pattern of an organism that emerges after experiencing impact from an external stimuli. The analysis can of course be of the Physiological as well as the Psychological aspect. Obviously the external stimuli is viewed here as a constant and is assumed to remain unaffected by the receptor organism – or more precisely by the process of originating the stimuli. Affective analysis of both physiological and the psychological types is thus an analysis of one end of a bipolar process. As opposed to this we have what is called an effective analysis. It includes analysis of both the originator and receptor of the stimuli.

Now the question is whether it is valid to consider Hindustani raga a result of an unidirectional process. Does not the audience response account for a significant qualitative difference in the emergence of a Raga? Western Music does acknowledge the effective existence and aesthetic role of a Music-score. fact that a score exists results in a possibility of having; total music available even before a performance. Hence there is more of execution than interpretation and more of presentation than elaboration in it as compared to a Hindustani Raga, This means that methods used for music that is written and music that essentially belongs to oral tradition cannot be the same. Improvisation is one consequence the audience-response. It results in a performance that is dynamic and unpredictable. This dynamism is a condition that accompanies the realization of Hindustani Raga in all its stages or phases. A play-back of a recording is really a use or origination of a stimuli which is only half-way to performance. It is a recital and to that extent is too limited or narrow a version of a Hindustani raga. Experimental psychology uses here a seedform instead of a form. The precondition regarding a concepfual decision of evaluative nature that lies at the basis of our enquiry is not met with. Music belonging to a tradition where

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score reflects the entire or a very large portion of music may follow the method of 'play-back' without harm, because there the qualitative gap between play-back and performance is practically negligible. On the other hand, music having an oral tradition loses qualitatively in a play-back as it becomes a recital and not a performance. Raga in a recital is different from Raga in a performance because in the latter valuational features of improvisation and audience-response are present. Affective analysis of a Hindustani Raga thus suffers from a defective investigational start. The essential dynamism and unpredictability of a Hindustani Raga makes it necessary to reconsider the Western procedure used to analyze both types of affective responses.

Another comparatively minor point is regarding the basic Musical Unit to be used in effective analysis of Hindustani Raga. It is quite possible that a Drut 'Cheej' in a particular Raga may seem to be an ideal unit. It is definite, short and due to the comprehensibility of the word-content, ideally amenable to methods like that of Hefner's adjective circles. But here again is a weakness in the conceptual decision. A Cheej can at the best contain seeds of a Raga. The essential, final or total form of a Hindustani Raga emerges in its elaboration. A Cheej has structural seeds, the skeleton of the possible total form, but nothing more. It is better than a mere presentation of Aroha-Avaroha but still it can hardly be accepted as a full picture of the Raga as such. This will be less so in Ragas which are Aprachalita or Anavat (i.e. rare) which for all practical purposes do not have much scope for imaginative elaboration. In case of these Ragas even one Cheej may reflect the total picture of a Raga to a very great extent. These Ragas are structurally so rigid that the channels of elaboration are fixed and limited. These are most 'predictable' Ragas.

This leads us to an important consideration of the validity of treating all Ragas as subjects of an a affective analysis. It can presumably be accepted that individual Musical notes by themselves do not affect. It is because they gain contextuality that they appear to cause changes of both Physiological and Psychological nature. (Rasa-theory can enter into picture only through the accompaniment of word-content.) But the problem is: can

we maintain with equal force that Darbari and Nat-Bilawal affec us? The threefold Musicological classification of Bhatkhand ( based on Ragas taking shuddha re, dha; komal ga, ni, and komal re, dha: respectively ) is structural. As far as the affective aspect is concerned Yaman and Gaudsarang, or Yaman and Chayanat can hardly be treated as similar. Same point can be made about Regas in other Thats too. What is necessary is Raga-classification put forward with an affective bias. It seems that in this context the Rasa-oriented classification may be used with a qualification. What are known as Jod-ragas should be left aside. Varieties of Kanada, Malhar, Sarang, Shri, Bilawa may thus be omitted and primarily Mood-oriented Ragas like Jogiya, Darbari, Bhairavi be taken up for investigation. I at aware that this sounds speculative but at the present momenti is better to be speculative than being categorical in an eas manner. Jod-ragas are intellectually conceived. They are more concerned with structural manipulations than building up of mood. That this is so is reflected in the ordinary responses reflect ed in the critical or appreciative terminology used by musician and music critics.

We can also take a clue from the folk-melodies like Pile Pahadi, Mand, Gara-melodies that are called Dhun-ragas. These ragas have definite identifying phrases but otherwise they have a loose structure. It is curious that only certain Raga-like structures are discernible in folk-music. Pending greater field-work and more rigourous analysis, it is to be kept in mind that as mooth music relationship is likely to be an ethnomusicological and ethnopsychological phenomenon, Dhun-ragas will be a good starting point for affective analysis than the deliberately structured Jod-ragas, or other that are not primarily mood-oriented.

Adjective-scale methods or adjective-circle methods vis-a-vis Hindustani Ragas pose one more problem. The methods and developed in a system that has recognised and given a considerable weightage to 'Programme Music.' Music with clear-coldescriptive purpose therefore must play a great role in channel lizing responses. This will be consequently reflected in the methodology of affective analysis. Hindustani Ragas follow different method of construction, presentation and realization of

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anne ow i the ultimate expression. Except for the seasonal Ragas like Malhar and Basant, there is no possibility of having a descriptive content associated with the core of a Raga. As said earlier, it is the descriptive aspect that distinguishes programme music from music that is configurational. It seems therefore imperative to evolve new methods of analysis or modify the existing ones if they are to be used with benefit in the context of Hindustani Raga.

In another context I have concluded that Music has only two moods-a mood of elation and dejection; (Neitzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian bi-polarity will come to mind easily.)

Responses to music can be grouped under these two categories and thus far a universal or a generalized statement is possible. Further variations in individual responses are of course possible, but they will have to depends on the individual associations. Adjective-scale or Adjective-circle methods will have to consider this possibility too. A theoretical position or a conclusive statement that avers a universal, intrinsic relationship of correspondence between music and mood is possible only up to certain point. Beyond that the individual associations sub-group themselves in various ways and defy a general statement. The question involved is not that of having a more detailed or exhaustive list of response-indicating adjectives. The question is of recognizing the existence of limited validity of the universal element in music and corresponding to evolve a more comprehensive and inevitably intricate methodological complex.

Does the melodic realization of Hindustani Raga warrant a difference in the method to be affectively analyzed? Perhaps so. Because harmonization or melodic progression are the causes of differing musical features. Harmonization means: simultaneous use of various instruments: therefore greater variety of operative tonal and instrumental symbolism: therefore greater possibility of associational aroused of allusive emotions. Thus harmonized music may be the cause of a more fruitful use of adjective-scale and other analogous methods. On the other hand, melodic progression seems to be more intense but less varied as far as its allusive potentiality is concerned. This too may be the reason why a different approach will be necessary for the proposed affective analysis of Hindustani Ragas.

This position taken above may be summerized as follows:

- (1) Any investigatory activity in experimental psychology starts with a conceptual decision taken about valuational aspect.
- (2) Affective analysis concentrates only on one pole of a two way process of music realization. Therefore it presumably starts with an investigatory handicap. Effective analysis is a way out.
- (3) Hindustani Raga is realized in a performance and not in a recital. It is a dynamic, improvised, unpredictable entity and as such cannot be subjected to methods applied to music having different characteristics.
- (4) Methods of affective analysis used with reference to western music seem to have doubtful utility in case of Hindustani Raga because (unlike western music) it does not possess the characteristics of having descriptive content, instrumental symbolism, and written versions.
- (5) Essentially, mood-music problem is the core of affective analysis mood-music relationship being ethnocentric rather than universal and bi-levelled rather than mono-levelled. The adjective-scale and analogous methods have to be suitably modified. Alternatively new methods have to be evolved after taking into consideration the nature of Music involved in the inquiry undertaken.

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### SOME TENSIONS IN SPINOZA'S ETHICAL THEORY

In a recent essay on Spinoza's moral philosophy, E. M. Curley has pointed to the paucity of serious studies of Spinoza's ethical theory:

It is a rare book on ethics which does not have at least a passing reference to Spinoza. But it is an even rarer book which has more than a passing reference. Those philosophers in our century who have been interested in ethical theory and who have gone to the history of philosophy-either to find a congenial ancestor or to add a scalp to their collection-have tended to go to Mill or Kant, to Plato or Aristotle, to Hobbes or Butler, to Hume or St. Thomas, but not to Spinoza.<sup>1</sup>

Now why should Spinoza's ethical theory be neglected in this way? Spinoza is, after all, one of the three or four most famous figures in the entire history of philosophy, one of the few philosophers whose name is known among the general public as well as among academic intellectuals. One explanation that we hear from time to time is that Spinoza's writings are "obscure." But this explanation cannot be taken seriously. Spinoza's terminology is no more difficult to understand than Aristotle's or Aquinas' or Kant's, and unlike most philosophers, Spinoza lays out all his arguments clearly, indicating his definitions, axioms, premises, and conclusions. Some ethical theorists complain that Spinoza's ethical writings are "dated," and yet, anyone who has even cursorily examined these writings knows that many of Spinoza's ideas are very much in vogue. A far more plausible explanation of the current neglect of Spinoza's ethical writings is that they do not provide the ethical theorists of our day with what they want from a great, dead philospher. For as Professor Curley has rightly observed, contemporary ethical theorists have generally gone to the history of philosophy either to find a congenial ancestor or to add a scalp to their collection. For all their depth, most of the great ethical theories have been one-dimensional; it is easy to put a label on the ethical theory of a Mill or a Kant or even an Arist-

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otle. But Spinoza's ethical theory is multi-dimensional, and it defies being pigeonholed. To understand Spinoza's ethical theory, we must break it down into its component theories. In this paper, I shall consider ten of these component theories. I shall not consider any of the ten in great detail, but I shall argue that there are five major tensions in Spinoza's ethical theory and that some of them seem to be serious enough to warrant our regarding Spinoza's ethical theory as internally inconsistent. The five tensions that I shall examine are compatibilism vs. fatalism, absolutism vs. relativism, egoism vs. altruism; hedonism vs. self-perfectionism and activism vs. passivism. Again, I shall not give to any of these ten theories the attention that it merits, but shall deal instead with the problem of inconsistency in Spinoza's ethical theory as a whole.

### Compatibilism vs. Fatalism

The most famous tension in Spinoza's philosophy is that which is related to the incompatibility of his compatibilism and his fatalism. Much has been written on Spinoza's approach to the problem of human freedom, partly because the subject is of interest to metaphysicians as well as ethical theorists, and so I will not say very much about it here.2 At Ethics, I Def. 7 Spinoza tells us that a thing is said to be free (ea res libera dicetur) which exists solely from the necessity of its nature, and of which the action is solely determined by itself. Thus God alone is free. God acts solely from the laws of his nature and is constrained by no one (I, Prop. 17).3 Human beings, being finite or particular things rather than substances or attributes of substances, have necessarily been determined to act as they do by God, the one substance (I, Prop. 26). Moreover, no thing which is finite and has been determined to exist can exist or be determined to act unless it is determined to exist and to act by another finite cause (I, Prop. 28). In the mind there is no absolute or free will (absoluta sive libera voluntas) but the mind has been determined to will this or that by a cause, which has itself been determined by another cause, et sic in infinitum (II, Prop. 48). Men believe themselves to be free because they are conscious of their wishes and appetites, while of the causes which have led them to have such appetites and to wish, they are ignorant and never even think in their dreams. (I, Appendix). In discu-

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led rant scussing falsity, Spinoza tells us in no uncertain terms that men are mistaken in considering themselves free. Their idea of freedom consists in their not knowing the causes of their actions (II, Prop. 35.) In the scholium that follows II, Prop. 49, Spinoza speaks of the great practical value of being aware that we human beings are not free. This awareness brings with it calmness of soul and enables us to discern that our highest happiness or blessedness consists solely in knowing God. It also enables us to be better citizens, for it teaches us not to hate, condemn, or deride other men, and it teaches us to be content and to help the next fellow, not from pity, partiality, or superstition, but solely from the guidance of reason.

In Parts IV and V of the Ethics, however, Spinoza speaks over and over again of the "free man". At IV. Prop. 67, he tells us that a free man (homo liber) thinks nothing less than of death. In the demonstration next proposition, he tells us that one is said to be free who is led by reason alone ("Illum liberum esse dixi, qui sola ducitur Ratione"). The propositions which follow tell more about the free man, and the Preface to Part V tells us that this last part of the Ethics deals with the way that leads to freedom (modo sive via, quae ad Libertatem ducit). Spinoza clearly does not believe himself mistaken in regarding human beings as capable of being free in this sense. He is obviously introducing a second concept of freedom in the latter parts of the Ethics, one which unlike that introduced in Part I can be ascribed to human beings. Unfortunately, the two concepts of freedom do not co-exist comfortably. For is Spinoza's homo liber really free? If we accept Spinoza's views on human behaviour in Part II, then we must conclude that whoever is free in the second sense is simply fortunate to be so, for men cannot be responsible for their rationality or irrationality, their "freedom" or their bondage. All of Spinoza's positive prescriptions are vitiated by his denial of the fact of human moral responsibility in the early parts of the Ethics. Still, those of us who accept the fact of human moral responsibility can evaluate Spinoza's prescriptions without making reference to his approach to the problem of

### Absolutism vs. Relativism

The existence of the second tension in Spinoza's ethic theory has been recognized by Bidney, who writes that, "Spinoza Stoic rationalism with its acknowledgment of absolute mon standards is incompatible with his biological naturalism which teaches the complete relativity of all good and evil, virtue and vice to the requirements of self-preservation."4 We must remember here that Spinoza's ethical relativism is rather different from the more popular kinds of ethical relativism that we encounter in the modern literature (e. g., emotivism, or the cultural relativism d anthropologists like Westermarck and Herskovits ). Spinozak ethical relativism is rooted in the metaphysical conclusions of Part I of the Ethics; it follows from Spinoza's repudiation of finalism. In the Appendix to Part I, he tells us that after men had persuaded themselves that everything that is made is made for their sake, they were obliged to judge as the most important quality in a thing that which is most useful to them. And they formed notions for explaining this nature of things, such as good (Bonum), evil (Malum), etc. whatever is conducive to health and the worship of God they have called "good," and whatever is contrary to these things they have called "evil". In other words, the "goodness" and "badness" of things is not determined by God, who lacks or needs nothing, but by individual human beings. Thus, "goodness" and "badness" are not objective properties of things. This point is developed in the Preface 10 Part IV, where Spinoza tells us that "good" and "evil" indicate nothing positive in things (nihil etiam positivum in rebus) considered in themselves, but are simply modes of thinking or notions that we form by comparing things with one another. So one thing can at the same time be good, evil, and indifferent. It is here that Spinoza gives his famous example of music, which is "good to the melancholy person, bad to the mourner, and to the deaf person neither good nor bad." Soon after, Spinoza formally defines "good" as that which we know to be useful to us and "evil" or "bad" as that which we know to be an impediment to our attainment of some good. The criteria of utility afe specified in Part III. Utility is determined by considering to what extent the thing in question helps the person to persist in his Human beings (and all other things insofar as they are being.

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"in themselves") strive (conature) to perist in their being, and they are conscious of their striving. Spinoza also associates utility with the extent to which the thing in question is conducive to joy (laetitia); and since he associates joy with increasing perfection or realization, Spinoza's association of utility with joy is not unrelated to his association of utility with a man's basic striving (conatus).

On the other hand, immediately after informing us in the Preface to Part IV that one thing can simultaneously be good, bad, and indifferent, Spinoza observes that the words "good" and "bad" should still be retained. And he tells us that in the discussion that follows he will understand by "good" that which we know is a means of coming closer to the ideal or model of human nature (ad exemplar humanae naturae) which we have set before ourselves. So Spinoza is aware that there is something strange about an ethical relativist telling us in great detail how we all ought to behave. But the "explanation" he gives us in the Preface to Part IV for retaining the words "good" and "bad" in no way mitigates the tension that arises from the juxtaposition in the Ethics of ethical relativism and ethical absolutism. The question before us, then, is whether or not Spinoza could have given us a sounder defense of this juxtaposition.

I believe that he could have, and I want to draw your attention again to the way in which Spinoza is an ethical relativist. Spinoza's relativism is not at all like that of Protagoras or Nietzsche or the cultural anthropologist. Spinoza's relativism is, as we have seen, rooted in his repudiation of finalism in Ethics, I. When Spinoza tells us "good" and "evil" indicate nothing positive in things, he is telling us that goodness and evil do not exist independently of human beings and human judgment. One cannot explain goodness and evil by speaking of God's ends, for God needs nothing and has no ends. Goodness and evil, then, are not determined by God but by men. In having made this observation, Spinoza is no different from most ethical cognitivists, certainly not utilitarians. And as we learn from IV, Def. 1, Spinoza is both an ethical cognitivist and a utilitarian, for here "good" is defined as that which we know to be useful to us. The

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kind of knowledge which Spinoza has in mind here is an importatione; it is not simply imaginatio, for Spinoza tells us that he "good" he understands quod certo scimus nobis esse utile. So is we are going to call Spinoza an ethical "relativist" because he recognizes that good and evil are categories which depend on human existence, human striving, and human judgment, we shall also have to call many other ethical theorists "relativists" who being cognitivists, are generally regarded as non-relativistic of even anti-relativistic.

However, there is another element in Spinoza's ethic relativism. For he tells us that human nature is somewhat variable Some men are melancholy, others are in mourning, and still others are deaf. What is good for one is not necessarily good for the other, and one thing can simultaneously be good, bad and indifferent. The point Spinoza is making here is conly indirectly related to his original reason for asserting that "good" and "evil" indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves. He is now making the additional point-and it is a correct one-that men are significantly different from one another and have different needs. However, Spinoza also makes it quite clean to his readers that he considers human nature to be reasonably uniform from person to person. Spinoza's ethical theory is basel on his psychology. His discussions of desire, joy, sorrow, etc. at considered by him to be relevent to all men. So although recognizes that what is "good" varies to some extent from person to person, he also realizes that human nature is basically uniform. In fact, his view of goodness as involving utility and his view of the criteria of utility are both themselves based on Spino za's belief that all human beings, as a matter of fact, have certain very basic and very important things in common. More over, it is certainly not unimportant that Spinoza conceives "good" as what a man knows to be useful to him rather that what he believes or judges or feels is useful to him.

To summarize: there is a tension in Spinoza's ethical theofthat arises from the juxtaposition in the Ethics of relativistic and absolutistic ideas. But Spinoza's "relativism" is a fairly innocuous theory. It involves, on the one hand, a recognition of the dependence of the categories of good and evil on human existence human striving, and human judgment. It involves, on the other CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Harfdwar

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awareness of the fact that because men are significantly different from one another and have different needs, what is good for one is not necessarily good for another. The former aspect of Spinoza's "relativism" is compatible with ethical cognitivism, and the latter can only be understood in the context of Spinoza's general view that human nature is for the most part uniform. Thus, Spinoza's special brand of "relativism" does not preclude his being entitled to make specific moral prescriptions. Still, as Bidney points out, Spinoza teaches the relativity of all good and evil to the requirements of self-preservation. We shall not be able to pass final judgment on how serious the absolutism / relativism tension is until we have considered Spinoza's concepts of self-preservation and self-perfection in greater depth. We shall consider these concepts a bit later on.

### Egoism vs. Altruism

Spinoza's ethical theory is basically egoistic The good for any particular person is what is useful to him and that is useful to him which is conducive to his joy and enables him to persist in his being. There are no criteria of utility for a person other than these. Why then, should-and do-people have a concern for justice and the interests of their fellow human beings? Spinoza has suggested in the scholium that follows II, Prop. 49 that the impetus to helping the next fellow should not be pity, partiality, or superstition; but if the good for an individual is what is useful to him, what can the proper impetus be?

Spinoza is in the Platonic tradition of ethical theorists in the sense that he feels obliged to show that justice is beneficial to the just man. Strictly speaking, then, the tension that we are concerned with here is not related to a conflict between egoism and altruism but to a conflict between "unenlightened" egoism and enlightened egoism. For Spinoza, the proper impetus to doing "good deeds" or helping one's fellow man is an egoistic one. There is no room in his ethical theory for altruism per se; genuine altruism is incompatible with his psychology and his definitions of "good" and "useful". Spinoza offers us in its place an "enlightened" egoism, and his argument for this quasi-altruism begins in Part III and carries over to Part IV. At III, Prop. 21, he tells us that whoever believes that what or whom he loves is affected with joy or sorrow will himself be affected with joy or sorrow, and the affect

or emotion will be greater or less in the lover in proportion to its greatness in the loved one. At Prop. 27, he tells that when we believe that a thing which is similar to us, and which we have not considered with an emotion, has been affected with an emo. tion, then we are ourselves affected with a similar emotion. at Prop. 30, he tells us that if one has done something which he believes has affected others with joy, he will contemplate himself with joy (i. e., he will himself be affected with joy because of his consciousness that he has affected others with it). Similarly, if one has done something which he believes has affected others with sorrow, he will contemplate himself with sorrow. At IV. Prop. 37, Spinoza states that the good which whoever pursues virtue wisher for himself is desired by him for other men (reliquis hominibus etiam cupiet). And at Prop. 40 of this part, Spinoza says that whatever is conducive to community or society among men is useful (utilia sunt), and whatever induces discord in the state is evil (mala.) Spinoza's egoism, then, is an "enlightened" egoism, and there is no need in his theory for an account of altruistic motives.

Unfortunately, Spinoza's "enlightened" egoism may be incompatible with his more basic egoism. Let us grant for the moment that much joy comes with doing good deeds. What grounds do we have for assuming that this joy will necessarily be greater than the joy that comes with attending to our own private interests? Spinoza does not specify any, and none come to mind. Moreover, since Spinoza has argued that that is good or useful to a person which enables him to persist in his being, then he would seem to be committed to the disturbing view that anything that an individual does to preserve his life is good and useful for him, no matter how much misery that thing causes for others. For though a man may contemplate himself with sorrow when he realizes that he has done something which has affected others with sorrow, he knows at the same time that his most basic striving is a striving to persist in his being, to survive. A person who must steal, kill, and induce discord in the state in order to save his own life may well contemplate himself with sorrow but by Spinoza's criteria, he is doing what is good and useful for him. And, of course, Spinoza cannot allow for or rational acts of martyrdom, or perhaps even rational acts of extreme sacrifice.

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Now I am not criticizing Spinoza here for attempting to explain why men should and do have a concern for justice in terms of "enlightened" egoism rather than altruism. In fact, it is to Spinoza's credit that to preserve consistency in his ethical theory he is prepared to treat what we generally regard as a altruism as certain kind of egoism. However, when we consider the precise nature of Spinoza's "enlightened" egoism—which is rather different from, say, Plato's—and we consider the juxtaposition of this theory with Spinoza's most basic remarks about the conatus, the nature of the good and the useful, and the multiplicity of the emotions, we are ultimately forced to conclude that there is another serious tension in Spinoz's ethical theory.

### Hedonism vs. Self-Perfectionism

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When we hear the phrase, "the life of reason," Spinoza is one of the two or three philosophers who immediately come to mind. Spinoza follows Plato and Aristotle in believing that the best life for a human being is the intellectual life, and he 'follows the Scholastic philosophers in believing that the highest good for a human being is intuitive knowledge of God. No one understands Spinoza's ethical theory who does not appreciate the full force of Ethics, IV, Prop. 28: "The mind's highest good (Summun Mentis bonum ) is knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue to know God." And surely one of the loveliest passages in all philosophical literature is IV, Appendix Ch. 4: "In life it is before all else useful (utile) to perfect the intellect or reason as much as we can, and in this alone consists a man's highest happiness or blessedness; in fact, blessedness is nothing but the peace of soul which comes from the intuitive knowledge of God."

Yet, Spinoza is not only a utilitarian; he is actually a hedonist. One of his criteria for utility is the extent to which the thing in question is conducive to laetitia. We are told at IV, Prop. 41, that laetitia is not directly evil but good (bona), and tristilitia, on the other hand, is directly evil. Now throughout this paper I have followed the tradition of translating "laetitia" as "joy," but there is also a tradition of translating it as "pleasure." Spinoza is no proto-Benthamite, and given some of the developments in ethical theory in the last few centuries, it seems rather out of place to treat Spinoza's "laetitia" as "pleasure."

Still, there is no point in our deceiving ourselves, and the safest course to follow in matters like these is to turn to Wolfson's commentary. Wolfson tells us the following:

The terms laetitia and tristitia used here and elsewhere by Spinoza are taken directly from the Latin translation of Descartes' Les Passions de l'Ame (II, 101-102). were the corresponding original French terms are love and Tristesse. But they reflect the Greek hedoné and lupe respectively, and are one of the many pairs of Latin terms which have been used in translating those two Greek terms. Thus in three Latin translations of Aristotle's De Anima printed in the same volume the terms hedu and luperon are translated by (1) laetum and triste, (2) iucundam and molestam, and (3) delectabile and contrista. Thus also Cicero sometimes expresses a preference for the use of the Latin laetitia as the equivalent of the Geek hedoné, and sometimes he prefers the use of the Latin voluptas. The term voluptas, as we have seen, is used by Spinoza as the equivalent of the Greek epithumia. Since the terms laetitia and tristitia represent the Greek hedoné and lupe, they are 10 be translated according to their primary meanings of "pleasure" and "pain," though in some places they may also mean " joy " and " sorrow. " The term dolor, which also represents the Greek lupe, is evidently used by Spinoza in the sense of "grief."5

Wolfson proceeds to point out that while Descartes recognized six "simple and primitive" passions, Spinoza has consciously restricted the class of "primitive or primary" emotions to three, and that Spinoza's classification may be compared with that of the Stoics, who recognized Spinoza's three primary emotions plus fear (phobos).

So there would seem to be yet another serious tension in Spinoza's ethical theory. On the one hand, Spinoza directs our attention to the intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis) and on the other, he directs our attention to the pursuit of pleasure. But at this point it is crucial that we consider Spinoza's definition of "lactitia," for Spinoza's definition of the term is all CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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attempt on his part to mitigate this tension. In an ingenious—though unjustified-move at III, Prop. 11, in the scholium he tells us that in the discussion that follows he will understand by the term laetitia, "a passion in which the mind passes to a greater perfection" (passionem, qua Mens ad majorem perfectionem perfectionem, qua Mens ad majorem perfectionem transit). Now, as far as I can tell, this metaphysical analysis of laetitia cannot be justified on either empirical or rational grounds. It could even be argued that the concept of a thing's "passing to a greater perfection" is itself rather cloudy. Whenever we encounter such Spinozistic phrases as "intelligo id" or in sequentibus intelligam" we should immediately become much warier. Still, there is no denying that defining "laetitia" in this way is a brilliant move by Spinoza, for by doing so, he is able to bridge the gap between a hedonistic ethical theory and a "self-perfection" or "self-realization" ethical theory.

We must not allow Spinoza to make this move. Clearly the definition is not simply meant as a stipulative definition. is evident from the fact that Spinoza is prepared to count as a kind of laetitia each of the following: love, propensity, derision (irrisio), hope, security, approval, self-respect (acquiescentia in se ipso ), glory, etc. Certainly these are all kinds of joy or pleasure, but it is not at all clear how they are states whereby the mind passes to a greater perfection. Nor is it clear that any of them affects the body in such a way as to increase its power of acting. But let us actually look closely at this concept of perfection. Spinoza tells us at II, Def. 6 that by reality and perfection he understands the same thing. His identification of the two concepts has its roots in classical and medieval philosophy, although it has its immediate roots in the philosophy of Descartes. While we now conceive of things as being either real or unreal, Spinoza follows earlier philosophers in allowing for degrees of reality or perfection. As early as I, Prop. 9, he tells us that the more reality or being a thing has (quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquoeque res habet), the more attributes it has. Then, as Wolfson tells us, Spinoza also conceives of perfection as completeness; for Spinoza, the perfect action of man involves man's not lacking anything that is required by his nature, so it involves the maximum attainment of his power of acting insofar as it is understood by his own nature. So far, so good.

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Unfortunately, Spinoza also tells us (in the Preface to Part IV hat perfection and imperfection are simply modes of thinking tnotions, in the same way that good and evil are ("Perfectio igin et imperfectio revera modi solummudo cogitandi sunt, nem notiones ....."). We must somehow make sense of Spinozzi talk of self-perfection in the context of these conflicting gener views of perfection. Now certainly the single most important ke to understanding Spinoza's concept human self-perfection or self. realization is recognizing his association of human perfection with activity (as opposed to passivity). Self-perfection for Spinoz involves increasing the body's power of acting. At V, Prop. 40 one of the last three propositions of the Ethics, Spinoza tells u that the more perfection a thing has, the more it acts and the less it is passive, and correspondingly, the more it acts, the more per fect it is. This view has its roots in the views advanced by Spinozi in the early pages of Part III.

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A human being strives to persist in his being (prop. 6) This conatus is his actual essence ( Prop. 7) and is appetite, or in so far as he is conscious of it, desire (Prop. 9 Scholium). Now Spinoza does not think of self preservation in the way that we are accustomed to thinking of it now a days. For Spinoza, the being (esse) in which a human being strives to persist is being of a particular degree, and increases or decreases in proportion to the extent to which the person is active rather than passive. man's striving for self-perfection or self-realization does not conflict with his striving for self - preservation; it is his striving for self-preservation. A man's striving to persist in his being involves his striving to have more being (perfection, reality).

We may now return to Spinoza's claim that laetitia is 3 state in which the mind passes to a greater perfection. Surely neither pleasure itself nor any particular kind of pleasure (e. g., love or honour) involves a person's becoming more real or more perfect in any sense. And it is extremely important that Spinoza himself admits that laetitia is not an action but a passion. if pleasure involved acting, it would indeed enable the mind body to pass to a greater perfection or reality or being. Now it is true that at V, Prop. 3, Spinoza asserts that an emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion when we form a clear and distinct idea of it. It is through the intellect and knowledge CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

TENSIONS IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS

that we are able to overcome the strength of the passions which enslave us. But this point is simply not relevant to Spinoza's definition of laetitia. Thus the tension created by the juxtaposition of hedonism and self-perfectionism has not been removed.

This point and the related points are extremely important, and so I shall elaborate on them. We have seen that Spinoza associates "perfection" with (a) reality, or a particular degree thereof; (b) a notion or mode of thinking which we form from comparing things; and (c) an increase in a particular thing's power of acting. It is clear from the Preface to Part IV that Thus, he does Spinoza sees these three associations as related. not see himself as inconsistent in associating " perfection " with reality on the one hand and with a mere notion on the other. He even offers an argument to show how they are related. describes Spinoza's position in the following passage:

We class all natural products under the abstract universal idea of "being": and hence for us they are " perfect" or "impergect," according as the they exhibit more or less "being" or "reality" in comparison with one another. But in reality—in and for itself—every natural product is of necessity all that it has in it to be, What it has not in comparison with others, is only for us and is no part of its nature.7

Toward the end of the Preface, Spinoza tells us that the transition to a greater perfection does not involve changing from one essence or form into another; it involves an increase in the power of acting. Whether these three views of perfection are consistent is an open question; I am inclined to think that they are not. Even if they were, however, Spinoza would have to offer a far better explanation of why an increase in a thing's power of acting necessarily involves an increase in its reality. And even the basic concept of degrees of reality needs to be explained in greater detail. Now in the important Prop. 8 of Part IV, Spinoza tells us that knowledge of good and bad is nothing other than the emotions of joy and sorrow, inasmuch as we are conscious of them. Again Spinoza's cognitivism is itself worth taking note of. But it is in the demonstration for this proposition that Spinoza ties together various strands in his ethical theory by telling us that we call something "good" or "evil" when it (respectively) enables

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clear edge us to conserve our being or does the opposite, that is (hoc est) only if a when it increases or decreases our power acting. So self-preser, lar sense vation is (self -) perfection or (self -) realization (in sense (c) absolute at least); and that which is conducive to joy, being conducive to probably a transition to a gueater perfection, is conducive to self-preser in their vation, which it is our essence to strive for. Hence, the good of perfection useful is that which is conducive to joy, and rather than there Activism being several independent criteria of utility, all the criteria of utility overlap or are identical. For Spinoza, there is no conflic between a hedonistic ethic and a self-perfectionist ethic because theory w self-preservation, self-perfection, and joy are the same. But, as we have seen, Spinoza is not justified in defining "laetitia" as he does, and thus he is not really successful in bridging the gap between a hedonistic ethic and a self-perfectionist ethic. Further more, in defining both "perfection" and "joy" as he does, Spinoza does not seem to be following the clear and intelligent rules of definition that he lays down in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.

I should like to return for a moment, as I promised earliest from Ar to the problem of the absolutism/relativism tension. With an eye on Bidney's comment, I suggested that we shall not be able to pass final judgment on the seriousness of this tension until we have further considered the concepts of self-preservation and self-perfection. For Bidney is understandably worried about the relativity of good and evil to the requirements of self-preservation. Now I have expressed a similar anxiety in my discussion of Spinoza's egoism, for I observed there that though Spinoza argues that harming other men is conducive to sorrow, and thus to a decrease in perfection or reality, he cannot deny that it is good or useful to do something which, although it leads to such a decrease in perfection or reality, prevents one from dying or completely ceasing to exist. Still, in light of what we have seen in our inquiry into Spinoza's concept of perfection, it is clear that in general or for the most part, Spinoza's "Stoic rationalism with its acknowledgment of absolute moral standard's" is not incompatir ble with his "biological naturalism" with its emphasis on the requ irements of self-preservation. Spinoza's intellectualism and selfperfectionism are, as we have seen, associated by him with his views on the striving to persist in one's being. Now it is true that CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

I rea Spinoza sophy. figure in symboliz arguing t ing, Spin that kno Spinoza But Spir Aristotle plative 1 which w rather th few exte would so plate being fr things a contemp Spinoza lism. (V, Pro man, co The wis and of always has alre

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est) only if a man feels secure in his chances for survival (in the popupreser lar sense) will he be able to concern himself with Spinoza's lofty se (e) absolute moral standards. Spinoza's view seems to be-and he is sive to probably right on this point-that most men can feel secure enough preser in their chances for raw survival to concern themselves with selfod or perfection of a loftier sort.

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I remarked earlier that no one understands Spinoza's ethical theory who does not appreciate the full force of IV, Prop. 28. ut, as Spinoza is one of the great intellectualists in the history of philoas he sophy. He not only defended the life of reason but lived it. e gap figure in the history of philosophy, not even Socrates himself, symbolizes the nobility of rationality better than Spinoza. In does, arguing that the intellectual life is the best life for a human being, Spinoza follows Aristotle and the Aristotelians. In arguing that knowledge of God is the highest good for a human being, Spinoza follows the Christian Aristotelians of the Middle Ages. But Spinoza's defense of the life of reason is significantly different rliear from Arisiotle's. In the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics, an eye Aristotle presents various arguments in defense of the contemple to plative life. He tells us that it is the most pleasant life, a life in which we pursue the one thing that is desired for its own sake and rather than for the sake of something else, a life which requires few external goods, etc. His main point, however, is that it reser- would seem to be a human being's special function to contemplate. It is his ability to contemplate that distinguishes a human being from all the other things in nature. Surely, then, those things are virtues which enable a human being to lead a life of contemplation. Contrast this defense of the intellectual life with Spinoza's. Spinoza, of course, repudiates teleologism or finalism. In the scholium to the last proposition of the Ethics (V, Prop. 42), he tells us that the wise man, unlike the ignorant man, comes to attain true peace of soul(vera animi acquaiescentia). The wise man, whose soul is undisturbed, is conscious of himself and of God and of things, and so he never ceases to be, and always possesses true peace of soul. In V, Prop. 27, Spinoza has already told us that from the third and highest kind of knowledge arises the highest peace (acquiescentia) of mind that is Spinoza argues in the Ethics for the immortality of

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the soul, but he adds in V, Prop. 41 that even if we were aware that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as the m important things piety, religion, and all the other things that related to the fortitude of the soul. For unlike ignorant men are aware that virtue and right living are founded on the purs Spinoz of what is useful to us. The value of the intellect to us is subord through it we acquire knowledge which enables us to overcomenon the strength of the passions. We can only achieve the high essor possible human perfection if we are as active as possible To be as active as possible, we must overcome the passio Spinoz which enslave us. Activity and increased perfection bring greater peace of soul or peace of mind. But ironically, acquiescentia, whatever exactly it is, is certainly not an action the or activity. Though it is not a passion or a passive state this sin Spinoza's sense of the term (III, Defs. 2 and 3), it is closer men " what we now consider a passive state than to what we now a in Spin sider an activity or action. To the extent that we are imposs adequate cause of peace of soul, it must be, by Spinoz sing st criteria, an action rather than a psssion. But is such a state theory tranquility or satisfaction really an action? And if Spinoz pigeor criteria of action and passion force him to regard acquiescent compo of this kind as an action, does this not perhaps suggest the theori Spinoza's criteria are unsound?

This tension may seem to be the least important of the others that we have considered, but in some ways it is the most import tension tant. It is perhaps the one that has the most relevance to mionism crete life. We see this relevance in Spinoza's own life, seems to have been the kind of man who could not decide passiv tween a life of political action and a quiet, intellectual life. The are se fighter for just causes and adviser to De-Witt and the other liber occas leaders of seventeenth-century Holland was able to seclude his relative self from friends and strangers for months at a time. Perhan the expression " vera animi acquiescentia" was simply an in icitous way of Spinoza's expressing himself; or perhaps 1 reading too much into it. In any event, I am not suggest that Spinoza is inconsistent here, merely that there is another tension in his ethical theory.

# The Internal Consistency of Spinoza's Ethical Theory

A hefty volume could be written on each of the ten of Spinoza that we have touched upon in the

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as the minquiry. It was not my intention to say anything terribly pros that found about any of the ten ethical theories. My aim, you will nt men, recall, was to shed light on the problem of inconsistency in the pure Spinoza's ethical theory as a whole; and even this aim was us is subordinate to the less ambitious aim of explaining a phenous is the menon in contemporary philosophical scholarship to which Profne high essor Curley has alluded.

Stuart Hampshire has observed that, "When the study of passio Spinoza is reviewed historically, one sees that each commentator, bring unconsciously faithful to his own age and to his own philosophical nically, culture, has seized upon some one element in Spincza's thought; an acin he then proceeds to develop the whole of the philosophy from ve state this single centre." Unfortunately, the commentaries of these closer men "do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts now a in Spinoza's Ethics. They remain interpretations that have been we are imposed from outside. They smooth over and cover up the oppo-Spinoz sing strains within the original thought. "8 Now Spinoza's ethical a state theory, as we have seen, is multi-dimensional and defies being Spinoz pigeonholed, and to understand it, we must break it down into its quiescent component theories. When we break it down into these component ggest theories, we find that there are five tensions in the ethical theory as a whole, and that some of these tensions are quite serious while of the others are not. The seriousness of the compatibilism/fatalism st importension is generally acknowledged. The hedonism /self-perfece to on ionism tension is equally serious, although it has not received Spine nearly as much attention. The egoism/altruism and activism/ decide passivism tensions would appear to be less serious, although they life. It are serious enough. And though scholars have criticized and even her liber occasionally praised Spinoza for his "relativism," the absolutism ude his relativism tension is not very serious.

I think that we must conclude at this time that Spinoza's ps I sethical theory is not internally consistent. However, its inconsistency is not in itself a reason for ignoring it. Some of the component ethical theories are brilliant, and Spinoza's arguments in defense of them are uniquely profound. Although Spinoza is very much a systematic philosopher, the importance of his ethical theory for our generation lies not in the interrelation of his ethical ideas but in the ethical ideas themselves. Inconsistency is a

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price that great thinkers often have to pay for having refuse analyze a problem from a single, narrow perspective. Fortunathere are still many people who do not share the fondness of a of our academic ethical theorists for one-dimensional theorem which can be pigeonholed, labeled, and then conveniently forgon about.

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JAY NEWMAN

#### NOTES

- 1: E. M. Curley, "Spinoza's Moral Philosophy," in Spinoza: A Collection Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Bo. 1973), p. 354.
- 2. See, e. g., Stuart Hampshire, "Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom," ceedings of the British Academy, XLVI (1960) and my paper, Compatibilist Interpretation of Spinoza, "The Presonalist, L V (1974).
- 3. This proposition and all subsequent propositions, definitions, appends etc. to which I refer are in Spinoza's Ethics.
- 4 David Bidney, "The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Studyin History and Logic of Ideas" (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962 [1940], p. 317. The italics are Bidney's.
- 5. Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vol. II [Clevelands New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958 (1934,)] pp. 2063. I have transliterated the Greek characters.
- 6. Ibid., pp. 222-23.
- 7. H. H. Joachim,: A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford Clarendon) p. 241.
- 8. Hampshire, op cit., p. 195.

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# AN IDEALISTIC REPLY TO THE LATER MOORE

G. E. Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' is well known. It would be of interest to examine the position of the later Moore in order to see how, if at all, it differs from the position taken by the early Moore.1 As best as I can understand Moore's later position, it is this. Moore no longer subscribes to the position that there can be unsensed sensibilia, i. e., that blue exists independently of our sensing it. He does, however, insist that there are a class of objects of which it would be true to say that they exist independently of our sensing them, e. g., something which possesses the property of blue. This is, at leas t, what I understand Moore to be saying in these comments:

"In that early paper I really was asserting that the sensible quality "blue" (and, of course, also should have asserted the same of the sensible quality "bitter") could exist without being perceived: that there was no contradiction in supposing it to do so. Mr. Ducasse's view is that it cannot: that there is a contradiction in supposing it to do so. And on this issue I am now very much inclined to think that Mr. Ducasse is right and that I in that paper was wrong. "2

.. "I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and hold that early paper of mine was wrong. As an argument for my present view I should give the assertions that a toothache certainly cannot exist without being felt, but that, on the other hand, the moon certainly can exist without being perceived."3

.. "when we say that a tie is blue or quinine is bitter .. here each word stands for a property in Mr. Ducasse's sense of that term, and a property which may belong to physical objects, and hence certainly may exist when it is not being perceived."4

It would appear, then, that Professor Moore would not suppose that the sensible quality "blue" could exist without being perceived, but a blue thing could exist without beng perceived, e. g., a blue wall. But it is not at all clear how, blue wall can exist without blue existing. Professor Moore seem to hold that blue would exist as a property of the wall. But how can this be if the blue of the blue property cannot exist outside of perception according to Moore?

What then can it mean to say that the blue property of the wall exists outside of perception? It can only mean, I suppose that the wall possesses the property, not strictly speaking of blue but of being capable of exciting that blue upon being perceived This seems to be the only way of saving Moore from a contradiction. Blueness can only exist in sensation according to Moore But the wall can exist outside of sensation. If the wall can exist outside of sensation but blue cannot and blue is nonetheless a property of wall it seems that the only manner in which we can to be abl give meaning to the expression 'blue property' is to say that should maintain the wall be observed by someone, that it is blue will be experienced question Yet, if this is what possessing a blue property means, (and it papprehen difficult to see what else it can mean ), then the wall must in some way be responsible for causing the sensation of blue to arise in us. Moore, in a word, is back to a causal theory of perception.

If, as we say, Moore is committed to a causal theory of perception, he cannot maintain a causal theory of perception while maintaining that blue is a property of wall. For, if blue arises in us upon our perception of wall, and this is our only contact with blue, then by what right can we say that same blue exists in the wall when it is not perceived? We surely cannot say that we know that blue exists in the wall when it is not perceived.

Now, it might seem unfair to attribute causal and representation which tive theories of perception to Moore, but we did so initially this save him from a contradiction. If we do not ascribe a causal and lirectly a representative theory of perception to Moore, there is another according consequence which will follow. There are two classes of entities for Moore, those which can exist unperceived (as the moon) and that we do those which connot (as blue). The class of entities which cannot bject is a exist except as perceived; are, for Moore, directly apprehended tis a trai

... 'I am inclined to think that it is as impossible that any thing which has the sensible quality "blue" and, more than the sensible quality "blue" and, more than the sensible quality "blue" and the sensible quality "blue generally, anything whatever which is directly apprehended P.Q.

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IDEALISTIC REPLY TO LATER MOORE

any sense-datum, that is, should exist unperceived, as it is that a headache should exist unfelt."5

It would seem from this analysis that Moore holds that whatever is directly apprehended cannot exist apart form perception. If this is true then whatever exists apart perception cannot be directly apprehended. It follows then either that the moon, for example, is not directly appreaended (in which case, I take it, we are involved with some form of a causal theory of perception), or, that the moon does not exist apart from being perceived. Now, of these two alternatives, I think that Moore would prefer the first.

Moore is himself troubled by the problem. He wants both ve can to be able to say that we can directly apprehend objects and still should maintain realism. He states his puzzlement with regard to the enced, question of whether physical surfaces are directly or indirectly nd it is apprehended.

> "Now at the end of the last section I said that I was strongly inclined to agree with Mr. Murphy and Mr. Marhenke that physical surfaces are directly apprehended. I am, therefore, now saying that I am strongly inclined to take a view incompatible with that which I then said I was strongly inclined to take. And this is the truth. I am strongly inclined to take both of these incompatible views. I am completely puzzled about the matter, and only wish I could see any way of settling it."6

Moore wants to be able to say that we can directly see obesenta ects which possess qualities and yet he realizes that he cannot ally this or else he must give up his realism, for whatever is al and according apprehended cannot exist apart from being perceived nother according to his own notions. How can we resolve this problem?

It seems that the resolution to this problem is the realization ) and hat we do not directly perceive objects but that what we call an cannol object is a creation of the mind. We hear a sound; we infer that We see a color, a line, a shape; we judge that it is a chair. 7 If we understand that our peculiar mode of grouping nt any qualities together so as to make of them objects is a function of

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Ibid., p. 6

Op. cit., p

the human intellect and does not reflect what exists in indepen dence from the human intellect, we should be able to resolve Moore's dilemma. It is Moore's conception that we directly sell for an explicit that is a cause of his difficulties. A fuller conception objects that is a cause of his difficulties. A fuller conception of phicial Qu the contribution of the human mind to perception would, I think G. E. Mo obviate many of his difficulties. Let us examine a particula p. 658. case in point. We may take a very late description of sensation, Ibid., p. 6 given by Moore:

"It seems to me evident that I cannot see the sensily, lbid., p. 6 quality blue, without directly seeing something which lbid., p. 6 has that quality - a blue patch, or a blue speck, or Itis a mor blue line, or a blue spot, etc., in the sense in which application in after-image, seen with closed eyes, may be any of the Reason, Tra things."8

Now, that blue is seen no one would deny. What we might alter in Moore's description is the status of the object. could just as easily say that it is blue which has the quality shap Or, we could say that it is the patch which could we not? blueing. Another possible description of the blue pattern that it is the patch which is in the blue. In all of these cases same qualities are seen; it is only the arrangement of them the differs.

The point of these varying possible descriptions is that of arrangement of colors and lines into what we call objects is matter of epistemological convenience. The fact that vary and differing descriptions are possible indicates that no description can claim to be the description of the way things It indicates, I think, that what we call a "blue patch" is s something that we directly see, but is a composition which have made up because it best fits our epistemological "Blue patch" is something done, rather than something diff The resolution to G. E. Moore's dilemma is that we " perceive objects; what we call an object is a creation of mind.

Chung Chi College,

Robert Allinson

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#### NOTES

resolution of Moore's classic position, cf., R. E. Allinson, 'A cily se Non-Dualistic Reply to Moore's Refutation of Idealism', Indian Philosootion of phicial Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 4, pp. 661-668.

I think G. E. Moore, 'A Reply to my Critics' The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, rticula p. 658.

nsation Ibid., p. 653 (emphasis his).

Ibid., p. 658 (emphasis his).

sensible Ibid., p. 658 (emphasis his).

which Ibid., p. 658-9 (emphasis his).

c, or Itis a more complicated affair than simply this, to be sure. There is comhich abination in conformance to certain rules. But the example makes the point tear. For the rest, one may be referred to Kant, The Critique of Pure of the Reason, Transcendental Analytic.

Op. cit., p. 659 (emphasis his).

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## THE NATURE OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

Ethical considerations of the fundamental moral problems lead towards different types of ethical theories. Can we say that all ethical theories concern similar objects, or is it that ethical theories discuss different things? It is dubitable that two moral philosophers will think of same thing in one way. One fundamental moral question 'What ought to be done' has been answered in several ways. Since, moral problems are diverse and -each at the same time enormous in type so it is not always easy to decide to which type a given particular case belongs. Two -each moral philosophers will refer to different problems in accordance with a principle or a set of principles. The difficulty about what ought to be done is a matter of decision and not of passing -each judgment on something which has already been done. As there are so many moral problems so are the principles to resolve and then justify them.

Before we touch the problem of decision making process of principles we should make a clear distinction between moral problems and factual ones. All those statements which involve uch words as good, bad, right, wrong, ought and duty are not ways moral in character because of the different uses of terms. We apply 'moral' to attitude, feelings, actions, conduct, behaviour and so on. In order to understand the nature of moral problems one will have to give meaning to the term 'moral' which overwears several meanings. For, the term 'moral' can be applied to several things which may increase the complexity of data of thics. The question can be settled by giving answer to the question how moral use of a term is different from that of its

We should separate moral problems from personal ones which are basically psychological in nature. Even if 'moral' were to execute and assert certain facts regarding conduct, there still temains a difference between moral facts and other facts. Even if we could give an emotive meaning to moral terms we could still dake a distinction between moral and non-moral expression of

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7274 0012 emotions. For instance, Moore maintains that 'Good' is different from 'the good'. A moral philosopher must not confuse a thin which is called the good and the nature of 'good' itself. A persumbor tries to explain the nature of the term 'good' in terms of the object for which it is used, is accused of committing naturalist fallacy. Good cannot be substituted for an object. It does a stand for the object but it is used to commend. The very maning of 'good' is to commend, to prescribe and hence, it function regulating conduct of human beings.

Traditional moral philosophers offered certain ultime principles to regulate and guide conduct. They did not reconize different functions to be played by a moralist and a morphilosopher. There is nothing wrong for a moral philosopher moralize but he is not confined to this job. For traditional morphilosophers there are certain pregiven principles taken granted which would determine the nature of human conduct. we say that a moral problem must be concerned with make decisions which is an intellectual inquiry we cannot say the they are absolute in nature. For any ultimate principle will a leave room for freedom to think. In such situations we we remain where we were earlier in relation to the problem how arrive at and recognize so called ultimate principles and how they check, affect and change our attitudes.

What do we mean by terms like directing, changing regulating? Is it merely telling someone what to do? Guidel someone else's conduct must not mean deciding for others, rath it is to decide for oneself; for, it is to think (imagine) oneself int sivations under which the guidance seeker is going. Guiding on or that of others attitudes means making up one's own min Whether it is a guidanceseeker or a guide, he makes a deliber choice. One may be fully at the consent of someone else intelligi or by merely copying his way of life. In the former case he decide for himself but not in the latter. Copying others without making oneself sure of the possible effects of the action cannot help ding and consequently in regulating behaviour. A moral phi sopher is one who decides for oneself in view of certain mo principles. Freedom to decide is basic and fundamental col tion to regulate and control human behaviour. Thus, we can that a person, who never decides for himself but always at

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under the dictates of others and obeys the instructions given by them, cannot be called a moral philosopher. A moral philosopher must be capable of understanding the nature of principles that he opts for to guide his or other's behaviour.

But again we find that the term behaviour is used in a broad and loose sense which will include all sorts of actions reflex, intended, unintended, rational, irrational, passionate and so on.2 The variety of ways, in which the term behaviour is used, makes its meaning ambiguous. In order to come out of this complexity we will have to come out of the muddle of ambiguity of meanings. In other words we will have to clarify the meaning of the term behaviour when we use it in moral sense. In autonomous activities, behaviour may mean breathing, sneezing or itching or comforting oneself by moving limbs unintentionally; while psychologically one may mean by behaviour, a responsive activity i. e., we just respond to the present stimuli. This stimulus-response theory does not leave any room for choice and decision but our actions are determined and controlled by external stimuli. A moral philosopher is not concerned with such a notion of behaviour which involves reflex activities or determined activities which cannot be counted as intelligible. A moral philosopher is concerned with intended, rational and deliberate activity. Moral action is not a mere response to outer situations but a voluntary and deliberate decision. It is this deliberate decision which modifies one's principles. A moral philosopher is not at all bothered about reflex activities or determined behaviour for one cannot be held responsible for such actions because they cannot be changed at any cost. Therefore there is no sense in talking about decisions. We talk about decisions and changing attitudes only in so far as we have something more than responding to situations in one particular manner. This ability to think for oneself, to think of all the possible effects which could take place under such and such situation makes a man a human being. A moral philosopher, therefore, we can say, is not at all concerned with naturally determined behaviour which will include acts of sneezing, breathing or itching and so on. But he concerns himself with deliberate actions (here too, his actions are determined but by his own free choice) where his rational faculty plays fundamental role in making decisions with regard to moral problems and principles

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which could be applied to them under certain situations. Man is not always bound to respond to a stimulus in one particular way. It is this consciousness or deliberation or awareness of mind which makes a man say he could have done otherwise That is why we do not speak of animal behaviour while talking of principles or guiding one's behaviour. Since, animals cannot think, they cannot be held responsible for their actions. For they do not have principles to choose and obey. They act on instincts and will do in the same manner as they have been doing in the past. But man's behaviour is not so determined. choose to act in different manners though within limited boundaries.

Human conduct, as we know, is not controlled and regulated only in one way. As man can think for himself so he can use various means to control human conduct. It can be controlled by making propaganda, persuasion, advice, guidance, training, threat or by bribing or forcing one to act in particular way. But, as we have already maintained that a man is different from animals because of his rational faculty and he does not live like cattle or cabbages, he can always choose the way to live by. And here too, we must make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary action. If we stand by our own consent, that in order to be a moral philosopher one must be capable of deciding for oneself, we cannot call a man a moral philosopher who acts under threat without his own assent. Even if he copies someone else's way of life he must be capable or understanding the nature of principles which he ascribes to his actions. Adherence to a rule whether decided by oneself or by others needs its full understanding and acceptance. An animal, at the most, can be trained to act in certain particular ways but a man, being intelligible, can think for himself even under ever-changing situations. Man's activities cannot be determined and controlled in the manner in that of an animal. It is true, that in the beginning, sometimes a man is taught certain principles where he has nothing to share. For example, a child, who just does not know the meaning of ' good ' or ' bad ' he uses them in the manner in which he is told, But later on when he starts understanding the meaning of the term we can use it in different ways for different things. larly, at the preliminary stage, a man who does not know how to

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drive a car, may be told certain rules of driving but he can always operate them in divergent ways as required of the situations. These rules are not rigid but dynamic and flexible in nature. is not at all to think of new rules every time but once learnt, rules can be applied even if some new situations occur. Even when new situations occur, we do not always change our old rules but we just think over the problem and modify them according to the new situations. Therefore, we can hold that a man is always free to decide ' what he ought to do ' under such and such situations.3

From the above discussion, we can conclude, that main function of moral philosophy is to regulate human conduct and regulation amounts to mean the acceptance of certain moral principles which involves a decision-making process.4 With regard to moral principles one needs clarity of meaning that one attaches to terms used in the principle itself. A principle is applicable in so far as it is understood and interpreted by others the way in which the speaker understands it. It is the correct understanding of the language of principles which enables human beings to communicate the idea behind principles and in effect which helps in controlling human conduct later on. Any moral theory which tries to seek its affirmation without making clear the signs and symbols used in moral principles, starts on a wrong track. We must clearly distinguish between facts and values. Values may have three dimensions: empirical, normative and conceptual. However, normative study of morality is not free from empirical study. Empirical aspect of values include social sciences which are factual in nature and they just describe the nature of performed actions. Empirical study of value is systematized, ordered and factual. Here, one has just to gather information regarding the performed action in virtue of the consequences. Normative study of values on the other hand, speaks of certain ultimate principles which take refuge on the empirical data. A normative thinker does not make a sharp distinction between facts and values. Normative enquirer has to refer to actual attitudes and dispositions of the doer. He takes some basic values for granted which he calls as self-evident and therefore need not be put to test for justification. For an empirical scientist and a normative thinker there is always a certain goal to arrive at. An empirical scientist reaches

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his goal by analyzing problem in terms of values of observed factual data, while a normative thinker proceeds with certain pregiven basic principles which he thinks are valuable in themselves. A normative enquirer is concerned with proposing a scheme of values. The normative study of values is not free from empirical studies and knowledge of facts. When we call a thing valuable it is not valuable in it-self. A principle cannot be taken for granted which could be applied to anything under any situation. It is the judgment passed on certain actions, which may help in deciding for principles. A normative enquirer should know what actually could be implemented. As such it is only factual knowledge which will support the acceptance of certain principles.

Conceptual study of value, on the other hand, questions the nature of principles and activity themselves. It explores the meaning of the terms that we use in moral principles and judgments. These three aspects of value are not logically exclusive of each other. Social scientist, however, has to touch the problems in normative and conceptual study. Conceptualizatian may stand first in the sequence because unless we are clear about the meanings of the terms, we will not be able to know values correctly. Empirical study of values will be misleading if not taken care by conceptual analysis of values. And on the other hand conceptual study of values will have to refer to facts which will serve as the criteria to justify the nature of meaning of the term that one gives to the term while using it in some principle of judgment.

Ethical terms, normally have an imperative function.<sup>5</sup> For instance, 'this is good' may stand for 'you ought to do this' of 'approve of this'. The sentence, 'this is good' is the evaluation of some action, thing, event or conduct which at the same time implies an advice to other to do the same thing if they fall under same situation. But 'you ought to do this,' or 'approve of this,' have a further direct function of prescribing and commending which, we find, is implicit in 'this is good.' What is indirectly suggested by the first is given directly by the second. And here again, we can use, so called moral terms in a non-moral sence. As in the case of 'you ought not to smoke here at this particular time' may have purely non-moral use of the term 'ought'. This principle is prescribed because of certain factual resaons, one of

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which may be that it is harmful for the patient sitting next to the smoker. Or, to have another example, 'this is a good pen' may have certain non-moral reasons for the use of the term 'good' that it has a nice colour which one likes most and writes with a flow, and the shape is beautiful and so on. Number of such characteristics could be multiplied. 'Good' is given an adjectival meaning in such cases where it attributes certain qualities of a thing. And we attribute qualities to a thing when we make statements about them. Moral language, in this sense, will be regarded as making statements which are likely to be true or false. But do we attribute certain qualities to things by using ethical terms in moral principles and judgments? It becomes apparently true that while making moral judgments, to some extent, we do explain and describe facts. By saying this is good, bad, right or wrong we certainly make judgment on something where descriptive function of ethical language is primary to make sense of what we mean by such terms.

From this, it follows, that evaluation of something is different from its description.6 We call a thing good for certain characteristics and therefore 'good' could be given meaning only in the realm of these factual characteristics. We certainly give reasons to justify something to which we apply terms like good or bad. But it will not at all be fair to say that we describe something by saying it is good or bad. It is different from saying somes thing is red or yellow. There is no grammatical dissimilarity between 'this is good' and 'this is yellow', but the two sentences have different functions to perform. Former is to recommend, to evaluate, to appraise, whereas latter is just to describe, inform and explain. Good or bad are not terms like yellow or red which could be given ostensible definitions. These are like sincere, honest, nice, dishonest, cruel and so on. When we are told that someone is good, and if we understand the meaning of good clearly, we at once may assert his judgment, or may answer, 'I do not know him, so I cannot say so'. Even if we do not know the person being talked of, still we can understand that the person is being commended or favoured or approved of. We at once make an image of the good person without having any information regarding the qualities and characteristics that the person owns. We may acquire some information about the goodness of the person by inference from our previous knowledge which could be attached to a good person. But this will not do unless we understand the meaning of the term good itself which is absolutely different from the characteristics which we refer to, for giving reasons to support our judgment. A person may be called good by different people for different reasons but the meaning of the term 'good' remains the same forever for everyone. It is to be understood that ethical words are appraisal words which are used to advice, to guide, to regulate conduct. But this is not true of something which we call yellow or red.

Therefore, we can say, that ethical terms are primarily evaluative and more in the nature of imperatives. And these imperatives have no similarity with grammatical imperatives. They are not direct commands but suggestions or quasi-imperatives. A moral imperative does not command one to act in a particular way but advises one to act in accordance with certain principles which one decides for oneself under certain circumstances. 'Do so and so' is in imperative mood, speaking grammatically which is shared by moral impertatives too when we implement some principle. 'You ought to do this' is not a mere echo of the words but it is a prescription given to others that if I were in such and such a situation I would have done like this. So it has an element of command in itself.

To evaluate something is not only to use terms like 'good' or 'bad'; or to accept or reject a principle of conduct is not merely to say yes or no to it. We keep evaluating all sorts of things like tables, chairs, books and so on just for certain psychological reasons. In such cases, it becomes a matter of taste, like, or dislike, therefore of preference. For one thing may be preferred by one in virtue of personal taste or for certain sentimental reasons which we must distinguish from evaluation. To say something is 'good' because it is liked by someone will hinder generalizing the judgment. When a person is overpowered by his emotions and sentiments with regard to something and does not let himself generalize his judgments, his attitudes cannot be called moral. For moral principles have to be public.

Moral choice is not a mere matter of taste. Deciding for moral principles excludes sentimentality from its domain. Mo-CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Handwar NATURE OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

ral evaluations differ from non -moral ones but they share the common quality of generalization with non-moral evaluations. To say something is good is to say that I and others rate it higher than other things. The point is that whenever we evaluate something moral or non-moral we have a standard to apply for evaluation i. e., if I commend a person's action or a thing or a particular case I become committed to my commendation that I will always commend it in future too and will act according to it if confronted with same cases in similar situations and conditions. 'You ought to do it' whether in moral or non moral cases implies a principle that the speaker will meet with similar sort of cases. under similar situations in similar way. Thus, a moral principle is not a personal command or an imperative as recognized by grammar or what one wants to be done; neither, it is a desirous activity that it is an expression of wish that someone would work in such and such way. Therefore moral principles are universal in nature.8 The effect of acting in accordance with certain principle is to acquire a particular attitude towards actions.

How do we arrive at principles? Do we get them in theoretical realm or practical realm as they have dual status of belonging both to theory and practice. ?9 It often happens that we perform actions without knowing the principles working at the root of the action. In such cases practice precedes principles. It does not mean that action is not guided by any principle but the principle which is not known at the time of acting gets recognition later on. Here, patterns of activity follow principles unreflectively. principle which was not explicitly formulated in theory becomes authoritative when a person is asked to give reasons for acting in a certain way or doing something, or calling a thing good or bad. For, it does not always require knowledge of moral principles in order to be moral as it is not a necessary condition to know the principles of logic in order to be good a argumentator. A man may be a good argumentator without studying the laws of thought. But laws are always there even when they are not discovered by the argumentator. Implicit principles become explicit by learning them by reflection on practice, by observing what we did in the past, through experience. Once principles are recognized they simultaneously become authoritative.

There is no dispute regarding the nature of inquiry or decision that it begins with some existing body of thought and practice... CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Any inquiry or decision that we make will force us to see its applicability in the light of past activity. Therefore, function of decision is to provide a source or basis for ultimate principles which themselves are not deduced from greater generality. Either we justify moral judgment by relating the facts of the case, or by approaching the principle or a set of principles. On being challenged we may give some more general principles until we reach some ultimate principles which may not be deduced from still higher principle. But there may remain the possibility of dispute. It is possible to think of such ultimate principles only in theory but not in practice, To think of such an ultimate principle would amount to saying that it does not need further reasons for justification.

Lastly, principles and rules are often used synonymously. But two of them have different connotations. Rules are not commendatory and prescriptive, while referring to a principle in this or that particular activity we have already committed ourselves to the principle.10 A rule is descriptive and informative but principle is the endorsement of speaker which involves the element of commitment. As such, evaluation not only requires mere rules but principles which could be recognized by reflection on practice and modified in view of new or changing circumstances. We keep applying working principles until we reach some more general principle.

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Veena Malhotra

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## KIERKEGAARD'S NOTION OF SUBJECTIVITY AND ITS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

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It is very obvious to the very nature of Kierkegaard's philosophy that he should desist from any systematic attempt to explain the nature of human existence. Such system-building is more to the liking of the idealists. Kierkegaard's philosophy is opposed to all conceptual schemes and theoretical systems A theoretical enquiry into the nature of human existence would ignore the reality of man and reduce him to a mere object. Indeed, the very starting-point of Kierkegaard's philosophy takes the form of protest against such systematisation and objectification. The subjective dimension of human existence as analysed by Kierkegaard defies categorisation. This is the significance of his characterising human existence as subjectivity in contrast to the objectivity of the speculative modes of thought and of science. The reality of human existence is not outside the individual but inheres in the subject i. e. in the concrete, free, unique individual. The self has its original being, its true actuality in what cannot be stated as an objective event. Hence each individilm est ineffable, no objective statement can convey the full truth about him. Here it should be noted that this ineffability does not imply vagueness, it is because of the unfathomable depth, richness and complexity of subjectivity. Subjectivity is interpreted in terms of passionate inwardness which represents personal concern and involvement. As Pascal has aptly remarked, " the heart has reasons, which reason does not know, "1 and what the individual man in a concrete situation knows, feels and chooses cannot be comprehended through objective reason.

The often-quoted statement that 'truth is subjectivity' implies that truth is not something that is outside the individual as an end-product. It is to be assimilated in inwardness. The subjective thinker is concerned first with his own existence and everything else in relation to himself. Without this human or existential relationship, the objects of the world have no significance, thus everything external has to be transformed into I. P. Q...6

things internal and each such act constitutes an affirmation of subjectivity. As Kierkegaard puts it, "Only that truth which edifies is truth for you. This is an essential predicate relating to the truth as inwardness, its decisive characterisation as edifying for you i. e. for the subject, constitutes its essential difference all objective knowledge, in that the subjectivity itself becomes the mark of the truth."2

Objective truth is concerned with objective problems of science, mathematics and history, it is detached and disinterested and therefore indifferent to the human subject. Kierkegaard characterises the Hegelian notion of truth as 'mediate' in contrast to which his own notion of truth is 'immediate', i. e. il does not involve reflection and it is not hidden in speculative metaphysics. In Hegel, the appropriation of truth is achieved through the process of 'mediation' by reflection, i. e., truth is the product of a logical process arrived at by reflection, by the achievement gradually of elimination of the subject-object divi sion. This is how? Hegel seeks to arrive at a reconciliation between thought and being, subject and object, knower, known and knowledge.

Kierkegaard on the other hand keeps clear of any such speculative metaphysics, by holding that the subject as an existing individual must be regarded truth in the continuous process of subject becoming and hence truth cannot be a static identity of subject and impers the object. The subject as contingent and temporal finds isself or Sh always in the tension of endless striving, truth, therefore is never telation final, it is always in transition, it has no beginning and no end kind o and hence remains forever an approximation. On the other hand relation the metaphysical or the scientific subject is static and fixed, can person not be regarded even speculatively as synonymous. In the words buber of Kierkegaard, "Not for a single moment, it is forgotten that the subject is an existing involved buber of the subject is an existing in the subject is subject in the subject is subject in the subject in the subject is subject in the su the subject is an existing individual, and that existence is a process of becoming, and that the notion of truth as an identity thought and being its activities. thought and being is a chimera of abstraction."3 Subjectivity direct immediate self which is to be created, lived and tru rienced.

Now the question arises: If truth is subjectivity and evade other hands the communication possible? experienced.

conceptualisation, then how is communication possible?

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is to be communicated is inarticulate and ineffable. How can we express the ineffable, indescribable character of existential reality? In other words, how is communication possible, when the very subject-matter of communication is not available in formulable terms? Thus communication emerges as a difficult problem in Kierkegaard's philosophy. In the domain of subjectivity there is something else besides the individual in the first person, there is a second person he addresses, and over and above the first and the second person, there is God.

In the first place, it is important to realise that Kierkegaard's analysis of communication is different from scientific or conce-', i. e. il ptual communication. Scientific communication is through concepts, ideas, thoughts based on abstract rational capacity of culative the mind. This sort of communication does not pose any distinguishable problem. On the contrary, existential communication goes beyond the sphere of rational discourse. Kierkegaard is not speaking of communication in the social and political realm. He looks at the problem of communication from an individualist own and point of view. Existential communication is not descriptive, it is the expression and revelation of the very being of the individual. uch spe The end of human communication is not to command but to existing commune, it is achieved not through objectivity but by interocess of subjectivity. Martin Buber has made a distinction between bject and impersonal relationship of 'I-It' ('It' can be replaced by 'He' nds ilselitor 'She') and personal relationship of 'I-Thou'. 'I-It' is never relationship cannot be spoken with the whole being because this no end kind of knowledge is independent of the observer. her hand telationship is personal immediate relationship, the whole ked, call personality of the individual is involved in it; I is completely ne words Buber calls 'a personal meeting', the personal is based on the is a problem to the 'personal meeting', the personal is based on the beapplied to the 'personal meeting'.

Kierkegaard maintains that direct communication of existenved a finality on possible, because it presupposes certainty and finality. The mode of objective communication is direct because it is indicated. On the it is indifferent to the existing subject (communication). On the other hands are the indifferent to nd evaluation other hand, the indirect communication cannot be indifferent to the communicator, it is concerned with the subject because it

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contemplates inwardly. Kirekegaard calls this 'double reflection' The reflection of the inwardness confers upon thinker a doub more di reflection', so to say, because in thinking he thinks the univer sal, but existing in his thought, he becomes infinitely intereste therfore in his own existence. The first reflection is thinking of the university highlight sal, the second reflection is the assimilation of the universal; elabora one's own existence, in inwardness. The ability to communicate bolically truth inwardly is an art. To quote Kiekegaard, "The greater 1 acknow artistry, the greater the inwardness .... Whereever subjective "Abrah of importance in knowledge, and where appropriation the ety and constitutes the crux of the matter, the process of communication the univ is a work of art, and doubly reflected."4 The common ground so that between artistic activity and existential communication is the cannot human interior. The meaning an artist seeks to conveyist great cl reality as it is experienced and lived through, not as it is describe experien or stated. He expresses what is inarticulate and ineffable. As Thus it S. Eliot says that 'all poetry is a raid on the inarticulate'. Artist anguish activity is the expression of feeling, which cannot be conceptual complet An artist expresses himself indirectly through symbols whit from are suggestive, evocative, indefinite and non-cognitive. Jask towards has used the word cipher which is a unique symbol and cannot question verified. As he says, "Symbolism has at the same time an unfather mysticis able depth which it alone transmits the light of indefinite being.

Indirect communication is through the emphatic use of signals answer which properly executed leads to the Socratic art of maieus ubjecti Socratic method was indirect which consists in leading the read criticism to a point where he finds out for himself what the authorh been trying to convey to him. All that Socrates could do in manner of communication was to assist others negatively means of his maieutic art or 'midwifery' in order that the nesses, might arrive at the truth by themselves. Socrates was essential a midwife who could deliver but not bring forth the new Indirect communication tries to bring about a certain revelail in the recipient and at the same time it awakens one's authentic existence. Both the communicator and recipient independently and retain their individuality. The attempt communicate the whole of my being is bound to shatter. Com nication thus becomes the cornerstone as well the stumb block of Kierkegaard's existentialism.

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The communication of the unique and the singular becomes doub more difficult when Kierkegaard describes the relationship bete univer ween man and God which is wholly subjective and personal and ntereste therfore is highly incommunicable. The unique religious experience e univer is highlighted by the myth of Abraham. However, this entire iversal elaboration of the religious stage has to be comprehended symmunical bolically, for this is not the realm of discursive reasoning. reater acknowledging the inadequacy of language, Kierkegaard says, jective "Abraham is silent but he cannot speak and therein lies his anxion the ety and dread .. Speech is a consolation which translates me into unication the universal." The ethical demands that Abraham should speak, n ground so that others can understand him. Abraham knows that he on is the cannot make others understand through language. nvey is great clash between the ethical and the religious. Abraham describe experiences anguish and dread because of the constant struggle. e. As Thus it is at the religious stage that man realises the essential '. /srist anguish of the human situation. For it is here that one feels ceptual completely alienated from others because others look upon him ools whit from universal demands of ethics. Kierkegaard's approach Jaspe towards religious experience is a-social and is a-moral. But the cannot question is would not religious experience be transformed into infathor mysticism when it becomes highly individual, private incommunicable? e being.

Is the image of man portrayed by Kierkegaard adequate? To se of signal answer this, one has to evaluate critically Kierkegaard's notion of maieus ubjectivity. Our criticism may be divided into two parts: (a) the read criticism of the internal inconsistency of Kierkegaard's position (b) criticism of Kierkegaard's neglect of external factors which do in are essential for a comprehensive approach towards man. Kierthat the necessary's notion of subjectivity suffers from certain internal week that the desses. On the one hand the very nature of this notion of essential subjectivity is such that it cannot be defined by any rational means new of analysis, still he makes an attempt to explain — the idea of revelation truth and subjectivity. Every expression-even if it is one of claristical avalanation. one's fication involves in varying degrees some rational explanation. ipient If truth is subjectivity then it should not be expressed at alle Attempt However irrational existence a philosophy might have to deal with, it cannot altogether dispense with conceptualisation. stumb

But even if such conceptualisation and characterisation of man as definining himself in and through his actions, were excused

as unavoidable, the question still arises as to whether such characterisation puts us into the right perspective. to what we have called the external criticism. Kierkegaard seem to have overemphasised the subjective and irrational character human existence, ignoring the fact that communication involve factors which are objective. It is right that in the process communication, one does not determine the other; but this interpersonal relationship certainly brings about a change in the other person. The individual is not a 'windowless monad'; he has gr a reciprocal relationship with his fellow-beings. He is continuous becoming a different person, for his every experience is a parte continuing process. Kierkegaard's notion of subjectivity extremely individualistic. The task of the subjective thinkeri only to reflect on his inward reality. The existential man is m supposed to be interested in anything else in the world. One net not be a social scientist in order to point out the multi-dimension personality of the individual, which develops within a social context. The conclusion that the individual himself is mould in many respects, including those of his choices and decision though reciprocal relationship with others, is inescapable, eve though such factors may limit man's consciousness of b existential situation.

Department of Philosophy Punjab University, Chandigarh Indu Jalois

#### NOTES

- 1. Blaise Pascal: Thoughts (Pensees) Trans. by W. F. Trotter, in the Harve Classics, 1956, p. 98, No. 277.
- 2. S. Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Trans. by David Swenson, Princeton, 1944, p. 226.
- 3, Ibid. p. 176.
- 4. Ibid. pp. 72-73.
- 5. K. Jaspers: Philosophy, Vol. 3 Trans. by E. B. Ashton, p. 129.
- 6. S. Kierkegaard: I ear and Trembling: Trans, by Walter Lowric p 106

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## ON SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION

One of the strongest urge of man is to know about his observable environment. And the most important function of a scientific theory is to satisfy this need.

The influence of model in interpretation of a theory has played an effective role. For example, the achievement of mechanics is so striking that some outstanding philosophers of physics like Kirchhoff and Mach hold that the ability to condense a potentially infinite set of information, law-like statment into a single manageable formula, is the only function of a scientific theory. However, we need not share their belief because we do not confuse the 'bare theory' with the 'Model'.

Now, between the 'Bare theory' and its model, there lies a very fundamental concept of interpretation. At times, it is quite explicit. At times, it is so implicit that the distinction between the theory and model becomes very delicate. Unless there is initial awareness of the distinction between the two, and unless there is sufficient acqaintance with the eontext, a model may be taken for a theory. But theory does not only summerise the laws and facts established. It also has predictive function as we well know that the predictive function of an empirical theory is more spectacular than its summerising success e. g. the prediction of a solar eclipse to its last possible detail has so impressed the philosophers of science that quite a few of contemporary philosophers of science hold in esteem this predictive function of scientific theory as did A. Comte, the father of the Philosophy of Science.

A scientific theory has other functions of 'controlling' and 'explaining' the phenomenon. 'To control' is to bring about the desired change of environment and this aspect was implicitly identified by William James, with the 'truth' of the theory. Needless to debate the issue, because such truth must necessarily be the pragmatic dimension of truth. When a theory is interpreted either analytically, contextually, or in the light of the model, there is no loss whatsoever of these functions of the theory.

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The laterpretation of a theory:

The interpretation of a theory may be carried on two levels.

1. The contextual 2. With the help of a model.

Before considering these two types of interpetations, it is important to note that the problem of interpretation arises only in the phenomenon not quite ordinary. The immediate example that I can think of is that of the sign board "Keep to the left"on the road side. Interpretation is easy here simply because the communication is direct and in the manner in which we are habituated (trained) to understand the sign board 'keep to the left.' On the other hand, the phenomenon which is generally not explained in the manner in which we are habituated to understand, required interpretation. Examples of such non-ordinary and ordinary phenomena could be multiplied, and so those of interpretation of nonordinary phenomena and the accepted interpretation of the ordinary. Now, the distinction between, what marks one as ordinary and the other as not, requires no elaboration because it is well understood. The accepted and the seasoned communications need not be freshly interpreted unless there is a specific demand for that.

On the other hand, there are cases in every walk of life which compel or force themselves upon us for interpretation. But my concern here is to consider scientific theories whom Karl Popper calls systems of signs or symbols. An interpretation is closely linked with signs and symbols. The interpretation of symbols, signs, sentences, gestures or phenomenon is the interpretation of the symbol 'P'. E. g. it may be interpreted as '2' which may be further interpreted as a consecutive unit on a numerical series of it may represent two units of milk, two chalks. etc.

Now when 'P' is interpreted as '2' on a numerical series, the interpretation is more contextual than modelled. The contextual lists hold that the way in which theoritical concepts function in a scientific theory is given what is technically called an interpretation of the calculus expressing the theory which works from the bottom of upwords. The final theorems of the calculus are interpreted as expressing empirically testable generalizations, the axioms of the calculus are interpreted as propositions from which these generalizations logically follow, and the theoritical terms CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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ON SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION

occurring in the calculus are given a meaning implicitly by their context, i. e. by their place within the calculus. So, an understanding of a theoritical concept in the scientific theory is an underestanding of the role which theroitical term representing it plays in the calculus expressing the theory; and the empirical nature of the theoritical concept is based upon the empirical interpretation of the final theorems of the calculus. These technical requirements can be said to have been fulfilled when No. 2 is interpreted as a unit on a numerical series. In such a contextua list account, where meaning of a theortical term is adequately communicated, there is no need to look for a model. Of course asatisfactory account by contextualist is possible only because there has been a full understanding of the theoretical concept which Quine calls 'semantic ascent'. But for many people it is simpler to employ a model to a scientific theory than to understand the uninterpreted scientific theory its bare form: The deductive model itself is thought of as an interpreted system, which may be reinterpreted to the advantage of the context. Thus the modelist interpreted the originally interpreted theory suitably, while contextualist interprets the originally uninterpreted theory.

And hence, the expectations in interpretations of these two methods are slightly varied. The contextualist interpretation may be more procees – oriented and hence, has less predictive expectations, while a modelist interpretation is more established and hence, more predictive.

If No. 2 is interpreted as a second step in a geometrical theorem, or the sum of two digits, or two units of milk, then we have definitely employed some model and have made some kind of prediction possible, though these might have little explanatory value.

However, informational or congnitive function of a theory is better served by 'interpreting a theory in the light of a model, for, models are but 'seasoned experiment', tested, varified and accepted for their utility; a bare theory may not be able to serve with equal amount of efficiency. Someone might hold that a model is predictive in a way in which a bare theory is not. It yeilds new generalizations about observable properties which the theory itself does not provide; i. e., they can be used for making new predictions; so a modelled theory will be stronger than the theory in its bare form. Very true, but the moment one empirical evidence nullifies

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the propriety of employing a particular model, the entire generalis zation falls off.

#### Interpretation and analysis

An interpretation is not an analysis. Analysis no doubt, si a permanent feature of the interpetation. Analysis herein, may he implicit or elaborate. But it must be present in any interpretation But interpretation is something more than sheer analysis. It would be foolish to interpret without employing analysis. One must have proper grounds for interpreting 'P' as 'It is raining' and not as 'zero'. E. g. 'P' is interpreted as 'It is raining'. The relationship of 'P' and 'It is raining' is the point at which analysis could be carried on. Why should 'P' represent a proposition and not 'Paris'. It would be an over-statement to say that we decide it arbitrarily, when we say that 'P' stands for proposition and not for Paris; it is because the entire context in which the discussion is made and expected to be interpreted is of a particular nature. It can be said that the interpretation basically takes into consideration say, the context, the Universe of discourse, the range of significance and so on. Suitable technical nomenclature may be used, though the principle recommended is the same. principle is this:

Interpretations have necessarily been influenced by the colltext, and hence, have no likelihood whatsoever of being arbitrary. A seeming choice at interpreting 'P' as 'Paris' or It is raining, is no choice at all, in any one single act of communication. uneasiness about there being an element of arbitrariness accompanying and every intepretation is mainly due to a mis-conception that 'one is free to interpret any way.' Rhetories have added to it by such statements, 'Well, I leave it to your interpretation.' There can be only one interpretation of any sign, symbol, sentence, gesture or phenomenon. And this assertion is the result of analysis. Where sufficient and proper analysis has been carried out, one is face to face with 'The Interpretation.' Analysis only confirms the interpretation.

Interpretation and communication: 'P' is interpreted means that 'P' has communication value. Or, it would not be interpreted There are instances of some strange script being not interpreted because there is no proper context granded on Warithous appropriate

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senteesult of carried is only model. It may be argued and quite convincingly that after all, the so called interpretation does not accompany any symbol as such. It is 'the interpreter' who gives it a value according to the context of his own acquaintance and the general nature of the symbol.

Very true, but this would be the interpretation of the kind of a second degree. The first degree of the primary value of 'P' is that alone which the author of 'P' had in mind. In case the interpreter's own value coincides with that of the primary value of 'P', then the communication is perfect. Till then, no claim to the perfectness of communication need be made. Now, the author of 'P' may be any agent, human or not. If the agent is human, verification of the intended meaning of 'P' becomes easier and even possible. Otherwise, we have to take recourse to the impersonal rules. The nonhuman agent such as the framework, context, a range of reference can serve as suitable standards by which some kind of verification could be had.

A model of a theory is such a standard. Interpretation is the conceptual distance between a theory and a model. There is a sense of comprehensiveness when a theory is interpreted with reference to some model, obvious or implicit. A contextual interpretation is more of a process than a compact whole which any scientific theory attempts to remain.

Faculty of Arts. M. S. University BARODA-3 (Miss) Yogini Nighoskar

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## IN SEARCH OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL LIFE\*

I have been asked to write on "Philosophical Concepts in Contemporary Social Life". The topic is rather vaguely indetermined. However the practice of supplying 'vague' and 'indeterminate' subject to a philosopher for the exercise of his talent is neither new nor unexpected. If the function of philosophy is to make our ideas (thoughts, language) clear then it would be quite wrong to provide clean water to a philosopher; he should be provided only with muddy water. (Fishes do not survive in clean water). Let the philosopher do the sanitary job; it is what philosophy teaches him to do. Therefore, one need not be apologetic about one's failure to provide a clean topic. But I one's should know exactly what I am going to do. How to begin? From where to begin? Which corner to sweep, and, what kind of broom to use? The question 'how to'end' would arise only if one succeeds in making a beginning. My power to write and my ability to express ideas has been put to test. Let me appear for the test.

The subject, philosophical concepts in contemporary social life, brings before me the picture of a drowning man. I have seen his head, and, I have seen his legs, and, I have seen his arms. Though I have seen only the bits of him at different times, they are sufficient for my belief that what I have before me is a drowning man, and not simply the drowning bits. Before me is occurring the death of a man, and not simply the death of a head or a leg or an arm. The expression 'philosophical concepts' stands for the head of the topic, 'in' stands for its arms and 'contemporary social life' for its legs. One can reverse the order if it pleases him. One may not follow the pattern I have evolved. One is quite free to treat contemporary social life as the head of the topic and philosophical concepts as one or both the legs. The pattern can be changed, for 'drouning men' are unlike drowning topics. The topics of seminars may not be found drowning in the same fashion as men are found drowning. We are making use of an analogy, and no analogy is perfect. (Basic teaching in philosophy). It is an

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ideal situation if one is free from analogy. It is my misfortune that I happen to be a man and not a topic. Had I been a topic, i. e., Had I been free from analogy, I would have certainly succeeded in getting the whole sense, the whole picture, of the topic of our seminar (of any topic under any seminar). All topics have something in common as all men have something in common. (An appal to Plato).

Am I really as helpless as I appear to myself? Cannot! understand the sense of such a trifling entity as a topic? It seems to me that my worries and anxieties are unnecessary. (Invitation to second thoughts ). These worries and anxieties are the outcome of getting myself muddled in the process of cleaning the furniture of my mind. In order to know the nature of a hairpin or a teacup I am certainly not required to be (become) a bairpin or a teacup. There is no doubt that some poets (I don't remember their names at the moment) have considered themselves as beings of an inferior quality than hairpins and teacups. Had they been hairpins and teacups rather than men with flesh and blood, they would have possibly reached those hairs and lips that they desired to reach. But the expression of these wishes and desires presuppos es that it is possible for us to know what a hairpin or a teacup is without ourselves becoming a hairpin or a teacup. So also, in order to know the sense of a topic I am not required to be a topic.

Nature has planted (evolved) man in this universe to know its own secrets. (Hegelian thought). Therefore, he has been given powers not only to know the creatures of his own kind, but also those items of the universe which are not of his own kind. And the philosopher (a special product of nature) has taken on himself the responsibility of devising strategies, methods and plans to know whatever item falls under the hot Sun or the cold Moon. "Philosophical speculation is the creation of the rich. Down with it" says Nabokov. (Despair, p. 1). "Philosophical speculation is the highest achievement of nature. Up with it" say I in my Hegelian frame. Isn't it true that the philosopher is an academic superman? Isn't it true that the philosopher has a telepathic, telephonic and telescopic (perhaps also microscopic) mind? (Is it a tragedy or a comedy?)

Let me do my job. Consider the head-of our topic, i.e. 'philosophical concepts'. The question arises: Are there any such

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things as 'philosophical concepts'? And if there are such things, what is their nature and mode of operation? (Do I really see the head of a drowning man?) One possible answer to the question is that there must be such things as philosophical concepts, however vague we may be about them. Vagueness is associated with the very notion of a concept, so there is no surprise that it is associated with the notion of a philosophical concept. But to accept that there are philosophical concepts and at the same time to accept that there is vagueness associated with them makes the status of philosophical concepts extremely dubious. How dubious are philosophical concepts? Consider the operation of 'slums', 'beauty competitions', 'horse races' and 'tight pants' in contemporary social life. One may express one's pleasure or displeasure over (about) them. The psychological (also physiological) reactions expressed by people have both qualitative and quantitative variations. But philosophical concepts are quite unlike slums, beauty competitions, horse races and tight pants. No smile on the lips and no tears in the eyes occur when one entertains a philosophical concept. The reception given to a philosophical concept is unlike the reception given to a beautiful person or a dirty politician. Perhaps there may be conceptual smiles and conceptual tears. But conceptual smiles do not require lips to be moved or facial expression to be made, and conceptual tears do not fall from the eyes. Entertaining philosophical concepts is certainly not a matter of entertainment. Not because no entertainment tax is levied on them, but because they are not objects of sensibility and perception, hence not objects of everyday transaction. (Thanks to Plato for giving us a clue ).

The above discussion has landed us directly into the arms of the topic of our seminar, the metaphor of 'in'. Even if there are such things as philosephical concepts they are certainly not objects of social transaction. Slums require slum-dwellers. And there can be no beauty competition if there is only one beauty. Similarly, it is impossible for one horse to succeed in a race if there are no other horses. And tight pants have not been tailored accoading to the bodily needs of a conceptual person. (Concepts presuppose unity or oneness). If concepts are different from things and events, then it would be a fruitless attempt on our part to search for concepts in slums, beauty competitions,

horse races and tight pants. Though philosophers have attempted institutionalize concepts (as ordinary men have institutionalize slums and horse races) they have not suggested that the institution of concepts be established near a slum or a racecourse. The institution of concepts is an affair of the underworld. And the who knows concepts, knows how to handle them, is a man to the underworld. Philosophers are unlike, but not quite unlike the agents of Mafia.

The emergence of Mafia is a new feature of society, therefore the consideration of Mafia has naturally brought us to the legs the topic of our seminar, i, e., to 'contemporary social life'. The mode in which an agent of Mafia operates and the mode in which an agent of philosophy operates have certain comparable feature Mafia men smuggle themselves into our everyday society. do not keep any label on their faces that they belong to the Mate It is only when you hear the shot of a gun or the roar of an eng ine or the prick of a knife that you know that he is not just you neighbour, having such and such a house number, but a ma from the Mafia. (You are certainly a fortunate person if you survive to tell your tale ). Similarly, a philosopher is an ordinal person so far as his basic needs are concerned. He laughs and b weeps and he eats and he drinks and he stands in the queues for entering into cinema-houses, public buses and railway carriages It is not written on the face of a man that he is a philosopher. It is only when one starts shooting you that you know that you are in a situation of having an encounter with a philosopher Of course, the philosopher's bullets, trucks and knives are not made of metal and wood; they are made of ideas and ideals they have conceptual stuff inside them.

The survival of Masia depends on its Godfathers And the survival of a Godfather depends on his alertness and efficiency handling two fronts, an external and an internal front. The external front is connected with the survival of his underworld the place from where the Godfather operates. This front is easier to handle. So long as corruption and nepotism remain the sustaining pillers of our society there is no danger to the existence of Masia, to the existence of any kind of secret criminal society. Though But the real challenge to the Godfather is posed by the internal front. A Godfather has to see that there exists no other Godfather.

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PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND SOCIAL LIFE

father in his underworld. God is one, therefore. Godfather is also one.

Philosophy too these days has its own Godfathers. And its Godfathers are in a similar situation. Contemporary social life is unique in every respect. How could it spare philosophers from being influenced by its respectable institutions like corruption and nepotism. These institutions deserve to be democratised. And in making use of these institutions we would simply be quickening the process of democratisation of these institutions. Why should only the politicians and the Mafia-men be allowed to take advantage of these institutions. The underworld of philosophy has its own victories and defeats, its own feuds and treaties and its own joys and sorrows. Blessed are they who are ignorant of what is going on in the underworld of philosophy. Without ignorance it is impossible to have illusion. And without illusion it is impossible to survive. (Something like this was Sankara'sview). Let us opt for survival.

But what after all is being done in the underworld of philosophy over and above the personal feuds of philosophers. One of the things that is being done is the invention of concepts (ideas and ideals) for the purpose of using them on the helpless men and women living in society. In the process of inventing concepts the Godfathers of philosophy have sometimes taken up a far more dangerous course than the Godfathers of Masia. It is possible to ow that survive a bullet or a knife injury. The possibility of survival exists even when one has been run over by a heavy vehicle. But there is no possibility of surviavl if one has been run over by a philosophical concept. And the philosophical infection is more dangerous than the bacterial infection. An agent of the Mafia can kill you; he can hold you for ransom. Isn't it a small scale operation? For, a philosopher can hold the whole society, the humanity as such, for ransom. (A clue from Karl Popper). derworld Men and women for a philosopher are nothing but guineapigs; is easie they are simply subjects meant for the verification of philosophical sustain theses. Plato was certainly wrong if he meant that the world of existent connecepts has no impact on the world of things and events. society Though concepts are different from things and events, they do intern sometimes change the shape of things and events.

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The fact that the world of concepts has impact on the world of things and events should not however mislead you into thinking that concepts are not items of the underworld that they occur in the same social reality in which occur the car. accidents and love-accidents, football-games and foul-games battle of Bangladesh and battle of wits etc. (compare concept with metaphors). There is no doubt that some philosophers having Kant-like frame of mind, have attempted to smuggle con cepts into our everyday life. A criminal thinks that there's nothing wrong in performing criminal acts, for all of us are basi cally criminals. Similarly, some philosophers think that therei nothing wrong in having concepts, for all of us have concepts All human beings, in a sense, are philosophers as all human beings, in a sense, are criminals. One just cannot manage u survive if he is not equipped with concepts. (Is it modesty mischief on the part of a philosopher?)

In order to know a thing or an event you must first have the concept of that thing or event. Thus, you are deprived knowing hairpins and teacups if you are not equipped with the concepts of hairpins and teacups. Does it mean that in order know what contemporary life is you must be equipped with con temporiori concepts, (Kantian model: contemporiori concepts a priori concepts of contemporary life). Whatever sort of ment equipment is conceptual equipment, the view under considers tion clearly implies that there are no such things as 'philosophi cal concepts' apart from 'non-philosophical concepts'. The may be concepts subsumed under other concepts. The concepts 'hairpins' and 'teacups' may be subsumed under the conce of a 'substance'. One may further apply the distinction between 'a priori concepts', and 'empirical consepts', calling 'teacu an empirical concept and 'substance' an a priori concept. give more weightage to his a priori concepts one may descri them as 'categories'. But none of these distinctions and desc ptions has the implication that there are any such things 'philosophical concepts'. What is philosophicality about concept of a 'substance' which is missing in the concept ' teacup '?

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those of 'substance', 'self', 'immortality', 'good', 'evil', and there like have been invented by the philosopher. He is not only their inventor but also their guardian, hence these concepts deserve to be described as 'philosophical'. Neither an ordinary man nor a scientist of any repute is capaple of handling these concepts. But in saying all this one forgets that all concepts have been invented by the philosopher. Even the notion of 'concept' is philosopher's invention. The philosopher is responsible, not only for the invention of the concept of 'substance' or 'self' but also for the invention of the concept of 'hairpin' or 'teacup'. The concept of a teacup is as much removed from the lips as is the concept of a self removed from the body. (This might have led Kant to think in terms of schematization of his a priori concepts; i. e., categories. Once the concept of a teacup is schematised. there is no difficulty for the teacup to reach the lips. Of course, the concept of a lip has also to be schematised). How misleading would it be to distinguish 'ordinary concepts' from 'philosophical concepts', for no concept is ordinary, it is an extraordinary achievement of the man from the underworld. (The philosopher is caught in his own web).

The topic of our seminar presupposes a distinction between 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical' concepts. But if there is no such distinction then it is an exercise in futility to search for philosophical concepts in contemporary social life. This introduces a real difficulty. Suppose we allow that concepts are as much a part of our social reality as are hairpins and tight pants, how are we going to smuggle a philosopher into our social reality ¿ Even sending concepts to the Platonic underworld does not solve the problem. The philosopher in that situation would be a manufacturer of concepts in general and not any specific brand of them. And if he is not a specialist of any sort then he is free from praises and blames. Perhaps he can be blamed only on the ground that he should not have manufactured certain concepts which he did really manufacture. He is in a similar situation as a scientist. The function of science is to expose the secrets of nature. It is unfortunate that the exposure of these secrets has led us to a dangerous situation. It has led us to the production of, say, the ilosoph neuclear weapons. Similarly, it is unfortunate that the production of certain concepts by philosophers exposes society and humanito dangers. But how can we blame the philosopher for all this It is really we who are to be blamed; it is we who are destroying ourselves. Of course, we are destroying ourselves with the he of science and philosophy. Would it be a solution to banish eith science or philosophy or both? This is an issue which has recent been debated, and should certainly be debated, by our under graduate students, seasoned politicians and professional by writers. (We should not enter into such debates).

The topic of our seminar is really not as muddled as it work appear to a philosopher. (Seeing muddles is a philosopher's desease The topic raises a simple question for discussion. What are the concepts which make contemporary social life unique, which distinguish it from the past social life? It does not matter mu whether we do or do not call these concepts 'philosophical'. is simply a terminological issue. For the concepts remain wh they are whether we do or do not call them philosophical. Similar it also does not matter much whether the concepts in question fluence social life from within or from the outside. So far as !! residential situation of these concepts, both the words 'in' at 'out' with reference to 'contemporary social life' have a mel phorical use. We should not make fuss if we already know in these words have a metaphorical rather than a literal use. What matters is simply that we should divert our attention to thos features of our contemporary social life which distinguish it from the past social life. What are the unique features of our content porary social life? Cannot we bring out these features, and the see the relevant concepts at ached to these features?

Unfortunately, even here we fail. We are late in raisis questions about the unique features. We have already reached stage in history where most of the features of our social lifest unique. The right question to be raised at our time should have been what is not unique in our social life. Every thing has changed, even the fashion in which we philosophise has changed, even the fashion in which we philosophise has changed, which have reached the stage of total change, a change which have reached the stage of total chaos. Life is not worth living this chaos; it has lost its dignity. (How unsaintly? Isn't)

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wonderful to live in chaos? Why should one live in a dull and static society? Why should one accept monotony?)

The attempt on the part of man to expose the secrets of nature has certainly disturbed the balance of our social values. (Unless we talk about values our talk of social life remains incomplete). What sort of disturbance has occurred? Let us consider a few examples. Let us first consider the issue of dress, for it is this value that distinguishes man from the savage. What sort of relationship has the dress to the human body? People of the past exhibited poor intelligence, for they used to wear dresses over their bodies. How different we are, for we wear bodies over our dresses. It is the dress and not the body which should be hidden, for soul resides in the body and not in the dress.

Come now to the academic absurdity. Those books and papers which are being written for filling the garbage-cans fill the university library shelves. (Imagine the result yourself). Most of those who count in the academic world seem to be a part of aircrew. They seem to be in the service of airlines rather than the departments and the universities from which they derive their livelihood. And those who are engaged in research are often different from those who get national and interanational prizes. The caste of airborn (e) is different from the caste of earthborn. Teachers and students come closer to one another, not because of any academic bondage but because of the exhibition of physique and armament. It would be safer if I keep silence about our students, for I want to remain one piece. (Reflections with reference to the third world ).

Why have these magnificient temples been constructed by the rich? Not because they are afraid of God, but because they are afraid of the income-tax officials. And our Yogees are so very different from the Yogees of the past. In the past they used to live in the deep forests like beasts. These savage-Yogees looked horrible. But the Yogees of our contemporary society are handsome people; they have their garden-ashrams in the posh citysuburbs. And their training in the art of magic succeeds in producing the same miracles which were produced by the savage-Yogees with the help of long-endured sadhanas. Our Yogees live live like film-stars. They have telephones and they have cars and CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

they have air-conditioners and they have aeroplanes and the have rich disciples and beautiful secretaries. Isn't it more allumn to be an Yogee (or at least the disciple of an Yogee) rather the a Central Minister?

How different is our daily life. Our offices, workshops, cla and seminar rooms and even our market places sometimes gi the impression that they are just different sorts of stages set film-shooting. Reduction-sales are just like political promie nothing is to be obtained on reduced rates as no political promi is to be fufiled. Often shops behave like spinsters; whatever worth buying is exhibited in the windows. And those shops with have nothing to exhibit, exhibit their sales girls. This is just his the university semester system. If we do not teach ( either because we do not know teaching or because we do not have time for the extra-curricular activity ) we poster the students with homework surprise tests and moral discourses. Teachers are like salesm without selable goods. How complicated, how absurd, is c contemporary life. How can this life be governed by the de and static things called 'concepts'? And how can the old mail called 'values' be permitted to enter into it?

We are free from concepts and we are free from values at we are free from all the traditional drudgery. (It is not deals that the static societies of the past were governed by the first concepts and dreary values). We are living in the age of affix nce (omit the third world) and heading towards the age of free dom, the age of chaos, the age of absurdity (include the third world). We are not believers, but so also we are not heather and pagans. We are not civilized, but so also we are abbarbarians and savages. We do not like ourselves to be catterised in any fashion, for we reject categories.

It is not that we do not know our way out, that we have values and ideals to guide us, but that we do not want a way we do not want any value or ideal to guide us. We desire freed therefore we reject all kinds of impositions. If a choice is given me for my next birth I would prefer to live in this age, the of chaos, the age of absurdity. Of course with slight modificions here and there. But unfortunately talking about the birth is https://www.new.gov

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clouds of confusion and dirt do not allow us to have clear vision of freedom or absurdity or chaos.

Department of Philosophy, Central University, Hyderabad Suresh Chandra

#### NOTES

\* The paper presented at the seminar held at Lady Sri Ram college for Women, Delhi, on 9th and 10th of November, 1979.

#### CORRECTION

The sentence beginning on the 10th line from the bottom of page number 657 in the article entitled "Substance, Monads and Particulars" by Mr. Frank Lucash published in Indian philosophical Quarterly Volume VI, No 4, Juiy 1979, should be read as,

"He says that Leibnitz was not trying to reduce relation to non-relational predicates but rather to reduce relational statements to statements in which a complex predicate, possibly involving relations, is attributed a single subject."

The printing error is deeply regreted,

-Editors.

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#### DISCUSSIONS (1)

Is Philosophy Free of the Psychology of philosophers?

Dr. G.L. Pandit argues in his 'Analysis without Empirical Description'1 that

.... a given concept in need of philosophical analysis may be either a psychological or a non - psychological one. Any actual attempt at analysis of either type of concept will presuppose number of things including the psychological fact of a given philosopher's dispositions to provide the analysis that he does provide. In either case there is no sense in which analysis of the concept in order to be complete can be required to incorporate empirical statements of psychological fact about the given philosopher doing the analysis. Conceptual analysis, in any case, has to be analysis without any elements of empirical description including those of the psychology of the analysis, no matter whether it is a psychological or a non-psychological concept. Psychologic of conceptual analysis may very well be developed as a branch of psychology. But it is absurd to subject conceptual analysis to a completeness requirement accord-to which it must incorporate in its anatomy the sort of statements whose proper place is in the psychology of analysis'.2

Dr. Pandit's supported by Mr. T. McMullen, a point is psychologist:

'The proper description of scientific method is the philosophy of science seen as the description of the logical connections and distinctions, the conceptual relations generally, between the elements of a network of scientific propositions. It is logically independent of the psychologies of individual philosophers'.3

Just as Dr. Pandit reacts to my article, 'Self-Knowled ge and Human Action' 4, Mr. McMullen reacts to professor J. Z. Young's article, 'The pineal Gland's. Mr. McMullen says that

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uce to ha tri'Young's mistake is that he identifies the description of scientific method with accounts of scientists' motivations and intentions, i. e. he has a psychologistic view of the philosophy of science's.

#### Dr. Pandit says;

..to require, as Rakesh does, that, in order to be completely conclusive, Descartes-type analysis must incorporate a specific descriptive component describing one's disposition to make that analysis, is really to commit the grave error esseeing attempts at empirical description where actually there are only attempts at providing methodologically better alternatives to existing frameworks for empirical description of reality'.

#### Professor Young, a professor of anatomy, says:

'Until ten years ago biologists had almost no informatic about the function of the pineal body, though they suspect that it was not that assigned to it by Descartes. It was often stated to be a mere vestige. We now know approximately what it does, and the sequence of the discovery makes a interesting case of scientific procedure. So far as I can set it does not conform to any clear schedule of method such a are proposed by Popper or Kuhn. Certainly biologists were not trying to disprove Descartes. Nor were they seeking to establish a new paradigm of normal science. They were trying to find out what the pineal does, and they succeeded to the seeking to find out what the pineal does, and they succeeded to the second second

Thus while Professor Young was concerned about the nature of the pineal gland, I was concerned about an adequate answer to the question, 'Who am I?,.9 I went on to say that.'.. I shall to show that any conclusive answer, except one, would be se stultifying'10.

Without going into too much detail about what Professi Young or I say, let us examine the arguments of Dr. Pandit and Mr. McMullen.

To take Dr. Pandit's argument first. I don't think the Descartes was concerned about 'providing methodologically bell alternatives to existing frameworks for empirical descriptions reality'. When Descartes asked the question: 'But what the am I?' he was not, to my mind, making any distinction about

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the philosophical analysis of 'I' and about an existence of a psychological state. Descartes was asking the question out of philosophical curiousity, and he wanted an answer. Descartes was not bothered whether that answer came from physiology or from psychology or from philosophy. (As a matter of fact, Descartes located the seat of the soul in the pineal gland ).

Also, Dr. Pandit sees the role of philosophical analysis as conceptual analysis: 'Conceived very broadly as conceptual analysis, the purpose of all philosophical analysis should be..'12. I think that some existentialists and phenomenologists might disagree. They might insist in calling themselves philosophical analysts but not conceptual analysts.

These problems aside, it is clear that if we can rebut Dr. Pandit, we can rebut Mr McMullen. Mr. McMullen says of Philosophy of science what Dr. Pandit says about philosophical analysis as a whole. And what is true of philosophicalal analysis must also be true about one particular area of philosophical analysis, namely the philosophy of science.

Is philosophy free of the psychology of philosophers? No. If by psychology is meant the 'sum of the mental states and processes characteristic of a person or class of persons'13, the answer must be a definite No. The answer will be Yes if psychology is 'the science of the mind or the mental states and processes'14, or if we define psychology as 'the science of human and animal behaviour'15. Obviously philosophy is different from psychology in the latter two definitions of psychology much as any other science is different from philosopy. But it is obviously false to say that philosophy is free of the psychology of philosophers in our first definition of psychology, where by psychology is meant 'sum of the mental states and processes characteristic of a person or class of persons'. If we say that philosophers are human beings and all human beings are psychological entities then, obviously, all philosophers are psychological entities. This means that they are psychological entities while they are composing philosophical Works. This means that there is a relation of philosophy to the psychology of the philosopher whereby philosophers would not be philosophers without at the same time being psychologicalentitise. Nothing very profound is being said here. Disp-

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assion, someone might say, is necessary for philosophical pursuit

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But dispassionate search after truth is as much a psychological state or process as is a passionate search after truth. Both passion and dispassion are psychological states. The obvious, ness of our conclusions render Dr. Pandit's observations about the independence of philosophical analysis from psycho. logical states quite absurd. It looks even more absurd when he says that'.. there is no sense in which analysis of the concept in order to be complete can be required to incorporate empirical state ments of psychological fact about the given philosopher doing the analysis'16, where the concept of analysis is 'I'. Where does the philosopher most readily begin in an analysis of 'I', if not with himself? This, indeed, is what Descartes does when he says 'But what then am I? A thing which thinks. It is a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses and which also imagines and feels'. I saw a logical ( not psychological ) difficulty with any conclusive account of 'I', namely the difficulty that any conclusive analysis of 'I' faces when it leaves out the disposition to make that analysis. But it must here be remarked that logic and psychology are extremely close. It is a logical empiricist dogma which says that we can ( indeed must ) do logic without psychology. I will end this article by smashing this dogma. Let us doa thought-experiment. Can we or can't we imagine ourselves to be at two different places at the same time? Let us see what this entails. It entails that at time t<sub>1</sub> we should be able to imagine ourselves to be at two different places p2 and p4. I can't do this and neither can you: The moment we think of p2 it is too late (by howsoever small fraction of a second) to think of p4 at t1. What is self-contradiction if it is not the inability of the human mind to perform the kind of thought-experiment stated above? Would it make any sense for us to say, "p and-p, are self-contradictory but I can imagine 'p and -p" ? It would not make any sense because the statment above is self-contradictory. Thus it is that people knew logical reasoning before Aristotle. Aristotle came to formalize logic, not to expound it.

Another very obvious empirical fact about the effect of individual psychology upon philosophy: philosophers disagree, sometimes violently. Scientists mostly do not. Scientists don't even disagree in their almost universal profile ton philosophy:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukur Kangil Collection philosophy:

'Many of my experimental colleagues in psychology, physiology and biology believe that there is quite a difference between what they actually do as scientists and what philosophers of science tell them that they are doing. themselves as simply getting on with the job': they regard philosophers of science, to put it more charitably than I have heard it put, as mere purveyors of esoteric stories which have little to do with the realities of scientific activity', 17

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Rakesh Varma

#### NOTES

- 1. G. L. Pandit, 'Analysis without Empirical Description', Indian & hilosophical Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 4 (July 1979), pp, 727-731.
- 2. Pandit, pp. 729-730.

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- 3. T. McMullen, 'Philosophy of Science and the Pineal Gland', Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 209 (July 1979), p. 381:
- 4: R. Varma, 'Self--Knowledge and Human Action', Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VI, No.3 (April 1979), pp, 570-573.
- 5. J. Z. Young, 'The Pineal Gland', Philosophy, Vol. 48, No. 183 (January 1973), pp. 70-74.
- 6, McMullen, p. 381.
- 7, Pandit, p. 729.
- 8, Young. p. 70,
- 9. Varma, p. 570.
- 10, Varma, p. 570,
- 11, Pandit, p. 729,
- 12. Pandit, p. 728.
- 13. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (College Edition), Allied Publishers Ltd., 1977, p. 1068 (Def. 3.). Henceforth The Random House Dictionary.
- 14 The Random House Dictionary, p. 1068 (def. 1)
- 15. The Random House Dictionary, p. 1068, (Def. 2)
- 16. Pandit, p. 730.
- 17. Young, p. 380.

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#### DISCUSSIONS (2)

A note on Suresh Chandra's "Philosophy in the Environmental Setting"

My purpose in this note is to show that Suresh Chandra's claim "that philosophy is one of the manifestations of human intellect which is not only originated in an environmental setting, but is also doomed to be restricted to that setting" is mistaken, In claiming this, as he explains later on he is "simply referring to the fact that system of philosophy, like a variety of wheat or creeper, requires certain sort of environmental conditions for its birth and survival"

- 1. At no place in his paper does he explicitly mention the meaning of "environmental setting" but that by it he means the physical, natural surroundings like the climate, weather etc. is clear from the fact that time and again he says that the problem of perception, of other minds et al are there because of the foggy weather of Britain. Likewise, he has not clarified implicitly or explicitly, the meaning of "philosophical system." It would not be unreasonable to say that by this he means systems like empiricism, rationalism, etc.
- 2. It is true that one of the factors which stimulates thought is the environmental setting, but it is only one of the factors; it is not the only or prime factor as Suresh Chandra has claimed. The most important or the most essential ingredient of philosophic attitude are inquisitiveness, imagination and a capacity to see through the immediate and familiar, to underlying complex ities. Only the person who is capable of experiencing perplexity about the meaning of his life, his relationship with others, and the nature of the world, and who desires to understand more about these matters than can be learned from history books, science laboratories etc. will embark in more than a cursory fashion upon an inquiry that is distinctively philosophical. Philosophy springs from an inquiring attitude that seeks to penetrate beyond the limits of settled accepted knowledge. This

can be illustrated by the fact that there are many parts of the world, including India, other than Britain which have fog weather for the most part of the year, but none of the peopliving in any of those areas ever for whatever reasons (letharg mental laxity, dullness etc.) examined and evaluated the common sense belief that whatever we percieve exists in the world. Not of them attempted to answer the question 'What relationship exists between that which we percieve and the real things in the world?' in a patient, serious and disciplined way.

- 3. If what Suresh Chandra claims was true, the subject matter of philosophy would be problems of regional interest, in other words, the problems of philosophy would be only spatio-temporal and not universal. But this is wrong because the subject matter of philosophy are the problems of the kind: What is knowledge? What if any, are the limits of knowledge? What is justice? What is virtue? What is a cause? etc. and each of them is of as great interest today (in all parts of the world) as they were in Platot time and would continue to interest and agitate human mind for years to come.
- 4. I believe that the mistake of Suresh Chandra lies in his ignoring the fact to which Sartre draws our attention namely,

"Philosophical variations can never be wholly explained by reference to surrounding social and historical conditions, important as they are to the full undersanding of them, for ideas often spread across geographical boundries and periods of time; they germinate anew wherever they find individuals with mentality and sensibility favourable to their gtowth."

St. Stephen's College, Delhi

Ashok Vohri

#### NOTES

- 1. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1977.
- 2, Ibid, p. 363
- 3, ibid, p. 365
- 4. Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip. Mairet, Metheun & Co. 1968, p. 10

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#### THE INDIAN THEORIES OF ERROR

The book\* under review is the doctoral thesis of Prof. Bijayanand Kar, which was written by him under the guidence of Prof. Ganeshwar Misra, who has written the introduction of the book. The book is devoted to the Indian philosophical explanations of error, which are traditionally known as khyativadas. As it is claimed on the jacket of the book, it is for the first time, that such a comprehensive study of the theories of error in classical Indian philosophy has been made by applying the techniques of linguistic and conceptual analysis. It is also true again, as it is stated on the jacket, that in this book the attempt has been made not only to interest the professionals who are already familiar with the questions with which it deals, but also to provide an introduction to the subject for the general reader. In the five chapter of his book Prof. Kar deals in detail with Visistadavita, Mimamsa, Nyaya, Buddhist and Advaita theories of error. In every chapter generally the author first gives the traditional account of the respective theory of error and then analyses it in hi own way. Ultimately the author comes to some important conclus sions. The conclusions at which the author arrives are novel and are elaborated by him though sometimes they give the feeling of iteration. In the following lines I wish to discuss some of the main issues raised by the author in the present work.

The author again and again emphasises that the problem of khyati is not the problem of preceptual error but it is the problem of error in general. Therefore he calls the theories of khyati as the theories of error, and not as the theories of illusion. (Again, while doing this one has to make a distinction between cognitive error and practical error. The theories of khyati are the theories of cognitive error, though. Ramanujaites and Prabhakaras claim that all errors are only practical and there are no cognitive errors

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<sup>\*</sup> The Theories of Error in Indian Philosophy by Bijayananda Kar, Ajanta Publications, Delhi (1978), Pages 146, Price Rs. 45, Introduction by Prof Ganeswar Misra.

as such.) The author's view is of course very important because although the model of khyati, is primarily applied to mere perceptual error, it can be applied to any cognitive error whatsoeve. The model of perceptual error was in fact used for explaining the cognitive error in general. For instance, Vedantins used the model of anirvacaniya khyati (which was primarily a model of perceptual error) for explaining adhyasa, while adhyasa mean the cognitive error in general.

However, the author does not seem to have established he thesis quite satisfactorily. For example one has to deal with the question whether all the classical Indian philosophers while dealing with the problem of khyati, really meant 'a theory of error by the term khyatiwada. If it were the case, the hetvabhasa and the other types of fallacy (for instance chala, drstantabhasa) would have been found discussed in terms of khyativada. Some Naiyayikas at least would have explained hetvabhasa as a type of anyathakhyati. But we nowhere find this. This attitude of the classical Indian philosophers suggests that those philosophers dienot have such a general idea of khyativada, though some philosophers like Advaitins did use khyativada as a model for explaining the cognitive error in general.

While discussing every theory of error, the author comes 10 a conclusion that the real aim of the respective theory of error is to face the problem of error by analysing the nature of judgement from the logical point of view. I have a feeling that while making this kind of claim again and again, the author is trying to transplant the western idea of 'logical point of view' on the Indian way of thinking. According to the author, the logical ana lysis of khyativada gives us the concept of error as mispredication. And mispredication being merely a logical issue, the problem of khyati is really the logical problem of error. But this important thesis of the author can be questioned. Though we may vaguely use the language of 'subject' and 'predicate' in Indian epistemological discussions, the ideas of 'logical subject and 'logical predicate' are quite aline to the ancient Indian wal of thinking. When, for instance, Naiyayikas talk of 'this is silve as an example of cognitive error, this 'for them does not stand for the 'logical subject' or the 'logical referent', but it connote the actual object present before the perceiver. And 'silver' for CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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them is not just the 'logical predicate' but it is the 'silverness' which subsists there in the actual silver. The scholars trained in western logic and philosophy are accustomed to considering logic as divorced from ontology or psychology. But Indian philosophers in general would not go by this way. When an Indian philosopher is talking of theory of error, he is not only concerned with logic (in the sense that he is trying to give the meaning of the term 'error') but also with the espistemology, psychology and ontology of error. (The ontology of error would tackle the ontic status of the object of error. ) Though Naiyayikas, while giving their theory of error are concerned with defining error and though to give a definition of the concept of error can be called a logical task, that does not imply that Naiyayikas were concerned with the concept of error which subsists as a logical entity. Error for Naiyayikas was existent ontologically. (Not just epistemologically; because Naiyayikas did not divorce epistemology from ontology. Cognition for them was an existent- 'sat' quality of a soul in the same sense as the white colour is an existent quality of a piece of chalk.) To define error, for Naiyayikas, was to state the distinctive feature of the existent erroneous cognitions. Thus the author's plan of depicting Nyaya account of error as an account in purely logical/conceptual analysis becomes misleading.

Prof. Kar also tries to give a modern interpretation of the Nyaya view of Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. He claims that according to Nyaya school, nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is only a postulate, it is only logically assumed (p. 60). By this the author seems to mean that according to Nyaya the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is only an empty notion; it is a term which has sense, but no correspondence with ontology. I doubt whether any Naiyayika would be prepared to accept this. In fact a Naiyayika, in his frame of thinking, cannot conceive of a logical postulate which has to be accepted for explanatory purpose, but which does not subsist as a part and parcel of the world. Thus the author's introduction of the concept of 'logical assumption' or 'postulate' in explaining the Nyaya theory of perception leads to a distortion of the Nyaya content.

The similar problem arises with the author's interpretation of idam (meaning 'this'). While explaining the status of idam the common than in the erroneous perception of the form 'idam rajatam', the author is again under the influence of the western philosophical

analysis of 'this'. 'This' for the philosophers like Russell and so on is absolutely a non-description and following this western conviction, the author presupposes that the Indian philosophers are also convinced that idam is equally a non-description. But idam for Indian philosophers does not merely serve the function of a demonstrative pronoun but it has also a descriptive function. The function is spelled out by the frequently used term 'purovarti' (meaning 'that which is in front of somebodoy'). Many times the descriptive functions of the pronouns idam, tat, etat and adas are distinguished from each other. In such a case the question of use or misuse of idam in a perceptual judgement cannot be easily ruled out as the author seems to have supposed.

The author's main thesis which runs like a thread in whole of his book, that the Indian theories of error are primarily and basically the logical theories, is reflected in the new etymologies of the different khyatis, suggested by the author. He tries to show that the etymologies of different khyatis really suggest the different logical analyses of the erroneous judgement, and they do not say anything either about the ontological status of the object of error or about the psychology of error. Some of the etymologies given are as follows (p. 11)—

- 1) satkhyatih = sati khyatih ( = true judgement )
- 2) asatkhyatih = asati khyatih ( = false judgement )
- 3) anirvacaniyakhyatih = anirvacaniya khyatih
  (= indeterminate judgement)

The difficulty about the first two, which strikes me is that the terms sat and asat in the Indian philosophical literature do not mean true and false respectively. The author holds that sal also means true (p. 119, fn.). It would have been better if the author would have given an instance of this from classical philosophical Sanskrit. To the best of my knowledge sat is not ambiguous as to mean both real and true. Etymologically also sat means that which is/exists. And asat means non-existent, unreal. It such a case sati khyatih would mean 'real judgement' which is not the traditionally intended meaning of the term satkhyati.

Similarly the term anirvacaniya in the language of Advallation vedanta is always used as an adjective of object of knowledge and not case of public bimain Guruki Press of the language of Advallation of the language of the l

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called anirvacaniya in the sense that we cannot decide it to be either real or unreal. Therefore it is referred to as sad-asad-anirvacaniya. Thus the etymologies of the three khyatis, given by the author do not suit to the usages of the respective technical terms in the classical philosophical sanskrit.

The author gives these interpretations of the different khyatis because of his presupposion that all theories of error must be basically concerned with the logical question namely 'what is meant by error?'. But I suppose that we need not unnecessarily delimit the scope of the programme which the Indian theoreticians had undertaken. The author has rightly pointed out that to regard Indian philosophical theories of error as merely psychological or metaphysical is wrong. But at the same time one has to keep in mind that to regard Indian philosophical theories of error as merely logical is equally wrong. The questions with which Indian philosophers were concerned while exposing their theories of khyati, seem to be as follows.

- (1) Do there occur any cognitive errors as such?
- (2) What is the so-called cognitive error?
- (3) What does exactly happen when somebody commits the so-called cognitive error? In other words, how does the so-called cognitive error occur?

The first question, that is the whether—question, is metaphysical one, while the second question, that is the what-question, is logical one and the third question, that is the how-question is the psychological one. Indian theoreticians of error are concerned with all these three. Prof. Kar has succeeded in distinguishing the three questions from each other, but while emphasising the logical question he has disregarded the other questions to be genunine questions.

The auther also claims that no theory of khyati can be regarded as a scientific theory. Though it is true that all the theories of khyati do not give scientific answers to the how-question, still the scientific element in some of the theories cannot be denied. At the early stages of philosophy the demarcation-lines between metaphysics, philosophy and science were not clear. Thus the philosophers were also supposed to state the scientific truths. In particular we find that the theories of khyati stated by Mimam-

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sakas and Naiyayikas were more empirically based. Prabhakara tried to explain the process of erroneous cognition and the stage of that, process stated by Prabhakaras were not totally denied in Naivavikas but were only supplimented by saying that error is not only the non-discrimination between two distinct objects but it is also the false identification of the two objects. The last sten namely false identification was omitted by the Prabhakara because of their metaphysical bias. Thus it seems that though we need not regard Prabhakara's theory of error as purely scientific we may regard it as a crude scientific theory. Prof. Kar seems to have missed the point. The auther says, " A khyativada is clearly not factual in the sense of a scientific theory, as in that case it would have been either established or rejected in view of empirical observation and experiment". (p. 44) The statement is confusing because a scientific hypothesis does not refrain from being a scientific hypothesis if it has not been either established or rejected in view of empirical observation and experiment, Itis still a scientific hypothesis if it is capable of being established of rejected in view of empirical observation and experiment. suppose that the largest part of Prabhakara's theory of error is capable of being established or rejected in view of empirical observation and experiment.

There are many other difficulties which I came across while going through the book. A few of them may be cited. The auther rightly points out that according of Vaibhasikas as well as Sautrantikas reality consists of the unique particulars. But again he says that according to those Buddhists all these are bare particulars in the sense of the bare referents for logically proper names. (p. 81) I doubt whether there are any logically proper names according to Buddhists. All names according to them are common names and particulars are really speaking unnameables.

The auther says, 'Sankara's programme is not of discovering any fact ...... His philosphy only aims at pointing the inadequacy of language'. (p. 112) Now, is not inadequacy of language a fact which Sankara tries to point at? Sankara's statement that this kind of (inadequate) linguistic activity of the people is but natural ('naisargiko'yam lokavyavaharah') points at the same factual thesis.

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Till now we have seen how it is difficult to agree with the author's main theses. Some comparatively minor errors in the book may also be pointed out. The author uses the word 'indeterminate' rather ambiguously both as the synonym for nirvikalpaka and for anirvacaniya (see pp. 12, 20. I suppose that 'non-judgemental', would have been a better synonym for nirvikalpaka. Secondly Romanisation of Sanskrit terms and quotations is many times wrong because the necessary diacritical marks are not given at due places. The value of the book would have been increased if sufficient care would have been taken in this regard.

Dept. of philosophy University of Poona. Pradeep P. Gokhale

#### NOTES

I. A popular verse runs,

idamastu sannikrstam samipatarayarti caitado rupam adasastu Viprakrstam taditi parokse yijaniyat

Meaning: 'Idam' connotes the sense of proximity; 'etat' connotes more proximity. 'Adas' connotes a far distance and tat is used when the object beyond one's vision is to be connoted.

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# PREJUDICE, IMAGINATION AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

"We must not add wings, but weights and lead to the intellect, so as to hinder all leaping and flying"

- Bacon

Scientific knowledge appears to be the most definite and precise type of human endeavour on which we can trust confidently. It is supposed to be founded upon the solid ground of observation and experimentation, devoid of any speculative non-sense—free from any bias or wild imagination. I shall try to show in this paper that the role of prejudice and imagination in the construction of scientific theory is not negative as has been mistakenly undermined by both Bacon and his modern contemporary successors (I mean the inductivists). On the contrary they play a very important constructive part in scientific knowledge. The idea of bias (theory)—free knowledge is a myth.

## I. The Doctrine of Prejudice revisited — Bacon

No one had a lower opinion of the past than Becon to whom all theoretical achievements must be forgotten to make our mind free before any observation. Everything which Aristotle taught is declared to be not only false but also a poison which pollutes the mind. Bacon has a twofold theory for scientific knowledge:

(1) The negative aspect of it is the doctrine of error or idol. It amounts to saying that there are some in-built existing ideas in us which can in unwatched way vitiate our knowledge. We should get rid of this rational infra-structure so as to get a free and open mind for observation. (2) The more positive aspect is that of a sensible scientific method by which we can discover true theories from pure observation. This method he suggested is the method of induction, which only can gurantee us certain knowledge. In this section I shall explain and evaluate the first and wait for ode fields Proprint Grants Magnification, Haridwar

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The predispositions which Bacon fears to have a bad influence over any open method of discovering true knowledge are classified by him in a fourfold scheme. He calls them (1) Idols of the Tribe, (2) Idols of the Cave, (3) Idols of the Market place and (4) Idols of the Theatre. The (1) refers to our tendency of finding order where there is no order. This is a general human disposition to see things in the light of pre-existing order. The (2) however is not a part of general human error, but we also have on top of the defect of the (1) type—peculiar individual prejudices. The (3) is the most interesting and most troublesome of Bacon's system. It is connected with the convention of language. We understand the nature of different concepts (e.g. up-down or rest-motion) as absolute contrast and do not realise their relative character. The classification due to linguistic convention excludes certain possibilities of thinking. The (4) is the most condemned error of all, Bacon warned us that various large theoretical systems which have been advised by many great authors of the past have an influence over people's understanding in interpretation of facts. The Aristotelian system, for example, blindly spins out a handful of theories out of certain a priori ideas as the spider spins the web out of its body.

How deep-rooted are these errors? Alas! we are born with these mischievous propensities - we can try however to counteract and control the evil tendencies of error. In our attempt to neutralise them we see that the '(1)' is innate, the '(2)' may or may not be innate - a good brainwashing may help, the '(3)' is due to social intercourse and the '4' is a result of listening to the authority, paying attention to the ancients. Although these propensities cannot be comepletly eradicated Bacon did not despair. He optimistically believes that we can nevertheless try to neutralise them by will-against intellectual tendencies by willful commission and looking at things in a free way. Scientific method (inductive method, to be sure) should begin with trying to purify language and construct scientific language by some familiar concepts and not by establishment of certain laws. The scientific concepts for exampl, 'force', 'mass', 'acceleration'—should be clarified in their meaning. But the meanings of these concepts again depend on blait bearaitical una scampito mention thaisathus a para doxical situation Bacon has landed into, we cannot have a good

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science before we have a scientific language firmly established. In this endeavour he did not trust Aristotelian logic. His mistrust is not because the syllogistic method cannot prove anything deductively but rather on the ground that it is better to be piecemeal, unsystematic, than to construct a syllogistically spinned out system of ideas to avoid the possibility of idols. He denounces this highly interconnected system of intellectual imprisonment. Syllogistic logic consists mainly of demonstration-taking some universal premise to be true. The dominant influence of Aristotle is the justification of a proposition by referring back to this universal premise. The method of science, however, is to an amine the premise, not the conclusion, to question the validity of the universal on the ground of the particulars given. To draw particulars from the universal is a trivial job.

This doctrine of error is regarded by many<sup>1</sup> as the pivot of Bocon's philosophy. It condemns all mistaken views as anticipations and therefore as prejudices. The word prejudice (idol) was initially introduced to have a specific philosophical sense but later on it includes all theories not established by observation. Bacon emphasises that error is a result of prejudice and prejudice has its root in dogmatic acceptance of any conceited view. Error and sin are almost equated, though accidentally, by the rise of Puritanism<sup>2</sup>.

Now to come down to the task of what Bacon exactly meant by 'idols' and their function. We see that they appear to be names of classes of prejudice which, like robbers unwatched, try to deprive us of our reason. But names are not theories, since may determine them at our will. Some educationists acclaim Bacon's demand for making us aware of our in-built prejudices which vitiate our mind. Some others, however, like S. T. Coleridge, points out that the word 'idol' is given only to give Redantic air to his reasoning—what he means by it in fact is no more than what Plato means by opinion (doxas) which lies in between between realm of scientific knowledge on the one hand and that of ignorance on the other. But I think the idol is not just opinion but some degenerated form of it. Plato anyway never condemned detriment the way in which Bacon vehemently attacked idols as detrimental to scientific knowldge. Opinion in the form of popular howledge, in deat, in Replic Odmain accomplished the sound to scientific knowledge. Opinion in the 10th of the sound of the second of the seco

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purpose when more systematic scientific knowledge is wisdom found. But idols of Bacon definitely have no such positive man-peo it is the most unwelcome hindrance in the pathway to knowled cipation Every opinion i. e. any undemonstrated view—anything that wisdom intellect worships blindly—is an idol. Bacon's reply to Macaula not desp question 'what is a prejudice'? was that all hypotheses of science doubtful views, are necessarily prejudices of those who believinging that they are true. In his introduction to the Novum Organ selves t Bacon contends that the path followed by the ancient did not be observa them to certain knowledge because the inductive machine on not operate due to the evil effect of the prejudices. The min of these people were polluted with atomism and other su metaphysical theories. He repeatedly declared that once of leaps to a too general axiom one is holding to an axiom whi is no longer certain and therefore possibly false and therefore prejudice. So, here we find a very interesting function of doctrine of prejudices—all past failures can very well be explain fact. H by it. It explains not only future theories but past theories well. When a scientific theory is refuted, this doctrine makes convenient to explain it by referring to the fault of the man wil operates it leaving the machine untouched. Thus it makes the the theory of induction irrefutable. Methodologically it supplement us with a new criterion or line of demarcation between science at ion of metaphysics. Science is certain, definite and based on observe tion; whatever else is uncertain, doubtful and speculative does to belong to scientific knowledge, it makes metaphysics. Thankington purgative or negative way to knowledge was found to be connected only he with the true spirit of learning. The doctrine of purging marketistotle of all impure ideas before waiting patiently for certainty this. T truth to emerge has almost a religious devoutness. No downthat scie it has a tremendous superficial impact. As some critic aptly pulobserval it, we may say in short, 'prejudice paralyses science' is Bacon dangero slogan. He tells us how tremendously difficult it is to overcomplest the the temptation of guessing while observing, and how necessary the test is to resist this temptation if one has to make true science.

The origin of error and prejudice can be traced to my described by Bacon in his 'Wisdom of the Ancients' (1609). The idea myth conveys a metaphysical theme. God created mind and the location universes on Public Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar natural and for examine was not examined was no

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ge is wisdom prevailed among the ancients. Then came the Fall of ositive man-people did all forbidden things like speculation and antiknowled cipation, and since then the art of learning degenerated and ng that wisdom was lost. But that is not the last thing; for we need Macaula not despair. The elixir of knowledge, the key to the kingdom otheses, of science, can be regained by a simple but austere method: by who belig purging mind of all evil effects of prejudices we can purify ourm Organ selves to return to the golden age of knowledge once again. did not to Observation, and not speculation, is the real philosopher's stone.

We can see however that Bacon's methodology was never The migriously accepted or followed. The myth of the no prejudice other sui formula can also be exploded as I shall do later. One important thing however can be mentioned about the theory of error. therefore and it is difficult to extricate it from the influence of prevailing e explaint act. He saw the problem of the relation between theory and hearist act. How to reconcile observation with theory? It is perheories lettly possible to find out a new fact which does not confirm e man with an existing theory, in other words, what would be the makes the latter has been it supplement. Bacon would answer that the new fact would surely sciences ion of our theory as we are on the look out for the confirmaconfirm the theory as we are on the look out for the confirmave does that theory which may turn out to be false! Bacon alleges that sics. That theory which may turn out to be talse. Aristotle would never have come to the theory of spheres if connecte only he had observed carefully. But it is obvious that once ging mildistotle's theory is accepted no improved observation can avoid ainty this. The assumption underlying this doctrine of prejudice is No doublet scientists tend to confirm their hypothesis by making aptly Pulobservation. But evidently this assumption is unwerrented and is Bacon dangerous for the progress of scientific knowledge. Scientists overcomplest theories not only to confirm them but also to see whether ecessary the test refutes them, no matter how much established the

1 to my The idea of the influence of our theories on our observation, 609). The idea of the influence of our theories on the light of our theories that we interpret all observation in the light of our theories. and and that we interpret all observation in the decrees, is regarded by many as an insoluble problem (Whewell, atural and lor example maintain publishmilam viewkin Kabaroon dawn en and and geested

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a solution, viz. that we can overcome it by rejecting all there This is simply ridiculous. He struck a genuine problem but solution is not adequate, for we do interpret all our observat in the light of our theories. In case our theories are falset may misguide us. We see the world through them, there they are not reliable. To avoid this difficulty the conventional totally ignore the point that theory is even related to fact. The regard theory as convenient tool for computation and not can force us to abandon them. The inductivists on the hand believe that we observe facts as they are, unaffected theories. Both of them cannot satisfactorily explain scientists can generally agree about facts. Bacon in a remarkation way says that general agreement does not guarantee the truth the idea, it does not exclude the possibility of everyone ki prejudiced in a similar way. But it is more difficult to aux such possibility which goes almost to an absurd extent than seek for some other logical relationship between theory and in

Thus, far from being recondite, the problem of observation is very concrete and difficult from the methodological proof view.

## II. Role of Imagination in Knowledge

The naive scientific doctrine of inductivism denounces a scope for speculation in science, its task being only to be a sear for true nature discovered by the method of observations experiment. We again come to Bacon in the sense of tractions scheme back to him. He made the first systematic attent to formulate a method of science and also recognise methodological problem of relating the method of discovery the method of proof. In both these tasks he foreshadowed the views of his modern counterpart—the inductivists and results them even in his failure. I shall discuss these two poil under (a) and (b).

## (a) Induction and Anticipation

The negative or purgative task before any intellection pursuit is that of being first rid of all the prejudices wis might vitiate our senses. The more positive task lies in patient and cautious observation of nature. As we see, we the conventionalists Bacon believes that Nature is full of for

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of Essences which science tries to discover. The Form or cause is apparently hidden in nature—the method of science is to know this natura naturans which is manifest in its effects, that is natura naturata. In this persuit Bacon differentiated between (1) the method of interpretation and (2) the method of anticipation. Here he can be classed with Plato, Aristotle or Descartes and can be called an essentialist. To a phenomenalist this problem does not exist, for him, science has only to correlate sensation with phenomena. The single instance of Heat as the nature is found in the whole Novum Organum, and science has to find out its cause or refer it back to its Form. The method of interpretation is the true method, which can promote scientific knowledge by systematic observation. True theory will automatically emerge out of it which shows the nature of the true cause. There is no scope of speculation or wild guess here. We should be patient in our observation. There is no need to hurry or employ our imagination in our attempt to know nature. All these hurried speculation or guess can be condemned as the method of anticipation. This latter method is short-sighted, it distorts nature and amounts to blasphemy. In the wisdom of the ancients he denounced all anticipations asrapes, vexations and torture, enforcing and imprisoning nature. The method of anticipation is black to be avoided at any cost, the method of interpretation is good, i. e. a white method.

As regards the positive method of science Bacon tried to seek the road form sensation (or singular) to knowledge (or universal). This is a difficult job but he believes that the method of interpretation can do the trick. In part II and III of Great Instauration he elaborates this method. The inductive machine as he calls it starts with the systematic arrangement of raw materials or observational data. People look for observable nature and its phenomena to discover in what way nature works behind. Table of presence, Table of absence and Table of degrees represent two natures going together, absent together and varying in concomitant degrees. Summarisation of the different correlations from these different tables give us some predictive ability but does not lead anywhere. For suppose we do not come across some such natures (present, absent or varying together), then there remains no standard of these empirical CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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observations from which we can get some knowledge. If we have to produce the thing we have to know the cause or Forms underlying nature, otherwise we have to wait for infinity. Thus Bacon's attempt to construct a real structure of knowledge behind empirical observations leads to disastrous result. The process from nature to Form as Bacon thought is not as easily computable by the inductive machine. The requirement of finite. ness thus is to have a finite form after knocking out all other possibilities. Thus Bacon is driven towards some kind of a priori assumption for the Forms which he calls 'alphabets of nature'. These requirements are as the following: (1) Limited number of forms, but then how could we know them by empirical observation? In case of all Forms, do they reveal themselves? Form of heat is rapid motion of particles. We observe heat and then get Motion as its cause surely not by observation. (2) Each Form is sometimes observable. The number of observale elements is not infinite. (3) There is one to one correspondence in nature, it guarantees the existence of some kind of Form with actually observable effects. No two or more Forms are responsible for the same nature. There is always one Form for one nature. Each separtae nature requires a different Form. Thus it seems to have a duplicated form of nature almost in the Aristotelian fashion. But Bacon's duplicated universe is not real like Plato's universe, it is only linguistic duplication.

It involves however a serious logical fallacy: from N (nature)  $\rightarrow$  F (Form) Bacon deduced  $\sim$  N  $\rightarrow$   $\sim$  F, which obviously does not follow. But he nevertheless struck a very important note, viz. belief in essence or 'real'. In many aphorisms times greater than the subtlety of the senses and understanding and therefore axioms established by argumentation cannot cope orderly method from particulars easily discover the way to new particular and thus render science active. "If there be any one to penetrate further, he has to overcome not an adversary probable conjectures but certain and demonstrable knowledge". Such a person is a true son of knowledge, he may find an untrodden way to nature in schemical conference of the richard and an adversary of the public bornair conference in the richard and an untrodden way to nature in schemical conference in any find an untrodden way to nature is selection to seek not petty and untrodden way to nature is schemical conference in any find an untrodden way to nature is schemical conference in the richard con

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employed for such tasks are anticipations of the mind and interpretation of nature. The first one is ordinary reason, hasty and precocious, the latter is reason elicited from facts by a just and logical method.

## The new method for active science: Inductive Machine

There is a little controversy among Bacon's critics about his idea of induction. The confusion arises from Bacon's condemnation of anticipation in almost all places as a natural bent of mind. So he prescribes restricted suppression of them. But in another place he is found to describe Induction as a natural process. It is not any specialist's job, neither is it a complicated process. Bacon cheerfully hopes that once we start afresh from pure observation and in a strictly disciplined way, weigh the data in the inductive machine (somewhat in the same manner as a modern computer is fed ) then true theories will be elicited from them. So far so good. But after that he gives a little concession to our intellect! Overlooking the ironical situation, Bacon permits a little guess or 'Permission intellectus'-better known as 'First Vintage' or 'First Attempt'. It may be knowledge or just an attempt or conjecture threatening to have that dangerous thing, uncertainty, which Bacon dreaded most. It is remarkable to notice that he could not help giving this permission although he denounced any kind of imagination to do any thing with knowledge. He started with a very simplified theory of knowledge with three stages: (i) no preexisting idea, (ii) Pure and orderly observation (presented in the different Tables) and (iii) true theory (knowledge) emerging out of it. The whole process is automatic. If the theory is correct it is due to pure observation, if it is falsified it is because the observation was not pure due to influence of some preguidance and only a little cautious interpretation of nature. If the theory is refuted, the mischief can be referred back to the built-in prejudices working behind our mind, which must have distorted pure observation. In effect, it makes all theories irrefutable, because clearing the mind of prejudices is methodologically a small limitation and psychologically a tremendously difficult job. This is the modern inductivists' plea as well—they unduly emphasise the role psychology plays, in knowledge and therefore need a logic to justify it. That job, alas is equally difficult, as has been shown by the sceptics headed by CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Hume. Justification of induction or any empirical theory of knowledge leads to infinite regress and many other logor fallacies.6

### (b) Discovery and Proof

Observation, however, is not any perception-but perception with a definite objective. Can this objective be defined at a except by referring to any existing framework? Observative includes the processes of analysis and identification. something as a star or planet, for example, includes classification and identification which presume theoretical knowledge of at less geometry and astrophysics. What we need therefore is a melto dological criterion for discovery of new facts. So although slogan was 'Do science and do not discuss it', Bacon tried ! give a methodological criterion which however was trival unsuitable. His criterion of novelty of observation and theor of discovery was founds in the context of discovery of magnet ".....nor was it by philosophy of rational arts, that the were found at least, but by Accident and by Occasion.... altogether different from anything that was known before, that no preconceived notion could possibly have led to the covery of them....... "Although Bacon did not claim that he criterion is only not claim that he criter Criterion is exhaustive, it is of surprise which comes by accident This however is not an adequate criterion, it is not satisfactor becausecwenganbianomamanchukturwedacunsdardwarand invention

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by it. Neither was he a utilitarian, but only awe-struck naively amazed at the wide and new horizons of science opened before him which he did not understand well.

One of the difficulties of Bacon's theory of discovery is that it is unacceptable not only to any rational philosopher but also to the inductivist who believes in observing facts as they are. Nor does anybody share his belief that novelty is intuitvely observed by an 'empty mind.' Many facts were declared as great novelties but were later found to be slight variations of well-known phenomena. The discovery of new sources of electricity found in steam was heralded as very important but soon ignored when Faraday showed that this was only ordinary (friction) electricity. The opposite case is found in Hertz's discovery.

Another point shows Bacon's criterion difficult; it is that we may be able to characterise novelty by appeal to facts. If the mind is empty, it will not be surprised by finding new facts. Every fact will be absolutely new and therefore no fact will be more surprising or important than another. All discoveries are accidental if they are not aided by theory, but only by induction. But what is the guarantee for discovery then? Surely there are old discoveries which are not due to sheer luck but results of a theoretical expectation. Deflection of the star light (The Parallax effect ) was expected by Einstein, long before the famous eclipse experiment. The expected prediction was based on a belief in the General Relativity Theory. Now, although Bacon's theory of discovery sounds like scientific realism, it does not lead anywhere and turns out to be a false note. He did not clarify what exactly is meant by a 'discovery'. Secondly, what observations sholud be regarded as new and how do we make discoveries? These questions are neither answered nor even raised by Bacon. No modern inductivists either offered a good theory of discovery to explain their methodology. What they emphasised is discovery of new theories (The universals) which are deduced or induced for that matter from the facts (the singulars). What they need is a logic to go from the singulars to the universals. No attempts to justify this logic however is successful.9 Both a priori and a posteriori attempts in this connection lead to many logical difficulties. So, we remain exactly at the same point where Hume left us viz In that it is in the particular Rangin Collection, Haridwar physical reality or other minds or the past from the phenomenal or the present. The logical gap between the premise and the conclusion remains to be filled by a valid logical process. Otherwise we can claim to have neither a standard of knowledge nor any criterion to distinguish between valid and invalid knowledge. Bacon was too naive to see all these philosophical problems relating to knowledge. The phenomenalists and the sceptics at least saw this important but difficult problem. But the former tried to resolve it into the problem of sensations whereas the latter considered it insoluble.

Bacon foreshadows his logical positivist followers in many basic points about this problem, although he lacks both the high sophistication of the latter and also any logical analysis of the problem of knowledge. He is characterised by a tremendously childish naivety about his strong belief in reality and its easy access to our intellect only if we follow the right method of interpretation. The logical positivists tried different formalistic methods including sophisticated probability calculus which can determine at least the degree in which a theory approximates truth and certainty. But those methods unfortunately do not help much because even if knowledge is elicited from facts or, in other words, even if we accept the passage from the singular to the universal as admissible, the truth value of a universal proposition is alway equals 0 according to probability calculus.<sup>11</sup>

The point in which these modern Baconians resemble their intellectual godfather is that both tried to link the theory of discovery with that of proof. Bacon tried to establish scientific on the basis of an empirical foundation in such a way that true knowledge only can be obtained from it. The contemporary knowledge of empirical laws and that therefore empirical foundation can provide us with the synthetic character (non-empty) of thought necessary is a logic to prove or justify such knowledge short, they tried to combine method of discovery with that of proof. But how can we discover with the without knowledge them, without knowledge Domain. Guttkul Kangrie Glestich Hardwarf them, without knowledge Domain.

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words, pre-thinking or theorising precedes any collection of facts including finding new facts. Both, Bacon and the inductivists fail to give a solution of the problem of relation between theory and experiment and saw it the other way round, viz. first experiment (observation of new facts) and then theory. For Bacon, discovery does not appear to involve so many epistemological problems. It is just a part of his dogmatic optimism that proper scientific research must constantly lead to new discoveries.

Philosophically, it has an obdurate realistic note: methodologically it gives, a new mark, a new criterion of demarcation between science and theology or and metaphysics. Science is fruitful and progressive, metaphysics doubtful and dangerous for science. He identifies science with advancement of learning. Bacon was the fierest anti-metaphysician and therefore regarded the idol of the theatre as the most difficult detriment to free observation of facts. Logical positivists share almost the same contempt for metaphysics but for a different reason. They tried to eliminate metaphysics not because it is established by the speculative method as Bacon thought, but because whatever they say can be shown by the analysis of language to be nothing but sheer nonsense. But that difference does not amount much because they almost share Bacon's belief that the task of Induction is 'rendering man's intellect equal with things in nature'.12 Reducing all meaningful empirical propositions ultimately into some basic propositions is a programme which will eventually eliminate not only all so called metaphysical propositions but also many scientific propositions which speak of non-observable but scientific entities (like statements about micro-bodies). In--consistency found in Bacon was naive and initial, that of modern empiricist's is formal, highly sophisticated and terminal. What I wanted to emphasise is that factual support does not have any logical force by itself to lead to any discovery of new facts.<sup>13</sup> Unless it follows from a framework, it does not have any significance ficance to any scientsit. The letter has a preconceived notion of what he is expecting to find. That does not of course mean that he would ever find a surprising fact which might even be falsifying for his for his theory. In case he finds such a falsifying fact, he has to look for an alternative theory to explain the phenomena.

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a method of proof. The sceptical argument in this context remains consistent and impeccable. If we believe in accidental discovery of empirical facts, as the mark of scientific knowledge we cannot at the same time have a logic to justify it. We shall see in the next section that there are ample evidences in the history of science where a scientist believes a theory to be true even if it does not have any factual support. It is well-known that the Copernican theory of heliocentric universe has even less factul support than the geocentric theory of Ptolemy except that it is a little simpler than the latter theory but nevertheless it was accepted not because of its simplicity or factual support but as it represents a true description of reality. Realism and not just a mode of speech demarcates scientific knowledge from any other type. This belief in real nature cannot however be expected to be proved to emit certain and demonstrable knowledge. Neither does it need to, because a scientific theory is accepted neither for its weight of factural support nor for its demonstrable character. In fact both the weight of actual support as such and demonstrability make it trivial. For example, we can imagine any accidental generalisation based merely on positive instances, any tautology on the other hand is demonstrable but does not have any informative content. It is verifliable but therefore empty and trivial from the epistemological standpoint. Scientific theories therefore need neither be loaded with so-called factual support nor proved. Both Bacon and modern empirical philosophy overlooked this. The former was quite unware of the problem; the latter however saw and tried to solve it by many formalistic methods and not unsurprisingly failed.

We can discuss in this connection Popper's theory of discovery which explains Bacon's theory as well as the questions which were not explained by the inductivists. Popper admits that there is novelty or surprise in discovery. But an 'empty mind' (devoid of any theory) cannot be surprised. It can be surprised only if the 'newly discovered fact' does not fit with a theoretical framework. The anomaly in the predicted pathways of some planets, for example, leads to the discovery of then unknown Uranus. Discovery is surely a surprise, but that is not wholly intuitive but always relative to some theory. Popper gives a new criterion for discovery. It follows from the consideration that once

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a theory is accepted, no confirmation would surpries us. Only by refuting a theory, we know that a new fact is discovered. So refutation of a theory is a good mark of discovery. All great discoveries are refutation. The upshot of this argument is disastrous both for Bacon and for the inductivists. Their emphasis is on confirmation. But the increase of the confirmation of a theory is important only as it makes the discovery which will refute it more important. An experiment on an observation of a fact. for example, which will refute Einstein's special Relativity theory will definitely be regarded as a very important discovery. This criterion of discovery explains two things which are not clearly explained by the inductivist theory. One is the fact that in science we seek for independent tests, the other is that a new fact can only be recognised as new in the light of a theory—an empty mind cannot judge which one is new. Every fact should look alik to him unless seen for some purpose. The idea that discoveries of new facts will never clash with old theories is rather a dream than a theory of Bacon. His realistic essentialism finds science to be a process of constant discovery. That is what he meant by saying that science must be progressive—exploring the mysteries of nature. But this progress cannot be the result of accident on the part of any free and empty mind. It is rather the theoretical scientist than the artisan, rather the hard-boiled metaphysician' whose mind is 'polluted' (?) by some existing theory, than the credulous laboratory assistant that makes any discovery or invention. Scientific imagination and 'prejudice' to some extent can only explain that.

## II. In Defence of Prejudice

In the previous sections I have tried to show how the attempts to construct a methodology for science in a purely inductive way fail and how they cannot explain many problems related to scientific theory and its relation to facts. Senerally the assumption behind this is: imagination or prejudice is detrimental to scientific knowledge; progress in knowledge would be guaranteed if we follow the maxim do not trust any authority except that of the senses'. It that that this assumption is unwarranted. It is not only on the contrary assumption or prejudice is not detrimental, it is not contrary assumption or prejudice is not detrimental, it is

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be sufficiently shown by plenty of examples from the history of scientific discoveries. I remember a favourite phrase used by Popper when he lectured on scientific method: 'a scientist has to be in love with his theory and love is the strongest prejudice. Surely what he means is that though Bacon is right in saying that we have our own prejudice, this does not mean that we can fully eradicate them, nor that anybody can do science with pure observation and no theory. On the contrary, we cannot get rid of the existing theories or 'paradigms' as Kuhn calls them. Even our language is infested with theory (Bacon also realised this very important point).

Now if we analyse the idea of prejudice a little more clearly and also consider the important features of scientific knowledge, I can show that the latter can very well be said to be aided by it. The idea of prejudice in general signifies belief in a theory without sufficient rational ground. That means it has a deductive structure. For example, Aristotles's theory of physics is the general premise from which his theory of projectives follows, or Einstein's General Relativity Theory is the premise from which the deflection of star-light would follow. That means that if the conclusion does not follow, i. e. does not tally with observation, then the theory in connection has to show that the theory is wrom Background knowledge and a scientific tradition always influence any scientific observation and, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as 'pure observation'. All our observation in volves some ideal element; or, to be precise in the modern linguistic way, all empirical propositions—even singular propositions like 'This swan is white'—involve universals and therefore go beyond observations. 15 As 'swan' is a universal and as all universals are dispositional, singular propositions can also be called 'theory impregrated', to use Popper's terminology. the inductivist obsession for pure observation or purely obser vational language is unjustified: observation always involves some theoretical reference. We cannot get rid of the ghost of theory —it is chasing us down to the bottom of even the simplest possible kind of empirical propositions.

So this search for theory-free knowledge which is the result of passive conservation in an observation and has a certain aim. As all

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interpretation is a function of imagination, we can not explain the interpretative aspect of scientific knowledge except by referring to imagination.

Now, if we shift the emphasis from facts to theory the situation is totally different. When is a theory or a hypothesis wanted? It is not called for unless it is necessary. It is only when a problem arises that a possible hypothesis is made about a fact, or, in other words, an attempt is made to explain it. No settled phenomenon calls for a theory, only a problematic situation needs a theory. So a scientific theory has two important functions to perform: (i) It must explain past events or problems and (ii) it must also predict some future phenomena. The value or acceptability of a theory is judged by how well a theory is performing these two functions. Of the two competing theories a theory which explains and predicts in a better way is more preferable. Now both explanations and predictions are two logical processes having formal structure. Only active imagination or ingenuity can help onstruct such a structure. The Corpernican helio-centric model, for example, was highly formal structure, a result of unusual inagination which was not only against an existing theory but also went against observational evidences until Kepler's corroboration by telescope. The theoretical scientist expect the predictions to follow not because of observational facts but because they are necessary consequences of a theoretical framework which he spinned out of his imagination. The greater the imagination the more is the theory rich in its fruitful explanation and prediction. Imagination is an essential component not only to make a theory but also to understand scientific concepts which are highly theoretical. The notion of 'centrifugal force' or the behaviour of the 'microbodies' of matter or 'uniform relative motion' can be understood only with reference to a theoretical framework. In fact the whole of micro-science is a body of scientific knowledge which transcends all observations and therefore is a result of rational imagination. We can see the tremendous effect this kind of knowledge has over our whole philosophical outlook although they speak of entities which are by definition non-observable: in fact all major scientific theories are regarded as fantastic in the beginning, because scientific imagination travels faster than ordinary imagination. Only a little latter the true significance of atheory (which on the Ryblic Romaine Enruth & agait Callection with the work of the Callection with the contracture

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result passive As all when it was first initiated) is realised when the predictions of the mided me theory tally with observation. But that observational support does not surprise the scientist because he has logical grounds to believe the theory. When the eclipse-experiment confirmed Einstein's General Relativity Theory, he was asked by someone what would have happened to his theory if the eclipse-experiment could not tally with his prediction? He was quite unperturbed and answered "then I would have been sorry for the dear Lord, as the theory is correct". This clarifies another scientific relevant point which is related to this perverted view of observation and theory. The point is that all scientific knowledge aim nathemati at finding out the real, their theories are attempts to describe the rinciple of real, not just instruments for prediction (as the conventionalist faith in the say to avoid the justification problem). Moreover, belief in faith: as a extrasensory reality is not necessarily metaphysical—scientists also God does imagine many transcendent objects the existance of which are may refer non-observable but real. The ground for such belief is logical infi and rational.

I wish to explain one more point before I conclude. It is the inevitable question : what are the safeguards that can dema 23/13 Gar reate active scientific imagination or influence of (prejudice?) Calcutta. existing theory from wild imagination or a dogmaatic bias? That can be very well done if a theory prescribes the conditions which may refute it. Only then can we call it scientific imagination. In other words testability is the logical constraint of any scientific theory. The more a theory has factual content the more it is vulnerable, i. e. capable of refutation. cannot think of any better criterion of demarcation. melts at 1500° centigrade' is highly informative and at the same time more refutable than 'there is heaven' which is metaphysis cal. The latter is metaphysical not because it speaks of nonobservable entities but because it does not say under which condition it can be refuted. A metaphysical theory can definitely be distinguished from a scientific theory as the former cannot be tested for its truth or falsity whereas a scientific theory is more acceptable for its rich content or degree of refutability.

These considerations lead us to a view of scientific knowledge which is called by some as scientific realism. 16 I shall rather call it scientific rationalism to go a step further. What I want to emphasise by coining this term is that all scientists are not

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softh mided merely by a belief in reality as the goal for science. It is support that they regard their theories as good approximations to unds to truth. But that is not all. They are also convinced of a rational nstrated structure by which observations can be logically interpreted. Omeone Leibnitz's 'pre-established harmony' or Kepler's celestial geomeexperi gical pattern describe this faith in an overdone artistic manner. unper late unless there is a mathematical or logical regularity in physical for the reality, we cannot hope to give a highly accurate picture of it. another scientific theories speak of nomic or physical necessity, and bserva contingency can be computed on the basis of some fundamental re aims nathematical principles. Heisenberg's famous Indeterminacy ribe the rinciple cannot beter Einstein, for example, from his obdurate onalist aith in the real as rational. It alomst amounted to a religious elief in faith: as a matter of fact he called it cosmic religion. He said, sts also God does not play dice'. Methodologically, scientific theories ich are may refer to empirical facts but they are rational parts of a logical infra-structure that corresponds to the order of cosmic reality.

dema 23/13 Gariahat Road, dice ?) Calcutta.

Mahasweta Chaudhury

#### NOTES

1. Bacon's works-Edited by Ellis & Spedding.

2. Role of Interpretation in Science-Agassi.

4. Novum Organum, Book I, aphorism 10, 11, 12, 14, 24, 30.

5. N. O. pp. 36.

6. See Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, Particularty sec I, chap. 1. Also Karl Popper, Objective knowledge.

7. Novum Organum.

8. Novum Organum I, ph. 109.

9. W. von Wright, Logical Problem of Induction.

10. A. J. Ayer, Problem of knowledge.

A. J. Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy.

Il. See Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery.

12. Novum Organum II, Aph. 19.

13. See 'Realism and Instrumentalism' by P. K. Feyrabend in Critical approach to Science and Philosophy ed. by M. Bunge.

14. T. S. Kuhn, Structure of Revoluion.

15. Karl Popper, Logic of scientific discovery, Appendix X. 16. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery

Popper, Objective knowledge, Conjecture and Refutations D. M. Artostoohepublin Persain Gulust Kangi CReation, Haridwar

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### INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

## ANNOUNCEMENT

The 55th session of the Indian Philosophical Congra will be held at Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur-8120 decay and (Bihar) from Oct. 26 to 29, 1980. Professor Nityanani Mishra will be the General President for the session Thus, Re For details regarding local arrangements Dr. G. D. Indarises a contract of the state of the stat Head of Philosophy Deptt., Bhagalpur University 119 be contacted.

> Secretary Indian Philosophical Congress Permane

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## CONTRIBUTION OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Jaina philosophy has some similarities with the other ladian philosophical schools, as it has its own peculiarities as well. Jaina philospher uses the terms sat, tattva, dravya, mha padārtha, tattvārtha etc. generally as synonyms for Reality. Ithink, he does not make any strict distinction among them. The other Indian philosophers do not agree with him. Vaisesika ises the term padartha for dravya, guna, karma, samanya, viśesa and samavaya, but the term artha is reserved only for the first three1 which are called sat owing to the connection of satta by the samavā va relation.2 Sānkhya regards prakrtipurusa as tattva. A Naiyāyika calls the sixteen principles as sat.3

Jaina philosophy defines Reality as possessing origination, -812 W decay and permanence or as having qualities and modes.4 Origination and decay are nothing but the changing modes or forms. Permanence is the same as the essential qualities or attributes. session Thus, Reality is possessed of both change and permanence. Here D. Jharises a question. How can change and permanence, which are contradictory, live in one and the same thing? Jaina Philosophy sity says that permanence is not to be understood as absolute thangelessness. Similarly, change is not to be taken as absolute difference. Permanence means indestructibility of the essential nature (quality) of a substance. Change means origination and destruction of different modes. Reality is transitory as well as Congres Permanent, different as well as identical. No object can be absolutely destroyed, nothing can be absolutely permanent. The modes (paryāyas) change, whereas the essential characteristics (gunas) remain the same.

Our experience tells us that no object is absolutely identical. We experience also that there are various differences. Jainism accepts this commonsense view and maintains that the identity or permanence exists in the midst of all the varying modes or differences. There is no reason to call in question the reality of the changes or of the identity, as both are perceived facts. Every entity is subject to change and maintains its identity

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throughout its career. Thus, Reality is a synthesis of opposite identity and difference, permanence and change.

Vedantist starts with the premise that Reality is to permanent universal conscious existence. Vaibhāsika Sautrāntika believe in atomic particulars and momentary ide each being absolutely different from the rest and having notion underlying them to bind them together. Naiyāyikas and Vaisesile hold particularity and universality to be combined in individual, though they maintain that the two characters: different and distinct. A Real, according to them, is an aggregation of the universal, (i.e., identity) and the particular, and not are synthesis (i. e., difference). Jainas differ from all these Indiphilosophers and hold that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in an object which is at on identical with and different from both. A Real, according them, is neither a particularity nor a universality exclusively h a synthesis which is different from both severally and joint though embracing them in its fold.6

There are six ultimate substances or eternal Reals in Jaina mataphysics: 1. Soul (jiva), 2. Matter (pudgala 3. Medium of Motion (dharma), 4. Medium of Rest (adharma 5. Space (ākāśa), 6. Time (Kāla). The souls are infinite (ananta) in number and each soul has innumerable (asankhyor indivisible parts (pradesas).7 By contraction and expansion of these parts the soul is capable of occupying different bodies like the light of a lamp that occupies a small room as wells a big hall.8 It can occupy the smallest possible body of bacterium or the largest possible body of a whale. No other school of Indian philosophy regards the soul as equal in exter to the body it occupies. Jainism maintains that even the ems cipated souls, which have no physical forms, since they are possessed of bodies, have the psychical forms of their last bodies Though the liberated souls possess their own form and maintain their individuality, there is perfect equality among them. The do not obstruct one another. Jainism does not believe personal God. Every soul, which is capable of salvation, possessed of the innate nature of Godliness. It can attain state of Godhead through right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. This state is nothing more than final liberation

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All the liberated souls are essentially equal. None of them enjoys any privilege. Every emancipated soul perfectly shines with infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite power.

Matter consists of two forms: atoms (anus or parmanus) and molecules (skandhas). The indivisible material particle is called atom. It is the smallest possible form of matter.9 Each and every atom possesses touch, taste, smell and colour and is potentially capable of forming earth, water, fire and air. There are no distinct and different kinds of atoms of earth etc., i. e., the atoms are untimately not different. Airy atoms can be converted into water, watery atoms can be converted into fire and soon. Ultimately, all the atoms belong to one and the same class, viz., the class of matter. Sometimes they form earth, sometimes they form water and so on. All this depends upon certain conditions and combinations. Air can be converted into a bluish liquid by continuous cooling, just as steam can be converted into water. Thus, according to Jainism, earth, water, fire and air are not ultimately separate and independent entities but only different forms of matter. There are no ultimate qualitative differences among them. The school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not agree to this view of Jainism. It regards earth, water, fire and air as absolutely different and independent substances, and hence, their atoms are also ultimately distinct and different.

A combination of atoms is known as molecule. It possesses a gross form and undergoes the processes of union and division. The manifestations of molecules are found in the form of different kinds of body, organs of speech, sound, heat, light, darkness, shade etc. <sup>10</sup> Some Indian philosophers like Vaiśeṣika etc. associate sound with ether. Jainism does not accept this view. It explains the creation of sound as due to the violent contact of one material object with another. A single molecule cannot produce sound. Darkness is a positive entity. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the existence of darkness is nothing more than the non-existence of light. Jainas hold that darkness enjoys an independent existence. It is as real as light.

No other Indian philosophical school than Jainism admits that karma is also material. According to the Jaina conception, karma is an aggregate of very fine material particles impercepti-

ble to our senses. The entire cosmos is full of that kind matter which can take the form of karma. Through the action of body and mind the karmic matter gets into the soul and tied to it according to the modifications of consciousness consid ing of passions. In the state of bondage the soul and kar are more intimate than milk and water.

The Medium of Motion is helpful in the movement of the souls and matter. Though the souls and matter are possessed of the capacity of movement, they cannot move unless the medium of motion is present in the universe. As water help fish in swimming, the medium of motion assists the souls and matter in their movement. This substance is formless11 and exists everywhere in the universe. The auxiliary cause of m to the souls and matter is known as the medium of rest. It is also formless and pervades the whole of the universe. The conception of the media of motion and rest as two separate substances is a unique contribution of Jainism to the India philosophy.

That which provides accommodation to the souls, matter, the media of motion and rest and time is called space. It is also formless and all-pervasive. It consists of two divisions: univers space (lokākāśā) and non-universe-space (alokākāśa). Tha space in which all the other five substances exist is known a universe-space. That which is beyond this universe-space and has nothing in it is called non-universe-space.12 It is empty space or pure space. No other Indian philosophical system believes in such an empty space.

Time is the auxiliary cause of change. The souls etc. which are by their own nature in the process of constant change accompanied by continuity, are helped by time or as the media of motion and rest are helpful in the movement and stoppage of the souls and matter, time is helpful in the origination destruction, i. e., modifications of the souls etc. In other words the function of time is to assist the other substances in their continuity of being through gradual changes or modifications Unlike the medium of motion etc. time is not a single continuous substance. The particles of time exist throughout the universe space, each time-particle being located in each space point. innumerable substances (particles) existing one by one in every CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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point of the of the universe-space, like heaps of jewels, are the units of time. They are formless. Thus, according to Jainism, time is not one substance but comprises of innumerable substances. It consists of innumerable minute (indivisible) particles which never mix up with one another. This conception is a unique one in the history of Indian philosophy.

Jainism holds that knowledge is like light. It is self-illuminating as well as other-illuminating. This refutes the position of the Bhāṭṭa Mimāmsakas etc. who hold the non-perceptibility of knowledge and the conception of Yogācāra Buddhists etc. who do not accept the reality of the external world.

Knowledge is of two kinds. Is this two-fold classification to be understood in the terms of the two kinds recognised by the Buddhists, viz., perceptual and inferential, or in a different way? The Jaina classification is certainly different. It is in terms of perceptual (pratyakṣa) and non-perceptual (parokṣa). The perceptual knowledge is direct or immediate, whereas the non-perceptual cognition is indirect or mediate. That which knows is the soul and that which manifests itself in the soul without the operation of the senses and mind is direct or immediate knowledge, whereas that which arises with the functioning of the senses and mind is indirect or mediate knowledge. Here Jainas differ from those who contend that knowledge resulting from the operation of the senses is direct and that arising without the functioning of the senses is indirect.

Vaisesika as well as Sānkhya maintain that there are three means of knowledge, viz., perception (pratyakṣa) inference (anumāna) and word (āgama). Naiyayikas accept analogy (upamāna) in addition to these three. Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas add implication (arthāpatti) as the fifth. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas accept negation (abhāva) as an additional means. All these means of valid knowledge, except negation, are included in the perceptual and non-perceptual cogintions recognised by Jainism. As regards negation, it is not accepted to be different from perception. Since Reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own. A real, as a matter of fact is made up of both being and non-being as its constitutive elements, since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the others. A perceptual cogni-

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tion determines its object by way of affirmation and negation. When we say that jar is not on the ground, we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar. The surface of the ground itself is the negation of the jar.

The Jain logicians divide perceptual knowledge into two categories. That perception which is directly derived from the soul is known as extra-sensory perception or real perception (pāramārthika pratyakṣa). The perception conditioned by the senses and mind is termed as sensory perception or pragmatic perception (sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa). To miscience (kevala), telepathy (manaḥparyāya) and clairvoyance (avadhi) come under the first category. The second category consists of sensation (avagraha), speculation (īhā), determination (avāya) and retention (dhāranā).

The perfect manifestation of the innate cognitive nature of the soul, emerging on the complete annihilation of all the obstructive karmic veils, is called omniscience. Is It is the highest type of perception. Omniscience is not the only instance of extra-sensory perception. There are other varieties also. Owing to the variation of the degrees of the destruction of obstructive veils, the extra-sensory perception admits of two varieties; limited knowledge, i. e. avadhijñāna and knowledge of the modes of mind, i. e., manahparyaya-jñāna. That extra-sensory perception which is confined to the objects having form, i. e., material objects, is called limited knowledge, i. e., clairvoyance. Mind, according to Jainism, is a particular material substance. Its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. The direct knowledge of these modes is called manahparyaya-jñāna, i. e., telepathy.

The non-perceptual knowledge is of five kinds; recollection (smaraṇa), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), induction (tarka), deduction (anumāna) and verbal knowledge (āgama).<sup>20</sup>

Recollection is a cognition which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'. It is Jainism alone that regards recollection as an independent organ of valid knowledge. As a consequence, it has to face a number of objections from the side of opponents. How can recollection be

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an organ of cognition when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis? The answer is: It is certainly based on an object that has been experienced in the past. The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition. If the opponent thinks that the revelation of the relevant object is the criterion of validity, it is found to be equally present in recollection also. How can a dead object be the generating condition of a cognition like recollection? Jainism answers: The object is not the generating condition of knowledge. As light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions, reveals the objects jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also a cognition, which comes into existence by its own conditions, viz., the sense-organ or the mind accompanied by the destruction-cum-subsistence of the obscuring veil, reveals its object, though it is not produced by the object. Moreover, if recollection is regarded invalid, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference, since there is no possibility of inference being realised unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. Hence, recollection has to be accepted as a valid and indeependent organ of knowledge.

Recognition is the synthetic cognition born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'it is the same' (judgment of identity), 'it is like that' (judgment of similarity), 'this is different from that' (judgment of difference) and the like. Observation is the perceptual cognition and recollection is an act of memory. These two are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic knowledge. This refutes the view of Buddhists who hold that there is no one knowledge as recognition, because it consists of two varieties in the form of this and that which are obvious and obscure respectively.

Induction or inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation. The observation in this context stands for the knowledge of existence of the major term ( $s\bar{a}dhya$ ) on the existence of the middle term ( $s\bar{a}dhana$ ) and non-observation for the knowledge of non-existence of the middle term on the non-existence of the major term. It cannot be maintained that such knowledge is derived exclusively

from perception, since it is beyond the capacity of our ordinary perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, for our sensory perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of universal concomitance. It follows, therefore, that induction or inductive reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge. It is known as tarka or ūha in the Jaina logic.

Deduction or inference is the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) on the strength of the probans (sādhana). It is of two kinds: for one's own self, i. e., subjective and for other, i. e., syllogistic. The subjective inference consists in the cognition of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Necessary or universal concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. In other words, the probans has inseparable relation with probandum. Inseparable relationship (avinābhāva or anyathānupapatti) consists in the universal necessity of simultaneous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. The triple chrracteristic of the probans maintained by Buddhists, viz., its subsistence in the subject (paksadharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapakṣa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti), as well as the five-fold characteristics maintained by Naiyāyikas, viz., the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abadhita-visayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asat-pratipaksatva) in addition to the above three, is nothing but an elaboration of this inseparable relationship, i. e., avinābhāva or anyathānupapatti recognised by Jainism.

The syllogistic inference is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the statement of the probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance. Philosophers of different schools hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. Sānkhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three parts: thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu) and example (drsṭānta). Mīmāmsakas assert four parts with the addition and consists of the constitution of constitution and consists of three parts: thesis assert four parts with the addition and consists of the constitution of constitution and consists of three parts: thesis assert four parts with the addition and consists of three parts.

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# CONTRIBUTION OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Naiyāyikas assert five parts with the addition of conclusion (nigamana). Jainism holds that the thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for an intelligent person.<sup>22</sup> For others it may have more propositions also.

The cognition produced by the statement of a reliable person is called verbal knowledge. One, who knows the objet as it is and states it as he knows it, is termed as reliable or authentic (āpta).<sup>23</sup> Such a person can never tell a lie. The omniscient who is totally free from passions, is regarded by Jainism as the real or extraordinary authentic person. From the pragmatic point of view, father etc. are considered to be ordinary reliable persons. Verbal knowledge is also known as scriptural knowledge. The Jaina scriptures are neither eternal, i. e. apauruseya in the sense of Mīmāmsaka nor God-created, i. e., īśvarakṛta as conceived by Naiyāyikas. They are human creations based on the preachings of the passionless omniscient tīrthankara. Hence, they are valid means of knowledge.

Thus, Jainism has contributed a number of original ontological, epistemological and logical concepts and enriched the philosophical thought of India.

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#### NOTES

- 1. Vaiśesika-sūtra, 1. 1. 4; 8. 2. 3.
- 2. Ibid, 1.1.8.
- 3. Nyaya-bhasya, 1. 11.
- 4. Tattvārtha-sūtra, 5. 29-30; 5.38.
- 5. Ibid., 5. 31.
- 6. Astasahasri, pp-147-8.
- 7. Tattvartha-sutra, 5.8.
- 8. Ibid., 5.16.
- 9. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.25.
- 10. Tattvārtha, 5.19-20, 24.
- 11. without touch taste smell and colour CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukur Kangri Collection, Haridwar

- 12. Dravyasangrapha, 19.
- 13. Parīkṣā-mukha. 1.1; pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 1.2.
- 1.4 Ibid., 22.
- 15. Pramana-mimamsa, 1.1.9-10., 13; 1.2.1.
- 16. Sarvartha-siddhi, 1-12.
- 17. Pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka, 2.4.
- 18. Pramana-mīmanisa, 1.1.15.
- 19. Ibid., 1.1.18.
- 20. Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, 3.2.
- 21. Pramana-mimamsa, 1.2.5.
- 22. Jaina tarka bhaṣā, 1.50.
- 23. Ibid., 1.61.

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## PREDICATE AND PROPERTY

It all started with St. Anselm, when perfectly convinced by faith in the existence of God, he tried to prove the existence of God by what has come to be called 'The Ontological Argument'. Incidentally, this argument so-called is wrongly attributed to St. Anselm since he did not use the expression. In fact, it was Kant who first named it as such. But let that pass.

The proof for God's existence that St. Anselm put forward purports to prove, simply from the concept of God as the supreme being, that God's existence cannot rationally be doubted by anyone having such a concept of Him. It is, thus, a purely a priori argument, that is to say, one that does not appeal to any facts of experience but is concerned solely with the implications of concepts, in this case, the concept of God, the central idea of the argument being that perfection implies existence. It should be stressed here that his argument presupposes no belief in the existence of God. It presupposes only the concept of God, that is to say, the concept of an absolutely supreme being, and for this no religious faith at all is required.

Kant expressed the refutation best in his claim that existence is no predicate. He held that having described a thing one adds nothing to the description of it by adding that it exists. There is no contradiction, he held, in denying of anything whatever, including a being than which no greater can be conceived, that it exists. A contradiction arises, Kant insisted, only when incompatible properties are predicated of one and the same thing. (cf. Strawson: Introduction to Logical Theory) The denial that God exists, however, involves no such predication.

This seems to be a fatal blow to the so-called ontological argument. It seems to be generally accepted that no one can Pass from the mere conception or idea of a thing to the conclusion that a thing thus conceived actually exists or that it does not exist. Some proof of existence is needed that a mere descri-Ption does not supply.

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But although it may be accepted that the existence of a thing cannot be inferred or proved from the mere description of it, it may not be accepted that the same can be said about its non-existence. That is to say it can be simply maintained that solely from the description of the thing, that the thing in question is impossible, and properly concluding from this that it does not, therefore, exist (e.g. square-circle). And this inference is not only a legitimate inference but a very common one when it is the non-existence of something that is inferred. And as Richard Taylor puts it, "One might maintain that God's existence cannot be proved by a consideration of the concept of God, but one cannot do so on the ground that no conclusions concerning what exists can be derived solely from our conceptions of things, for that is not true".

From Anselm's 'perfection implies existence' to Kant's 'existence is not a predicate' is a long way indeed from ontology to logic. And since Kant's time the issue most debated has centered round the question 'is existence a predicate', quite independently of the ontological argument. Let us, therefore, follow the issue leaving the ontological argument apart for some time. We will return to it in section III.

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The direction which this controversy takes is mostly due to G. E. Moore's paper 'Is existence a predicate?' in which we do not find any mention of the ontological argument. Moore starts by distinguishing between the use of "exist" and "growl" by considering two sentences viz. "Tame tigers exist" and "Tame tigers growl" and makes the following points.

- 1. While the sentence "Tame tigers growl" seems ambiguous, since it might mean "All tame tigers growl" or "Most/Some tame tigers growl", there does not seem to be any ambiguity in "Tame tigers exist".
- between the use of "growl" in "some tame tigers growl" and the use of "exist" in "some tame tigers exist", is that if in the former case we insert "do not" before "growl" without changing the Theanth of Communication of the Communication of

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significant, whereas if, in the latter, we insert "do not" before "exist", without changing the meaning of "exist", we get a sentence which has no meaning whatever".

And if by the statement that "growl" in this usage, "stands for an attribute", whereas "exist", in this usage, does not, then I should agree that "exist" in this usage does not "stand for an attribute" (Moore, p. 119)

However, Moore concedes that a meaning can be given to "Some tame tigers do not exist". Thus he says, "The sentence "There are some tame tigers which do not exist" is certainly significant, if it means only that there are some imaginary tigers in either of the two senses" (Ibid, p. 120) (viz. in fiction and hallucination).

3. Referring Russell's interpretation of "Some men are Greeks" to mean that the propositional function 'x is a man and a Greek' is sometimes true, Moore remarks, "We can say that one feature about our use of "growl" is that, if we consider a "value" of a propositional function which is such that "Some tame tigers growl" means that at least two values of it are true, then the singular word "growl" can be used, with the same meaning, in the expression of such a value. And perhaps this may be the part of what is meant by saying that "growl" stands for an attribute". (Ibid, p. 122)

Can we say the same thing about "Some tame tigers exist"? Here we enter into the most interesting point in the controversy between Moore and Russell.

Russell's treatment of 'existence' is implied in his, what Ramsay had called 'a paradigm' of philosophy, viz, his Theory of Definite Descriptions.<sup>2</sup>

Russell analyses the proposition, "The daughter of Hitler is a Soprano" as a conjunction of two propositions, the first being the proposition, "Hitler had one daughter" and the second one being, "She is a soprano (singer)". The first proposition, Russell points out; involves the idea of existence, because it means that the daughter of Hitler exists. Russell's main point about existence is that it does not qualify things directly, in the way in which shapes and colours qualify them. It does not qualify things even in lirectly through their properties and relations. For under analysis existence is transformed into a property I. P. Q....§C-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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of propositional functions, the property of having instances, which Russell calls 'possibility'. "This theory", says David Pears, "is in part, a precise formulation of the rather vague philosophical thesis that existence is not a predicate" (Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy, p. 64). But it is not enough to say that it is not a predicate. For what this means is that it is not an ordinary predicate and it needs to be explained how existence differs from them. Kant provided part of the explanation in his critique of the ontological proof for the existence of God. He pointed out that, whereas ordinary predicates may be included in the definition of a thing, existence cannot be included. You cannot say of a thing that it must exist because it has been defined as existing. For a definition can give a description of a thing as it would be if it did exist and the question whether it does exist is the question whether there is something that satisfies that description.

Russell seems to take up this thread when he introduces the concept of 'satisfying a propositional function'. For example unicorns might be described as 'equine (like a horse) and equipped with one horn', and Russell would take these adjectives in the context of the proposition 'This is equine and equipped with one horn'. Then in order to get a translation of the proposition that unicorns exist, Russell makes two moves. First he strikes out the word 'this' and leaves a blank in the proposition. The result, '-is equine and equipped with one horn' is what he calls a 'propositional function'. His second move is to introduce the concept of 'satisfying a propositional function'; an individual satisfies a propositional function, if and only if the insertion of its name in the vacancy of the propositional function produces a true proposition. Then the meaning of the proposition, that unicorns exist, is that the propositional function '-is equine and equipped with one horn' is satisfied. In this translation no mention is made or properties. Their place has been taken by propositional functions. Thus according to Russell, "We say that 'men exist' or 'a man exists', if the propositional function 'x is human' is sometimes true".

It is this point of Russell's that Moore is contesting. As he says, "Owing to this view of his that "Some tame tigers exist" means the same as "Some values of the propositional function 'x is a harmonic incomin and the leading the proposition of the propositio

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"Existence is essentially a property of a propositional function" and "It is of propositional functions that you can assert or deny existence" and that it is a fallacy to transfer 'to the individual that satisfies a propositional function, a predicate which only applies to a propositional function". So that, according to him, existence is, after all, in this usage, a "property" or "predicate", though not a property of individuals, but only of propositional functions". (Moore, p. 123).

Moore says, "I think this is a mistake on his part. Even if it is true that "Some tame tigers exist" means the same as "Some values of 'x is a tame tiger' are true" it does not follow, I think, that we can say that "exist" means the same as "is sometimes true", and "some tame tigers" the same as "x is a tame tiger". (Ibid, p. 123).

Strawson in his 'Introduction to Logical Theory' has described how "The logical character of sentences whose use to make statements presupposes the existence of something referred to by their grammatical subjects" by maintaining that the question of whether statements exemplifying the Aristotelian forms of general statements are true or false is one that does not arise unless the subject-class has members. (cf. Chapt. 6). He further maintains that such an interpretation can be given even of Singular Statements and considers Russell's theory of Definite Descriptions as a 'classical illustration' of the 'error' of not noticing the nature of general statements as explained by Strawson. The reason for such an 'error' according to Strawson. is 'the operation of the bogus trichotomy, true, false or meaningless'. To put very briefly the theory can be summed up by holding that if the sentence is of the subject predicate form, then, ifit is not meaningless, it must be about something; so the form of the sentence, 'The King of France is wise' is either meaningless or there is a king of France for it to be about. But since there is no king of France, the conclusion is drawn that it is not a subject-predicate sentence and the existential analysis is adopted instead. On that analysis, the sentence is false (and hence significant) if there is no king of France. Thus it is argued, holds Strawson, that this analysis provides the only acceptable means of reconciling the fact that sentence is meaningful with the fact that there does not happen to be a king of France.

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According to Strawson these arguments 'lose their power's we keep in mind the distinction between sentence and statemen "For a sentence of the statement-making type to have meaning holds Strawson, "it is not necessary that every use of it, at an time at any place, should result in a true or false statement, is enough that it should be possible to describe or imagine circum. stances in which its use would result in a true or false statement For a referring phrase to have meaning it is not necessary the on every occasion of its use there should be something to which it refers" (Strawson, p. 185) The whole mistake is due to main taining that the meaning of any genuine expression is taken tok identical with the object to which it applies. According to Strawson even the proper names would not 'fill the bill.' One can significantly ask, using a proper name, 'Did N exist?'. The same name can be borne by many different creatures or things and in no case is the meaning of a name identical with a creature or thing which bears it. "To bestow a name", says Strawson, "is not to give a word a meaning. Names, then, do not satisfy the require ment". (Ibid, p. 190).

Thus Strawson's position about the status of statements of the pattern of 'x's Exist' is that the existential statements came be assimilated to any of the four forms or be regarded as a subject predicate statement at all. And in doing so, as perhaps Russell is doing, "We should be faced with the absurd result that the question of whether it was true or false could arise only if it were true. This gives a new edge to the familiar philosophical observation that 'exists' is not a predicate. When we declared deny that 'there are' things of such and such a description or that things of such and such a description 'exist', the use of the quoted phrases is not to be assismilated either to the predicative or to the referring use of expression." (Ibid, p. 191)

Russell in his "Mr. Strawson on referring", takes a note of Strawson's arguments criticizing Russell's theory of descriptions and holds, in short, that Strawson has indentified the two problems which Russell regarded as quite distinct—namely the problem of descriptions and the problem of egocentricity. (What the egocentric words refer to depends upon when and where the are used.) CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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#### III

C. B. Martin<sup>3</sup> makes a distinction between 'God' as a proper name, and 'God' as a concept. 'God (concept) is good' is analytic, 'God (proper name) is good' is synthetic, and learned, if at all, by experience. This view can be taken about 'exists' also. Thus when we say 'God exists', 'God' can be taken either as a proper name or as a concept. And then 'God (concept) exists' will be anylytic, while, 'God (proper name) exists' will be synthetic, learned, if at all, by experience. Such a distinction would also bring to light the distinction between a property or a quality and a predicate. When for instance, we talk of 'God (concept)' that it 'exists', 'exists' is a predicate, not a property; and when we talk of 'God (proper name)' that it 'exists', 'exists' is a property, not a predicate. And it is more with the former, than with the latter, that is, more with the predicate, than with property, that the ontological argument is about. In the light of this, I think that the whole controversy was misdirected, since it centred around 'property' when in fact it is centred around 'predicate'. And in this, I think, Russell's position is more reasonable and correct than Moore's.

It is, again, with 'existence' as a predicate, and not as a property or quality, that Russell and Ryle are concerned when they held that 'existence is equivocal' and Quine when he rejected this view while maintaining that 'existence is univocal'. As Ryle4 says, "A man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely, the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies, or that there exist both bodies and minds". While Quines says, "Why not say that chairs and questions, however unlike, are hard in a single inclusive sense of the word? There is an air of Zeugma about 'The Chair and question were hard' but is it not due merely to the dissimilarity of chairs and questions? Are we not in effect calling 'hard' ambiguous, if at all, just because it is true of some very unlike things? Essentially this same question comes up in instances that are taken seriously. There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that 'true' said of logical or mathematical laws and true, said of weather predictions or suspects, confessions are two usages of campigue bottoms of suspension are philosophers

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What they who stouty maintain that 'exists' said of numbers, classes at the like, and 'exists' said of material objects are two usages ambiguous term 'exists'. What can they possibly count a evidence? Why not view 'true' as unambiguous but very general and recognise the difference between true logical laws and true confessions? And correspondingly for existence?" Thus Quing finds 'no evidence' for calling 'existence' and 'truth' ambiguous when predicated of things of different types.

#### IV

My position in this context can be summed up in the following points:

1. I do not accept the ontological argument for the existence of God. I don't accept, in other words, that the existence of God can be convincingly proved or inferred from the concept or idea of God, since I hold that existence and concept or idea have logically nothing to do with each other.

2. I do not deny that existence is not a property or a quality like any other quality. But this denial does not logically bind me to deny that existence is or can be a predicate. In other words, I subscribe to the view that though existence is not a property, it can be used as a predicate. Since property or quality is experiential and predicate is logical. And, therefore, denial of one does not necessarily lead to or mean, denial of the other.

3. Thus contradictory as it may sound I reject the ontological argument but accept that existence can be a predicate, if not a property, since a relevant meaning can be given to exists.

4. I do not see why Moore's 'open question argument that he uses for considering 'good' cannot with equal force by used for considering 'existence', and if, therefore, 'good' can't considered as a predicate, why not 'existence'?

Department of Philosophy Nagpur University, Nagpur. S. W. Bakhle

#### NOTES

- 1. Philosophical Papers, G. E. Moore, (1959)
- 2. Classics of Analytic Philosophy, Ed. Ammerman.
- 3. New Essays in Philosophical Theology, Ed. Flow and Mac Intyre.
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   CCC0. In Public Domain: Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar Words and Objects, pp. 130-31.

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# IN DEFENCE OF 'SATISFACTION-LOGIC' OF COMMANDS

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The word 'command' is used to mean what is conveyed by an imperative, that is, by an expression of the form 'X, do a!'. The distinction between 'imperative' and 'command', thus, is analogous to the distinction between 'sentence' and 'proposition'.

Since Mally's seminal work in 1926, a number of attempts have been made to construct a formal logic of commands/imperatives. Four major systems have been developed so far, namely by : Hare;1 Hofstadter and McKinsey2 (based on Carnap's language 1 or R); von Wright3 (based on the logic of 'necessary', 'possible', and 'contingent'); and Alf Ross,4 Rescher,5 Castaneda,6 and Kenny7 (modelled on the truth-functional logic of propositions). The present paper is directed towards the last type of approach and attempts to demonstrate that the values of 'satisfaction' and 'violation' of a command are the only value which can appropriately be substituted for the 'truth' and 'falsity' of propositions. the course of the discussion, some of the important inadequacies of Rescher's system will be brought out and necessary modifications suggested. The central concern is not to defend Rescher's system as a whole but to justify his choice of 'satisfaction' as the truth-surrogate.

#### II

For anyone who is trying to construct a logical system for commands, based on the truth-functional logic of propositions, the most critical task is to find an alternative for 'truth' and 'falsity'. The choice naturally depends, to a large extent, on the characteristic or function of truth/falsity emphasized in the criterion designed to evaluate the possible alternatives. In the literature three functions of 'truth' have been identified:

- (a) truth is what a valid indicative inference preserves;
- (b) because of a special relation between asserting a proposition (that is, the speech-act) and the truth of the asserted proposition, it is *logically inconsistent* to assert two mutually contradictory propostions; and
- (c) the logical relations are defined in terms of the truthvalue relations.

Depending on their personal preferences, different writers have emphasized different requirements. Kenny, Castaneda, and Alf Ross, place maxium emphasis on (a); Hare along with those interested in developing a logic of commanding (that is, the speech-act)s

on (b); and Rescher and von Wright on (c). I shall in the follow. ing sections examine these requirements briefly and see how 'satisfaction' fares on each.

#### III

The purpose of a valid indicative inference is preservation of truth. Similarly, it is demanded, that the proposed substitute for 'truth' must be able to accord the purpose of command/imperative inference. As practical inferences are conceived to be a subclass of command inferences, the value chosen must be that which practical inferences aim to preserve. Since there is no agreement with regard to the aim of practical inferences, there is, consequently, no agreement with regard to the proper substitute for 'truth'. However, the dis-satisfaction with the proposal of 'satisfaction' as a substitute for truth is widespread. It is generally agreed that the purpose of practical inferences is not merely to ensure that if the premise commands are satisfied then the conclusion command has also been satisfied. This criticism of 'satisfaction' however, is misconceived as it rests on an unacceptable assumption.

The demand that the proposed substitute for 'truth' must provide the purpose of practical inference is based on two fundamental assumptions:

- that there are command inferences; and (1)
- (2) that practical inferences are a sub-class of the command inferences.
- (1) is more basic than the (2) for the latter presupposes the former. (1), however, is untenable for the following reason.

An inference9 is roughly a process wherein one accepts of tries to establish a conclusion on the basis of certain premises which too one accepts (categorically or tentatively) or acknowledges to be true, and which are seen to be related to the conclusion in a particular manner. This element of justification, the fact of establishing or trying to establish the conclusion, is one of the most important features of an inference or an inference or collection, Haridwar CC-0. In Public Domain.

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There is general agreement that accepting a proposition means (atleast partly) believing it to be true, and in a like manner, establishing a proposition is to show that the proposition is true. Inference, therefore, in such cases becomes a process wherein one accepts/establishes the truth of a proposition on the basis of the truth of certain others because the truth of the former is seen to be related to that of the latter. Difficulties arise when we introduce an inference that contains commands as premises and conclusion. Since commands are neither true nor false, what is it that we are trying to establish/accept through a command inference? What does it mean to say 'establish a command' or 'accept a command' apart from establishing/accepting that the command is — (issued. contextually proper etc.)?

This problem of assigning a meaning to the phrase 'establish/ accept a command' is entirely different from the problem of determining whether or when a command entails another. In the literature, however, the two are rarely distinguished. Hare, for example, posits that since the logical relations hold by virtue of the meanings of the sentences and not by virtue of their truth-value relationships, the fact that commands are neither true nor false poses no serious threat to the possibility of command inference. Similarly, Alf Ross contends :

"-truth and falsity are not the only possible indefinables of a deductive logical system and - imperatives are not, therefore, precluded beforehand from being constituent parts of a logical inference". (op. cit. 59)

Thus it has not generally been recognised that even if there are entailment relations among commands, the possibility of command inferences is still an open question. The latter, as has already been contended, can be granted only when we have a meaning for the phrase 'establish/accept a command' which is distinct from the assertion that a command is being issued etc. To find an analogue of truth will not, as Edgley<sup>10</sup> thinks, suffice to show the possibility of such inferences; this analogue of truth must also not render the establishing of a command a mere assertion.

Hare suggests that 'assenting' to a command is akin to 'accepting a proposition. This implies that in a command inference we assent to certain commands on the basis of certain others which We have already assented to. This suggestion, however, loses all CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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of st its plausibility once we take into consideration Hare's concept of assent.

To Hare 'assenting' to a command means doing what is commanded when the occasion arises, provided that the person is physically and psychologically capable of performing the act. In the light of this concept of 'assent', let us now consider the following (so called) command inference:

'John, shoot all the traitors!'

'Peter is a traitor.'

'Therefore, John, shoot Peter!'

If John assents to the first premise, on the above concept, he will shoot all the traitors, including Peter if Peter is actually a traitor. It is consequently, unnecessary for John to further assent to the conclusion command—he has already fulfilled it. The possibility of an *inference* is, thus, straight way ruled out.

A different concept of 'assent' is suggested by Gauthier. He avers that:

"—a man may assent to an imperative as *justified*, whether or not he acts on it or even considers acting on it". (63)

We may characterize command inference, then, as a process in which we accept the justifiability of a command on the basis of its relationship to other commands which we have already acknowledged as justified. This argument too becomes unhelpful as soon as we analyse the claim of the justifiability of a command. If the linguistic expression 'the command is justified' is itself an imperative, then the problem has not been solved; it has only been shifted one step further. On the other hand, if this expression is a descriptive judgement, then it has no relevance for the present discussion. An inference from the justified character of an imperative/command to that of another, will be a straightforward indicative inference.

An acceptable interpretation of the phrase 'accept/establish a command', thus, is lacking in the literature. The possibility (and existence) of the command/imperative inferences, therefore, is doubtful. The demand that the suggested value must provide the purpose of practical and command inferences, consequently is premature rather unjustified, and may be disregarded for the present. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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#### IV

The second requirement, emphasized by Hare runs as follows: If two propositions are logically contradictory—cannot be true together — then it is logically inconsistent for someone to assert both, at the same time and in the same respect. Similarly, it is demanded, that whatever be the chosen substitute for 'true', if it renders two commands contradictory then it must be logically inconsistent for a person to issue both at the same time, to the same person, and in the same respect. This is the gist of the 'speaker-commitment' demand.

The demand of 'speaker-commitment', however, seems to rest on a misconception. To assert a proposition is to make a claim for the truth of the proposition. Consequently, if a person asserts two propositions which cannot (logical cannot) be true together then he is being logically inconsistent. In the case of commands, therefore, if we wish to maintain a similar position then we must concede that: (a) two contradictory commands cannot both be 'x', where 'x' is the value in terms of which contradiction is defined; and (b) to issue a command, say, 'p and q' is to claim that both p and q are x. But what can this 'x' be which one is ascribing to the command issued? According to Hare to command is to tell someone to do something. However, what is the relationship between telling someone to do 'a' and the act 'a', Hare does not tell us. The neustic is an indefinable in his theory.

Alf Ross, 12 unlike Hare, asserts that the imperative 'X, do a!' means 'X's doing, a, so it ought to be'. To command is to make a claim of the 'validity' of the action commanded. Given Ross's conception of imperatives and the act of commanding, if now contradiction is defined in terms of the 'validity' of the commands, perhaps it would be logically inconsistent to issue two mutually contradictory (in this sense) commands. But then, on this conception, commanding is no longer different from asserting as the claim of the 'validity' of a command is only to make a statement about one's own psychology. In fact whatever interpretation be given to 'x', if commanding is conceived as ascribing 'x' to the command, it is difficult to imagine how commands can retain their distinctive 'imperative' character. Hare, thus, is faced with a dilemma. Fither sommanding is only a sub-class of the speech-

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rovide uently, or the act of asserting, in which case no logic of imperatives/commands is needed. Or, commanding is unique but there is no logical inconsistency involved when a person issues both the commands simultaneously, namely, 'X, do a' and 'X, do not do a'.

For the above reason, Hare's contention that it is logically inconsistent to issue two commands at the same time, etc., when they cannot be satisfied together, seems unjustified. That some inconsistency is present in such cases cannot be denied. However, this inconsistency is not logical and thereby, not analogous to that involved in asserting two mutually contradictory propositions. It is more like 'contextual' or 'pragmatic' inconsistency though not exactly similar to 'logical oddness'. The difference between the three types of inconsistencies is as follows:

Where one asserts 'that p and not-p', the logical contradiction holds between the propositions p and not-p. This contradiction renders the claim of their joint truth (that is, the assertion) logically inconsistent.

When one asserts 'p but I do not believe that p', the logical contradiction holds between the 'contextual implicant of the assertion 'that p' and the other half of the assertion itself, namely, 'I do not believe that p'. This renders his utterance 'logically odd'.

When one issues the command 'p and not-p', his utterance presupposes (or, perhaps, pragmatically implies) that both commands, namely, 'p' and 'not-p' can be satisfied together—a possibility which is ruled out by logic. The logical contradiction thus, holds at the level of presupposition (or the pragmatic implication) of the command. This case, therefore, is entirely different from the first where the contradition is at the level of the content of the claim itself.

The absence of logical inconsistency in issuing two commands which cannot be satisfied together, however, does not entitle us to disregard the demand of 'speaker-commitment' totally. As has been already pointed out, even if there is no logical inconsistency in such cases yet they are not perfectly consistent either. Hence, if a certain chosen value renders two commands contradictory and yet a person who issues them both simultaneously is intuitively perfectly consistents. Filter Damain Certain Collection Hardwar Taking

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this stand we may reformulate the 'speaker-commitment' demand as follows:

'Whatever value be chosen, it must be such that a person cannot consistently (in a contextual sense) issue two contradictory commands'.

Contextual inconsistency, though not sufficient to establish the contradiction, is nevertheless, necessary for it.

From this point of view, 'satisfaction' is a week substitute for 'truth'. In several cases, on satisfaction-logic two commands are logically contradictory and yet the person who issues them jointly appears to be perfectly consistent. To take the frequently debated instance, consider the following:

- (1) 'If you have read the book, come and see me!'
- (2) 'Read the book!'
- (3) 'Come and see me!'

In 'satisfaction-logic' (1) and (2) jointly entail the third. A person who satisfies the first two cannot fail to satisfy (3). Yet a person who issues the first two is not committed to the third in the sense that if he commands (1) and (2) and the denial of (3), then he is being inconsistent. That he is not so committed is evident from the fact that if he adds one more proposition to the set, namely 'You have not read the book', he can consistently command 'Do not come and see me!' Had (1) and (2) committed him to (3), the addition of an assertion would not have made the joint utterance of (1), (2) and the denial of (3) consistent.

Again, on satisfaction-criterion the proposition 'p' entails the command 'p', and yet a person who asserts the first but denies the second cannot be said to be inconsistent in any sense. To say 'You are doing 'a' but do not do 'a!' is perfectly consistent. These observations, however, do not imply that the value of 'satisfaction' must be abandoned, or, that it is totally inadequate. They only necessitate the formulation of rules which can restrict such unwanted entailments. Two such rules have been suggested by Hare¹³ and Clarke¹⁴ but both have been found to be either too restrictive or too lenient.¹⁵ Treating logical connectives as connectives between 'themes' of commands rather than commands themselves, and following Rescher's analysis of commands, I propose the following rules:

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(i) In the case, where the entailment is dependent on the recurrence of a command or proposition, in each of its essential occurrence a command must occur as a command and a proposition as a proposition. This excludes such entailment as 'p'/'p'!

- (ii) Where the entailment depends on the recurrence of a constitutent of a command (that is, the action variable, the condition variable etc.) the following must be true:
  - (a) except for the 'condition variable', a constitutent which has a bound occurrence in one command, must appear as bound in all essential commands; if it occurs as free then it must occur as a command.

This excludes the entailments of 'You are doing a' from 'do either a or b!; do not do a!'. Or the entailment of 'do b!' from 'do either a or b!; You are not doing a.' At the same time, it allows the entailment of 'if you are doing a, then do c!' from 'if you are doing a, then do b!; 'if you are doing b then do c!'

(b) the 'condition' of a command must occur in all essential members of the set either as a condition in some command, or as a proposition.

As a command only its denial can appear. This rules out the entailment of 'do b!' from 'if you are doing a then do b!; do a! At the same time it allows the entailment of 'you are not doing a' from 'if you are doing a then do b!; do not do b!'

The above syntactical rules I believe, will provide the necessary restrictions needed to satisfy the requirement of 'speaker-commitent' (in the weaker sense).

V

The third requirement which the proposed substitute of 'truth' is expected to fulfil is concerned with the logical properties of truth-values. Truth and falsity determine (in a truth-functional logic) the logical relations among indicative sentences/propositions. They are mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive (we may ignore intuitionism for the time being). Two propositions which are mutually contradictory logically cannot be true together, and likewise it is logically impossible with tenari for the first station of the substitution of

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and yet p is true and q false. Moreover, truth and falsity are objective values and, therefore, the contextual factors like who utters the sentence, or in what context etc. do not affect the logical properties of the sentences/propositions.

Keeping in mind these features of truth and falsity, it is expected, that the values substituted for truth be objective and context free. They should explain why commands 'open the door' and 'do not open the door', are logically contradictory when issued to the same person, at the same time and in the same respect. In other words, why both the commands cannot be assigned the same logical value.

From this point of view, the only suitable substitute for 'truth' seems to be 'satisfaction'. On this criterion alone the two commands, mentioned above, logically cannot have the same value. Other criteria like 'satisfactoriness' or 'validity' fail to satisfy The two commands in question, can be contradictory on the latter values only if it is assumed that the person issuing these commands does not have conflicting wishes, demands, or aims. But why should a person who desires the same door to be both open and not open, at the same time and in the same respect be considered to have inconsistent demands, or aims? The answer will have to be in terms of the impossibility of the joint satisfaction of these demands or aims. The value of 'satisfaction', thus, is more fundamental than 'validity' or 'satisfactoriness'.

Moreover, the number of contextual factors which have to beconsidered logically relevant are minimal in case of 'satisfaction'. The two commands under consideration, will be contradictory on this value even when they are issued by two different persons. For other criteria, however, the source of the command has to be the same. As for the addressee, it is a constraint for all.

Rescher in his system tacitly acknowledges the logical relevance of another factor, namely, what von Wright calls 'the condition of applicability'. The concept of 'bypassing' in his system incorporates this factor. He also explicitly admits the logical rele-Vance of the contextual factor, namely whether or not the condition under the control of the addressee. A pair of commands may be perfectly consistent if the 'condition' is within the human control. A logically similar pair of commands, however, may become inconsistent if the conditional clause refers to something beyond CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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human control. (see page 107). But why do we have to take into consideration all these factors? Rescher gives no justification It is true that such considerations as that of the human control are important when we are deciding the epistemic propriety of a command. There is, however, no need to include them in a logical system. As for the concept of 'bypassing' a command, if a cond. tional proposition can be regarded as true when its antecedent's false, why can we not regard a conditional command as 'satisfied' when its antecedent is false? In fact, once it is realised that 'salisfaction' means 'non-violated', just as 'true' in propositional logic means 'not-false' and not 'true' in the strict sense of the term, the 'paradox of implication' in case of commands will appear no more paradoxical than it does in case of propositions. If we define 'satisfaction' in this way, we can construct a two-valued logic of commands exactly analogous to the truth-functional logic of property sitions. This isomorphism of the command logic with the propositional logic, in my opinion, further confirms the appropriateness of 'satisfaction' as a substitute for 'truth'. It can be taken as a weak ness of the system only if it is assumed either that each type of language must have a special logic of its own, or, that the twovalued truth-functional logic is not a proper model for commands. Neither of these assumptions seems to have any ground.

In conclusion we may examine some of the repercussions of the foregoing discussion on the popularly held beliefs about the relationship between the logic of commands and moral reasoning. Historically, one of the most pressing reasons for developing imperative logic, has been its instrumental value for a theory of morality. A defense of the rational nature of 'morality' while preserving the prescriptive function of moral judgements (that is, the repulation of logical positivism) was seen to hinge upon the possibility of imperative inferences and imperative logic.

The earlier discussion suggests that there are no imperative command inferences and also that there is no logical inconsistent in commanding both 'p and not-p' at the same time, to the same person, and in the same respect. As a result, a study of the logic of commands, that is, of the logical relations among commands can at the most tell us when a person is (in a contextual sense inconsistent. Unless moral reasoning is to be reduced to such considerations in the libopopular formula for the logical reasoning is to be reduced to such considerations in the libopopular formula formula for the logical reasoning is to be reduced to such considerations in the libopopular formula formula for the logical reasoning is to be reduced to such considerations.

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in logic of commands is totally misplaced. This also explains why there has been so widespread discontentment with 'satisfaction-logic' of commands—it was expected to perform something which it cannot, because of the very nature of commands, perform.

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#### NOTES

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### DASEIN, DEATH AND FUTURE

(A Study in the Philosophy of Heidegger)

Dasein literally means 'Being-there'. "Though in traditional German Philosophy it may be used quite generally to stand for almost any kind of Being or 'existence'......in every day usage it tends to be used more narrowly to stand for the kind of Being, that belongs to persons" (foot note, p. 27). So Dasein throughout this paper means individual person.

Every living organism dies. "Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life". (200) Death is a daily occurrence and it is an undeniable fact.

Death is usually considered to be an evil and the greatest enemy of man against which man is helpless. It causes the maximum suffering to man It would be a metaphysical study to deal with death as an evil and suffering. Death may also be taken as a biological fact. Biologically death is cessation of physiological functions. As birth is the beginning of a living organism, death is the end of it. Science studies death from a biological standpoint. Heidegger deals with death from an existential stand-point.

Death is always the death of an individual. Death may be looked upon either authentically or inauthentically. In an inauthentic way we come across death as an event among the world of events. It is one of the 'they' who dies. A funeral procession passes by as we are engaged in our pleasures or problems. Death in an authentic way is one's own and has a special meaning. Heidegger writes, "Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's own most possibility-non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped". (302)

The following points stand out from the above definition of death by Heidegger. Death is (i) the own most possibility of the which is not to be outstripped.

The own most possibility of the self' is the possibility of going our op existence. It is true that biologically every one

G. S. HERBERT DASEIN,

must die his own death and one cannot die in the place of another So 'own most possibility' indicates that death which is in the future of every individual is his own exclusively and it is an important characteristic of the being of man (Dasein). "It is a 'not-yel which any Dasein, as the entity which it is, has to be" (288). 'Not-yet' indicates 'possibility' and 'as the entity which it is, has to be implies 'own most' or personal belongingness of death. Same is the case with 'certainty'. Man is sure to die. As Heidegger says "At soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die" (289).

'Non-relational' indicates that when a man dies, he is more existent to have any relationship with anything. Death is the end of life and it is a non-relational end, i. e., it is an end at which man is devoid of all relations. When he is no more, it is impossible for man to enter into any type of relation.

That death is 'indefinite' is a temporal characteristic. The 'existential mood of anxiety' which Heidegger mentions in the context of indefiniteness is due to the temporal indefiniteness of death. Though death is certain, no one knows when death occurs, whether it is natural or accidental. It might be said that death is definite in some cases atleast as in suicide as a person committing suicide knows definitely about his death. Such an argument is untenable. Even in the case of a suicide death is indefinite at there are any number of instances where attempts at suicide have misfired.

"Not to be outstripped' means that death is considered as all end, beyond which there is nothing else. The individual man does not outlive his death. When a man dies, he becomes non-existent Death is the end of man's life.

Death as the not-yet has to be understood in the unique existential sense. In order to explain his point of view, Heideged makes helpful comparisons of death as an end with several other 'ends' which are 'not-yets' which we may note briefly.

He takes the example of a moon (287) which is not yet a full moon. The whole moon is existent, but we see only a part of it due to various circumstances like the relative position of the earth in space. The death of an individual is not already so existent "The 'not-yet' which belongs to Dasein, however, is not just some thing—CC-0 in Rubbis Danouing Quitaleth (287) idwar

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Death is not like the end of a road. (287) A road upto the end point is an arbitrary, artificial end. Death as an end has the characteristic of natural necessity.

Heidegger compares the death of Dasein with ripening of a fruit. There is a resemblance between the two. Any fruit ripens and the not-yet of ripeness of the fruit is comparable to the not-yet of the death of Dasein. "The 'not-yet' has already been included in the very Being of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too is already its 'not-yet'" (288). However, there is an important difference between the two. "With ripeness, the fruit fulfills itself". (288) But death is not such fulfilment of the Dasein as it cannot be said that Dasein has "necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities" (288) at its death.

Next, Death according to Heidegger is to be understood as that which makes Dasein a whole. Dasein is a whole which comprises in itself birth, death and in between care. Birth is not that which is no more and death is not that which is not yet. Death is as Dasein's own most possibility. Both birth and death are coexistent with the Dasein, which is care; and because of all the three factors Dasein is a whole.

Dasein occupies a very unique position in the universe. The aim of Heidegger is to understand 'Being' and he tries to achieve his aim through Dasein. The understanding of 'Being' is through time. Time is viewed as a possibility to understand the Being in all its manifestations. "Whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint". (39) Past, present and future are the ecstases of time. These parts of time are derived from Dasein. They are founded or based on the basic states of Dasein.

Future: In the context of the study of death, we are mainly concerned with future as death is futural to a person. Ordinarily future is understood as the not-yet actual. A future event is one that has not yet occurred, and that which will occur later on. Heideger differs from such a conception of future. He does not mean by the future the not-yet but that which is potentially which will be realized in the course of time. "By the term, 'futural' we do not here have using summa summa summary with the course of time."

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t a full rt of it e earth xistent. 'actual' and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming (kunft) in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself". (373) Such a notion of future depends upon the fact that time is derived from or dependent upon Dasein. The individual man is born in the world and finally dies. As man is born, death is inescapable for him. Man in going towards death is going towards his ownmost end as death is potentially present in him. As death is already present (potentially) in the individual man, future is also said to be present.

Primordial or authentic future is finite. This is so again as the authentic time and hence the future are pertinent to the self. The self is a 'being-towards death', and the being of the self comes to an end at death. The individual man dies and goes out of existence. "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein." (294) Hence the self is finite. Consequently time is finite and the future is finite. This future which is finite is the future of an individual finite self.

At this juncture it is relevant to refer to an important question, "Does not the time go on? Is time not infinite?". Heidegger himself raises this question and answers yes.

Heidegger admits a notion of endless time, and he calls it 'inauthentic' or ordinary time. The inauthentic time is infinite. It is said to be derived from the authentic or finite time. As Heidegger points out, "The problem is not one of how the derived infinite time..... becomes primordial finite temporality; the problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality arises out of finite authentic temporality....." (379) Heidegger makes the most important contribution to the philosophy of time when he says that the ordinary notion of time which is infinite is not a basic conception of time but has only a derivative status, derived from the authentic, finite time of the self.

The derivation of the infinite time from the finite time is explained as follows. The structure of Dasein with birth, death and in between care gives rise to time and its structure. This is primordial time and is finite. The individual experiences other things existing 'alongside-of-himself'. The self endures and in so far as the self has been enduring, other things are considered to be enduring. This idea of enduring is next the self has been enduring by a considered to be considered. This idea of enduring is next the self has been enduring its next that the self

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the self beyond its own endurance. Such an imaginative extension gives us the notion of 'time-infinite'.

However the ontological basis of such an imaginative extension of duration disappears with the death of the self; and hence the inauthentic time or the notion of time as being endless would then be without any basis. Therefore infinite time has only a derivative status. However, Heidegger opines that the infinite time is admissible.

Heidegger further explains the derivation of infinite time as follows. In science and history we come across events which are described as occurrences happening 'in time'. As we cannot possibly understand these occurrences apart from time, we get a notion of time as that in which occurrences take place. "That time 'wherein' entities within-the-world are encountered is the 'world time'". (471) World time is the public or objective time. Public time is that kind of time within which we encounter or come across entities ready to hand and present at hand. These entities are of a different character from that of Dasein and so are called entities 'within time'. (465) They are always presented as being in the 'now'. Consequently the ordinary understanding of time is a sequence of nows. Such time is a stream of flowing successive nows which leads to the notion of infinite time.

Moreover in inauthentic existence, the self is lost in the 'they'. The 'they' never dies for death in each case is the death of a particular individual. "Dasein knows fugitive time in terms of its 'fugitive' knowledge about its death". (478) The world time or the inauthentic time goes on for it "belongs to every one and that means, to nobody". (477) Thus Heidegger's distinction between the authentic Dasein and the inauthentic Dasein gives rise to timefinite and time-infinite respectively.

Infinite time naturally implies infinite future. But it is important to note that in Heidegger's Philosophy, infinite time (consequently infinite future) is inauthentic and has a derivative status only. The notion of time and its structure is primarily based on Dasein. Dasein is a totality of 'facticity, existence and falling' corresponding to past, present and future respectively giving rise to the concept of time.

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The above study of Heidegger has revealed that death as the necessary end of Dasein leads to the understanding of future. Heidegger's notion of future as being potentially present along with past and present is a significant contribution to the understanding of time.

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G. S. Herbert

#### NOTE

 All references in this paper are from Heidegger — Being and Time, S. C. M. Press, London, 1962. Page numbers given in brackets are from the book.

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### KANT'S SCHEMATISM OF CATEGORIES

It is held by Walsh that nowhere is Kant's genius shown so very clearly as it is shown in his seizing the problem of schematism. He has regarded the problem of schematism as the central problem of the whole critique. We may feel a bit reluctant to agree with Walsh's above eulogy of Kant and may regard his view as a slight exaggeration, yet we shall not disagree with him when he says that the aim of Kant in dealing with the problem of schematism is "to show that categories, despite their non-empirical origin and remoteness from sense, can nevertheless be shown to have a sort of empirical reference and therefore to be capable of genuine application." This task is undoubtedly of paramount importance within the framework of Kant's critical philosophy. But the presentation of schematism is so very enigmatic and ambivalent that it i has led to many misunderstandings. The aim of this paper is to make the exposition of this problem as clear as possible in order to understand and appreciate the real intention and implication of Kant.

The significance of categories lies in their being applied to experience. This is proved by Kant in his tortuous argument of the transcendental deduction of the categories. Knowledge arises only when sensible intuitions are brought under the categories of understanding. The fact that they are brought to give rise to knowledge is shown by Kant with a geat deal of labour. But a question arises. Are the categories shown to be applicable in experience by Kant in the transcendental deduction the same that are derived from the forms of judgment in the metaphysical deduclion. If they are the same, not only can we prove that they are applied in experiece, there can be really speaking no application at all, as sensible intuition and categories are both hetrogeneous. The former are empirical, the latter are devoid of any empirical content and are logical. Nothing is common between them on the basis of which they may get related. Kant himself says that these categories are logically significant, although lacking real significance. lo use the phraseology of Frege, they have a meaning but lack significance. As a matter of fact, pure categories derived in the metaphysical deduction standing as they are are of no use at all.

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ng and ven in Knowledge is constituted by two elements, linguistic or a priori and factual or a posteriori. Kant's categories derived in the metaphysical deduction are undoubtedly linguistic elements in the composition of knowledge. To use those categories is simply to play with words. Being non-empirical is certainly their distinctive feature and shows their pure logical character. But this distinctive feature, however pleasing it may appear, gives them an airy look because this non-empirical or pure feature deprive them of being applicable to empirical objects. Therefore they must be brought down to earth. That is to say, they must be enabled to be applicable to objects. The transcendental schema enables a category to apply to objects. Schemata in this way bring categories down to earth.

All the concepts — whether pure or empirical — must be homogeneous with the instances or intuition which are supposed to fall under them. If there is no such homogeneity the concept would be of no worth at all. Kant observes that empirical concepts have homogeneity with their instances. Categories, on the other hand, appear to have nothing in common with the sensible intuitions which are to be subsumed under the former. How is the subsumption which will go to make the categories meaningful possible? Kant answers this question by saying that, "there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand, with the category, and on the other hand, with the appearance and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in ont respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. "Such a representation is the transcendental schema."2

Thus transcendental schema serves to link the categories with objects and thereby supplies a reference, a meaning to the former. The very term "schema" suggests the function that it performs Weldon holds that a schema is simply a plan or design such as the ground plan or elevation of a building and may be thought of as mediating between the general idea 'house' and a particular construction of bricks and mortar. The same function of mediation is done by it in the realm of categories.

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must be satisfied if concepts are to be applied correctly. If a man learning English knows that 'being a dog' implies 'being a mammal' he knows the non-referential rules governing these concepts. He knows their logical grammar but not their referential rules. Non-referential rules require the referential rules which make the former applicable to intuition. Kantian categories derived in the metaphysical deduction are the non-referential rules and the transcental schema functions as a referential rule making the former applicable to sensible intuition.

In his endeavour to find out transcendental schema, Kant looks towards time which is the form of sensibility. Being an a priori form of intuition it is pure and therefore it is homogeneous with the pure categories. Being itself an intuition, it is empirical and is therefore homogeneous with the appearances. So this dual character of time makes it fit for being a transcendental schema. A question may be asked here, why does Kant not take space which also fulfills both the above mentioned requirements. The reason for not making space the transcendental schema and for making time the same may be as follows. Whereas space is the form of outer sense and therefore only external objects pass through it, time is the form of inner sense through which not only external objects but the internal objects also pass. Thus time is the formal condition of all phenomena in general, not only of the external phenomena but of the internal phenomena as well.

Kant refers this transcendental schema to the transcendental determination of time. He does not make clear as to what he means by this phrase. He may be taken to mean by it "not a determination or characteristic which must belong to objects so far as they are temporal and are combined in one time." This transcendental determination of time is homogeneous with the categories in so far as it is universal and it rests on a priori rule. It is homogeneous with the appearance in as much as all empirical intuitions occur and last in time. This transcendental determination of time is thus a mediating representation between the categories and the appearance and makes the subsumption of the latter under the former or the application of the former to the latter possible.

Kant makes a distinction between an image and a schema both and percentagues with the control of the control of

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not be confused with a picture or image. A schema enables us to form an image of the concept but it is not itself an image. An image is particular whereas a schema is universal. If we think of '1', '2', '3', '4', '5' we get an image of number 5. But if we think of number in general by which we can form an image not only of number five but of any number whatsoever, we have a schema and not an image. So we see that a schema is a universal procedure of producing objects i. e. images of different kinds. According to Kant, there are three things — concept, schema and image. It is by means of schema that we get the image of the concept. Kant says,

"This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in producing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept."

Kant considers the difference between schema and image not in relation to categories but in relation to empirical and mathematical concepts. An image cannot render the universality of a concept possible. It is the schema which does so. Since schema is a rule by which different images are constructed it can realise all the possibilities that a concept (e. g. that of a triangle) may have (whether it is right angled or obtuse angled). An image on the other hand, can realise only one of these possibilities.

Prof. Paton observes that the transcendental schemata are the necessary charactristics of objects which must be had by them if they are to be categorized. Transcendental schemata are the universal characteristics which must belong to objects as objects in time. "These universal characteristics belong to objects, not as given in sensation, but as combined by the transcendental synthesis of imagination in one time." Transcendental schemata are the ways in which objects are to be combined.

Necesary succession e. g. is a characteristic of objects in so far as they change in time. It is their characteristic not as they are given in sensation. It is rather imposed upon them, by the transcendental synthesis of imagination. It is by virtue of this characteristic that the application of the pure category of ground and consequent to phenomena becomes possible. As such, the pure category of ground and consequent is empty. It is only when we see this category in the light of the fact that objects succeed in one time that we know that cause (ground) General Confection that (concequence).

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KANT'S SCHEMATISM OF CATEGORIES

In other words, the pure category of ground and consequent becomes the schematized category of cause and effect.

Kant, as has been pointed out, maintains that the categories applied and restricted to the transcendental schema of time or as one writer has put it, 'sunk in time' become schematized categories. Thus the category of ground and consequent added by the transcendental schema of necessary succession becomes the schematized cateogry of cause and effect. A difficulty here inevitably comes up. As Kant never uses the phrase 'schematized category', should he be supposed to have identified the schematized category with the transcendental schema? Or as the names given by him to different schemata are different from the names given to different schematized categories, should the supposed identification be regarded as implausible? Prof. Paton maintains the latter view and in fact this seems to be in conformity with the intentions of Kant. Transcendental schema, according to Prof. Paton, is that element in the schematized category which is lacked by the pure unschematized category. In addition to this element of transcendental schema, the schematized category possesses the element of pure category also and this element is lacked by the transcendental schema and therefore it cannot be identified with the schematized category.

Kant himself appears very emphatic against the supposed identification when he says,

"Now there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding, even after elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of representations."

The category of cause and effect e. g. which is a schematized category does have the logical element of the pure category of ground and consequent. Thus schematized category may be said to be an addition of pure category and transcendental schema. Prof. Paton takes into consideration the traditional definition of substance according to which substance is regarded (a) as the ultimate subject of all predicates (b) as the permanent substratum of change. Paton observes,

"The first (i. e. "A") Kant derives from the form of judgement. The second is given in the transcendental schema and is derived from the synthesis of the manifold in time and space"? Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Kant, as has already been shown, makes a three-fold division of concept, schema and image. Concept, according to Kant, is universal and image is particular. What is the status of schema? Whether it is universal or particular? As regards this question, Kant is very enigmatic. Some of his remarks can be interpreted to mean that schema is universal and some of them can be construed to suggest that schema is particular. We shall engage ourselves in this problem here.

When Kant contrasts schema with an image he maintains that the former is a rule for the construction of the latter and therefore whereas the former is universal, the latter is particular. He seems to have identified the transcendental schema with the empirical concept in as much as the former is regarded by him as a rule of synthesis which, according to him, is the functional definition of a concept. This identification of a schema with the empirical concept yields an undesirable consequence. If this identification is done, the very purpose of introducing schema as mediator between the concept and an image would be ignored. Because of this undesirable consequence commentators of Kant have tried to give a different interpretation of the conception of schema. They have held that schema is a monogram. It is a schematic image which represents the concept. As an image is particular, a schema can be denfied as a particular representing a universal. "This definition of the schema" says Swing "sounds almost like Berkelean definition of an abstract idea."8

We have seen as to how two mutually opposed interpretations have been made of Kant's conception of schema. One interpretation regards it as a universal rule for constructing particular images. Another interpretation regards it as a particular image representing a universal concept. In view of these conflicing views about Kant's conception of schema some students of Kant have maintained that the two opposed views express two characteristics of schema which can be upheld at the same time. Thus, says Swing, "the schema has come to be understood to be an image (or a particular) which represents a concept (or a universal) that functions as a rule of synthesis."

This interpretation too is unacceptable. According to this interpretation, schema is a symbol or monogram representing a rule of synthesis. But Kant does not ascribe this symbolic function of Country of the symbolic function of Country of the symbolic function of Country of the symbolic function of the symbolic function

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In view of above views which are not satisfactory and are mutually incompatible, another interpretation is given which appears to do justice to Kant's intentions. According to this interpretation, Kant entertained two definitions of schema, instead of one. Corresponding to two definitions of schema, two names of schema are also given — image schema and concept schema. "The image schema means the schema that is an image or particular representing a concept or universal; the concept schema means the schema that is a concept or universal functioning as a rule of synthesis." A particular triangle that represents all the triangles or the concept of triangle is the image schema of triangle. The rule for constructing particular triangles is the concept schema. We may note here that the image schema corresponds to Heidegger's schema-image. 10

Kant, it may be noted, does not give as many schemata as there are categories. All the categories do not have schemata corresponding to them. Each category of relation as well as of modality has a schema. That is to say, there are three schemata for relational categories and three for modal categories. But there is only one schema for the categories of quantity and one for the categories of quality.

The schema of the category of quantity or magnitude is number. The determination of the quantity of a thing implies measurement. And measurement implies the determination of the units that a thing has. This measurement shall remain incomplete if the units that are homogeneous are not successively added. This successive addition of homogeneous units is nothing but the act of counting. In the process of counting, the schema of number is produced. All objects, according to Kant, in so far as they are spatial and temporal must have number or to put it differently, must be numerable because space and time being homogeneous, all the objects in space and time are known by means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination which successively synthesises the homogeneous parts of space and time.

Kant's description of number is full of ambiguities. He says, "Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuitionalist Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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ting bolic By regarding number as the unity of the synthesis...., Kan seems to identify number with counting or with the unity of the act of counting. As a matter of fact, number itself is a synthetic unity produced by the successive addition of homogeneous units or a unity comprehending in a whole the successive addition of homogeneous units. As regards the second half of Kant's above statement, it may be said that time is generated not only in the act of counting but in every mental act. Therefore the mere fact that I generate time in counting cannot be a reason for regarding number a schema.

The schema of the category of quality is degree. Kant calls it 'sensation in general'. But this seems misleading as Kant dos not mean only sensation but rather the degree of sensation or sensation having degree. Kant believes that the bare forms of space and time devoid of any content give us no knowledge. They require to be filled in by some material. This material is sensation The affirmation of a thing or being in space and time is found in sensation. The negation of a thing or non-being is signified by empty space and empty time. Every sensation, according to Kant involves the notion of degree. It cannot always remain the same Its intensity is subject to getting more and getting less. of colour red e. g. is sometimes less bright and sometimes more and thereby involves the notion of degree. The cateory of realing refers to being in time or filled time. The category of negation makes a reference to not being in time or empty time. The category of limitation "rests upon the distinction of one and the same time as filled and as empty."

Besides quantity and quality, an object of experience must have a position in space and time. This position is determined by the relation that an object has with others. There are three schemata of the categories derived from the relational judgements. Each relational category has its corresponding schema. Thus the schema corresponding to the category of substance is 'permanence of the real in time.' The concept of substance involves the notion of something abiding and invariable underlying continuous flux. Substance refers to something that is non-transitory ambiguated appearances.

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# KANT'S SCHEMATISM OF CATEGORIES

it is nothing but rule-governed succession. The schema of the category of community is rule-governed co-existence of the determinations of different substances.

Agreement or compatibility with the general conditions of time is the schema of the category of possibility. Existence in some determinate time is the schema of the category of actuality. If a thing is to be brought under the category of actuality, it must have the characteristic of being existent in some determinate time. Necessity implies being for all times. So the schema of the category of necessity is "existence of an object at all times".

Prof. Paton has attached a great deal of importance to Kant's doctrine of schematism. He says,

"If we reject his derivation of the categories, this chapter acquires a new and special importance; it suggests the possibility of making fresh start, and of justifying the categories from the nature of time without any reference to the forms of judgment." 13

On the other hand, this doctrine of Kant has been subjected to severe criticism. Not to say of the solution, the very problem for which Kant introduces the conception of schematism is questioned. It may be argued that the very problem of schematism, that since categories and empirical intutions are hetrogeneous there is required a mediator to link the two, is absurd. To have concepts implies their way of application. To have inapplicable concepts is a contradiction in terms.<sup>14</sup>

Kant, indeed makes the problem appear as something highly artificial when he says that this problem is not in relation to empirical concept as, to follow Bennett "a general empirical concept is not worrifyingly hetrogeneous from a highly specific empirical concept. A question arises as to what it is for a highly general concept to be homogeneous with a highly specific concept which falls under it. Bennett exposes the artificiality of the problem quite beautifully,

"The concept of a dog (an empirical concept) is homogeneous with the concept of a loyal though bad tempered borzoi with an off white coat and bad teeth, in the sense that the former concept is included in the latter. But then the category of substance, say is in that sense homogeneous with I. P. Q... CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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the concept of a substance which is spherical, orange coloured, sweet tasting and rich in vitamin C. So what is the problem?"15

Warnock who treats the problem of schematism quite sympathetically offers another interpretation. According to Warnock when Kant says that empirical concepts are homogeneous with their instances what he means is that they (concepts) are sensible muite emp characteristics of a thing and therefore they can be applicable without the introduction of a third thing. Warnock says,

"I think Kant's point is only that the roundness of a (an empirical concept) is sensible (intuition) characteristic of it. I can see that a thing is round, and can be taught to use 'round' by having round things pointed out to me"16

Such is not the case with categories like causality, possibility etc. Warnock further says,

"'This is the cause' is not like 'This is the foot ball'; a possible President does not at the moment of electoral triumph, lose one characteristic, possibility and acquires a new one, actuality, what is referred to by . . . . 'cause', or 'possible', is in no case a thing I can look at, point to, 'intuit' . . . . "17

Kant is criticized by Joseph for maintaining that the universal concept in order to be applicable to particular intuitions must be in some way like the letter.18 If this is held, then in that case another universal concept resembling particular intuitions would be required and this will give rise to the fallacy of infinite regress. Thus Kant's doctrine of schematism is subjected to criticism in the same way as Plato's theory of ideas was subjected to criticism by Aristotle's 'third man' argument.19

Joseph takes Kant to mean that particular plates are said to be subsumed under universal circularity. He refuses to accept that there is any resemblance whatsoever, between a round plate and circularity. Joseph further says that Kant should not have forgotten the fact that mathematician is concerned not with circularity but the circul larity but with perfect circles (or another imperfect circle) that a plate can be homogeneous with.

Prof. A. H. Smith makes a criticism of the above contention of Josephc-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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"Now if we cannot exclude all reference to universals in describing the study of the mathematician, Kant's account may be preferable to Joseph's and it seems indeed that Joseph misses an important point which Kant is trying to

To sum up, we may discuss the opinion of Walsh who says sensible wite emphatically,

"The uncommitted reader may still find both problem and solution here artificial."21

both the problem as well as the solution given in the chapter on hematism, says Walsh, are based on certain assumptions. The st assumption that Kant makes is that there are categories and they can be plausibly shown to play a part in human thinking. we challenge Kant on this point, he will quote certain ategorical principles like "nothing happens without a cause". the second assumption made by Kant is that there can be nothing mept the logical notions at the root of the categories. He defends his assumption by saying that understanding is discursive or ntellectual and not intuitive. By such an argument, he gives he impression of asking an opponent to show what the origin of categories is, if it is not pure logic. It has been taken for granted y Kant that logic does not vary with content and is in no sense mpirical. Kant does not try to justify this contention. lew we may observe, is challenged by modern writers like Quine nd Waismann.

However critical we may be of Kant's formulation of the doctrine of schematism, we shall not and we cannot disagree with Walsh when he says,

"The fact remains that if categories are to have a genuine use, we must be able to show how they make an empirical difference or have empirical effects or (which comes to the same thing) have an empirical cash value. The importance of the doctrine of schematism is that it tries to do precisely this, and in a measure at least succeeds in doing it."22

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Shailesh Behari Mishra

#### NOTES

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## : Macro THE ALLEGED DUALITY IN SUSANNE LANGER'S AESTHETICS: A REASSESSMENT

George Al The purpose of this paper is:

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- (i) to explore the alleged duality in Susanne Langer's aesthetical theory, said to be traceable to her use of the terms, "symbol" and "virtual":
- (ii) to attempt a refutation thereof; and
- ii) to argue that both these key terms in her writing are not merely complementary to each other, but make for one single coherent viewpoint central to her theory of art.

ton India A good way to begin would be to restate, briefly, Samuel Bufford's remarks on Susanne Langer's asthetics in his essay in Pure Resulthe Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1972). He contends that there is no necessary connection between the two key terms her aesthetical writing viz. "symbol" and "virtual"; and that utledge whey make for two separate theories of art, — the expression and the perceivability theories.

Let me begin by considering how Mr. Bufford interprets the ress, 1966 wo terms. The term "symbol" is for him the key concept of what he regards as) the "expression theory". Indeed, he outlines he latter around Langer's use of the term "unconsummated ymbols" for works of art, and by concentrating on that part of (Oxford her theory which (according to him) says that :

"In art, feeling is expressed symbolically,.... Works of art are symbols because they have the same kinds of elements and relations, or the same forms, as the processes of feeling." (p. 10, my italics).

In this context, however, Mr. Bufford also refers to Mrs. langer's view that works of art, as distinct from the ordinary manner of language, have a non-discursive form; and that they articulate what discursive language cannot, — that is, "the subjective aspects of experience." (p. 10).

Unlike the "expression theory" which explains "how the arts are alike", the "perceivability theory", Mr. Bufford holds, is brought by Mrs. Langerini Public Demain Growwith Info Collection! Handlist inctive about each realm of art". He further resolves the "perceival theory" into two parts:

"The first is the contention that works of art are not like other things in the world around us. The second is a presentation of the aspect of experience that each of them makes 'more perceivable'. The two parts need not go together; the first might have been presented as an addition to the expression theory....The second part is thus the heart of the theory, and I shall argue that it is different from the expression theory, and that neither implies or requires the other." (p. 10; italics mine)

Before, however, I weigh Mr. Bufford's arguments as to alleged separability of the "two" theories, I think it is needful examine the validity of the distinction he draws within the "per vability theory" itself. Here, where he equates the virtual character of works of art with their being "a vision, a form or an image I have nothing to complain. Nor do I disagree with his remarkate each art (according to Mrs. Langer) is distinguished by a "primary illusion". But where he takes the next step of suggests that their being an image or illusion means (in her view), that was of art "do not have material existence" (p. 11)<sup>2</sup> I find it differ to acquiesce. And my difficulty is here heightened by his sweeps manner. Thus see:

"A second way, Langer thinks, works of art are different is they do not have material existence, while other things do (F.F., p. 47). We abstract the appearances of such things as buildings and pots from their material existence to consider them as work of art. She says each appearance then becomes a vision, a form, or an image." (p. 11)

Mr. Bufford here seems to ascribe to Mrs. Langer the vithat a work of art results from the mere process of emptying so object of its content. But, if this is so, what would he say of mis which has nothing to do with the corporeality of objects?

Further, before we turn to see whether Mrs. Langer actual says (categorically) that works of art do not have material existence we may wonder as to what could Mr. Bufford suggest by says that Mrs. Langer denies "material existence" to works of at Surely, he cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" in Public Marriager Corpused Caroni Collection Haridway no one cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" on one cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" on one cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" on one cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" on one cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" and the cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that works of art have "material existence" are cannot be said to imply that

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SUSANNE LANGER'S AESTHETICS : A REASSESSMENT

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The real test, however, is the evidence of text. Does Mrs' Langer actually say that works of art "do not have material existence?" Mr. Bufford, we have seen, appeals to p. 47 of Feeling and Form.<sup>3</sup> But there the actual words run as under:

"How can a work of art that does not represent anything—a building, a pot, a patterned textile—be called an image? It becomes an image when it presents itself purely to our vision, i. e. as a sheer visual form instead of a locally and practically related object." (FF. p. 47; italics mine)

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"An image is, indeed, a purely virtual 'object'. Its importance lies in the fact that we do not use it to guide us to something tangible and practical, but treat it as a complete entity with only visual attributes and relations. It has no others; its visible character is its entire being." (FF, p. 48; italies mine).

Now, to my mind, what is stressed in these passages simply is that works of art are different from other things in this sense that whereas the "existence" of other things can be, that of works of art cannot be regarded as a matter of practical serviceableness. A work of art "exists" only in the sense that when contemplated it is given to us as a self-complete autonomous form or image.

It is here necessary to add that Mrs. Langer uses terms such as "image", "form" etc. in senses quite different from their common meanings. In common parlance an 'image' is an image of something other than itself. In the contemplation of an art object, on the other hand, the image so formed is itself the work of art, and seems self-complete.

Perhaps all that Mrs. Langer could here be accused of is that many common terms — such as, "image", "form", "vision" — are given in her writing a quite uncommon range and meaning. But this hardly justifies Mr. Bufford's imputing to Mrs. Langer a view which is not really hers. It seems to me that what prevents Mr. Bufford from seeing Mrs. Langer's real view is his inability to clearly realize why she speaks of art as "virtual". The term 'virtual" in question is put forth in answer to the searching query CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

as to what is that which each art creates. Is what art creates merely material? An affirmative answer would here be clearly improper. For, art objects like sonatas and lyrics are not 'things' in the popular sense of the word. Nor is my protest confined to music and poetry. I quite see the presence of the material in painting, sculpture and architecture. But it is no less obvious that what is here created is no such thing as could be properly called merely or even essentially material. This may be brought out as follows:

The stone is there even before the sculpture comes into being. And so are the pigments and the canvas in relation to the painting. If this is so, how can art be said to *create* the material. How can the same thing (say, stone) which existed before, and has continued through the making of the sculpture be regarded as itself a "creation"? What is in fact created (and is new) is the pure form or image that the finished sculpture is for both the artist and the contemplator. This does not, however, warrant a rebound to the extreme view, which Mr. Bufford ascribes to Mrs. Langer, that the sculpture is utterly *immaterial*. No one denies the material in art; and the least of all, Mrs. Langer. All that she implies by (or openly says about) the "virtual" in the context of art is that the material medium, if any, does not obtrude itself upon the contemplating eye as a distinct and self-complete something. This is, I believe, amply borne out by her following utterance:

"Every work of art is wholly a creation; it does not have illusory and actual elements commingling in it. Materials are actual, but art elements are always virtual; and it is elements that an artist composes into an apparition, an expressive form." (P. A., p. 42)

'Sunflowers', no one proceeds to smell or touch them, as we may do in the case of actual flowers, for a fuller feel of their material existence. Mrs. Langer, therefore, distinguishes a work of art from a mere material object on the one hand, and from an experience of optical illusion, on the other. Space, a feature of materiality, may well emerge in a painting. But here it is "virtual space", as opposed to the space which things actually occupy; and this "virtual space", according to her, "is the primary illusion of all snoh art." (P. A. p. 36)

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is obviously different from optical illusion. The extent of Mr. Bufford's opposition to "illusion" in the context of art is hardly proper. For Mrs. Langer herself realizes that "illusion is a prejudicial word", and that we would do well to replace it with "apparition" (P. A., p. 81).

A work of art differs from other things precisely because "its visible character is its entire being". It makes perceivable to us the felt aspect of the world around us. Aesthetic contemplation of a work of art calls for attention to the total perceptual or visible form; and in this it differs from our common attitude to everday objects.

Mr. Bufford also argues that there is no necessary relation between "expressions of feelings" and their being made "wholly perceivable". His wonder is here a protest:

"Why should expressions of feelings make them wholly perceivable, and not hide somewhat their structure?" (p. 16, italics in the text).

But, I ask, in what precise sense does he here use the word "expression"? Mrs. Langer, it is known, makes a clear distinction between mere symptomatic expression and expression which is symbolic. Mr. Bufford, on the other hand, seems to think of expression as merely symptomatic. Thus, see his following words:

"Is it not natural for our feelings to hide some of their aspects from us, just as do things in the world around us? We repress feelings when we are afraid of showing them or admitting them to ourselves." (p.16).

But, even if attention be confined to expression which is merely symptomatic, the link between expression and perceivability seems pretty close. True, a shy person represses a part of his feeling. But, along with the part of feeling expressed, is not repressing itself quite manifest or perceivable? What otherwise would be the difference between a person's *looking* shy and his merely being reticent? In fact, the more perceivable the act of "repressing" in such cases, the more clearly expressed will be the shyness of the person.

This brings me to the other, more relevant aspect of feeling conceived as a form and represented in art as a symbol. The wish to make binath sulfall kanga Collection, the only true

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way to express feeling in art effectively is first to duly apprehend the form or internal structure of a feeling as felt in life and then to make an analogous form which, by its very perceptual character, would appear as a symbol of the feeling. Mrs. Langer insist that the art object is a symbol, though not in the sense of being? substitute for something other than itself. The art symbol is a autonomous whole in which the details or the parts are held as on: in an organic relationship. The internal cohesion represents, in structure, the organic form of a feeling. It is only in this sens that art can be said to be essentially expressive. Mrs. Langer further holds that the "more perceivable" the form of the art work appears, the richer and clearer is the conception of forms of life feelings it symbolizes. What is viewed in the work of art is an "image" of feeling; and, it is because of its heightened perceivability that this image not only invites, but holds attention. an image or expressive, and being perceivable go together. Tok able to function as a symbol, the work of art has to possess a high degree of perceivability, so that it may be able to invite attention to details and their disposition in structure. Such is the magic of the perceptual form of art that the mere material medium in which it is created aquires the semblance of a "living" thing. In our experience of art the felt living character of the work eclipsed the gross materiality of the medium; and it is this creative transformation of the merely material into a living form that is mean when we speak of art as "illusion". I may here clarify (what I should have done earlier) that, as opposed to a common care of illusion where a thing is not what it appears to be, the work of art is an "illusion" in the sense that what it appears to be - that is, a living form — is its reality as art.

Now, by showing that the concept of "illusion" in Mr. Langer's theory is not necessarily independent of the "expression theory" I have brought out by implication, I believe, the untendibility of Mr. Bufford's thesis as to the independent and mutually exclusive parts within what he terms the "perceivability theory, for that part of this theory which heightens the differentness of affrom everyday things he himself regards as a mere addition to the expression theory. It follows, therefore, that the alleged dichotomy of the "two philosophies of art" is not really there in Mrs. Langer's in the concept of the theory which heightens the differentness of the expression theory. It follows, therefore, that the alleged dichotomy of the "two philosophies of art" is not really there in

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Using the abbreviations e. t and p. t for "expression theory" and "perceivability theory", respectively — and p. 1, p. 2 for the two parts of the p. t — I may summarize my argument thus:

According to Bufford, p. 1 can be taken as an extension of e. t; p. 2 on the other hand, is really the heart of p. t; therefore, e. t and (the essence of) p. t are independent of each other. I have shown, on the other hand, that no rigid distinction between p. I and p. 2 is possible; that p. 2 is, in fact, inseparable from p. 1; that p. 1 and p. 2 can both go well with e. t; and that therefore, e. t and p. t are not two distinct philosophies, but complementary parts of the same theory.

The way is now paved for a frontal attack on the 'duality' Mr. Bufford sees in Mrs. Langer's theory. Here the crux of his protest is that the two concepts of "symbol" and "virtual" have no link between them, and that they rather "lead us to concentrate our attention on different aspects of works of art, and thus to perceive them differently". (p. 19). I at once rejoin that the argument has two clear defects: First, it just misses the difference between symbol and symptom. Second, the *logical* distinction between a symbol and its import is here misconstrued as a *fact* of aesthetic contemplation. With these as my main grounds of protest, let me now turn to the details of Mr. Bufford's argument.

- 1. He contends that "tensions and resolutions" which (according to Mrs. Langer) are the "forms of feeling" should be perceivable in "things" and not in space; and that such forms of feeling have nothing to do with the *spatial* tensions and resolutions in a painting. Now, Mrs. Langer admits that tensions and resolutions may also be manifest in "things" say, in the faces of figures in a painting. But she adds forthwith that such expressiveness is merely symptomatic, and not the symbolic import which the full picture possesses as art. What I would here like to emphasize is that Mrs. Langer's theory of "expressiveness" applies as much to representational as to non-objective or abstract painting; that in abstract painting "tensions and resolutions" are not mirrored in human faces, which are here not present at all; and that, therefore, Mr. Bufford's view in question does not cover the whole range of art.
- 2. As for dance, Mr. Bufford says that to be an expressive art-form Gtoshowhic Benedicted and the confidence of the conf

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illeged iere in forces"; (p. 18) and that since the forces here made visible are in fact not psychic — but are rather "the powers of darkness, military power, the realm of demons, spirits and gods, important social activities such as birth, marriage, and death" what is made visible cannot be regarded as an expression of feeling. To this I react in two clear protests:

First, here again Mr. Bufford confuses artistic "expression" with mere symptomatic expression. Mrs. Langer, I may add, insists that what a dance expresses is only the "imagined feeling in its appropriate physical form. The conception of a feeling disposes the dancer's body to symbolize it." (FF, p. 181, italics in the text).

Second, as to the relative unimportance of (direct) self-expression in dance, Mrs. Langer's following words put the matter beyond doubt:

...the mystic force that works by remote control, establishing its own subsidiary centres in the bodies of the dancers, is even more effectively *visible power* than the naturalistic appearance of self-expression on the stage. (*FF.* p. 181, italics in the text).

The "mystic force" here — the force that determines and organizes the movements of the dance — is the conception of the dance, the dancer's imagination of the *felt* aspect of (say) darkness, gods etc. What a work of art expresses is not *raw feeling*, but "an idea of feeling"; the latter is what the dancer makes visible to the knowledgeable onlooker. (FF. p. 206).

3. An important strand in Mr. Bufford's protest runs around the conception of "form" in Langer's aesthetics:

"The expression theory emphasizes the form of the work, in the special sense that Langer understands 'form': tension and interactions between shapes in paintings, between characters in drama, between dancers in the dance.... The perceivability theory, on the other hand, does not emphasize so strongly the form of the work of art. The whole art work, it holds, makes perceivable for us our experience or the world around us. (p. 19).

Now, this account misses a vital part of what Mrs. Langer means by "forme.0. IF Bublic Domain, Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. IF Bublic Domain, Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. IF Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. IF Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Domain Gurukul Kangri Collection, Hardwar means by "forme.0. In Bublic Bublic

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of "not only a shape in space, but (of) a shaping of space — of all the space that... is given". (FF. p. 71). The meaning is that the spatial form created by the interaction between shapes in painting is at once an organisation of the totality of space which (I add) is surely perceivable. The "expressive form" of painting is the form of its total space; and its expressiveness lies in making its whole space perceivable. It is an "organic whole" in which the parts, — say, shapes in painting — do not become visible except in and through the total organization.

4. Finally, Bufford argues that what is made perceivable in a work of art is not feeling; and that therefore

"there is a more striking difference between the two theories when it comes to interpreting a work of art. For the expression theory, if we are to get at the heart of a work of art, we must discover the feeling structure that it exhibits. For the perceivability theory, we must discover what it makes more perceivable or understandable for us". (p. 19)

Here again, I hold, "feeling" has been taken to mean raw, occurrent feeling, and not its "form" or the way it is felt. To attend to the *idea* of feeling presented in the work is at once to attend to the *form*; and "form" is the way the feeling is articulated or made perceivable. The basis of Mr. Bufford's rigid distinction between "expression theory" and "perceivability" theory" is hence unsound

Having thus opposed Mr. Bufford's contention as to the presence of two different theories in Langer's aesthetics, I shall now state, briefly how the concept of "symbol" stands in relation to "virtual" in her theory of art. It would here be of help to attend to Mrs. Langer's following utterance:

"To keep virtual element and actual materials separate is not easy.... It takes precision of thought not to confuse an imagined feeling, or a precisely conceived emotion that is formulated in a perceptible symbol with a feeling or emotion actually experienced in response to real events... Yet there are such imaginary affects....those which we imagine as our own,..those which are imputed to fictitious characters in literature or seem to characterize the beings CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

portrayed in a picture or in a sculpture, and are therefore part and parcel of an illusory scene or an illusory self. And all these emotive contents are different from the feeling, moods or emotions, which are expressed in the work of art as such, and constitute its 'vital import'; for the import of symbol is not something illusory, but something actual that is revealed, articulated, made manifest by the symbol. Everything illusory, and every imagined factor...which supports the illusion, belongs to the symbolic form; the feeling of the whole work is the 'meaning' of the symbol". (FF., pp. 181-182 italics mine).

Langer here distinguishes the "virtual" in two ways: First, we are told, it is not actual but imagined or conceived (i. e. virtual) feeling which goes into the making of the art symbol. Secondly, whereas the completed art symbol is "virtual", its import is actual. To put the two as one, the "virtual" is either a character of the symbol or of something that goes into the making of the symbol; but the word cannot be ascribed to the import of the symbol. A work of art's elements, whatever be its import, are always "virtual"; but, just as essentially, the import itself is in every case actual. This view at once liberates the work from the constraint of reflecting actual feeling. Further, this is why even the right response to a work of art has to be one of the imagined rather than actual feeling. The danseuse too, as she creates a dance, does not express her own actually felt feelings. Nor is a painting the (symptomatic) "self-expression" of the artist's own feelings. Here, I may add, the symptomatic expressions visible in the painted characters are neither the actually experienced (because, they are imagined) feelings of the artist himself, nor that of the characters portrayed (because, either the characters are fictitious, or, if real or historical, their feelings are imagined). The art symbol, on the other hand, is not the imagined feeling as such that has gone into its making, but the way such imagined is made visible, i. e., the visible form. The "feeling" that emerges from this "way" or the "form" is what the total work of art is imbued with. It is the work's "vital import". The emergent feeling is organically related to the total form. In other words, aesthetic contemplation of the "form" cannot be done apart from opening up to its import. The form is at once self-expressive; that is collection, Harlowar

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import are in fact quite inseparable. Yet, a *logical* distinction between the two is necessary for a clear understanding of the role of the "virtual" in the arts. In painting, "the way the imagined feeling is made visible" is by creating "virtual space". In this sense, the "visible form" is the "virtual form", or the symbolic form.

In Langer's aesthetics, I conclude, the concept of "virtual" always goes along with the idea of symbol. She in fact even couples the two words and speaks of the "virtual" symbol. Nor is this coupling meaningless. It hints the truth that whereas the complete art symbol is virtual, its import is actual as revealed. (FF. p. 186).

Dept. of Philosophy University of Delhi Ranjan K. Ghosh

#### NOTES

- Samuel Bufford, "Susanne Langer's Two Philosophies of Art", in JAAC 31 (Fall 1972).
- 2. Bufford refers to p. 47 of Langer's Feeling and Form (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Lto., 1953) for support.
- 3. Hereafter, I shall use abbreviation FF for Langer's book: Feeling and Form, op. cit. and PA for her Problems of Art. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1.td., 1957).

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# FRED I. DRETSKE AND THE NOTION OF "DIRECT PERCEPTION"

## 1. Introduction

- 1.1. "Direct perception", is a key notion which occupies a significant place in the recent philosophy of perception. But Fred I. Dretske dismisses it cheaply in this way; "True enough. I cannot see my coffee cup directly; but neither can I see my own visual imagery directly. What is left? At this point one is inclined to say that the above definition introduces a vacuous concept: everything that we see, everything of which we are visually aware, is seen indirectly." Strengthening Dretske's stand point, David Hamlyn notes that if a perceptual belief "is to be analyzed in terms of belief or judgement, the regress must either go on ad infinitum (a very unsatisfactory idea) or it must come to a stop with a belief or judgement that has no basis (an equally unsatisfactory idea). If the latter is what immediate perception is, then either perception must ultimately lack a rationale and thus be arbitrary...."2 lintend to argue against the major contention implied in the above passages.
- 1.2 Like any other notion, "direct perception" too is a cloudy one. We intend to clarify its significance by investigating the application which the notion finds in various arguments held by recent perceptual philosophers and parapsychologists.

# 2. Sophisticated employment of the notion by Armstrong and Austin

2.1 Both Armstrong and Austin, on a wider realistic background, introduce the notion of "direct perception", of course, in a sophisticated way. This context is evidently made explicit by the following statement of Armstrong: "Since sense-impressions do not stand between us and our immediate knowledge of the world, our theory is a Direct realism." Closely resembling Armstrong's Austin contends, "....it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never directly "Audithornal Personal Range State Cutth, Harview-pheno-

menologywise-that "perception" is an immediate or direct affair, Though both of them dismiss sense-impressions (or sensedata) as mysterious entities lurking behind perception, the following question can be entertained without involving ourselves in contra-Cannot there be a state of affairs or states of affairs other than sense-impressions that may stand as grounds or bases of our perception? A positive answer to this question can be thought of which shall not be a philosophical error at all. Though Dretske believes that it shall introduce a vacuous concept, it is not the case If no philosophical error and contradiction are involved, theoretically speaking, a genuine problem stands to which a genuine answer too can be found. "Mediated perception" is not a vacuous concept at all. We hope to make explicit the idea in what follows.

## 3. Russell and Hirst on "direct perception"

3.1. Obviously, with reference to the notion of "direct perception" Russell once observed: "....that the whole theory as to the causes of sensation which are partly physical and partly physiological makes it unavoidable that we should regard "perception" as something less direct than it seems to be."5 Russellean position clearly demonstrates the meaningfulness of an argument developing on the notion of "direct perception" as against Dretske's manoeuvre. Needless to add that it being cemented by R. J. Hirst. According to Hirst, "....the conceptual processes involved in recognition, the selecting involved in priming and attention, the use of cues of of some degree of interpretation or imaginative enrichment, the influence of learning and past experience on the sensible character of what we see, the operation of the factors that produce object constancy—all these exclude simple confrontation with objects and reveal an immense complexity in perception not dreamt of by common sense."6

## 4. Parapsychology and "direct perception"

Paradoxically, enough, Hornell Hart reminds us that J. B. Rhine, the eminent parapsychologist in America concluded that the hypothesis of direct perception, beyond the physical senses as the only valid explanation concerning reports of parapsycholo gical research involving something like 3600000 trials. As in the case of telepathy and precognition, for instance, a person is believed to have an awareness of other people's of thoughts and of future

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events, respectively. But normal sensory perceptual mechanism together with stimuli bombardments, etc., do not mediate in these awarenesses. The notion of "extrasensory perception" (ESP) is often used to denote them. It is noteworthy that the notion of "direct perception" has a very different use, for instance in Parapsychology, comparatively to Armstrong or Austin or Russell or Hirst.

## 5. Norman Malcolm and "direct perception"

5.1 Norman Malcolm, following G. E. Moore, uses the notion "direct perception" to note a perception of the following sort: "A perceives B directly, if and only if there are some properties of B about which A cannot be mistaken." Malcolm's adoption though similar to Armstrong's yet, has its own qualifications. Armstrong does not speak about any mistake proof perception. To him "the immediate object of awareness is never anything but a physical existent which exists independently of awareness of it." The similarity is seen with reference to properties of objects perceived, say, physical property, at the least. The difference lies with reference to the quality of perception. To Malcolm, it is mistake proof, and, therefore, direct: to Armstrong, no mystenious entities lurk behind perception in the sense of a sort of mediation, and, therefore, direct.

## 6. A Critical examination of the argument of Dretske and Hamlyn

6.1 In the light of above uses of the notion "direct perception" by well known philosophers and parapsychologists, Dretske's attempt to reject the dialogue involving the notion of "direct perception", though stands as an alternative argument, yet, is unsuccessful. Dretske's attempt amounts to dismissing a philosophical dialogue on the notion of "direct perception"; for, to him, it introduces a vacuous notion—everything we perceive are perceived indirectly. Nevertheless, if we formulate the following—perception-occurrence', veridicalwise, depends upon other occurrences such as "sensing' and 'noticing', being basically different, phenomenologically on the one hand, and the environment and the physicality, ontologically, on the other. "Assuming them as veridicalwise, it follows by necessity that it being rendered impossible without them. Follows from it paradoxically enough, CC-0. In Public Domain Curukur Kangri Collection, Wally amough,

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in the lieved future is that 'perception-occurrence' is a mediated affair (conditioned affair) rather than a simple or direct one. The logical conclusion, therefore, seems that perception is, indirect." It's a serious philosophical error to see a kind of vacuity in this line of argument which genuinely attempts to lay bare the phenomenology, ontology and conceptuality of perception.8

- 6.2 David Hamlyn's objection to this line of thought seems developed on the wider contention—seeking a basis or a rationale concerning beliefs. This position needs some critical observation. Most direct realists on perception have made a distinction between perception and belief. Armstrong, a direct realist, very rightly claims that perceptions are not beliefs, and, thus a difference is made explicit, though it stands as a moot point. Hamlyn attempts to shift ground in this conncetion by emphasizing the need of a basis for the beliefs. Armstrong, in his own way, however, supplies the answer, though Hamlyn misses it; for the former's contention to the effect that perceptions are not beliefs, evidently suggests a basis for beliefs.
- 6.3 Paradoxically enough, Hamlyn's another point seems rooting out Armstrong's argument when the former stressed the lack of a rationale which leads to arbitrariness concerning perception. Alternatively speaking, beliefs have a basis— perception—but perception lacks a basis, and therefore arbitrary. But, then, why seeks a basis or rationale concerning perception? Does philosophy of perception exhaust itself if a basis or rationale concerning perception is not available? Alternatively, cannot there be meaningful reflections other than seeking a basis or rationale? Instead of involving in this sort of argument stressed by Hamlyn, a much more profitable one, indeed, is the dialectices of perception. Needless to add that its scope includes the phenomenology, ontology and conceptuality of perception.

#### 7. Conclusion

of or against "direct perception" gradually can take root. It is noteworthy that the notion is neither vacuous as Dretske maintains nor arbitrary as Hamlyn notes. Furthermore, the notion is not contradictory. It is tempting to say, however, that there is no single pattern governing the use of this notion each of which has its own mode of Pattivity in Gurullul Claristic Collection. Pallowarthe vacuity

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or contradictory nature or arbitrariness of the notion. To put the point yet more explicitly, entertaining 'perception' as a dependent-mediated affair or direct-simple affair, is not at all amount to an introduction of a vacuous notion. Russell, Hirst, Armstrong and Austin adopt a different line of thought which clearly suggests the meaningfulness of the notion "direct perception." The upshot of our brief analysis is the possibility of a genuine conceptual alternative concerning "direct perception."

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A.D.P. Kalansuriya

#### NOTES

- 1. Seeing and Knowing, Fred I. Dretske, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, p. 64.
- 2. The Theory of Knowledge, D. W. Hamlyn, Macmillan & Co., London, 1971, p. 185.
- 3. Perception and the Physical World, D. M. Armstrong, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960, p. 193.
- 4. Sense And Sensibilia, J. L. Austin, Oxford Paperbacks, 1964, p. 19.
- 5. My Philosophical Development, Bertrand Russell, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, p. 140.
- 6. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. LX., 1959-60; IVa - A Reply to Professor Mundle: R. J. Hirst., p. ii; (between p. 78 and p. 79.
- 7. Perception and the Physical World (op. cit., ) p. xi
- 8. I argue for these positions in my unpublished Ph. D. thesis entitled "'Perception': The Theoretical Impossibility of 'perception' as a direct affair," UC, 1973.
- 9. Perception and the Physical World (op. cit.,) p. 128 See also: Research Papers: Philosophy, A.D.P. Kalansuriya, Lake House Printers, Colombo, 1972, pp. 15-25.
- 10. The Theory of Knowledge (op. cit.,) p. 185.

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#### LOVE VERSUS IDENTITY

(In one of the last issues of *The Philosophical Quarterly* (39/2, July 1966) Prof. G. R. Malkani published an article entitled "Identity versus Love" (pp. 97-108). Circumstances have made it as it were the swansong of this convinced advaitin. It ought not to be forgotten for it is markedly characteristic of this fertile writer and able publisher who was ever eager to face upto philosophical challenges and welcomed any solid discussion. In order to honour him and to bridge over the regretted gap between the periodical with which he identified his intellectual career and its successor *The Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, I present the following critical reflections. When I sent them to him, he was kind enough to grant them some serious value and promised to published them. He would have, I trust, been glad to see here realised that promise which he himself was unfortunately prevented to fulfil).

In his article, Prof. Malkani tells us in the first place that "it is arguable that these two different ways, (namely, Identity and Love,) in which man can realise his highest destiny are not exclusive. At least the Advaitist thinks so... Most people are qualified to pursue the path of Love... Very few are qualified for the method of Identity... But the method of identity. may be preceded by love and also followed by it... There is a kind of super-love where love itself is fulfilled. Dualities of any kind do not obtain here; for the human has given place to the Divine " (97). This means obviously that in some mysterious and most elevated sense love finds its perfect realisation in Identity. Unfortunately, the rest of the article fails to clarify this important statement.

Prof. Malkani further records the repugnance of the followers of love for the philosophy of identity or advaita. This is due, he thinks, to "misunderstanding about the Advaitic position." The latter he intends to clarify but only after critically examining the other position, in which he includes Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and, in the vaguest way, Christianity.

"The dualist," he says, "may hold the view that God is the primary reality, and that God has created man and the rest of the universes" (26). In William and the whole the building the building of the little of th

whom Prof. Malkani has in mind as the dualist. It cannot be Madhva whose dualism denies creation. And, while the view referred to is Christian, its further understanding by Malkani takes no account of the precise doctrine of creation according to Christianity. It would in any case be misleading to designal. Christianity as dvaita when it is actually much closer to advaita (understood literally as non-dualism, not as monism) than to such declared forms of dvaita as Sankhya or Madhvism.

Whoever be this so-called dualist, Prof. Malkani finds difficulty with his view. For, while it is possible to conceive how the non-spiritual can be created (as posited—but in which sense he does not say—or perceived, or imagined as in a dream) "we have no instance within our experience which can make the creation of the spiritual meaningful to us. Whatever may be created, spirits are never created" (98). This is so because creation understood as self-communication of God's spiritual nature would imply, according to Malkani, that "the spirit of God is divisible into parts" (ibid). This is his great objection, and it would obviously be valid also against creation of the non-spiritual if this were understood similarly as a form of divine self-communication, but I doubt whether Malkani meant this when he said that the non-spiritual might possibly be posited by God.

His other objection concerns the created spirit. If it is created, it is finite and, if it is a soul, it is "enclosed within a body". Further, "most theistic systems conceive of the soul not as all-pervasive and universal, but as *atomic* in size and so indivisible. This is... a materialistic conception of it" (99). We may agree that those systems for which the soul is atomic in size are materialistic but most of the Western systems are innocent of this conception even when they agree that the soul is in some sense, not as spirit but as embodied spirit, located in space and time. Such systems also would be materialistic according to Prof. Malkani.

For Rāmānuja, the organic unity of soul and body in man constitutes the archetype according to which we may understand the unity of Lord and creation in the one Brahman. Apart from his own sāttvic body, the Lord has (through creation in the form of parināma or self-modification of that body) a hierarchy of other bodies: gross (prakṛti), subtle (the trans-migrating souls), and blissful (the liberated ones). Thus, "there is no soul (not even CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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the divine Atman or Lord) without a body and vice-versa. The two together constitute one organic unity. This conception of the individual soul is also, in our opinion, materialistic" (100). I agree here with Prof. Malkani that, if every spirit has to be embodied — even if only in a glorious body made of sattva-such a conception is materialistic, but I wish now to discuss his double objection.

Is it true that we materialize the spirit if we hold, on the one hand, that the divine Spirit can create limited spirits and, on the other hand, that such limited spirits can be embodied and thus in some sense located in time and space? I shall answer this question in the light of the teaching of saint Thomas Aquinas.

First of all, while admitting that no analogy from experience can equate divine creation, I contend that there do exist within our experience instances which can make the creation of the spiritual meaningful to us. There are, indeed, cases where new and limited spiritual realities are produced by the causal influence of a spiritual agent. For instance, a teacher who communicates his knowledge to pupils produces in their minds new and limited cognitions which are due to his causality as a spiritual agent. The analogy becomes even more striking if we suppose the teacher to be a perfect guru who out of pity enlightens an aspirant. The latter then comes to share in the perfect knowledge of his guru without in any way dividing, decreasing or increasing that perfect knowledge. It is, indeed, characteristic of a spiritual perfection that it can be participated without being divided into parts or affected in any way. The resulting participation depends ontologically on its spiritual cause without which it would not have come to exist and to be what it is and yet it is really distinct and finite. Its cause, on the other hand remains transcendent and independent of its effect which it has originated freely and not to fulfil any need of its own. This analogy, though very imperfect since the produced knowledge is not a subsistent reality but an endowment graciously vouchsafed to an already subsistent pupil, is yet relevant to show that the absolute lute Spirit can, without any inner division or change, produce freely other spirits, limited and dependent qua beings upon itself, and within which it will be most intimately immanant while retaining its perfect transcendence.

Another analogy is that of the man of science, say a mathematician, who conceives for the first time a geometrical figure CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Handwar

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such as the circle. This scientific conception is perfectly definite in contrast with the circles encountered in nature which never adequate it perfectly (for instance, their circumference can never be perfectly continuous and without breadth). It is, therefore not simply produced by them, but is a perfect idea whose mental existence and definite essence are rigorously due to the free conception of the spiritual agent by which and in which that idea exists. This analogy shows well how a piece of spiritual reality, in this case, an idea, can not only arise but also continue and even be reabsorbed in a consciousness to which it owes the whole of itself. But as an analogy it is more imperfect than the preceding one because the originated reality is, in this case, an accident which perfects the conscious mind in which it abides. But we could possibly conceive of a perfect mathematician for whom any such production of a definite figure would simply be an act of detailing his perfect intuitive (non conceptual) knowledge for the sake of communication. Other analogies, taken from the field of volition, could also be developed which could make us understand somehow the sovereign efficiency and freedom of a divine fiat ("let that arise") or command from the perfect Spirit. Thus, examples (as required by Indian logic) are not lacking to support the conception of creation out of nothing except the divine consciousness and will (which are identical in the Creator) without implying any materialisation of that creating Spirit.

As to the relation between creature and Creator, it is obviously not reciprocal. As Śankara says explicitly, "Brahman is the Atman of the universe, but the universe is not the Atman of Brahman' (Ved. Sūtra Bhāsya, 2,1,9). Aristotle and Aquinas may help us to understand this. According to their very elaborate theory of relation, whether a relation is true or not depends on the existence of a foundation of that relation; but whether it is real or only logical depends on whether that foundation is intrinsic to the related or extrinsic to it. Now the foundation required for the creature-Creator relation is the ontological novelty of the creature, a novelty which is intrinsic to the creature alone, since the Creator remains unchanged by his creation. Hence, that relation is real on the side of the creature but merely logical on the side of the Creator. (Just as the relation between knower and known is real in the knower insofar as he has changed by his act of knowing object of knowing o LOVE

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tance way d Advait there i man o (Satya and th of it. as rece by ther are not Fulnes As crea though the fa many charac and, ev poses : into a Cause of the can be used to by becoming known). The relation, therefore, which ensues from creating neither really affects nor materializes the Creator.

As to the question whether a created spirit can be intrinsically embodied, it offers no unsurmountable logical difficulty. Once we admit, according to the above explanations, that created spirits are possible as partial and imperfect participations which totally depend qua beings on the absolute Spirit, it is natural that they should form a hierarchy of specifically different degrees of finite spirituality which may range from bodiless to embodied spirits. The ontology and epistemology of the former (called "separated" finite substances, or angels in the Western tradition) has been fully elaborated in the Christian treatises of angelology; whereas the philosophical treatment of the embodied or human soul-spirits is the object of philosophical psychology.

To conclude this whole question, we may say that the acceptance of the reality of creation as delineated above does in no way detract from a strict adherence to the essentials of advaita. Advaita does not mean monism but non-dualism. It asserts that there is only one independent Absolute, which is the nirguna Brahman or incomplex God, the Fulness of Reality Knowledge-Infinite (Satyam-Jñānam-anantam), Bliss (Ānanda), Power (Śakti), etc., and that no other being is absolute or ontologically independent of it. While created beings can be susbstances (saguna dravya), as recognised by Sankara, they can never be a se (existing simply by themselves, as the Absolute, whose essence is to be). Yet they are not divine accidents, for they do not add anything to the creating Fulness, but are freely produced participations of that Fulness. As creatures endowed with a spiritual soul, we are born in ignorance though meant to achieve omniscience. We naturally begin with the false conception of ourselves and material objects as so absolute independent beings. This innate ignorance characterised by dvaita, superimposes absoluteness upon the relative and, even when it conceives of a supreme Being or God, it superimposes upon it the characters of the relative and individualises it into a saguna Brahman. But the search for the supreme and total Cause of ourselves and the universe can lead us to the knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman independently of which no other being be properly conceived or exist. While in our ignorance we used to conceived or exist. White the conceivent his is the conceivent his is operated to conceive the second of exist.

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or a body of the Absolute it is now seen that such thinking was adhyāsa or false superimposition. With regard to the Absolute the finite is not a visesa or a visesana, i. e., a differentiating element or addition, but an upādhi, i. e., a fictitious affix. This does not mean that it has not got all the imparted reality which a creature can receive but that it adds nothing to the Fulness. The finite (alpa) cannot increase the infinite (Bhūman). Being only a dependent participation and reflection, not a real part (amsa) of, or an addition to, the Absolute, it can be compared to a magic transformation which leaves the magician unchanged, or a bounteous dream which does not enrich the dreamer. The point of such comparisons is, however, not to dispel the dependent reality of creatures (as in Buddhism) but to maintain the transcendence of the Creator.

This advaita is expressed in the statement Tattvamasi (Tha thou art) of which the second part of Prof. Malkani's article recalls the impeccable Śankarian exegesis. This interpretation unveils the literal meaning of the text (understood within its proper context) by a clear recourse to the jahad-ajahal-laksanā of its three terms. This laksana (indication of the special secondary meaning intended in the sentence) is jahad (destructive, negative) of all the purely mundane connotations of the terms, and ajahad (retentive) of the svārtha or essential meaning of those terms which it elevates transcendentally above all understanding corresponding to worldly experience. Thus explained the sentence means that the purified and elevated "thou", i. e., the inner, unchanging Root-Cause, ruling Antaryamin, illumining sākṣin, and supreme Ātman of Svetaketu (or any man) is by pure identity (are not in any relational sense) the purified and slovated "that", i. e., the inner, unchanging Root-Cause and Lord of all that can be pointed out as "that", in short, of the whole universe. In other terms, my supreme Aman (attainable through retrogressive inner search down to the very root of my being) is the supreme Brahman. Or, in the terms of saint Augustine, "thou art, O God, more interior to me than my innermost and superior to my uppermost." It is not I as the experior riencer who am Brahman but Brahman is the Atman of this and every other experiencer: Atmā sa bhokturiti (note the genitive), so Sankara expresses it pithily in Ved. Sūt. Bhāays, 1,1,1 when defining the OVinduntic Domacn Edrukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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The kind of unity which links the experiencer (bhoktr) with his supreme (Ātman is called tādātmya ("having-that-as-ātman"). This cannot mean here identity pure and simple but can only designate the kind of unreciprocal relation which binds an effect to its innermost and total Cause (upādāna, a term often mistranslated as material cause-how can the pure Cit be a material cause?—and better rendered by Malkani as substantival cause; I, however, prefer to say immanent or inner cause). It is the tightest kind of unity, short of pure identity, since it subjects the whole being quabeing to the total Cause which penetrates it most intimately as the Planitude imbibes the totality of each one of its participations.

However, this unity can become even more perfect. It can, indeed, be merely "existing" me (to use 'exist' in an active sense) as unrecognised causality or it can become fully recognised by Between these two extremes lies the domain of my spiritual love for God. This domain is animated by the dynamism of my Brahma-jijnāsā or intellectual thirst for God. This is a desire for a supreme experience, for "a knowledge which culminates in comprehension" (avagati-paryantam jñānam), since "the comprehension of Brahman is, indeed, the end of man" (Brahmavagtirhipurusarthah), as Śankara writes in Ved. Sut. Bh., 1, 1, 1. But he also recognises that no word, concept or manovrtti can be the means of such a realisation of Brahman, yato vāco nivartanta aprapya manasa saha (wherefrom words recede, together with the mind, not having attained it: Taittiriya Upanisad, 2, 4). How, indeed, could anything finite, such as a concept or even a whole sruti, inform about the Fulness? an intellect adequately The intellect is open through its unlimited dynamism to receive that supreme Ineya (Reality to be known). St. Thomas Aquinas provides the following solution: for man to enter into the perfect intellectual possession of God, a free self-gift of the very essence of God is required by which he directly illumines man's intellect so that in this experience God is not only the Reality known but the immediate Informer of that intellect. Thus, besides the ontological presence and compenetration of God as Creator in all his creatures, there is another, free and beatifying, compenetration, which pertains to the intentional order, and by which God surrenders loyingly to those purified created spirits which their Brahmaijnāsā has sattuned to his divine Love. When the supreme Atman, who is the suprempublication allilance in the suprempublication allilance in the suprempublication and allilance in the suprempublication and allilance in the suprempublication and the suprempublicati

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sarvamspriyam bhavati, Atmanas-tu kama ya sarvam priyam bhavati: Brhadaranyaka Up., 2, 4,5) and is pure consciousness, thus communicates himself in the pure union of blissful love, man's intellect really shares in the very divine Consciousness and Omniscience and this unity in consciousness implies the highest unity in love and bliss, the identity begun by love and achieved by love. "Before you loved me, I loved you," said the Lord Jesus.

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#### NOTES

1. Since 1954, I have often recalled the importance of laksanā in Sankarian exegesis and, parallally, of intrinsic analogy in Thomism; of especially, The Correct Interpretation of the Definitions of the Absolute according to Sankara and Aquinas, in The Philosophical quarterly, Jan. '55, 187-194; Towards Reorienting Indian Philosophy Ibid. Jan. '57, 241-243; The Logical Structure of "Tattvamasi" according to Suresvara. 1bid., Jan. '61, 255-266; Some Governing Principles of Indian Philosophy, Ibid., Jan. '63, 255-257; cf, also the book Religious Hinduism, St. Paul Press, Allahabad 3rd edition, 1959, chapter on Sankara.

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### THE CONCEPT OF MAYA IN THE ADI GRANTH

The concept of Māyā has a unique place of the Indian philosophical theories. Several writers and thinkers of various schools of thought have used this concept. In the Vedas¹ and the Upanishads² it is used in a variety of ways. In the Gita³, Māyā is the power of the Brahman. In Buddhist thought too Māyā plays an important role. Saṃkara makes Māyā a pure philosophical principle, and uses it in the sense of ignorance, illusion, appearance and also as the material cause of the world. The Tantras⁴ use Māyā in the sense of power of the Supreme Reality. In the teachings of Gorakh Nath⁵ also there are references to Māyā. Thus almost all systems of religious thought have used the concept of Māya. Even the teachers of Bhakti cult did not lag behind in expressing their own ideas about Māyā. The Sikh Masters were also well aware of this concept and gave sufficient prominence to it in their teaching. In this paper an attempt is made to elucidate what

Grainthasahib has to say on Māyā.

In the Sikh scripture the word Māyā is used in several senses. It has been used in the sense of wealth. "You gather Māyā and are therefore accursed."6 "This wealth is Māyā, the great illusion "7. "She is the daughter of sea (Laxmi)".8 "The pandit instructs others but himself trades in Maya."9 Relatives and attachment with them are also Māyā." "There is no need to take pride in Māyā. Father, mother, sister and other relatives will not go with you."10 "The desire for Maya attaches us with wife, sons and kins"11. "Father and mother love their children immensely, but all attachment is Māyā."12 "Māyā's thick relations with the three gunas have been sufficiently highlighted in the Adi Granth. "The three modes of Māyā make you yelp." "The Vedas say that Māyā has three attributes."14 "It (Māyā) has yoked us to the three modes."15 "Māyā of the three gunas pervades everywhere due to attachment."16 "By reading the Vedas and the Sastras you are bound to the Maya of the three attributes and are engrossed in blind strife."17 It is also used in the sense of passionate life. "In the third part of night, when you are young, You are agitated and lured away by Maya "18 The Gurus hit CC-0. In Public Domain. Guruku Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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at the polytheist Hindus while defining it in these words, "Belief in gods and goddesses is the source of Māyā. This belief led to the creation of the Smrtis and the Śāstras."19 Sense of duality is also Māyā. "When one has the sense of duality, the mind is swayed by the poison of Māyā."20 It is also a great impediment. "Whatever I decide in my mind, it does not allow me to fulfil it"? "It does not permit me to gather virtue and continence".22 It is the source of all. "Believing Māyā, the source of all, men are swayed by doubt."23 The Sikh Gurus further define Mava in these words, "What is Māyā? Māyā is when one is bound by pleasure and pain and acts in ego".24 "It is the power of the Lord and is the cause for the birth of this world. Brahmā, Visnu and Siva are the sons of Maya."25 The composers of the Adi Granth were well aware of the universal pervasiveness of Maya and they said, "It is spread through the expression of pleasure and pain and infringes us through hell and heaven. Gods, welth, desire for glory, greed, intoxication, ego, attachment with sons, wife, worldly possessions, beauty, cattle, sweet sounds, all enveloping darkness of five desires, doing good deeds in ego, renunciation, austerities, pride in caste, avocation, culture etc., come under the sway of Māyā."26

Parallel references of this concept culled from relevant literature when compared with the above can be of great value to the readers for a better understanding about this term. According to the Tantras, "Sakti is both Māyā, that by which Brahman creating the universe is able to make itself appear to be different from what it really is, and Mula Prakrti, or the unmanifested state of that which, when manifested, is the universe of name and form It is the primary so-called the material cause."27 Gorakh Nath maintains that Māyā is like a tree which has no branch, rool, leaves or shade. It grows without water. Inspite of this, people Banerji<sup>29</sup> explains are very much desirous of getting its fruit." the same thing in a different way in these words, "Gorakh Nath regards Māyā as a form of expression of the human individuality. It appears to consist in giving undue importance to one's own individual self and its interests for that reason dealing falsely with orhers." According to Kabir, "Māyā is like the shadow. we try to catch it, it runs away. He who runs away from it, it never leaves him. It sticks to him "30 He further maintains that, "It is the mother of ignorance. Due to this ignorance the

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individual moves in the world fearlessly. The world is an illusion. Māyā has bound every body."31 Namdeva's view of Māyā pertains to wealth and passionate attachment to the satisfaction of five senses. "The fish without caring for her life jumps towards the hook, eats her food and is caught by the fisherman; the man is attracted towards gold and woman and falls a prey to the cycle of birth and death; the bee collects honey, but cannot enjoy it, and also the man hankers after wealth, but all these pleasures are temporary. The hoarded Maya in the form of wealth and fame remains in this world."32 Dadu also echoes similar ideas, "My mind is a culprit. It does not obey me. It is immersed in the love of gold. woman, attachment, ego, anger, sex and is after the satisfaction. of five senses. It does not bother about the ultimate end i. e. death."33 "Whatever we see alround, is the mirage of Maya. Man is attracted towards its glow and beauty and regards it as true."34

The above account of Māyā contained in the Adi Granth as well as the contemporary and near contemporary sources shows that Māyā is viewed in three ways, namely: (i) It hides the true nature of Truth from our view; (ii) It presents untruth as truth and (iii) Makes us believe untruth as Truth. In the Siddha literature, Māyā is the Śakti of the Śiva., while Śiva is the static element. In the Nath cult she limits the view of the Highest Reality. When the concept of Māyā began to be adopted by the leaders of the Sant Math, its old connotation as preached by the Samkhya system, Samkara, the Siddhas and the Naths, was sufficiently enlarged and changed. The Samkhya view that Māyā is eternal, was totally rejected by the Sants including the Gurus. The view of Samkara was partially accepted by them in their hymns here and there. The view that Māyā is the Śakti of the Lord which gives birth to the whole world, as preached by the Siddhas and the Yogis, was accepted by the Gurus to some extent. Thus, it appears that the concept of Māyā found synthesis of several prevailing views in several respects according to the teachings of the Gurus. The Gurus placed before their readers their concept of Māyā which was easily intelligible to them like their other doctrines and principles

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#### NOTES

- 1. The term Māyā, as used in the Vedas, means primarily mysterious, and some, wonder working power which produces effects and transcent human understanding (Paul David Devanandan, The concept of Māyā, p. 23).
- 2. To them belongs this stainless Brahma world, in whom there is no crook edness and falsehood, Maya (illusion). Prasanopanishad, 1, 16.
- 3. The Gita, vii, 25.
- 4. The limiting power of Reality by which its unmeasured, Being consciousness is measured, and its nature is made thinkable in terms of forms and categories has been called Maya (The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. IV, p. 229).
- 5. Gorakh Bani, pp. 139-40.
- 6. The Adi Granth, p. 42.
- 7. Ibid., p. 77.
- 8. Ibid., pp. 230, 279, 437.
- 9. Ibid., p. p. 56, 116.
- 10. Ibid., p. 27.
- 11. Ibid., p. 61.
- 12. Ibid., p. 75.
- 13. Ibid., p. 127.
- 14. Ibid., pp. 128, 647.
- 15. Ibid., p. 25.
- 16. Ibid., pp. 1140, 1260.
- 17. Ibid., p. 1126.
- 18. Ibid., p. 75.
- 19. Ibid., p. 129.
- 20. Ibid., p. 366.
- 21. Ibid., p. 371.
- 22. Ibid., p. 371.
- 23. Ibid., p. 232.
- 24. Ibid., p. 167.
- 25. Ibid., p. 7.
- 26. Ibid., p. 182.
- 27. John Woodroffe Introduction to the Tantra Sastra pp. 10-11
- 28. Gorakh Bani 153.
- 29. Philosophy of Gorakh Nath, p. 147.
- 30. Sant Bani Samgraha (Kabir) 1, p. 124
- 31. Bijak Sakhi, p. 227.
- 32. Sant Bani Samgraha, II, p. 32.
- 33. Ksitimohan Sen, Dadu ki Bani, II, p. 48.
- 34. Ibid., p. 116.

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## NAGARJUNA AND CANDRAKIRTI ON SUNYATA

Sūnvatā is very important in the Mahāvāna tradition of Buddhism in particular and the Buddhist thought in general. It has, however, received numerously varied and divergent interpretations at the hands of the different scholars. Some have interpreted it to signify nihilism, void or vacuity1 while others have interpreted it in the sense of non-exclusiveness.2 Situation of this kind raises more problems than it solves. But in face of such deen-rooted difference of opinion it becomes exceedingly difficult. if not impossible, to find out and locate what exactly does Swiyata mean. This demands a fresh look at it. We shall attempt, in this paper, to do this and present its import as at least two important and prominent exponents of it, viz. Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti, wanted to expound.

According to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we believe, the entire discussion of Sunvata brings three main considerations to the foreground. First, what we are given (ontologically) in this world are the extreme particulars, no two of which are either similar or identical with one another. Each one of them is uniquely particular and none of them is eternal and everlasting. Secondly, our knowledge at any time is of particular things only. It is irrelevant whether such knowledge is intersubjective, methodologically subjective or even peculiarly individual. It is further irrelevant whether such things are given simultaneously or in succession. Our knowledges of different particular things do not fully, partially or even spirally overlap. Our discovery of each one of the particular things is a fresh endeavour and our knowledge of one particular thing does not presuppose knowledge of another Particular thing on our part. Nor does our knowledge of a particular thing on our part. cular thing yield knowedge of another particular thing as its consequence. Thirdly, Śūnyatā behaves as if it is a threefold methodological censor— censor of *Dharma* (predicate and predicative language), Padartha (conceptual and categorial frame) and Bhava (states and modalities). These three censors are termed as Sarvadha. dharmasūnyatā,,3 Sarvapadārthasūnyatā4 and Sarvabhāvasūnyatā5 respectively. Although all these three aspects of Sūnyatā are interrelated the greater emphasis seems to be laid both by Nāgātjus and Candrakīrti on the third aspect of it. It is this third aspect of Śūnyatā which we want to investigate in this paper as it math a prominent deviation from the traditional interpretation of it. We want to maintain that both Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti do not need not necessarily, deny the world6 or the uniquely particular things7 which are parts of the world.

I

Nāgārjuna peculiarly combined philosophical and logical thought in his work called Madhyamakaśāstra. The same treat is noticeable in the commentary of Candrakīrti called Prasannapadā. There are some works of Nāgārjuna like Vigrahavyāvartani and Śūnyatāsaptati with his own commentaries which are predominently logical in treatment. But Madhyamakaśāstra is mainly give to the elaboration, clarification and explanation of Śūnyatā. In the very beginning we are told that the problem the present work proposed to take up was that of Pratītyasamutpāda and that Pratītyasamutpāda was characterised by eight promined characteristics (aṣta viśesaṇa viśiṣtaḥ pratītyasamutpādah—Prasannapadā, 1.1). But we are told later in the same work that Śūnyatā is nothing else but Pratītyasamutpāda itself (M. S. 24.18). The Śūnyatā itself becomes the topic of the investigation in the Madhyamakaśāstra.8

What then do Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti understand b Pratityasamutpāda or śūnyatā? There are particular things in the world, and in fact both Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti take extrement particular things alone to be the primary components of the world Both of them assure us that we take that to be the case what people normally take to be the case (Prasannapadā, 18.8). None of these particular things, according to them, is eternal. some time or the other, continue to be for some time and eventually die out. These particular things are given simultaneously of succession. When particular things are given in succession it called flow. Of course although flow is a permanent possibility it need not necessarily be permanent. Further, even if there is a flow it is not a second flow it is n flow it is not and need not necessarily be the flow of the supplement. We not not necessarily be the flow of the supplement. things. We normally tend to describe emergence of particular things teleologically or causally. But the only thing we are warranky to say is that there are particular things, given either simultaneously CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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or in succession. Yet, this in itself does not enable us to say either that one is the cause of the other or that the other is the effect of the first. Unfortunately we do not grasp this clearly and accurately. Instead of saying just that there are particular things we also say that not only things but also their states and modes arise from one another. On the basis of the data supplied by experience or on account of the teleological or other kind of explanation we come to connect things, their states and modalities with one another causally, sequentially and even consequentially. This gives rise to confusion. The other kind of confusion arises out of the fact that we inevitably employ language to describe the nature of things which either we genuinely experience or believe them to be there.

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According to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we do not merely experience particular things. We connect them with one another inadvertently. We also try to describe them. In our attempt to describe things the simplest tool that we can and do employ is that of predicative language, kind of language in which we come to say that a particular thing has or does not have a particular property, relation, state or modality. Such a kind of language not only employs a subject-predicate model of description but also distorts the nature of things attempted to be so described. Subject-predicate mould of descriptive language itself is beset with certain unsurmountable difficulties, not keeping track of which may further mislead and misguide us. But descriptive language has additional difficulties too. Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti have very elaborately considered many examples and indicated how descriptively used language logically creates difficulties.

We said that according to Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti the predicates that we employ in describing particular things fall primarily into three kinds: characteristics, states and modes. Each one of them has its own difficulties. But predicative language iself poses certain problems. By the very nature of the case every predicate that we normally employ is or rather can in principle ine. It is irrelevant whether such things are given simultaneously of objects. But since according to Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti here are no the case of the case of the case is a predicate of a class there are no the case of t

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he same articular arranted aneously objects are of the same kind. Now, if there are no two objects at all of any kind and if every thing is absolutely uniquely particular we should even in principle be unable to employ any predicate (dharma) to bring out a significant feature of a thing. We at unable to use predicative language descriptively not because thing do not even contingently have characteristics but precisely because any predicate, by its very nature, is intended to bring out a common similar or even identical character of things. But no two things are similar or identical. No two things have similar or the same characteristics. Thus predicative language is utterly unsuited to bring out the nature of an extremely particular object.

However, if we rule out predicative language altogether because it is incompetent, sterile and impotent to bring out particularly and peculiarity of each one of the particular objects we shall be left with no tool with the help of which we shall be in a position to describe the nature of such objects. Descriptive and predicative language may be unsuitable in so far it fails to bring out the real nature of an object. But this is not the case in regard to every property or dharma, which finds a place in language. The natural dharmas (svabhāvadharmāh) do succeed in presenting the real nature of an object. All dharmas, therefore, cannot be treated alike. Moreover, such dharmas as rāpa, śabda, rasa, gandha and sparśa are important basis of our descriptions of things.

But Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti rebut this objection "No matter what dharma we are talking about, it is incapable of bringing out uncommon and peculiar nature of any svalakson (peculiarly unique things).9" Any predicate states either a common similar or the same feature. Since no two things have even the similar features, we should say that no predicate whatsoever 'applicable'. 10 Everthing that is is Svalaksana. The dharms alone should be the basis of our description of it. and predicates that we attribute to a thing are not given. We are not given things, predicates and dharmas, nor things possession predicates and dharmas. What are given are things. In world of things, each one of which is svalaksana, there be nothing like dharmas whether natural or non-natural. dharma is a svabhavadharma. Our contention particular things and dharmas or that some dharmas at least at svabharadharaus or that some dharmas at less world of things or in the world of things or in the world of things or in the nature of uniquely particular things.

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There is also another argument which Nagarjuna and Candrakirti bring forward to establish that no dharma 'describes' and at the same time brings out the nature of any svalaksana thing. Independently of ascribing a particular dharma to a particular thing how do we know that it is a dharma of it? Unless we are independently sure that a given thing has the given dharma and that thing alone has it we are neither methodologically right nor logically justified in ascribing a dharma to a given thing. But by the very nature of the case no dharma is given independently of a thing. It also is not there independently and naturally as a matter of fact. 12 Like a thing no dharma is peculiar and particular that it can be given independently of anything else. This being the case dharmas are nothing in comparison with things of which they are said to be dharmas. Thus understood dharmas are ill-suited to bring out the nature of particular things. There is again no particular and peculiar justifiable reason why we should ascribe any dharma to any particular thing 'context-freely'; while contextual ascription of a dharma does more violence than justice to the nature of a thing. Every dharma is necessitated by our explanation of a thing or by the context, none of which is necessary to understand and discover things as they are given. Sanyata, therefore, amounts loaccepting total incompetence of predicative language descriptively used to bring out the nature of uniquely particular or svalakṣaṇa things.

III

Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are, thus, critical of predicative language maintaining that the characteristics which such a language brings to the focus are neither given nor are they necessarily constitutive of those particular things. They are equally critical of conceptual and categorial frames which we normally employ as explanatory and justificatory devices. Their chief complaint is that a particular conceptual frame is not necessarily tied down to an accepted categorial frame, for given a certain categorial frame it is possible to envisage alternative conceptual frames. Moreover, no conceptual or categorial frame is so tied with particular things that any one or both of them are given. They are given neither either. (P. P. 1.3) Concepts and categories are methodological objection. As Gachiological tools they are certainly important.

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But that does not mean that they exist in their own right. They are not constitutive of the nature of particular things either. Given things no concepts and categories are ineviatably thrust on us, It is our intention to communicate about things or our knowledge of things that makes acceptance and employment of concepts and categories necessary. But these devices which are logical linguistic and methodological in character are dictated not by the fact that there are particular and peculiar things nor by our intention that we want to discover them as they are. There may also arise the problem of preferring a better conceptual or categorial frame out of the alternative conceptual or categorial frames. According to Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti, however, even such a preference is not necessitated by the nature of things. For, things do not dictate acceptance of any conceptual or categorial frame nor do they necessitate a preference among them. Hence for Nagarjuna and Candrakirti concepts and categories are totally unhelpful as tools, in our exploration of uniquely particular (svalak sana) things.

#### IV

In bringing out the nature of uniquely particular things Sūnyalā does not merely bring within its perview impotence of predicative language. It also aims at making conspicuous incompetence of concepts and categories as tools of capturing the peculiarity of such particular things. Further it aims at bringing out theore tical unjustifiability of the ascription of any state or modality to any of the extremely particular things that is there. In spile of all our talk to that effect no state or mode of a thing is given independently of a thing. There are uniquely particular things given as a matter of fact. But the states of things or the modes which we ascribe to things are not there as parts of the furniture of the world. If we insist on the retention of what actually is there as a part of the world alone then we shall also have to do away with all our talk about things through states and modes. For how do we know and how are we in a position to justify that a given thing has a particular state or mode as a matter of fact. If experience is the basis then we may not only experience states or modes of a thing that is there but also of a thing that is not there at all or is illusorily or hallucinatorily perceived. It may be contended that states and charles and charles are necessary considered things are necessary the states and contended that states are necessary than the states are necessary to the states are not to the states things are necessitated by the conceptual or categorial frame

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within which we generally describe things. But since, according to Nāgārjuna and Candratkīrti, neither conceptual nor categorial frame is an ontological or methodological necessity, the states and modes they bring to the horizon too must be counted to be a shere contingency. The particular things do not dictate concepts and categories. But they do not dictate acceptance of particular states or modes either.

We, no doubt, can and often do ascribe such features. state and modes to things which they do not actually have. Nor do things need have them to be those kinds of things. Moreover. we are never given things and their states, modes or fearures. We are given things. Each one of them is unique, particular and peculiar. That is all. Through our coming to ascribe states, modes and features to things we first introduce the problem of distinguishables and then taking things, their features, states and modes to be equally real and equally genuine parts of the furniture of the world raise distinguishables to the status of separables. Thus understood states, modes, features and properties are not the things that are there but rather are the spectra created by our expectations about things, our taking experience to be the only necessary condition of our coming to discover things and by the conceptual and categorial frames which we conveniently employ to bring out the nature of things given to us. The extremely particular things are so constituted that no two of them can have either similar or common states or modes. Actually no particular thing necessitates any state or mode, common or otherwise.

V

Logically and methodologically Sūnyaia aimed at pointing out sterility and incompetence of predicative and descriptive language in bringing out and catching the nature of the uniquely particular and peculiar things that are there. It is also intended to show that the very language of things and their states, modes and features along with the conceptual and categorial frames it brings in, raises more problems than it solves. Prima facie that may be only tool with the help of which we can and do communicate about things; but on that count it is not the best tool. It is also not dictated by things. We shall not be in a position to say meaningfully that a particular thing has a particular feature naturally. No two things have anything in common or similar, much less identical. It is also not plausible to hold that states or modes of warthing arise

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from one another. They do not and cannot be said to be arising from particular things. Methodologically understood Sunyala is a censor of proliferative, unjustifiable and untenable platonism," These logical and methodological considerations envisaged to be brought forward exclusively, or in conjuction with other aspects alone do not go to show that what is intended to be conveyed by Śūnyatā is utter void, a complete non-existence of anything at all. Both Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti spare no effort to dispel this misgiving. 15 They argue that what is meant by Sunyata is not utter non-existence. Rather Sunyata is intended to be a tool of dispelling unwarranted platonism that arises out of linguistic confusions and conceptual bewilderments. It is not Sunyara properly understood that is detrimental to our coming to discover the world and the extremely particular and peculiar things which are parts of its furniture but rather misunderstood Sunyaia.16 For, Sunyatā is a tool through the proper wielding of which we can come to grasp Tattva—that which is the case. 17 Sanyala is designed to bring out methodological unserviceability of Samvrttitattva and not of paramarthatattva. In fact we are also told that Sunyata is a middle path18 which is intended to avoid both the extremes of eternal existence and absolute non-existence.19 Śūu atā is not at all intended to dispell and annihilate philosophically that which is there. It is rather a tool wielded by a nominalist to shave off Plato's beard, an Occamian razor to get rid of an ontological slum that results out of our resorting to linguistic traps, conceptual puzzlements and categorial nightmares. It is not a matter of quibbling or hair-splitting.20 It is whereby paramarthasatya is to be segrageted from Lokasamvrttisatya, for it is the latter that embraces the dreadful platonism. Thus Sanyatā is neither total doing away with things and making the world void nor is it a hold-all that can accommodate any number and kind of odd things, however cumbersome philosophically it may be to accept them as part of the furniture of the world. It is rather a very powerful tool of taking unfortunate flies out of fly-bottles or of sweeping the house of philosophy of its rubbish. It is this methodologial aspect of Sūnyarā that is both powerful and fascinating.

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## NAGARJUNA AND CANDRAKIRTI ON SUNYATA

#### NOTES

Banerjee, N. V.; Glimpses of Indian Wisdom; pp. 9, 28
 Banerjee, N. V.; Nihilistic Absolutism: The Spirit of Indian Philosophy;
 p. 228.
 Bagchi, S.; Introduction entitled "Śūnyavada" to Madhyamakaśūstra of Nagarjuna (eq) Vaidya, P. L.

2. Ramanan, K. Venkat; Nāgārjuna's Philosophy; p. 42

3. Śūnyatā nāma sarvadharmāṇām sāmānya a lakṣaṇamiti abhyupagamāt Prasannapadā, 13.7
Śūnyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ.....,Ibid, 22.11
Śūnyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ, Ibid, 15.11; 24.14.
..atyantaśūnyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ, Ibid, 24.40
Madhyamakaśūstra, 25.22-23.

..mṛṣāsvabhāvānām padārthānām, Prasamapadā 1.3
 ..sarveṣāmeva hi padarthhānām sarvabhāvāntargatavāt śūnyatvam, śūnyatvāt ca sarve eva hite padārthā nopalabhyanta....
 Prasamapadā, 27.29.

mṛṣāsvabhāvā api bhāvā....; Prasamapadā, 1.3
 vayam brūmaḥ.. na santi sarvabhāvāḥ iti, Prasamapadā, 15.10 see also note 4 above.
 bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvānām na sattā vidyate yataḥ—Madhyamakaśāstra,

Vigrahavyāvartani, 1, 9, 22, 25, 26, 60

1.12; 13.8

6. avināśamanutpannam dharmadhatusamam jagat |
Sattvadhātum ca dešeti eṣā lokānuvartanā II Prasannapadā, 26.2
sarvasamvyavahāraṁśca laukikān pratibadhase |
Yatpratītyasamutpādaśūnytām pratibadhase | Madhyamakaśūstra, 24.36
Vicitrabhih avasthābhih svabhāvaracitam svabhāvena eva racitam apratītyasamutpannam jagat svabhāvaśūnyavādinām | Svabhāvena eva yadi bhāvāh synh, tadā svabhāvasyākṛtrimattvāt avyāvartanāt ca sarvam idam jagat ajātam anirnddham ca syāt | ajataniruddhatvāt jagat Kūtastham syāt | Prasannapadā 24-38.

na vayam vyavaharasatyam pratyakhyaya vyavaharasatyam anabhyupagamya kathayamah sunyah sarvabhavah iti Vigrahavyavartani, 28

 nisvabhavah eva santah ghatadayah loke svakaryakṛt upalabhyante Prasannapadā, 17.30.
 dharma sabdah pravacane tridha vyavasthapitah Svalakṣaṇa dharanartheṇa ...... Prasannapadā, 17.1

Sarvatha anutpadah eva agnyadīnam paranirapeksatvat akrtimatvat svabha Gao iln Public Pomain Gueukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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- 8. It is interesting to note in passing that as Śūnyatā can be understood in three important aspects  $Pratītyasamutp\bar{u}da$  too can be, since they are the same. Further, since  $Nirv\bar{u}na$  and Śūnyatā are the same, similar consideration would also hold with regard to  $Nirv\bar{u}na$ . Consider, for example, the following statement by Candrakīrti ....tasmāt śūnyatā eva sarvaprapancanivrttilakṣaṇatvāt nirvāṇam iti ucyate |  $Prasamnapd\bar{u}$ , 18.5
- 9. bhavanam anyasadharanamatmiyam yatsvrupam tat svalaksanami Prasannupadā, 1.3
  na hi vayam dharmanam svabhavam pratisedhayamah, dharmavinir muktasya kasyacit arthasya svabhavam abhyupagacchamah i Vigrahavyavartani, 61 nisvabhavatvam eva sarvadharmanam spṣtam aveditam i Prasannapadā, 7.15
- 10. Śunyata nama sarvadharmanam samanyalakṣaṇam iti abhyupagamat— Prasannapadā 13.7 dharmah eva śunyaḥ — Prasannapadā, 13.8. Svalakṣaṇa asadharaṇat nirvaṇagradharma adharaṇat dharmaḥ—Ibid, 23.7.
- 11. rūpaśabdarasaparśāh gandhā dharmāca kevalah i M. S. 23.8. Kevalah iti parikalpitamātrah nisvabhāvāh ityarthah —P. P. 13.8.
- 12. Sunyāh sarvadharmāh nisvabhavayogena P. P. 15.11
- 13. bhavan tu nastitvam Śūnyatartham prapaācajalam eva samvardhyamnah ni śunyatayah prayojanam vetti P. P. 24.7
- 14. evam pratītyasamutpādasabdasya yaḥ arthaḥ saḥ eva śūnyatā śabdsya arthaḥ, na punaḥ abhāva śabdasya yaḥ arthaḥ saḥ sūnyata sabdasya arthah ı abhāvasabdartham ca śunyatarthamityādhyāropya bhāvan asmānupālabhate ı P. P. 24.7 M. S., 24.7.
- 15. M. S., 24.13 P. P. 24.13 Vigrahavyavartani, 25
- 16. M. S., 24.7; 24.11
- 17. M. S., 18.9
- 18. madhyamah margah M. S., 24.18
- 19. M. S., 15.10
- 20. M. S., 18.8

Lokah maya sardham vivadati naham lokena sardham vivadami yat loke asti sammatam tat mama api asti sammatam, yat loke nasti sammatam, mamapi tannasti sammatam P. P. 18.8.

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#### THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

In logical literature the words 'statement' 'proposition' and 'judgement' are usually used. Idealist logicians used the word judgement, in preference to proposition whereas the Realist preferred to use the word proposition and sometimes statement (and sentence). Kant also has us d the word Jugement in his three Critiques. The use of the word proposition or Judgement, of course, depends on the attitude of the philosophers towards the words. Kant in his Critique of Judgement further distinguishes two kinds of Judgements, the judgement of cognition and the judgement of taste. It will be desirable to explicate the distinction between the judgements and propositions, and further distinguish between judgement of cognition and judgement of tastes and also contrast the *Concept of Judgemet* with the *Concept of Rule*. This will help us to understand why Kant talks of Aesthetic Judgement and not of Rules of Aesthetics.

Bosanquet who can be regarded as a representative of the Idealist tradition thinks that Reality is not different from, or is being continuously modified by our activity of knowing. In our knowing we distinguish between the object of knowing and the ideas by which we enrich the object of knowing. The object of knowing is the logical subject and our ideas are the logical predicates. By means of our predicates we are continuously judging, i. e. enriching the subject. This is how the world of our knowledge continuously grows. The subject of such a judgement which is, of course, a subject of knowing, is indeterminate reality and with the help of predicate we are making it more and more determinate. What we call predicate is nothing but an attribute of the subject and in a sense one could say that more and more we perceive, we look at the subject, its predicates will become clearer and clearer. It means in a way we get the predicate through the analysis of the subjects; in another sense we can say that we are continuously superimposing our ideas on the subject. But since the world of knowledge is not different from the world of being, analysing the subject or superimposing our ideas on the subject does not make any difference to the subject, for the subject is reality, and what we predicate of it is evidently the part and parcle of reality. A

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common sense philosopher or an ordinary man may analyse this situation in a differenet way, he may say that in our act of knowing or perceiving we are not adding anything to the subject. All the qualities, which we discern in perception are possessed by the object represented by the subject of logical proposition. We only come to know gradually the characteristics. I do not want to enter into the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. The characteristics attributed to the subject may be synthetic but as a matter of fact they belong to the concrete object. And they are only perceived and discerned gradually in the knowledge process. For a common man the knower has no special status. His perception is natural in the sense that what he discerns by means of predicate are already there as qualities or characteristics of the subject. Such a judgement would be a cognitive judgement for an ordinary man, although Kant would say, that even for such a judgement, forms of intuition and categories of understanding would be presupposed. Since these forms and categories would be presupposed by every knowing being, a particular knower will add nothing to it and so these judgements will be regarded as cognitive judgements. These cognitive judgements have the same status as that of a proposition for a realist logician. Although these judgements are the judgements of a knower, what is being described is a state of affairs and therefore in such judgements the knower can be completely eliminated. And the results of the knower's judging can be put into the form, 'It is the case that...,' 'It is stated that....'etc. It means that the original form of judging namely that, 'I know that S is P' can be changed into the form-'It is the case that, S is P'. One can see that this is the form of proposition. But for a true idealist logician, it is not really S is P, but Ideas of P being imposed on Ideas of S. S is continuously growing on account of the imposition of 'P' ideas. Since there can not be Ideas without a sentient being there is nothing like a proposition, it is only a judgement. What we call being is nothing but knowing. Of course, the idealist logicians will have to make distinction between knowing proper and evaluating which I shall consider later. What is important here to know is that a judgement is not just a matter of binary relation, a relation between subject and predicate, but a trinary relation where the constituents are the knower, the subject and the predicte. In cognitive judgements the term knower is just ignored. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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However when we come to the term judgement of taste, this term 'knower' cannot be ignored and therefore, just as a cognitive judgement may be turned into a proposition, a judgement of taste cannot be so turned. In a cognitive Judgement although a knower is judging a subject, the predicates which he is using for judging are objective predictes. In a sense we believe that they are characteristics which the subject inheres in it. In a judgement of taste. the predicates with which he judges the subject are not the characteristics which the subject inheres. They are the moods or the attitudes of the knower himself vis-a-vis, the subject. It is not only evaluation of the subject, it is also in a way the evaluation or description of the knower. Let me make my point clear by quoting here from Dr. S. S. Barlingay. He writes, in his paper on 'The Nature of Aesthetics and Moral Values' 1 that we have to distinguish between the following three sentences. 'It is raining heavily' 'It is raining unfortunately' and 'It is raining probably'. When we say it is raining heavily we are describing the state of affairs. The adverb "heavily" is describing the state of raining, but when it is said that it is raining unfortunately, it is not only describing the state of raining but also stating the state of our mind. The word, 'heavily' is the expression of our cognition, the word, 'unfortunately' is the expression of our mind, of the subjectivity. I need not discuss here the nature of the third sentence as it has no relevance here. Kant, then, is right in distinguishing at least two kinds of judgements, the judgement of cognition, and what he calls the judgement of taste. Idealist logicians may perhaps explain the judgements of cognition as if they were the judgements of taste or subjectivity. For them there is not external world, the world is merely a system of 'Ideas', a continuous evolution of Ideas. Therefore while a Judgement is passed on 'the Reality' it is merely making a more indeterminate idea, determinate with the help of a predicate which is a determinate idea. It is thus a Judgement which is subjective in nature and in the strict sense of the term is not objective, i. e. it does not refer anything outside the subject (although the subject here need not be an individual mind). The Realist on the other hand, are likely to misunderstand a judgement of taste as a judgement of cognition. A realist for example is likely to think that in a judgement 'This flower is beautiful, or 'He is good', Beautiful or Good is as much a characteristic of the object as are red' and man in the judgements, 'The flower is

red' 'He is man'. The Idealist may go wrong in the case of the judgement of cognition and Naive Realist may go wrong in the judgement of taste. It will be more appropriate to say that judge. ment of cognition is an expression of a state of affairs and in therefore, reducible to the state of propositions. Judgement of taste is not so reducible to a proposition. A judgement of taste of course may be a blanket term, in which it may be possible to distinguish several varieties, the aesthetic judgement being one of them

When somebody says that 'X' is a man or 'Y' is a pillar, man or pillar is a name which describes the objective situation. It is a universal or a concept. It is thus possible to describe several universals like X, Y, Z as men or A, B, C as pillars. The words men and pillars, give us a characteristic held in common by several individual objects. But when we say 'X' is beautiful are we doing the same kind of activity? Are we finding out some common characteristic called beautiful, which is held in common by several 'beautiful' objects.? Kant would not agree with such a statement and I think that Kant is right. It means that the analysis of this is beautiful' is far more complex. It, of course, gives vent to our attitudes, but we will have to remember that our attitude is not just a primitive attitude, it goes on evolving with the development of society and culture. Thus when we say, 'something is beautiful' it is a judgement, passed on the object, but it also depicts our attitude which is in its turn at least partially determined by the history and culture. It is, thus, that as Plackenov pointed out-A whiteman is likely to regard that a statue of Venus with certain features, as a paradigm of beauty and not regard something in the non-Aryan world as beautiful. Although the judgement is concerned with our attitudes, our attitudes, of course, are determined by certain objectivity.

The traditional and true Idealist Logicians do not distinguish between judgements and propositions. For example, in certain textbooks on Logic like, Joseph's Introduction to Logic, the work Judgement, is used where the word, proposition, should be used. Thus the traditional propositions A, E, I and O are regarded of independent (15, 11) judgements. (If they are judgements they are only cognitive judgements). 'All men are mortal', 'some men are mortal' and men are mortal' and 'some men are not mortal', would be such

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judgements. These, judgements (propositions) are classified under quality and quantity. In the strict sense of the term, however, we need not regard a negative judgement as judgement, for, when we judge we are making something indeterminate as determinate and positive. 'No man is mortal' need not be taken as a judgement although in Logic we so regard it. Similarly the so called particular judgements are not properly the judgements. The question is whether a sentence of the form, All men are mortal is a judgement. Here, I feel that if, all men are mortal, is taken as sum-total of X is mortal, Y is mortal, Z is mortal, then "all men are mortal' may be regarded as a judgement. But if all men are mortal is translated as, for any X, if X is a man, then X is mortal, we are not passing any judgement on X. It may give us an implicit rule or law about man's mortality. A judgement must be passed on a particular object. By a particular, I mean, a singular object. Thus I feel, the demonstrative pronouns like this (It) and particular objects must be the objects of judgements. Unless it is so, something would not be judgement. For the first essential condition of a judgement is that, it must give us something positive and determinate. In this sense then, only the singular propositions satisfy the conditions necessary for a strict judgement. I feel that when one talks of aesthetic judgements, the object on which the judgement is passed must exist; the judgement must be singular; any 'ifthen' form of sentence would not give them the status of judgement. If any object did not exist, we would not be able to say that this is beautiful. 'If-then' form of sentences gives us rules, perhaps laws but they are not judgements. It may be noted, however, that a judgement may be directly passed as judgement or it may be deduced from some other premises as conclusion. Thus 'Socrates is mortal' can either be our direct judgement or it can be deduced by way of conclusion from the premises, 'All men are mortal' and Socrates is a man'. What kind of judgement is an aesthetic judgement? Is it just a judgement, or can it be a conclusion from certain premises, i. e. can it be deducible from certain rules or laws or from dicta and maxims? I feel that Kant distinguished between horal judgements and aesthetic judgements on this ground. He bought that judgements of the form 'It is good' or 'It is right' en either be direct judgements in the form of singular propositions or they can be deduced from certain rules of the form of universal propositions by way of logical deductions. When such deductions I.P. Q... 8 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

are possible the conclusions of the deductions could take a form of a singular judgement. But the subject of such singular judgements would only have a status of possible, it need not exist, i.e. may not have existential import. On the other hand, when a judgement is passed on an object without being deduced by way of rule, the object on which it is passed must necessarily exist and must be determinate. I feel, that Kant thinks that aesthetic judgements are of the second type and so Kant called his book on aesthetics, 'A Critique of Judgement'. He clearly states that the specific rules of aesthetics are not possible.

According to Kant although we pass judgement in Ethio such that 'X is good' and 'that action is right', these judgements are either directly derived from the principles or the maxims or even when they are not so derived, they implicitly presuppose a maxim or a principle. But so far as aesthetics is concerned we can only pass judgement, and the judgement is not dervied or derivable from any maxim or rule. Kant is silent whether there is any principle involved in determining something as beautiful and so there is a problem whether 'beautiful' is a concept. Her what is important to know is that according to Kant there cannot be any system or science of aesthetics. What we can have is simply a collection of aesthetic judgements, without presupposing an rule about them, as was thought by Baumgarten who was brough up in the rationalist traditions of Wolff (German). If it was not within our power to frame rules 'a priori' about aesthetics, even if such an attempt is made it will only be inductive and the un versality and necessity would not either be attached to it or ever if it were attached, it would be only arbitrary.

Let us examine the significance of the new aesthetic phenomenon on which an aesthetic judgement is passed. Aesthetic judgement is passed. Aesthetic judgement is passed on any phenomenon or object and therefore the predicate of such judgement would be beautiful or ugly (also sublime etc.). The copula of such a judgement would be 'is' or 'is not' and the subject of such a judgement would be such a phenomenon. Let us take an instance of such a Judgement. Let assume a judgement like 'Venus is beautiful' or 'The Statue of Venus is beautiful' or 'The painting known as madona is beautiful or 'The friscoes of Ajantha are beautiful'. The pertinent point or 'The friscoes of Ajantha are beautiful'. The pertinent point here is whether we would cannot could be such a phenomenon.

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if there had been no Venus, no statue of Venus, no painting called Madona, and no friscoes of Ajantha. Of course, there is nothing like Venus. Nobody has seen her, but when we talk of Venus we talk of some specific structures interrelated together in a whole. And although it is not presented to us necessarily as a living women still some general picture is brought before us. This is the picture of some 'beautiful' woman. When we imagine such a picture, we are perceiving the different structures together. And even if it is an ideal representation, nevertheless, it is a representation of some whole, the parts of which are actual. That is why the structures are moulded according to the cultural ideas of the people. If a Negro could imagine Venus of his dream, if he is not in contact with the Aryan Civilization, he would not imagine a particular kind of nose, a particular kind of complexion, a particular means that even when we are just imagining, height. This the subject of our judgement is mentally presented before us in a form of concrete structure. It is not of the form, 'if such and such parts are connected together in a particular way then the structure would be beautiful.' This second proposition will be of the nature of universal general proposition, and the first proposition, which is our judgement will be the singular proposition. A singular proposition is also a universal proposition, but its subject has a concrete structure. It cannot be reduced to hypothetical form, although the different parts of a structure whether real or imaginary are connected together in a necessary manner. I need not bring here whether there is any existential import in such propositions. What is important to know is that the structure we imagine is not an abstract one, it is concrete. When we are not talking of an imaginary object, like Venus, and we come across phenomena like the statue of Venus' 'Painting called Madona', 'The friscoes of Ajantha' one can easily see that the phenomena are existent i. e. If the phenomena are put in the place of the subject of logical judgement, they will have existential import. Perhaps the idealist logicians would say, even the imaginary phenomena would have existential import in their 'universe of discourse'. It is plain that We cannot pass a judgement on the painting called Madona the absence of that particular painting. Similarly we could not pass any judgement on the friscoes without actually perceiving them. It means then that existence or presence of the object on which it means then that existence or presence of passing which judgement is passed is a necessary condition of passing CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar passing

such a judgement, unless such a judgement is derived from a certain rule. When Kant says that aesthetic judgements are singular. he means this or atleast should mean this — that, in some sense the presence of phenomena is a necessary element in the process of passing a judgement. A singular judgement is regarded by the traditional logicians as a universal judgement. In the traditional form of syllogism we do get a correct conclusion, 'Socrates is mortal' from the two premises, 'All men are mortal' and 'Socrate is a man.' Both 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is mortal' are singular propositions. By combining a singular proposition like 'Socretes is a man' with 'All men are mortal' we can get a universal singular conclusion like 'Socrates is mortal'. But even by a farfetched logic, one would not be able to reduce the propositions 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is mortal' to the form, for any X if 'X' is Socrates — then 'X' is a man or for any x, if x is Socrates then x is mortal. In both these propositions the if-then part is illegetimitate i. e., the singular propositions, though universal cannot be reduced to the hypothetical form. It means, that the universality that we ascribe to the proposition like 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is mortal' is within the framework of cale gorical propositions. It must be borne in mind that when Kan talked of logic he talked of traditional logic. Kant's logic bears testimony to it. So while explaining the concepts that Kant has used we must primarily use the books, which Kan has in mind, and must not thrust our own concepts on Kant. The traditional logicians did say that when we say that Socrates is man then the predicate, humanness, occupied every part of Socra That is why they regarded that the term, Socrates, in the proposition, 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is mortal', is distributed It may be noted that Kant talks of subjective necessity and university and univer The subjective versality in the context of Aesthetic Judgement. necessity according to me arises on account of the fact that where we say 'Socrates is a man' or 'Socrates is mortal' manness or mortal lity is inseaparable from Socrates. It may be that people may st that it is an inseparable accident. But accident is a notion which can be properly used in the case of class. When this notion used in the case of individuals, it is no more an accident; it becomes a unique character of individuals, if it is inseparable. may venture to say that what is regarded in traditional logic as inseparable accident inseparable mappide not what is regarded in traditional regions inseparable mappide not what is regarded in traditional regions in traditional regions in the control of th

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element in the context of individuals.' It is perhaps this, that is meant by subjective necessity by Kant. When we talk of uniqueness we talk of certain organic unity or combination, but unless that combination is necessary, it does not become organic; it would merely be a combination of elements mechanically brought together.

Earlier I have said that no aesthetic judgement can be passed on a phenomenon which is not existent or not present. It is necessary to make a distinction between that which is existent, and that which is present. The existent may be present, but the present need not be existent. On account of our memory, a vivid image may be brought before our mind's eye and we might reconstruct it in our imagination, a new model of the elements from our own experience, selecting them form our own choice. In fact, that is what an artist does in sculpture, painting, poetry and even in an architecture. But the essential element here is that, the object is broken into elements, the elements intact. Thus for example, an artist may select the height of an Asian girl and combine it with the waist of a Cambodian and may combine the complexion of both into one, and may also add to it a little curlyness of the Negro hair, but what he is combining are not the concepts, they are the real parts of the objects separated in imagination. They are 'Concepts' understood with properties of space and time. They are something like the schemata of Kant. Mere abstractions cannot be combined or recombined. The difficulty is that the concrete forms and the concepts which are abstractions are usually misunderstood as one.2

Aristotle and the ancient Naiyayikas had made a distinction in forms and concepts. Aristotle clearly distinguishes between Ide (Idea) and form, similarly the earlier Nyaya Logicians distinguish between Samanya and Jati, on the one hand and Akrti on the other hand. When we talk of Akrti or form, its spatiotemporal characteristics are retained, that is, the concreteness is not eliminated; what is eliminated is the special characteristics Visesa guna. Combination or recombination or separation of such things is possible because, although they are parts of our imagination, they are as vivid as the things. They can be pictured. One can see that when we use words there are certain words, which evoke some CGO. In Public Domain. Courkly kanging content in a process of the concept of the process of the concept of

the picture of a horse is before me. And just as a horse can be cut in to pieces, similarly we can think of separate parts of the picture of the horse. When we think of stage drama, we for try to superimpose certain personality actions on the actor. This is possible because, although we are talking of action we are not talking of abstraction. It will now be clear, how we can think of the Venus although there is nothing like Venus-the most beautiful woman before us. When we talk of Venus, we combine the most beautiful parts of women together in our imagination, but the concrete shape of the woman is not given up. We are still talking of woman and not womanness which would be abstract. We can see that, when we talk of woman, the different element, the height, colour....etc. are uniquely imagined, put together and preserved. This uniqueness is necessary. If this necessity is ignored, and something is put instead, it will have a jarring effect. This necessity I regard as subjective necessity. The predicate, beautiful, cannot be used unless such necessity is present. Singularity (Universality) and necessity are therefore the most important aspects of an aesthetic judgement.

The peculiarity of an Aesthetic judgement can now be understood with reference to the two cases, which I have cited above (i) the statue of Venus is beautiful and (ii) The Venus is beautiful In the case of 'the statue is beautiful' the element of the existent i. e. statue cannot be ignored. The judgement that the statue is beautiful, cannot be passed, ignoring the Statue element. The element of statue is a part of the configuration and the knowledge of statue, the particular statue, cannot be kept away from the analysis while analysing the judgement, that the statue of Venus is beautiful. This particularity or singularity is also present when we are saying that Venus is beautiful. The Venus is a configuration of the ideational parts which are particular i. e. about each such part we could significantly say 'this'; all these parts could be pointed out. I think this is esentially the difference between Forms and Concepts. A concept cannot be pointed out. There is no particularity or singularity about the concept, but there is a particularity or singularity about the form. Perhaps there may be gradations even in these forms. Some forms may be spatio-temporal, some forms may be spatio-temporal, forms may be spatial or temporal and some forms may be symbolic as suggested hy Sustannail angul Rangi Chlericor Hand forms may be even if we are able to use a certain scale of gradation or gradations

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# THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

in regard to these forms, the singularity or the basic particularity of the form is never lost. These forms cannot be generalised in the sense, the concepts or the class can be generalized. Just as, if we know that in the case of the isosceles triangle, that its base angles are equal and the sides opposite to angles are equal, and we apply the formula to any isoceles triangle, we cannot, knowing that one configuration is beautiful, pass on to the law or rule that the configurations of this kind are beautiful. The reason is that configurations that are beautiful are bound to specific particularity. and segregated from this particularity, they are no more configurations of the beautiful. Therefore, they retain the nature of judgement and unlike some moral judgements, they cannot be derived from some premises, rules or maxims as conclusions. In each judgement the standard or principle of beautiful may be imagined like Plato's formal cause, i. e. the principle of beautiful, vaguely formulated, but it would not be formulated in the way we arrived at concepts, such as man, mortal etc. It is merely the principle that we find in the configuration itself alongwith the vague element that is supplied by the past culture.

In another way also the aesthetic Judgement must be carefully understood. I have said that aesthetic Judgement does not behave just like Geometry. The reason is that there are two types of jugements as Kant suggested. When I say something is a table, it is a judgement. Its full form is 'I know that this is a table.' Following Barlingay, I would say that the form of judgement is that 'I know that....'.3 Idealist Logicians said that the subject of the judgement is reality. I think reality or a part of reality is not a subject of judgement but is a subject of a logical proposition. Now as stated earlier some judgements can be transformed into propositions. For example, the judgement 'I know this is a table' can be transformed in to 'This is a table.' or 'It is the case, that this is a table.' It means that the part 'I know' can be ignored in such cases. It is ignored because we are merely stating the case. It is our belief that my knowing or my judging does not make any difference to the case, my knowing or judging is not the case of human engineering, a human construct. But in the case of sentences like this is beautiful whether we explicitly state or not, the 'I know' Part is integral to it, inseparable from it. That is even if I say that is beautiful it is all ways of 6ther Rangi Collection, Handwar that is beautiful it is beautif X is beautiful. It always remains a judgement and could never

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attain the status of a proposition. Unless something attains a status of proposition, the subjectivity in it cannot be eliminated and where the subjectivity cannot be eliminated there cannot be inference or generality. Even if communication is established a subjectivity i. e. to others that 'I feel that X is beautiful', I cannot establish any rule, as to why anyone should feel that anything a beautiful. Aesthetic judgements unlike judgements of cognition have always a status of judgement and never have the status of proposition which is required for framing a rule or for talking about certain logic or law.

Dhanawate National College, Nagpur.

Krantiprabha Pand

#### NOTES

- 1. S. S. Barlingay: Philosophical Quarterly, Amalner, 1964.
- 2. S. S. Barlingay: Distinguishables and Separables. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. II, No. 2. Jan. 1975.
- S. S. Barlingay: A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic: Chapter of Judgement.

#### REVIEW

Pandey, Sangamlal; Whither Indian Philosophy: Essays on Indian and Western Epistemology; Darshana Peeth, Allahabad, 1978; pp. 467; Price Rs. 200/-

The book is a collection of essays by the author, some already published, others appearing for the first time, arranged under four sections. There are seven essays in the first, five in the second, seven in the third and six in the last section. The essays are prefixed by a pointer to the perspective, namely to uplift the status of Indian Philosophy. We shall not comment essay by essay. Instead, we shall concentrate on the main sections under which they are grouped.

The first section, entitled "Exploring Indian Philosophy", seems to be addressed to the task of explaining why one should study Indian Philosophy. The author is right in holding that richness and variety of Indian philosophical thought are inviting. The author regrets that in spite of the fact that a number of persons are taking to study Indian philosophy "a complete history of Indian philosophy" has not came forth. But he avoids telling us the painful fact that the genuine raw material, depending on which a good history of Indian philosophy - leave alone a complete one—may come to be written has not been made available. Hence, what is rather regretable is that the researchers in the field seem to lack the correct perspective about what they do as also about what they should do. Likewise, a proper way to do Indian philosophy does not seem to be through "opposition to western philosophy" as the author thinks but by dissociating the former from the latter, wherever and the extent to which this is possible and feasible. Secondly, granting the unmistaken importance of Dinnaga in Buddhist Logic in particular and Indian Logic in general, one does not quite understand the inconsistent characterization of Dinnaga's philosophical position at the hands of the author: logical idealism (p. 35), idealism based on critical realism (pp. 36, 46) and that it is an epistemological transcendentalism (p. 37). Similarly, one is perplexed to understand what exactly naya is: doctrine (p. 49), statement (p. 50), process (p. 51). Prof. Pandeys' essay on Ravidasa is perhaps intended to bring home to readers the idea that one should also study writings of saints in order to assess their philosophical worth and bring out their relevance, if any, de-one purosophical worth and other philosophical

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or otherwise. The author, unfortunately, seems to fall a prey to the tendency pioneered by Dr. Radhakrishnan—viz. of religionizing philosophy.

section is of essays second collected under . "comparative religion and philosophy". In this section the author. perhaps, wants to indicate the outcome of his research in Indian philosophy, namely comparative philosophy as also comparative religions. First, comparative religion. Many researchers in our country have been actively engaged in undertaking investigation in this area. But why should one study religions comparatively? Is it to strengthen and rainforce one's religions beliefs on the ground that such beliefs are shared by the followers of other religious? In such a case this exercise may be important for the believers; but then it would hardly be philosophical. Perhaps one studies religions comparatively because it is a fashion. But in fact one should study religions and religious phenomena in the searchlight of critical analysis and proper philosophical assemment. The author unfortunately nowhere gives a trace of anything of this kind in any of the three essays devoted to the subject.

Coming to comparative philosophy. Unfortunately, comparative philosophy has became a catch-word and an attraction in our country. Many sweat in this area of research without ever raising and attempting to answer some of the important questions: (a) Why do we need to do comparative philosophy? Is it with a view to glorifying our past? We have not yet understood that glorification of the past is a wrong mode of understanding pastphilosophically a deception. (b) Have we reliable information about our philosophical past to be able to undertake a proper comparative philosophy? On this count, too, we are quite in the dark. And lastly (c) do we have the proper method and perspective of doing comparative philosophy? In their absence what kind of comparative philosophy do we intend to study? Our present task cannot be of doing comparative philosophy but of properly reinterpreting the philosophy of our predecessors and critically evaluating its worth In the absence of this anything done under the name of comparative philosophy is likely to be a futile exercise.

In the third section, "the search for new ideas" seven essays are collected. Four of these are devoted to the discussion of such concepts as non-violence are devoted to the discussion of concepts of man and society. The author is quite well-acquainted

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First, mere shift of language does not automatically guarantee

clarity in understanding. Secondly, for a clearer expression the language in which we do philosophy must be sufficiently rich.

Otherwise Cour language cannot function as a tool of proper philo-

MARATHE with Gandhian philosophy and many of the things he says on l a prev the topics deserves attention. Instead, we wish to comment on the of reliremaining three essays in the section. In them the author brings forth three highly controversial problems and they cannot escape under : attention of any serious student of philosophy. We propose to e author. discuss them in brief. (i) First, writing history of Western philosophy n Indian parative from Indian point of view. No doubt an attempt of this kind in our was made in our country by persons like R. D. Ranade and others stigation and the author exhorts such an exercise. But the important point ratively? is: Why do we need to indulge in this sort of exercise? It is doubtful ground whether we want to write such a history because we have something ligious? new to say on the subject. But if it is only a retort to the misplaced elievers: comments of historians of philosophy like Frank Thilly about studies Indian philosophy then the whole exercise is futile and not worthy act one of doing it as a philosophical exercise. For, even in the western rchlight philosophical circles such historians are hardly ranked as important. t. The If, on the countrary, it is because we have developed a new perspecof this tive of looking at philosophy then we better first write history of Indian philosophy from such a perspective than venture to do what the author commends us to do. (ii) Secondly, in which language compation in should we do philosophy? According to the author English seems ut ever to be ill-suited for the purpose because it is a foreign language stions: and it has not become part of our nature; and those who did philowith a sophy in English "failed to capture creative spirit of Indian Philosophy" (p. 306). The author does not wish to hold, I presume, d that past that this state of affairs arose because English is a bad language to do philosophy in! Nor would he accept that Indian philosophy about arative lacks creative spirit. So the only alternative that remains is that we do not have sufficient grip of English. What is then the alter-And native? Sanskrit? Certainly not. For it is a dead language and "a doing arative philosophy....done in a dead language becomes repetitive, imibe of tative, obscurant and antiquarian" (p. 305) and in consequence ng the useless. So according to the author unless we do philosophy worth. in our own language—national or vernacular—there is no hope rative of any illumination. Prima facie, this may be conceded. But, neverthless, we must not lose sight of two points of great significance.

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sophical communication. Something positive needs to be done in this regard for Hindi language The author's exhortation to switch over to Hindi as a medium of proper philosophical expression and meaningful communication is likely to be a futile exercise if proper precaution is not taken in this direction. (iii) Thirdly, how to make philosophy socially relevant? The author's answer is: By doing philosophy from the Advaitic perspective. One can very well understand the author's love for and commitment to the philosophy of Advaita. But in saying that our philosophy will become socially relevant provided we philosophise through the perspective of Advaita Vedanta the author seems to make two questionable claims: (a) The philosophy of Advaita was and is socially relevant — this needs to be established rather than assumed, and (b) No philosophy done by us would be socially relevant unless it is done through the perspective of Advaita Vedanta. It is needless to comment on these points.

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We now turn to the last section, "Investigations into Advaita" in which there are six essays. This section is given to the elaboration and defence of Advaita philosophy—especially Śamkara's philosophy. Granting that 'Śamkara's philosophy is dialectical—leaving aside the question what the dialectic is: discipline (p.360), Critique of Pure Reason (p. 370) etc.—one is unable to see how with the help of such a dialectic Indian mind to-day must be searching common truth between Euclidian and Non-Euclidian geometry (p. 374). One wonders whether 'Śamkara's Advaita is a pondora's box in which solution to any problem are placed, no matter whether problem concerned is in ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science or logic of perceptual terms (see especially chapters 23-25).

To point out the short comings is not to minimise the value of Prof. Pandey's book. In fact Pandey is one of those very few people who feel the necessity of reunderstaning our philosophy in some different way. Prof. Pandey, therefore, deserves our thanks for taking a step in this direction.

A minor but an important point needs to be stressed. The value of the book would have been enhanced if there were less number of printing mistakes. It would also have been better if by the high price of the book it were not kept, financially, beyond the reach of a common interested reader.

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### INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Our Contributors to Volume No. 7

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- 1) The Winged Form: Saxena Sushil: Sangeet Natak Academi (1980): pp. IV + 164 + (iii).
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- The Indian Philosophy of Beauty-Part One: Perspective:
   T. P. Ramchandran: University of Madras (1980):
   pp. x + 104.
- 4) The Indian Philosophy of Beauty-Part Two: Special Concepts: T. P. Ramchandran: University of Madras (1980): pp. x + 152.
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1980)

### INDIAN AND AFRICAN NON-ALIGNMENT ROLE A Theroretical Framework

Non-alignment is essentially anti-colonialism. It is an acce-T. Kanni plance of the principle of peaceful coexistence; a national assertion of independence based on efforts for self-reliance; and international apporcach to achieve just and equal economic relations for stable peace. Non-alignment stands against the creation of blocs and similar combines of nations that can be or are easily militarized.

In this paper we will discuss some of the relevant questions as to how non-alignment is the objective necessity for India, Africa and other developing countries; how it is the product of new political and economic relations and how changing material conditions of the developing and developed world have necessitated the adoption of non-aligned policy. How did this movement become a 'Unity Forum' for anti-colonialism, new economic order and thus against continued exploitation of developing countries? We will examine the attitude taken by Africa and India and see whether the concept of non-alignment has changed since its inception.

The reasons which necessitated a policy of non-alignment in India and Africa are very similar. We have a similar colonial past, we all were afraid of loosing hard won independence. Our economy was intricately linked with the western capitalist system. We were exporters of cheaply paid raw material and importers of heavily charged industrial goods. We all wanted to improve our economic conditions and thus be less dependent on others. Our national struggle had taught us that even the armed imperialist could be forced to relent by determined united action. Thus we chose to unite, even though on limited issues.

Non-alignment according to the Indian and African founder fathers was not neutrality. It was a movement and not a bloc.1 They had defined non-alignment in the following words: the only camp we should like to be is in the camp of peace and good-will. "2 said Nehru in 1959. Nasser expressed similar view: "I will not become the stooge or satellite or pawn or hirling of any body," 3 and according to Nkrumah "nonalignment .... in no way is anti-western nor is it anti-Fastern."

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Since its independence India based her foreign policy pronouncements on-anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, non-interference in internal problems of others, for free hand to build an economic base for the country, India has also been against military pacts. In her actions she has largely adhered to this policy. Nevertheless India has been continuously making efforts to avoid total economic dependence on the West and thus has not allowed imperialism to re-enter through the back door.

India has consistently opposed apartheid and racial domination since 1946. This she has done inspite of annoyance of western powers. India, in the recent years, has shown a qualitative change in her involvement with African freedom struggle. From more support she has now pledged full material, including military, support to the Africans. 5 India has given its active support for the establishment of a new economic order.

### Non-alignment - a Concept : A Historical View

With the end of 2nd world war a qualitative and irreversible change had taken place in the world. The European colonial powers had become weak. The nationalist movements in the colonia had become "uncontrollable" and thus decolonization had become inevitable. USA had emerged as a great capitalist power, capable of holding the strings of the purses of European countries and was also industrially capable and anxious to exploit the minerally rich lands of Asia and Africa. USSR had emerged as a great socialist power with fast growing economy and a strong army matching the western military strength.

As a sequel to these changes, there emerged two systemic capitalist and socialist—in the developed world. The newly independent countries who were struggling to clear the debris of centuris of foreign domination and were struggling to give content to the freedom and independence did not align with any of these groups. Consequently, some regarded these countries as a third force, a third world, allegedly opposed to both the capitalist and socially worlds and others hailed the policy of these countries for positive contribution to international peace, decolonization and economic independence. The policy which the newly independent countries adopted was not merely a reaction to the cold war; it had much firmer and wider basis. It was a response to the aspiration of vast masses of people who emerged into freedom from foreign curvatures.

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domination and were eager to attain the status of respect equality with other nations of the world. It was in line with the hasic aim of the newly independent contries to secure the right to make their own decisions in domestic and foreign policies free from foreign pressures. It was a policy of non-aligntment. Tanzanian president Nyerere chose non-alignment because "we shall not allow any one to choose any of our friends or enemies. for us". 6

For Dr. Nkrumah " It is not indifference that leads to a policy of non-alignment. It is our belief that.... we must be free to judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are just and peaceful, irrespective of the powers involved." In fact, perhaps a "non-alignment is a mis-statement of our attitude; we are firmly aligned with all forces in the world that genuinely work for peace. "7

The new states inherited their basic position within the international community direct from the colonial relationship. In the strategic terms they remained within the Western orbit, and in economic terms the majority remained virtually client states on the periphery of the western economic system. The question was: could they, in these circumstances, hold an independent position in the arena of international politics?

The socio-economic and political structure of the new states and consequently their foreign policies emanated largely from the circumstances, methods and actions through which the independence was achieved. Historically most of the nationalist movements in Africa and Asia had been led by petti-bourgeoisie or natiobourgeosie and not by working class. The colonial people had lought against their former colonial masters and had been aided, directly or indirectly, by socialist countries in their freedom struggle. During the national struggle for independence some leaders had expressed preference for the socialist development system and for delinking their economies with imperialist economies. bey found that their economies were intricately linked with capilist countries and the link could not be broken without risking conomic stability. It was also noted that in case of a shift of conomic links from capitalist to socialist block the latter was not in a position to meet all their requirements. Besides they had to experience of dealing with socialist countries,8 and hence were and thus not prepared to join them. Most of them chose

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The varying levels of political and economic independent and different alignment of class forces defined the different foreign policies pursued by various countries of Asia and Africa. In comparises where the anti-imperialist circles were in power, the government refused to participate in power blocs and came out against the policy of neo-colonialism, and for peace and security in their respective regions and throughout the world.

The principal manifestation of their foreign policy was the policy of non-alignment. The basis was their need of restructuring their backward economies, freeing their countries from imperials hold and marching towards faster socio-economic development. At these countries had diverse ideologies, economic and social structure and political institutions, they did not follow the same system for development and were not uniform in economic development plans.

They pledged to follow an independent policy, be self-reliar and restructure their economy, so that their dependency relationship presently leading to exploitation may change to equalify relationship. This they found was possible by creating a powerful state sector capable of introducing accelerated development process.

To protect their freedom they thought of unity with other newly independent nations and a unified attack on forces of colonialism, racialism and neo-colonialism. For Africans, units of African nations was an expression of Pan-Africanism. The anti-racialism was an asserion of human dignity And thus it was imperative for them to join only that group which favoured Pan-Africanism and was genuinely against racialism and colonialism. They found the socialist countries as anti-colonialist and anti-recialists but realized that a complete switch over to them could mean upsetting the economy even though temporarily. These historical conditions demanded the adoption of anti-colonialist and anti-perialist policy, a policy of not aligning with the socialist block.

When the independent nations of Asia and Africa were hore they found extreme type of antagonism between capitalist socialist worlds. The former was trying to surround the socialist worlds with those party to military pacts. The latter was aided to the victoriam, Algeria, UAR and freedom-fighters of Africa in the struggle against the practice was aided to the countries with those party to military pacts.

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INDIAN AND AFRICAN NON-ALIGNMENT

The newly independent countries had no choice; they could either accept alliance with western military blocs or remain out of them. They could not join the Pact, which the socialist countries had formed to safegurad themselves against the western imperialist forces, as it was open to only socialist countries of Europe. Recoenizing that their freedom was threatened due to the presence of army bases in Asia and Africa, most of the Asian and African nations decided to remain out of the western military pacts. Afraid of imperialist re-entry and to root out colonialism they adopted an anti-colonial and anti-racialist policy. To be strong they decided to unite on regional and global levels.

The new political and economic relations and the changing material conditions of the developing countries and the developed world necessitated the adoption of non-aligned policy.

### History of Non-alignment

The policy of non-alignment passed through a number of stages. In the first stage the Afro-Asian countries voiced their refusal to participate in the cold war and met at Bandung to condemn the arms race, racism and demand the abolition of surviving colonia regimes. 10 This period witnessed the antagonism between imperialist and anti-colonial forces.

The second stage began after 1956 and ended with the first conference of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade in 1961. This stage was characterized by the establishment of Soviet-US nuclear parity and the politics of bi-polarity dominating the world scene. resulting in what was called the balance of terror. This period also witnessed the massive liberation of African countries and the phenomenal increase in the membership of the UN, increase in the number of countries pursuing a policy of non-alignment and seeking to work together on an organized basis. During this struggle between the imperialists and anti-imperialist forces sharpened eventually further weakening the imperialists and strengthening the anti-imperialist forces.

The third stage was the period of Transition from old to new order. The Belgrade conference held in 1961 laid down criteria for non-aligned countries. It regarded only those countries nonaligned whose foreign policy was based on non-alignment and who followed an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence who supported liberation movements; who were not members of any

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bilateral or multilateral military pact in the context of East-West struggle, who had not granted bases to foreign powers. 11 Peaceful coexistence meant that the newly developing countries could develop friendship with both capitalists and socialists. This stage emphasises the historical necessity of change to new international relations guaranteeing national independence in economic and political fields. The need for unity amongst struggling nations also became a necessity.

The next stage of the history of the non-alignment movement covers the period from 1st to 3rd conferences held in Cairon 1964 and Lusaka in September 1970. During this period number of changes occurred. Most of the African countries achieved inch. pendence and identified themselves with the non-aligned movement started open intervention in Vietnam. Efforts to interfer in Congo's (Zaire's) freedom were made by western powers and Israel occupied Arab areas. On the economic front the imperialis powers tried to stage a come-back through neo-colonialism disguism under the cover of multinational corporations. 12 Neo-colonialism attempted to carry out the imperialist policy under the guise of aid In the process of change from colonialism to neo-colonialism or tain structural changes occurred. USA, which was not a traditional colonial power, became partner in neo-colonial exploitation Similarly Germans, who had lost all colonies during the great wats, entered the field through investments and aid programms Through multinational corporations and other methods colonialism took the form of collective colonialism. The old colonial power involved other economically advanced countries in keepingth newly independent countries under their economic control. Another form of collective colonialism was the formation of monopolistic unions for example, the European Economic Community and European Common Market.

The Common Market turned the newly free countries into agrarian raw material appendages to a group of powers instead of a single power.

These structural changes precipitated changes in the anticolonial camp too. Most developing countries adopted non-aligned
policy. In developing countries forces of unity and cooperation
were being strengthened. In spite of serious differences the radial
and moderate states of Africa succeeded in setting up Organization
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# INDIAN AND AFRICAN NON-ALIGNMENT

hecause the OAU affirmed the "policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs, "13 and expressed their determination to "provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among states. "14 The OAU determined not to involve big powers in solution of its internal crisis situations. The African Unity with its numerical preponderance gave new strength to the movement.

During this period there was a growing disappointment on the question of aid from the big powers, particularly the western capitalist powers. Historically speaking we find that in the fifties and early sixties there was tremendous optimism at the prospect of the developing countries "catching up" with the developed world. The development process was envisaged to proceed on an imitiative path based on the historical experience of the developed capitalist countries. Foriegn aid was presumed to assist in the endeavours for development. There was the belief that increased participation in international trade brought nothing but benefits in terms of increased external resources to the developing countries.15

The need to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism was emphasized and demand for just terms of trade for the economically less developed countries was made. The non-aligned countries were perturbed by the glaring inequalities and imbalances in the international economic structure and the ever widening gap between the developing and developed countries. More and more developing countries came to realize that their economic situation had continued to deteriorate and the resultant debt burdens on them had reached intolerable levels. These countries noted that if the deficit in the balance of payment rose at the prerent speed it will reach the figure of 212 billion dollars by 1980 ( It was 12.2 billion dollars in 1973 ).16

Recognizing the close inter-action between the political and economic relationship the non-aligned stressed the need economic self-reliance, accelerated economic development for gaining status of equality with other nations and solidarity and collective action by promoting economic cooperation amongst non-aligned countries.

The Lusaka conference endorsed this approch and pledged actively cultivate the spirit of self-reliance through their collective bargaining strength. This approach was based upon the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, independent economic activities, the formation of producers association and

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nization lopment proclamation in the United Nations of the New International Economic Order. The developments in international situation, since the Belgrade Conference, demonstrated the growing impact of the non-aligned. The non-aligned nations played a constructive and progressively effective role in world affairs. They substantially contributed towards positive transformation of international relations and promotion of world peace. The non aligned contributed significantly towards the prevention of the division of the world into opposing blocs and sheres of influence. The non-aliened succeeded in establishing themselves as an independent and vital force for the creation of a new and just system of political and economic relations and for combating unequal relations and domination arising out of neo-colonialism. 13

The 4th Summit Conference held in Algiers in 1973 laid emphasis on the mutual cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries and its decisions and recommendations served as the basis for intensive international negotiations aimed at the estblishment of the new international economic order. It further affirmed the need for collective bargaining strength among the non-aligned and placed entire weight and influence behind the actions to be taken by producer countries of raw materials to obtain a remunerative price for their products. 19

"Since Algiers Summit Conference in 1973", President Kaunda said, "major economic changes affecting the developing countries had taken place. The expectation that the 3rd world would get a fair deal from the industrially rich countries had been failed. The developing countries faced a very grave and common problem. They were linked with the international system which worked against their interests." The growing demand was that the monopoly in decision-making by the developed countries had to be ended. There was a growing conviction that "nothing short of a complete re-structuring of international economic relations through establishment of the new international economic order, will place the developing countries in a position to achieve an acceptable level of development." 21

### New Interantional Economic Order

In view of the growing realization that "the struggle for political independence and the exercise of their sovereignty cannot be disociated from the struggle for the attainment of economic control in Public Domain. Cartainment of economic control in Public Domain.

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emancipation,<sup>22</sup> a new international economic order was proposed as a system of collective bargaining against collective colonialism. The new order was based on Nyerere's concept of economic self-reliance and implied a firm determination on the part of the non-aligned developing nations to secure their legitimate economic rights in international dealings through the use of their collective bargaining strength. Nyerere emphasized the need for collectivity and cooperation and said "the big powers will try to prevent us from forging a real united front and if we succeed they will constantly endevour to break it up.... they will even strengthen their control over our political freedom." Stressing the need for economic independence Nyrere said, "we must have economic development or we have no political stability, we have no political independence either, but become play things of any other nation which desires to intervene in our affairs."<sup>23</sup>

Expressing his views in support for a change in international economic relations president Kaunda said, "we of the third world have become increasingly aware of the fact that we share one common problem namely that we are linked with an inequitous global system of international economic relations which works against our vital interests. We are opposed to present system whereby the wealthier and and industrialized countries retain the monopoly of making decisions affecting all other states. We believe in power sharing as an important gurantee for peace within the international community. "24

By the time Colombo Summit was held there was greater clarity in the understanding of world forces. The non-aligned leaders had realized that "much of the present international economic relations are a carry over from colonial relations. ...In some areas the old relationships have been replaced by new patterns of relationship which hide inequality and the essentially exploitative nature of the system and give a comforting feeling that a new era had dawned." 25 That the task of promoting change in the international economic order could be carried out through a collective self-reliance, through a non-imitative approach to develoment utilizing to the maximum the indigenous resources and mobilizing fully the collective potential and economic capacity to extract the best bargain from the developed countries. 26

During the course of 15 years non-alignment had become a dynamic movement activating change, indeed becoming an instru-

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ment of change. Starting as a movement against imperialism and neo-colonialism it sought to change the prevalent structure of exploitative economic relationship.

#### Conclusions

The bi-polar world power structure in which non-alignment was born fifteen years ago has gradually been replaced by new patterns of relationships in which many countries are losening their military links with big powers, are asserting their sovereignty and are exerting more control over the use and disposition of their natural resources. During this period a large number of countries, particularly in Africa, achieved national independence. These countries, in their effort to advance economically, came in closer touch with the international imperialism. They found that western powers aid and trade, although proclaimed to develop newly independent countries, actually underdeveloped them. The former colonial powers, after independence, introduced neo-colonial machinery. The new system involved many countries in collective exploitation of developing countries through multi-national associations and corporations. The newly independent countries realized that in order to fight this collective imperialism they had to form collectives. As they had done on national scale during the period of nationalist movement, they decided to bury their idealogical differences now to form international united front overlooking diversity of ideologies, social structures, political institutions, and uneven stages of economic development.

Twenty-five years ago primary preoccupation of the newly emerging countries was to avoid being partner of military link ups, set up by western powers. To-day, though not eliminated, the military alliances and bases, in view of the development of technology e.g. ICBM and satelite system, are not that important. The confrontations of yesterday have now been replaced by growing dialogue and spirit of detente. Detente recognizes peaceful co-existence and other principles of panchsheel. Detente has been interpreted by some as an instrument to obtain mutual recognition of sphere of influence as acceptance of a balance of big power relationship. Such a concept is negative. As we have seen above the prevailing structures of relationships are unsatisfactory, and to a considerable extent are a carry over from the hey-day of imperialisms, and participated by knew for the transparal and one

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We find that non-aligned are seeking change towards a new economic order, towards relationship based on quality, respect for sovereignty, self-determination, mutual interest and towards removing the causes of tensions. The non-aligned, in every summit, have made it abundantly clear that, for peace and detente, they are not prepared to forego their right of armed struggle by the people under colonial or racial domination.

Besides struggling against racist regimes in Israel, South Africa and Rhodesia, the non-aligned have to fight against the politics of pressure and domination which are seriously threatening the independence of states, and also against measures calculated to cause disruption and destablilization which threaten their internal security and create political confusion and economic chaos.<sup>27</sup>

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Africa			MIT DE	-	1-10	
inflow	182.2	162.7	241.5	201.6	235.5	270.7
Outflow	380.8	318.8	708.6	963.7	924.3	996.2
Balance	-198.6	-555.1	-467.1	-762.1	-688.8	<b>—725.5</b>

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### THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC PRETENSE

Human rights are proclaimed more often than they are observed. Is this proclamation then a pretense, a mere public lipservice to principles privately ignored? Do our leaders seek to be just or only to appear just?

One problem in answering these questions is that if the pretense, the appearance, is truly well done it is almost indistinguishable from reality. A good pretender, after all, will conform his conduct to his stated principles whenever he is being watched. Yet I think some progress toward answers can be made. A liar's story is not likely to be as consistent as that of someone telling the truth. By looking carefully at what public figures say about human rights, we may be able to discern such obvious arbitrariness that we can dismiss their pretensions as pious hypocrisy. On the other hand, if we uncover no inconsistencies (or if the inconsistencies revealed are later rectified) we then cannot know whether rights rule in their hearts.

This essay has three parts. The first sets forth the general problem of pretense, outlined above, in more detail. Through a game-playing analogy, it is argued that self-interest is likely to result in pretense. We have good reason to be wary of public professions of piety.

The significance of arbitrariness in the recognition of human rights as a proof of pretense is then examined. Unless all arbitrariness in the acknowledgement of human rights is condemned, no human rights, including our own, are secure. However, the irony of this argument is also pointed out. For the public censure of arbitrariness may itself be only a pretense arising from the real dangers which such arbitrariness poses for all, rather than a manifestation of a genuine commitment to subordinate oneself to justice even when one could get away with only appearing just to others.

The final section of this essay considers the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe V. Wade as a case study in the problem of pretense. It will be argued that, whatever may be the right answer to the abortion question, the Court's complete disregard CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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of the child before birth is clearly arbitrary and inconsistent with a commitment even to post-natal human rights. Overturning Roe, is this in the interest of all human beings—even of those who think they have non-arbitrary grounds, not mentioned by the Court, for approving of abortion? Yet if Roe is opposed only because its non-serious attitude to human rights endangers us personally, then such opposition itself lacks a serious concern for others.

### The Danger of Pretense:

Suppose a number of people sitting down to play poker. Would it be difficult for all to agree not to cheat? Of course not. No one would play in the absence of an agreement to abide by the rules. So anyone who wishes the game to be played will promise not to cheat. But are such promises always evidence of a morally serious commitment to the rules? Of course not. Even an amoral and self-interested person would not say openly that he planned to cheat, if he wished to have a chance to cheat. His interest is precisely in saying one thing and doing another, whenever he can get away with it. Therefore, public declarations against cheating are no guarantee of genuine commitment.

In order to focus upon the dignity of the human person, what has just been said should be translated from the language of rules to that of rights: Everyone in a card game would recognize the existence of a right not to be cheated (or more elaborately, a right to gain whatever one can according to the rules). Even someone who planned to cheat secretly would publicly profess to uphold such rights. Moreover, the very motivation, financial gain, which leads him to cheat also leads to his pious talk of rights.

Our would-be cheater knows, of course, that if all acted as he would like to act the game could not go on. But this knowledge cannot motivate him not to cheat when he will not be caught (not, what amounts to the same thing, when the risks of cheating are outweighed by the benefits to be gained). For what he does secretly will not affect the actions of others. Whether they do or do not cheat is causally entirely unrelated to what he does. Moreover, even if this problem is made public, it is not resolvable. If all the game players are self-interested, they will certainly be able to agree that each must renounce cheating in order for the game to go on, but just as certainly they will be unable to generate a motive for private adherence to the very principle which they all agree to be CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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over, Il the agree o on, e for necessary. Self-interest can discover what rights should be observed, but it cannot motivate observance.<sup>2</sup> As long as one's cheating remains undetected, it cannot affect what others do, and therefore the desire to have others not cheat cannot motivate one not to cheat in secret. Making this dilemma public cannot lead to taking rights seriously in private, but only to the abandonment of the game altogether.

Why, then, does the game go on? One reason may be that secrecy has been entirely eliminated. If everyone's hands and cards can be constantly observed, appearing not to cheat can be achieved only by not cheating in fact. A watched would-be cheater will act no differently than someone honestly committed to the rights of others.

Yet omniscience may be difficult, and we surely hope that it is unnecessary. We all (both cheaters and non-cheaters) hope that we can rely on the commitment of our fellow-players not to cheat. We hope that our neighbours are motivated by more than self-interest, that their protestations of concern for others' rights are not mere pretense. But is our hope justified? How can we know whether or not we are being fooled, taken in by mere pretense?

As we transpose our dilemma from the card table to the social world, these questions take on new force. The same motivation to pretense exists here on a larger scale. That is, rational and amoral self-interest must lead to a public agreement on certain rights (e.g. life, liberty and property) and to a personal desire not to appear to violate these rights. But, once again, such self-interest alone can generate no reason to abide by these principles in secret. And to eliminate all pockets of secrecy in society would be far more difficult and far more repugnantly invasive of our privacy than simply to make sure all hands and cards stay on the table.

Morever, we have been assuming that our cheater wishes to keep playing cards with everyone at the table. It is only on this assumption that watching him makes him conform to the rules. But if he is only pretending to subscribe to these rules, he will not only violate them in secret, but will do so publicly if it becomes in his interest to do so. For example, if one card pl. yer is exceptionally rich and weak, the rest may in the end put down their cards and simply take his money— if the benefits of

such a move outweigh the problems it will pose for future relations with him and with each other.

Therefore, insofar as we wish neither to be secretly chealed nor perhaps even to be openly exploited, we want rationally to hope that our fellow-citizens are not just pretending when they claim to care about human rights. Can we so hope?

### Proof of Pretense:

Proving the sincerity of others seems impossible. Practical and political problems aside, one can never prove that a given appearance is backed up by reality, because a really good pretender will appear exactly like a non-pretender, except when he is not watched or is ready to abandon the game.

Proving the insincerity of others may be a little easier. That is, although the fact that someone is never caught cheating does not prove that he adheres to a rule against cheating (or even that he has not been cheating all along), the fact that someone is caught cheating would seem at first sight to prove that he does not subscribe to a rule against cheating.

But here we encounter the problem of weakness of will. Even a very sincere opponent of cheating may find himself sometimes succumbing to temptation—say, if his debts are great and so is the pot. Such a person is not a pretender, and is not necessarily an untrustworthy game-player—except when the stakes are high, of course, if someone is so weak of will that he is tempted by even the smallest pot, then he is no different in behavior from the pretender, who lacks only his qualms. Yet, for the most part, weak-willed people would make reasonably good neighbours if they only now and again gave in to strong temptation.

Weak-willed people, unfortunately, may not only act in violation of their principles, they may try to justify their acts. For the sake of public appearance they may become pretenders in part. Their adherence to principle may be genuine, but the alleged exception allowing their behaviour is a pretense. But there now exists a discrepancy between the attempt to appear virtuous and the attempt to be virtuous, which makes the weak willed person almost as dangerous as the amoral pretender.

This is so because no authoritative system of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. It is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions. This is a matter of ideas (e. g. principles of human rights) can permit arbitrary exceptions.

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of principles may be, if one can carve out arbitrary exceptions, the principles lose all force. To affirm the right to make even one exception without adequate justification is to disaffirm the orinciple excepted to. Someone who publicly affirms both principle and exception must be only pretending to believe either in the first or the second. Either this person has been all along a mere pretender to principle, or he is committed to principle in his heart but now finds himself dishonestly claiming an exception for his own conduct.

But he has now been "caught in a lie"; that is, he has made claims inconsistent with his prior public principles. What will he do? Will his desire to appear virtuous destory his remaining virtuous, as he is forced by consistency to expand his exception and to allow new ones, to tell more lies in order to cover up the first? Note also that even if the principles he holds retain some force in his own heart, he may have lost all ability critically to respond to another pretender's private or public wrongs. This other pretender can always ask: "How is what I did any different or worse than what you did?", and the weak-willed person will have no answer. That is, he will have no answer unless he somehow summons up the courage to admit that the exception he himself had previously claimed was wrong. But this answer, though possible, seems unlikely in a weak-willed person. Particularly if the original exception was made under relatively non-tempting circumstances, the weak-willed person seems unlikely to recant. We all have some sympathy for the person who does wrong when he has a great deal personally lo gain or to lose. But we expect more of a person whose self is little threatened by his decision. If such a person arbitrarily makes exceptions he would mildly prefer, we may rightfully think him so weak as to be no more trustworthy than an amoral

Therefore, we may conclude that someone is not to trusted who publicly claims to be governed by a set of principles but also claims a right to make one or more exceptions without plausible Justification. Either he is a pretender through and through, or he a weak-willed person who by pretense has boxed himself into a lituation where he cannot logically resist the pretensions of others then if he could withstand his own unprincipled desires. In the latter case, particularly if he has been weak in the absence I. P. Q. . . 2

of great temptation or duress, he cannot be relied on in the future to adhere to or to return to principle.

Suppose that your neighbour at the game table whispers to you the suggestion that the two of you work together to take a thind for all he has. You ask in return "How do I know you won't cheat me, too?" Would "Oh, I would never do that." convince von! Of course not, because if your neighbour can arbitrarily exclude a third person from his non-cheating pledge, then he can just a easily exclude you. He is a pretender and is not to be trusted Would "Hey, I'd never try that. I know you'd beat me un or your friends would." convince you that he did not believe in the ting you? To say that the weak and friendless are cheatable down not seem a principled exception, and someone making sucha statement would have to be watched closely. Would somethin like this then be convincing "Listen, he's a black man; I'd new cheat a lighter-skinned man"? Here the question is more difficultion answer. If the third person is weak and friendless, as well as black suspicion is certainly justified. But if on the basis of the is of your neighbour's speech and conduct he seems consistently to make a moral distinction between the dark and black (or believed other universal racial characteristics, if there are any) that perhaps in his mind his promise has a principled basis, and he can be trusted. One could either question him at length, or (as would more likely be in practice) one could decide on the basis of the plausibility of such consistent racism. Such a judgement would a doubt vary with the mores of the times. But what is constant that someone who affirms arbitrary exceptions to a principle cannot be trusted to abide by the principle in question.

Lest there be some misunderstanding: I am not suggesting that moral integrity requires absolutism, but only that it requires non-arbitrariness. If one believes in given moral principles, will never simply disregard them. When one acts contrary to the one will at least have taken them into account before finding So, for example, a carl them outweighed by other principles. player is not obviously lying when he whispers that he know cheating is wrong but that he is going to cheat the other out of revenge for a past insult. Perhaps he sincerely and strong opposes cheating when no other principle is involved, but simple thinks that a morel. thinks that a moral demand for retaliation must take priority over a demandle brototomich catkulkarthis case on ha aveillar not claim to loally be

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the other has no right not to be cheated. He will acknowledge such a right in general, but argue that it is here outweighted by the right or duty of revenge.

Nor am I suggesting that everyone who is arbitrary is acting out of self-interest. Self-interest (which includes the desire for the praise of others) is a likely motive for pretense, as we have seen, but there may be other motives. Or someone may be simply not morally serious—a happy-go-lucky fellow who pays little attention to what he says or does. When someone who claims to believe in human rights willfully violates them arbitrarily, we know only that his claims are not to be relied on. We do not know for sure why he violated his principles, though we may suspect some self-interest.

Yet even with these qualifications, the non-arbitrariness test here enunciated has enormous analytical and political power. For it means that a single willful gap in a system of moral or legal rights is enough to undermine the entire system. No one who takes human rights seriously will think it right wholly to ignore them on occasion. Therefore, anyone who does think it permisible now and then to ignore human rights must be only pretending to take them seriously. He cannot be trusted when his hands are under the table, certainly. And he really cannot even be trusted to keep up his public pretense if he should wish another exception in the future. If one arbitrary exception is justified, why not another—as long as no one who can effectively oppose him objects.

This test for pretense is surely well-known and widely used. Why else is the charge of hypocrisy so common in politics? Everyone can see real or apparent arbitrariness in his opponent's positions, and he attacks these flaws with glee not only because they reveal the opponent to be an untidy fellow, but because they permit the charge of pretense to be explicitly or implicitly kivelled. And this charge, if carried, discredits the opponent not likely at the arbitrary margins of his position but through and through. Thus the frequency of such charges does not detract from their seriousness. They are common for the same reason of arbitrariness means that the affirmer is not really bound by the principles he proclaims, and therefore he cannot be trusted.

Alas, our pretender may be too clever for us. He may back off from his attempted arbitrariness (perhans because CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangn Collection, hans because

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ut simply priority laim that of arguments like those made here) and publicly extend to pretense beyond the point which his interests dictate at fine sight. So, for example, he may concede the rights of a weak not because he cares about its members as human beings, but only because he has no plausible rationalizations for discrimination and he does not want people to see through his pretended allegations to human rights.

Thus our test may succeed only in driving pretense deeper underground, where it cannot be detected as easily. Is there, that any point to our efforts? I think there is. As long as someon affirms the right to be arbitrary, he cannot be trusted. He is a pretender in whole or in part. Either he is unprincipled or in compromised principles provide no effective protection against further violations of human rights. As long as public arbitrarine reigns, we can have no security in private now, or in public if a should become weak, friendless, or otherwise unable to demand deference. But if pretense is driven underground, at least the remains no public precedent for further violations. And—the knows—perhaps the former pretenders have truly repented, not increase their own credibility, but because they now have be converted to a belief in human rights. At least we can hope a

# Pretending not to Know Whether Life Exists Before Birth:

The U.S. Supreme Courts' 1973 decision W Roe P. Wald provides an exceptionally clear case of the kind of arbitral dismissal of human rights discussed in the theory developed above. Because it is not compatible with principled considerations basic rights, it both provides a logical precedent for further rights violations and reveals those who support Roe's reasonate (not necessarily those who support abortion itself, as we see) to be conscious or unconscious pretenders if they elsewate affirm life as a human right. Such pretense to principle endance all human rights and should be opposed even by those favour abortion on grounds arguably less arbitrary advanced by the Court. Let me try to demonstrate these assertions.

Roe v. Wade does not allow the states to protect the except as merely potential human life, even in the last before birth. In describing the permissible limits of state about laws, other in Content against Raikul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even prescribe abortion, except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgement, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.<sup>6</sup> [Emphases added]

In reaching its position, the court states that "[T]here has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth," that "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth..." and that even a wrongful death action following still birth "...would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life."

The court clearly speaks and acts as though the existence of actual human life prior to birth were at best uncertain. Indeed, so certain is it of its uncertainty that, without explanation, it allows the states to permit abortion for any reason right up to birth, and requires the states to prefer the health (or simply "well-being") of the mother to the life of the child, even just before birth. The court treats, and requires the states to treat, the viable child before birth as though it were not a living human being whose rights may not be violated without serious justification. In other words, a child born at eight months gestation is presumably actual human life in the eyes of the court, whereas a more developed child at nine months in the womb cannot be said to be a living human being.

Is such position arbitrary? Would someone who consistently held legal or moral principles of human rights, applicable to the newborn, wholly ignore the interests of the child about-to-be-born? Note that our question is not whether allowing late-term abortion is itself arbitrary. We could not reach an answer to the latter question without considering more factors than we have here. Rather, our question is only whether it is arbitrary not to recognize a viable fetus as an actual existing human being, and thus at least as one factor going into a difficult decision.

Now, almost the only difference between the premature newborn and the pre-born is one of location (ex. or in utero). Does our moral practice, in regard to rights and to all other matters, CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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permit location per se to determine the very existence of living humanity? I think not. True, there is also the fact that its prebirth location hides the unborn child from direct view (though not from touch and hearing). But we usually regard the human tendency to ignore those we do not see (e.g., in dropping bombs) as a regrettable failing to be overcome, not a principle to affire No one who really cared about infant life would purposely ignore it when hidden. There are, of course, likewise some biological adaptations to the new location which take place at birth—primaring the shift from placental to pulmonary oxygenation. But these, too, do not seem morally decisive. Artificially filtering a kidney pair nt's blood does not make him non-living; presumably oxigenating it would be no more morally significant, especially if he were quite capable of functioning on his own as soon as necessary.

The only way, I suggest, that birth could be seen to be the beginning of actual human life would be if one of these physically minor changes mentioned above were taken to be metaphysically major. For example, someone might believe in a new scripture stating that God creates a soul when the child's head first emerge from the womb, or when the child takes its first deep breath of all Such a believer would certainly not be a pretender when he claimed to be committed to human rights only after birth. But the court does not (and perhaps constitutionally could not) claim to hold any such beliefs which could make its disregard of the child seem less arbitrary. 10

We must conclude, therefore, that the Supreme Court (a) more exactly, those seven members who joined in the Roe opinion does not take the right to life seriously, even after birth, someone cared at all seriously about the child after birth, would at least not ignore, and require others to ignore, the very existence of that same child hidden in the womb. He might fevor late abortion, but he would take into account the hard done to the child. But here the Court has denied the living humber reality of the unborn child. Thus a commitment to the humber rights of infants simply has had no observable weight in the Roy. Wade decision.

Of course, we do not know why the Court pretends not know that human life exists prior to birth. Perhaps its commitment to the human rights of the weak and unwanted it commitment. In Public Domain. Gurufair Kangfi Collection, Haridwar

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a pretense. Or perhaps it is simply weak-willed and gave into peer pressure from those who wanted abortion somehow legitimated. In the latter case, maybe we can still hope that the Court will protect other human rights, as long as its peers do not object. But if the Court's will is this weak, we cannot expect much. After all, life-tenured judges not subject to review are in about as neutral and untempting a situation as could ever be created. One can easily understand and sympathize with this kind of arbitrary rationalization from a woman who has had a late-term abortion, but not from these neutral males.

Moreover, the precedent of Roe has a force of its own which may be stronger than any weak good will remaining in the Court. Since location is not a plausible basis for distinguishing who is or is not alive or human, will there not be a tendency to fasten onto some other criterion to exclude the pre-born from community concern? And who else will fall within this new category? Handicapped newborns? Children below the age of reason? Anyone not intelligent enough to make a reciprocal promise to respect the rights of others? Anyone not strong or wanted enough to matter?<sup>11</sup>

I do not know. But the alternative to one of these additional restrictions on human rights, given Roe, is not the protection of everyone, but is the arbitrary protection of some. That is, if Roe is not rationalized by expansion, we are in a sense worse off than if it is. As long as we purposely close our eyes to the existence of the child in the womb, while recognizing its existence after birth, we legitimate wholly arbitrary recognition of fundamental human rights. To approve such unjustified arbitrariness is to deny one's commitments to the principle of human dignity everywhere else as well—in secret already and openly whenever self-interest may permit. We thus have good reason to fear that the Court and those who agree with it12 will not respect even our adult rights to life in private or public if they ever have an interest in violating them. Indeed, anyone who arbitrarily disregards human life can now rightly claim that he is only doing what the Court has done. If he is punished, this can seem to him only an act of power—rather than one of equal justice.

Perhaps, nevertheless, we ourselves will not be harmed. One CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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s not 10 s entire anted is cannot predict the future based only upon the structure of ideas. But we can know that even if we remain secure, our safety cannot result from the fact that our law takes human rights seriously, for in Roe v. Wade fundamental human rights were arbitrarily disregarded.

Let me hasten to reiterate that this necessary opposition to Roe need not result in opposition to all abortion. Much of the world allows abortion to some degree. But to my knowledge nowhere except in the U.S. have lawmakers been ordered to ignore the existence of the child as a living human being prior to birth. For example, a West German Constitutional Court justice wrote, in regard to early abortion, that

"[T]he life of each individual human being is selfevidently a central value of the legal order. It is uncontested that the constitutional duty to protect this life also includes its preliminary stages before birth." [Emphasis added]<sup>13</sup>

Yet this same justice went on to argue that a limited decriminalization of abortion for any reason is constitutionally permissible. Such a person is not obviously pretending. He seems honestly to be weighing in the interests of the child, even though his conclusion is surprising. Thus one need not wish to prohibit abortion in order to agree with the argument of this essay. Even those who support abortion should repudiate Roe, because it ignored the unborn without an adequate justification for such disregard. Whatever the right way to treat the very young may be, if the thoughtlessness of the Court is not something that can be approved.

Lastly, let us hope that Roe will not be repudiated only because it discredits our social commitment to human rights and thus may increase mistrust and insecurity. A repudiation for such a reason is still not a commitment to abide by principle, but is only an attempt to improve the public appearance of our commitment to rights. Not only a new public statment, but also a change of heart is needed in the Court and in all those who until now have supported it.

Visiting Professor

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# THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC PRETENSE

#### NOTES

1. This statement assumes that neither the particular cheater nor the fact that anyone has cheated has been discovered. In a small group, the latter discovery (as a result, e.g., of extra cards found on the floor) would be enough to upset the game, even if the precise culprit could not be located. But in a large group, such as society itself, the individual cheater is harmed only if he personally is caught. The mere fact that one more crime is discovered to have occurred would be most unlikely to affect the interests of the individual criminal.

2. For a solid analysis of the fact that rational sel-interested individuals will not act to achieve even unanimously agreed-upon group goals, unless coerced to do so, see Mancour Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

Many people falsely think that someone who does not act as he would want others to act (or as he himself would like to act as a rule) is irrational, or at least short-sighted. In fact, his failing is often moral rather than narrowly rational—e. g., a violation of the "golden rule." As long as the short and long run consequences of a particular act of cheating are appraised to be of net benefit, a rational self-interested person will cheat. In the absence of a felt moral demand to follow rules, not cheating would be irrational.

3. John Farago called my attention to the significance of "neutrality" in realation to weakness of will.

4. There exists, of course, a third possibility besides pretense and adherence to principle: self-deception. The weak-willed person may seem particularly prone to this failing, which might be called "believing whatever one wants to believe." Now, this is logically impossible. How can one knowlngly lie to oneself and be believed? How can one honestly think that some fact or value precedes one's desires and also that it proceeds from one's desires? But such self-trickery obviously often occurs on some literally unthinkable level. A weak-willed person is likely not only to pretend to an exception for himself, but actually to believe in it. However, I have not considered this third possibility in the body of this essay, because it seems to make no behavioral difference. The person who is able sincerely to shape his principles at will is not governed by them anymore than is the pretender without principles.

In other words, unconscious pretense is just as untrustworthy as is conscious pretense. However, the word "pretense" unpreceded by "unconscious" does imply a purposeful deception of others which I do not wish necessarily to impute to those who are arbitrary in their words or deeds. "Hypocrite" seems better to cover both types of unprincipled person, but it has such a strong connotation or moral condemnation that I have generally avoided it in favor of the milder though perhaps less accurate word "pretender."

It might be noted significantly that, in one way, unconscious pretense or self-deception is much worse than conscious pretense. The person

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who makes a worthless public excuse for his conduct may be disarred in the face of the wrongs of others, but he can still seek privately he live up to his principles. But the person who has deceived himself into an arbitrary exception to his principles now finds his own conscient disarmed, because every attempted return to principle is blocked by the precedent of arbitrary exception.

- That is, as long as various cases involve the application of a 5. single principle, e.g. human dignity, to act self-righteously arbitrary in any one is to abandon the principle. However, if someone claims to adhere to a number of separate principles, the fact that he violates one not obviously a proof of his insincerity in regard to the others. For example, someone who cheats at cards may still be quite sincere and trustworthy in his refusal to molest children.
- 6. Roe v. Wade 93 S. Ct. 705, 732 (1973)
- 7. Ibid., pp. 730-731. Roe calls the fetus variously "potential life" (pp. 725, 727) "prenatal life" (p. 728), "potential human life" (p. 730) "the potentiality of life" (p. 731), "fetal life" (p. 732), and "the potentiality of human life" (pp. 731, 732). It also states "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." (p. 730), but says "....a legitimate state interest need not stand or fall of acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth" (p. 725). Putting all this together, one gathers that the Court does not know whether "life" (in the sense of "human life"; exists prior to birth, but its potentiality does -- in the form of "prenatal" or "fetal" life.
- See the material quoted in the text supra for the "health" of the "mother" rule. At page 733, Roe refers the reader to the companion case of Doe v. Bolton 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). Doe in turn elaborates 01 the concept of "health":

"....[T] he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors--physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age--relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health." (p. 746).

This broad concept of health reasons for abortion was recently reaffirmed by the Court in Colautti v. Franklin 47 LW 4094, 4096-4097 (1979).

9. I am not even arguing here that the Roe Court was arbitrary (at pp. 728-730) in denying legel personhood (as opposed to actual existence) to unborn human life. The assignment of legal personhood is conclusion, not a fact, and it could not be criticized without extensive analysis of all reasons of policy and principle going into conclusion--although I think there is a very strong argument that every living human being ought to be considered a legal person.

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past legal treatment of the unborn as not "persons in the whole sense" (Roe, p. 731) cannot easily be faulted without discussing, e. g., tort policy and evidentiary matters which may have made it difficult for the law to give the fetus full legal recognition.

However, in Roe the Court is purporting to discern and limit not the law itself but the factual basis upon which past and future law is to be based. It is nonsense to claim that a car does not actually exist when it is in a garage, even if for purposes of interpreting a city ordinance requiring parking stickers the car might non-arbitrarily be denied legal recognition.

Nor does a legal fiction denying recongnition to a car or to an infant provide evidence of their actual non-existence, any more than the U.S. Constitution's slavery provisions provide some evidence that blacks are three-fifths as tall as whites. The provisions once provided that slaves were to count as three fifth of free persons, for purposes of allocating state representative strength at the national level.)

A non-arbitrary decision on what is real (as opposed simply to what is legal) requires factual arguments. (Or, perhaps more exactly, it requires concepts designed to organize experience rather than to govern legal treatment.) But the Court did not consider such arguments.

- 10. Again, it will not do to appeal, as the court does, to the conclusions that various ages and religions have reached regarding abortion. These conclusions may have been based upon illusion; what matters is whether the factual reasons for these conclusions are still acceptable to us today. Indeed, the very making of such a conclusory appeal may betray a lack of serious concern for the status of the fetus, a willingness to go along with arbitrary convention. See Roe, pp. 715 ff, 730.
- 11. Proposals moving in these directions have recently been made; Dr. James Watson has suggested that we wait until three days after birth before declaring a child alive. The National Observer, Sept. 1, 1973. For an excellent philosophical argument for the irrelevance of birth and in favour of infanticide, see Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (1972), see also Duff and Campbell, "Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery," The New England Journal of Medicine, 289 (1973). John A. Robertson, in a thorough analysis of the problem, has suggested that infanticide of defectives is "rapidly gaining status as 'good medical parctice." See "Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis," Stanford Law Review. 27 (1975), p. 214. As long ago as 1968, Joseph Fletcher pointed out that the only difference between the fetus and the infant is that the infant breathes with its lungs" and that this difference is not morally significant. He went on to claim self-awareness and a conscious relationship to others as requirements of humanness, concluding that a Down's syndrome child "is not a person". "The Right to Die", Atlantic Monthly 221 (April, 1968) pp. 63-64. (Fletcher, and the others mentioned below, are obviously not using the word

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"person" in the legal sense discussed in note 9, supra, but in the sense of the prior moral or factual reality which the law should take into account.)

H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., a prominent ethicist now with the Kennedy Institute in Washington, D.C., has presented the argument "that we do not have obligations to fetuses, infants, animals, and the very senile in the way that we do to normal adult humans, for only normal adult humans are persons in the strict sense of being necessarily objects of respect," "On the Bounds of Freedom: from the Treatment of Fetuses to Euthanasia", Connecticut Medicine, Vol. 40, June 1976, pp. 51-52. Social utility should determine whether or not legal protection should be extended to the very young, since no human rights are at stake.

I myself consider the only intellectually honest alternative to ascribing a pre-birth origin to the living human person to be the claim (towards which the writers mentioned above seen to be moving) that moral or factual personhood is only an appearance or experience, rather than a reality which may or may not manifest itself in experience. In other words, one could deny personhood to the unborn by arguing that a human person exists only when he is perceived to exist by himself and for by someone else. This position avoids locating personhood in an underlying reality containing the "potentiality" of acting like a person, and thus avoids being forced to recognize a person in the todder, in the fetus, and ultimately in the conceptus—where this potentiality first becomes complete, active, and autonomous.

Such arguments restricting the human community to unfounded appearances are fascinating (indeed, metaphysically mind-boggling), but I do not yet see how they can end in a coherent, principled, and workable concept of the human person. See, for example, the problem of whether a sleeping hermit is a person. However, unlike the Roe court, those arguing something like this position do seem to treat the issue of who possesses human rights as a morally serious matter.

12. Those who agree with the court are relatively few. While polls which ask whether or not one favours "the Supreme Court decision making abortions legal up to three months of pregnancy" (Harris, 1973 ) may show majority approval, more accurate questions do not For example, only 25% of men and 16% of women in 1973 thought abortion should be allowed at more than five months of pregnancy. And even these respondents do not necessarily support the reasoning of the Court that the existence or actual human life prior to birth is uncertain. Again in 1973, only 19% of men and 8% of women thought life began at birth. A majority of women and a plurality of men thought it began at conception. (No one was reported to have though that life begins at some point after birth.) See Gallup polls as reviewed by Judith Blake, Population and Development Review, Volume 3, Nos. 1 and 2. (1977) This article also demonstrates that there has been little change in in which in the beautiful in the second terms.

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13. "West German Abortion Decision", translated by J. D. Gorby and R. E. Jonas, 9 John Marshall Journal of Practic and Procedure 605, 663 (1976).

14. My own position is that the equal dignity of human beings means that the law in principle should permit abortion (at any stage of pregnancy) only to save the life of the mother. However, I do not think that logic or the Constitution requires us to punish abortion in way we would the homicide of an adult. Equal concern for all permits different treatment in different circumstances, as long as every distinction has a compelling rational basis; and pregnancy is a unique human relationship which may call for a special kind of care. Moreover, and more importantly, I do not regard anyone who truly agonizes over leaving human life unprotected to be a hypocrite, even if his moral conclusion sharply diverges from my own. Unlike the Court, such a person seems to be attempting to be faithful to principles of human dignity, although his judgment may seem mistaken.

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# SYNONYMITY AND THE THESIS OF INTENSIONALITY

This paper seeks to study the Intensional Thesis of Carnap as contrasted with that of Frege and ascrtain whether it provides a satisfactory account of "Synonymity" of natural expressions which the Extensional Thesis allegedly fails to provide. I shall try to show that inspite of his parade in technical vocabulary, Carnap fares no better than Frege and that, in the contex, of natural language, the intensional thesis is no superior alternative to the Extensional one. I propose to lay bare some of the misconceptions that lead Carnap to formulate his theory in the way he does. I would also suggest a radically different approach to the issues involved.

1. Extension and Intension: A very interesting account of 'synonymy' is to be found in Carnap's thesis of intensionality. He advances his thesis as an alternative to the thesis of extension. He claims that his theory has a decided edge over Frege's theory which is also intensional. The extensional thesis states that the meaning of an expression is ultimately determined by, and understood with reference to, the extension of some expression or other. Let us take the case of a foreigner who is being gradually acquainted with the expressions used by the native. The foreigner progressively learns (i) that a term applies to a number of things, (ii) that it does not apply to certain others, and, (iii) that there is an area of indecision of a range of objects to which he cannot possibly apply the term. The more he knows the language, the less is the area of indecision. In this way the total area of its application, i.e., the extension of the term is grasped. He is liable to make mistakes as to the actual range of its application, but such mistakes are to be treated at par with errors common to scientific operations.

Extensionalists, however, may allow the experession "intension" for the facility that could be derived from its use; but, for them, intension would be all a matter of decision. Two foreigners may agree as to the extension of a term, viz. "cordate."

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That is to say, they may have come to know the individuals, within a given region, to be designated by the term, and those not to be so designated. But the foreigners may differ as to the reason for which the native employs the term in those cases as he dose, and refuses to employ it in these cases as he does not.<sup>2</sup> One of them may think that cordates are so called because they possess hearts while the other may think that they are so called because they possess kidneys. Different classes of people belonging even to the same language group may be found to differ in like manner. Men are so called by the biologist for one reason, and by the labour contractor for another. Even the biologist may not agree among themselves on this point. For an extensionalist there may be various alternateve reasons for which an object may be identified as a cordate; one is free to choose any. The question of right or wrong, therefore, is irrelevant here.

Against this intensionalist position Carnap maintains that intension is as much a question of fact, and, therefore, of truth, as the extension. He emphatically holds that the intension of a term is as much a matter of empirical hypothesis as the extension.3 If one of the foreigners takes the native word 'cordate' to mean creatures with hearts, and the other takes it to mean creatures with kindneys-it may be argued that al least one of them is wrong. But the extensionalist thesis does not help us decide which one is so. For, there are no creatures with hearts but without kindneys, and none with kidneys but without hearts. Hence the need for the intensional theory. Further, we need a theory to account for the meaning of terms that do not designate. The term "unicorn" does not denote anything nor does the term "dragon". But this does not prevent us from using these terms distinguishably. We do this with reference to the intensions of these terms., This calls for an intensional theory.

That which is true of natural language applies to the language of science as well. The language of science is the natural language made more precise. Increase in preciseness of the language of science entails a corresponding increase in intensional precision. In earlier phases of science, a substance could be described in various alternative ways. But it was only with the increase in intensional precision that some one of the descriptions evolved as a definition.

For this we need explicit rules for intension along with those for CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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extension. It must be admitted, however, that the more we depend on such explicit rules the more we are bent on a constructed language system.

Carnap explicates "meaning" by "intension". Single-word terms, as well as phrases and sentences have intensions. The intension of a term is the general condition which an object must fulfil so that it may be designated by the term. The term 'human' (H), for example, has the property 'being rational biped' (F) as its intension in a system of language (S). That is to say, the object (Human) must satisfy the condition of being a rational biped, so that it may be called human in the language system S. According to the convention adopted in Meaning and Necessity. "the intension of the sentence is the proposition expressed by it." The meaning of a designator, —a word, a phrase or a sentence shorn of its non-cognitive elements or associations, is the intension. It is this rarefied content that is relevant to science, and, is sufficient for the determnation of truth-value of sentences. Intensional identity is an essential condition of synonymity of expressions. For complex expressions like phrases or sentences further conditions need be satisfied. This has been sought to be expressed in the conception of intensional isomorphism.

2. Intensional Isomorphism: If two expressions have the same extension as it is the case with "morning star" and "evening star"—they are said to be equivalent in the system of language(s) in which they occur. If two expressions have the same intension—which might not be the case with "morning star" and "evening star"—thay are said to be L-equivalent (logically equivalent). It is ordinarily held that two L-equivalent sentences are not only inter-changeable salva-veritate; they are synonymous also. But Carnap's ingenuity lies in this that contrary to the popular view, he mainthins that sentences which express the same proposition are not necessarily synonymous.

Thus "9 is equal to 9" is equivalent to "9 is equal to 3 x3". That is to say, they are interchangeable salva-veritate. They are, furthermore, E-equivalent. That is to say, they express the same proposition. But they are not synonymous. That is why somebody who knows that 9 is equal to 9, may not know that 9 is equal to  $3 \times 3$ . Accordingly, the sentences of the propositional attiude, "I know that 9 = 9", and, "I know that  $9 = 3 \times 3$ ", though 1. P. Q... 3 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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ensional inition ose for express the same proposition are not identical in cognitive impor In order that two sentences may be synonymous they must saish three conditions. First, they must be L-equivalent, i.e., they must express the same propsition (identical in intension); second, the must have L-equivalent parts i. e., the intension of each word or phrase of one sentence must be identical with the intension of the corresponding word or phrase of the other sentence; and third, the order or arrange ment of the parts of one sentence must be the same as the order or arrangment of the parts of the other sentence in respect of their intensions. If any two expressions conform to these conditions they will be 'intensionally isomorphic. "Intensional ismorphism" is, for Carnap, an explication of "sentential synonymity", or "synonymity between compound linguistic expressions".

The expression "7 + 5" has the same intensional structure as "VII" sum V" in the traditional mathematical system. These two expressions are synonymous, they have same intensional structure, because, (i) the sentences are L-equivalent, (ii) their corresponding parts are L-equivalent, and (iii) the arrangement of the parts of the one sentence is similar to the arrangement of the parts of the other in respect of their intensions. The expression (a) "7+5" is intensionally isomorphic with both (b) "VII Gr V" and (c) Gr (VII, V). The fact that (b) and (c) are intensionally isomorphic shows that placing of "Gr"outside the parenthesis, of between VII and V, without the parenthesis, is merely a syntaction device; its particular position in the total expression is not involved essentially in the determination of intensional It is interesting to note that though "7+5" is L-equivalent to "12", the two expressions are not synonymous. In Carnapean analysis the elements of "7+5" cannot have their intensional counterparts in "12".

3. Carnap Vs. Frege: Carnap employs his notion of 'intensional structure' to resolve the 'pardox of analysis'. "Brother" has often been analysed as "male sibling". How are we to view the relation between the analysandum and the analysans? If the analysis is correct, the relation must be one of identity; and, brother is a male sibling", like "A brother is a brother", put he considered a trival to the considered as trival to th be considered a trival truth. But, if the sentence, "A brother is a male sibling" is to 1 a male sibling" is to be considered informative, as it presumably

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SYNONYMITY AND THE THESIS OF INTENSIONALITY

is, the relation between "brother" and "male sibling" cannot be one of identity. And, in that case, "male sibling" should not be recognised as the analysis of "brother".

Frege seeks to solve the problem by drawing a distinction between the sense and the reference of designators. Both "brother" and "male sibling" refer to the same entity, but they have different senses. If the components of a sentence are not referentially opaque we may replace any component of the sentence by any expression which has the same reference. If we replace "male sibling" by "brother" the sentence (i) "A brother is a male sibling" is transformed into (ii) "A brother is a brother". The sentences have the same reference; they are equally true. But while (i) is informative, (ii) experesses a tautology. For cases like this, Frege holds, referential indentity preserves the truth-value, though not the sense.

According to Frege, subject of the statement refers to the object, and the predicate refers to the concept or relation. This, holds true of all regular subject-predicate form of statements, i.e., all those cases where the terms are not referentially opaque and simple conversion of sentence is not possible.

A sentence like: The morning star is the evening star, being convertible into: The evening star is the morning star, is called an identity statement. A statement like this may be rendered into: The morning star is identical with the evening star. Patently, this sentence has two subjects, viz., "the morning star" and "the evening star", and one predicate, viz., "is identical with". Considered thus, the two identity sentences,

- (1) The morning star is the morning star,
- (2) The morning star is the evening star,

would not vary in respect of the reference of their corresponding terms. Frege would account for the difference in meaning of the sentences with reference to their corresponding senses. The sense of the total sentence, according to Frege, is the function of the senses of the components—individual words or phrases—of the senses of the term "the morning star" is the concept of morning star, and the sense of the term "the evening star" is the concept of evening star. Theses concepts are different as concepts. Hence of the pair of sentences.

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- (3) The concept of Morning star is identical with the
- (4) The concept of Morning star is identical with the concept of Evening star,

the former (3) is true, and the latter (4) false. The difference between these two sentences may be accounted for with reference to their truth-values.

Now, Carnap points out that this method is not adequate for determining the difference between two L-true sentences which are mutually interdeducible. To cite his own example:

- (5) The concept Brother is identical with the concept Brother,
- (6) The concept Brother is identical with the concept Make Sibling.

The concept brother, for Carnap ( as distinguished from Frege), is the same as the concept male sibling. The two sentences do not differ in their reference, both are equally true; nor do they differ in intension; cooresponding terms of the sentences have the same intension or sense.5 These two sentences, thus, express the same proposition. But, while the former (5) is trivially true, the latter (6) is informative. The difference between sentences like these, Carnap thinks, cannot be accounted for by Fregean principle. Carnap recalls Black who explains the difference thus. While (9) expresses a relation of identity ("The concept Brother is identified with concept Brother"), (6) expresses triadic relation involving "brother", "male" and "sibling" ("The concept Brother is identical with the concept Male Sibling"). This approach is welcomed by Carnap. But the view that such a difference is to be regarded as a difference in proposition that the sentences express as Black thinks - does not appeal to Carnap. According to him, both sentences express the same proposition, but each sentence differs from other in propositional structure. To express in Carnap's terminological the sentences are identical in intension, but are not intensional isomorphic. In Carnap's own words, "The difference between the two expressions (i.e., "The concept brother" and "The concept brother" Male Slibing"), and consequently, between the two sentences [i.e. (5) and (6) as stated above] is a difference in intensional structure, which are the structure w structure, which exists inspite of the identity of intension. necessars Cand Aufficient condition Room public way between designator SYNON

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for Carnap, is this structural identity in intension, and not merely the simple identity of intension itself.

According to Frege the reference of the sentence is the function of the references of the individual words or phrases that occur in it. Frege holds, in a peculiar sense indeed, that the reference of the sentence is the truth value, which he calls "The true" or "The False" as the case may be. 7 Hence he cannot distinguish between any two sentences of the same truth-value, on the basis of their reference. He evokes sense to account for the difference. What Carnap does with 'intensional structure', Frege would do with 'sense'. Carnap thinks that, as we have already mentioned, identity is intension of two designators sometimes goes with difference intensional structure. Definitionally, two L-equivalent sentences share the same intension, but they may not be synonymous.3 Carnap quotes C. I. Lewis in support of his contention. "Two expressions are commonly said to be synonymous ( as in the case of propositions, equipollent) if they have the same intension, and that intension is neither zero nor universal. But to say that two expressions with the same intension have the same meaning, without qualification, would have the anomalous consequence that any two analytic propositions would be equipollent". [Meaning and Necessity, p. 60.]

Carnap acknowledges that sentences like "P or Not-p" and, "It is not the case that P and Not-P" have distinct meanings. But they are both L-true; and, furthermore, they are interdeducible in the system (S<sub>1</sub>). Same would be the case with sentences like "9 = 9" and " $9 = 3 \times 3$ " in a mathematical system. Two such sentences are L-equivalent. That is to say, they share the same intension; but, they differ in meaning or intesional structure. Now, the difference between Frege and Carnap may be stated as follows. According to Carnap, P<sub>1</sub> and P<sub>2</sub> may not differ as propositions, though they may differ in propositional structure (intensional structure). But, for Frege, variation in the propositional structure would be the same as variation in proposition. That is to say, P<sub>1</sub> and P<sub>2</sub> will be considered distinct propositions, should they very structurally. The "intensional structure", according to the Fregean way of thinking, will not be distinguishable from the sense", of the sentence or the phrase, as the case may be. In the context of natural language, Frege may not admit any sentence CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar to be analytic except, possibly, those that are strictly repetitive. The morning star is the morning star. Carnap explicate "analytic" by "L-true" (or "L-determinate", if we are to include "L-false"). But all L-determinate sentences are completely system dependent, created by the rules of the system they belong to But outside mathematics Frege would not be interested in those artifacts, not to speak of the of relation synonymy between them

4. Cognitive content and Logical content: It has been held that two L-true sentences of the same system are logical equivalent. Logical equivalence between sentences is the mark of intensional identity. Intensional identity, however, falls shorted synonymity. It is often assumed that if two distinct sentences at interdeducible there must be something common between them which makes this deduction possible. If P entails S, and, S entails P, a content common to both S and P is sometimes posited which, it is believed, makes this entailment possible. This content may be called the logical content of both S and P. Nor, (i) "P or Not-p" is L-true in S1, which is L-equivalent to (ii) "It is not the case that P and Not-P"; that is to say, and one of them may be deduced from the other. It is, accordingly, believed that there is something common between the expressions, which is the logical content of both. The total content of 2 linguistic expression is broadly divided by positivist philosophers into cognitive and non-cognitive components. It is only the cognitive component that has been considered relevant to truth and, therefore, this alone has been recognised as important for science. The non-cognitive elements of the expression, that it to, say the emotive, the associative and all other ingredients have been kept out of consideration. Frege's distinction between 'sense' and 'colouring' (tone) of expressions corresponds with those between cognitive and non-cognitive components. But Fres does not distinguish the alleged logical content from the cognitive one. Difference in cognitive content between distinct expressions but identity in their logical content, according to Frege, it impossible. If distinct expressions differ at all they must differ in sense i. e., in respect of cognitive content. But Carney distinguishes the logical content from the total cognitive content, the total being identified as the meaning (cognitive) of the expression. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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When two distinct L-true sentences entail each other, they need not as it is evident to Carnap—be synonymous. How, then, is it possible to deduce one from the other? Carnap could answer point blank that deductions are made possible by the rules of the system. The reason for not saying so might be this. Deductions are no longer officially held to be matters of syntactic manoeuvring. They are now considered by him as belonging to the semantic system. They are, therefore, required to be accounted for as consequent upon something extra-linguistic. He improvises 'intension' for this purpose. But the intension of a sentence is out of the pre-assigned properties of the a construction designators occurring in the sentence. These intensions are introduced into the system by special rules (viz., rules of designation). Viewed thus, the logical content or intension, supposed to account for mutual entailment between sentences (which, otherwise vary in meaning), is a made-to-order matter. Considered in the context of an artificial system of calculus this may be unobjectionable. But there is something in the very notion of intension as distinguished from meaning or the total cognitive content, which causes concern.

When two distinct expressions do not vary in intension, and yet vary in cognitive import, the variation is accounted for by their difference in intensional structure. 'Intension', therefore refers to the cognitive content minus the structural properties involved in it. This suggests that, for the purpose of deduction, the structural properties of the cognitive content are irrelevant. The more usual view, however, is that deductions are possible because of the structural properties essentially involved in the premise and the conclusion. Those who hold that the relation of deduction holds between sentences, depend on the formal properties of those sentences; and, those who view it as holding between propositions, as distinguished from sentences, also draw on the formal character of propositions. Hence, the muddle is potent in the view that, entailment of one sentence by another is consequent upon the common content or intension of the sentences, and, that the intension is the cognitive content or meaning minus the structural properties.

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<sup>5.</sup> Structure and Content: It may, however, be argued that two questions concerning deduction must be kept distinct:

- (i) How is a sentence deduced from another?
- (ii) Is the content of the conclusion same as that of the premise?

To the former question, it may be answered that deduction are made on the basis of the formal properties of the premise, and, to the latter, it may be replied that the content (a core of content, at least) of the conclusion is the same as that of the premise. Now, if the bare content is represented by c and the structural properties of the premise and the conclusion are represented by t<sub>1</sub> and t<sub>2</sub> respectively, we may cite a case of deduction as:

1. t<sub>1</sub>c, 2. / : t<sub>2</sub>c,

'c' being common to both, the difference between 1 and 2 is exclusively determined by the structural properties, t1 and t2 of the expressions. An uninterpreted calculus is system of relation between structures only. But the structures, considered apart from the content, are only meaningless signs. How can the structures which are meaningless in themselves cause variation in the congitive import of expressions? If change of form affects the meaning-and, it is claimed that it does-we are left with the following alternatives, one of which must be accepted. The first is that, both the bare content and the bare structure are severally meaningful so that when is added to the other, i.e. when the content assumes a particular structure, something is conferred upon structure itself in the form it by the of meaning, which distinguishes it cognitively from any other item (linguistic) with a different structure. The second alternative is that none of the elements – neither the structure nor the content - is independently meaningful; the alleged 'intension' is not to be identified with any core of meaning considered apart from the form it assumes. Meaning, in a manner of speaking, is oint product of 'structure' and 'content.'

Since the bare form is not supposed to have any meaning and there is general agreement on this point—the first alternative is not warranted. May we not hold that its 'bare content is independently meaningful? Possibly not. When the intension has a structure any consideration of the hare 'intension' as disting' CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Rangri Collection, Haridwar

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SYNONYMITY AND THE THESIS OF INTENSIONALITY

uished from the intensional structure is idle. It is not possible to know without reference to the rules of the system, that there is a meaningful content (i. e., intension), which is distinguishable, from the total meaning (cognitive) of the expression. Nor is it possible to know, without reference to the rules of L-equivalence whether two distinct expressions share the same intension. The total content of the conclusion is different from that of the premise, and we have no independent means of ascertaining the supposed identity in intension between them.

Let us fix on the structres;

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Now, the delta and the star are more signs, which may be interpreted as sentential symbols like p and q, respectively. The expressions will then read as:

According to the rules of the system (1"), (2") and (3") are intrededucible. That is to say, they are identical in their 'logical content'. It is to be noted that "p" and "q" are not sentences, but sentential signs or variables. The expressions of the uninterpreted calculus are now given a sentential interpretation. This shows that, in the context of a constructed system, the alleged 'logical content', CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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the 'content' (or 'intension', as Carnap would have it ) by virtue of which such deductions are considered possible is a structural matter which may belong (as it does in the case of expressions of group A and B) to items which are not meaningful sentences at all. Intension, according to Carnap, is the meaning of the expression minus the structural elements. These structural ele ments account for (along with intension) the total cognive cont. ent or meaning of the expression. It is the intension alone ( not the structural properties thereof ) which is held to be common between L-equivalent sentences, by virtue of which the relation of equivalence holds between them. Accordingly, this intension has been the called the logical content of such sentences. But, contrary to Carnap's claim, the relation of logical equivalence between expressions, as it holds between items of group A, B, or C, is all a matter of structure.

If we replace the sentential sings of the items of group C by concrete sentences, we get the set D, as follows:

- line of the line o he decides to marry. We nevit ad the
- 2". Either a young bachelor does not fall D in love or he decides to marry.
  - 3". If a young bachelor does not decide to marry then he does not fall in love.

Considered as items of the constructed system, that is to say, as substitution instances of the items of group C, the sentences must be mutually L-eduivalent. But considered as descriptive sentences independent of the system, i. e., as items of our natural express they may not share any common meaning content (intension). "If-then" and "not-or" of the calculus have been so de fined that an expression of the 'if then' form may be translated into an expression of the 'not-or' form. But their use outside the rigid system cannot guarantee that infalliblity which the calculus is supposed to vouchsafe. The sentence "If a young bachelor falls in love then he decides to marry "-viewed in the context of natural language does not strictly yield, "If a young bachelor does not decide to marry then he does not fall in love". At times assertion of the one, may, to an extent, be the ground for assertion of the other one, may, to an extent, be the of it is

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inte Lt actually employed in Social Science, or even in Physics (Micro physics in particular), involves the question of degree. Accordingly, these expressions are to be viewed, as partially, or even largely, similar in meaning; they cannot be said to share any common intension.

- 6.I. Concluding Remarks; Both the intensionalist and the extensionalist agree in that sentences like,
  - (1) A brother is a brother,
  - (2) A brother is a male sibling,

are dissimilar in meaning. They differ as to the reason why they are dissimilar. The extensionalist and the intensionalist might also agree, without involving any absurdity, that the sentences are not completely dissimlar in meaning. According to Carnap complete similarity or identity in meaning between two distinct expressions depends, inter alia, on the structural identity in respect of intension of the expressions. But a structure implies a combination of elements. Two or more intensions might make up an intensional structure. In the ultimate analysis, we must admit of cases of intension that have no intensional structure. And, for cases like these, the question of structural identity would be pointless. Hence, no two expressions having elementary (structureless) intension [s] can be said to be synonimous. It might be stipulated that, in the absence of any structure, identity in respect of intension alone will make the expressions synonymous. But such a stipulation must be followed by another. The expressions, will have the same intension only by fiat. Synoymity of complex expressions, will then, be equally matters of decision. To quote Carnap, "In order to speak about . . . intensions themselves, we have to look for entities . . . which can be assigned to designators in accordance with these definitions".9 The definitions he refers to are those for "have the same extension" and "have the same intension". Definition 5 - 2 runs as follows: "Two designators have the same intension (in  $S_1$ ) = Of they are L-equivalent (in S)". Two sentences are L-equivalent if both of them are L-true or L-false in the system. A L-true sentence is so by virtue of the rules of the system ("P or not p" is L-true in S, for 'it' holds in all state descriptions). The intension of a L-true sentence will be same as that of another L-true sentence by virtue of definition only. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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II. Intensions, for Carnap, are supposed to be non-linguistic entities. Intensions for predicators (i.e., 'predicates' in the wide sense ) are properties. These are represented in the language system as predicates. 10 The predicates themselves are introduced into the system (S<sub>1</sub>) by certain rules. Let us take the case of a language system Sx which contains, for instance, the designator "cordate" (constant for a class of individual/individuals). Let us suppose that the system contains, among others, the descriptions (I) creature with a heart and (II) creature with a kidney (predicates). The designator "cordate" may be so introduced into the system that the sentence : "A cordate" is a creature with a hear!" is L-true, and consequently, its denial, L-false. Assuming that hear and kidney are co-present in animals, the sentence, "A cordate is a creature with a kidney" will be F-true in the system, and its denial F-false. But we could construct another system Sy, where Fs, and Ls, would be redistributed. 11 Two logicians may construct two alternative systems, Sx, and Sy, respectively, and each may claim that his is the rational reconstruction of natural language. If both systems are internally consistent, to prefer one rather than the other, would be surely arbitrary.

III. It seems that there are two different tendencies in Carnap's theory which betray a bipolar desire—a desire to be faithful to what goes on around the world, and a desire to push the empirical content into one or other of his "a priori" systems that nearly divides sentences in to L and F groups. He must give up one Either he must rest content with his artificial systems which presuppose the principle of dichotomy, or, he must cut across the rigid barrrier of L and F, and forego the artificial systems. If he opts for the artificial systems, extra-systemic dialogue will be a far cry, though intensional identity may be made possible within the system. Intensional identity however, will not render two distinct expressions synonymous. Synonymity between expressions requires something more than this. Carnap has given, in his own way, the cirterion of synonymity; but, it is not clear from what he says whether two distinct expressions of the natural language can ever satisfy the criterion. Carnap might construct language systems that would exemplify synonymous expressions, as determined by the ined by the rules for synonymity. If intensions could be determined by the rules of by the rules of the system, the structures of intensions could very well be determined in Dollan common and would be

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confined to a closed world. If however, Carnap prefers to come out of his closed world, intensional identity between distinct linguistic expressions (should we decide to retain the expression 'intension'), and, for that matter, synonymity, will appear to be an ideal limit hardly to be attained in natural language. And, accordingly, one may not expect anything more than degrees of likeness in meaning between expressions.

Deptt. of Philosophy, Ashutosh College Calcutta. Kalipada Baksi

#### NOTES

- 1. This is Quine's own coinage.
- 2. We are all like foreigners when we are born.
- 3. ".... assignment of intension is an empirical hypothesis, which like any other hypothesis in linguistics, can be tested by observation of language-behaviour" R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 23.
- 4. Ibid., p. 27.
- 5. Ibid., p. 63.
- 6. Ibid., p. 64.
- 7. "Thus we find ourselves persuaded to accept the truth-value of sentences as its nominatum. By the truth-value of a sentence I mean the circumstance of its being true or false ... For brevity's sake I shall call the one the True and the other the False". "On Sense and Nominatum": Readings in Philosophical Analysis; ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, p. 91. Appleton Century Crofts, Inc. 1949.
- 8. "5-2 Definition. Two designators have the same intension (in  $S_1$ ) = If they are L-equivalent (in  $S_1$ )"., R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 23.
- 9. Ibid., p. 23.
- 10. "The intension of a predicator (of degree one) is the corresponding property". Ibid., p. 19.
- 11. So far as this point is concerned I have used a paper of Morton White. "What some philosophers usually assume is that the artificial rule books that they construct in making an artificial language is the rule book which ordinary people or scientists would construct, if they are asked to construct one or that it is the rule book which represents the rational reconstruction of the usages in question." "The analytic and the synthetic: An untenable dualism", Semantics and Philosophy of Language, ed. Leonard Linsky, University of Illinois Press, p. 277. (Paperbacks Firstip Dolished Giruk Mark) Collection, Haridwar

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or "letterious", and because of this reason one cannot charge any There are three notions which are central to Principia Ethica: definition, simple and naturalistic fallacy. Moore's charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy against a number of philosoohers follows from his notions of 'definition' and 'simple' as they are the key concepts in Moore's analysis. In this essay, I will not attempt to examine his charge of committing naturalistic fallacy, brought against several thinkers, though I believe that the present discussion will lead to some significant points on this issue. I will limit myself to an attempt to show that there cannot be any simples in the absolute sense. By showing that the so called simples are only relatively or that is a contingent fact that they are simples at a given moment of time, I hope to shake the basis of the charge of naturalistic fallacy. I follow the following procedure: In the first section I propose to discuss his three notions of definitions: arbitrary verbal, verbal and proper. I will concern myself with Moore's notion of simples in the second section. In the third section the impossibility of there being any absolute simple notion will be shown.

## Arbitrary Verbal Definition:

Arbitrary verbal definitions can be of two kinds: (1) One may define a word which is not use in terms of some other word which has some use. For example, by "archar" I mean a table. (2) One may define a word which is in use in terms of some other word which also is in use. For example, by "chair" I mean a pen. What happens in both the cases of arbitrary verbal definitions is that there will be a notion which is common to both definiendum and definiens. Both the definiendum and definiens are two verbal expressions used to stand for (refer or denote) one and the same notion. In the case of first, both the expressions, definiendum and definiens will be synonymous expressions, but in the second, both expressions, definiendum and definiens will not be synonymous. In the case of first kind of Arbitrary verbal definition there is no possibility of a sentence being ambiguous when the definiendum is used in forming sentences, whereas, if a word in use is defined in terms of another word in CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Handwar

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use arbitrarily, there is some chance of a sentence being ambiguous when the definiendum is used in foaming sentences. Apart from this, no definition can be chracterized as "wrong" or "fallacious", and because of this reason one cannot charge any arbitrary verbal definition to be committing naturalistic fallacy.

## Verbal Definition Proper:

This kind of verbal definition also involves one notion and two verbal expressions. Both definiendum and definiens stand for (refer or denote) one and only one notion. And both these expressions will be in use. For example, an "atheist" can be defined as "one who does not believe in the existence of God". The cogintive meaning of both the expressions will be same the ough there is some possibility of their having different suggestive and emotive meanings due to different expressions. The possibility of the constitent words of some definiens standing for different notions indedendently is not ruled out, but when they are combined into a phrase they must stand for the same notion to which the definiendum stands for. In order to find out whether a definition is proper one has to look into the uses of the or refer to standard revised dictionary. It will be a mistake if two expressions which are conventionally used to stand for (refer or denote) two different notions are used in a definition of this kind. But what kind of mistake is this? Certainly it is not a logical mistake, for no logical reasoning is involved. It can be sade to be an empirical mistake or a linguistic failure or misuse of a word. Being ignorant is not a logical mistake, nor is using a word where it is linguistically forbidden. Irrespective of the fact how such a mistake is committed, the definition turns out to be an arbitray verbal definition of the second kind which we have discussed. Arbitrary verbal definition cannot be said to be correct or incorrect, hence we cannot treat such definitions cases of the commission of the naturalistic fallacy. Thus either a verbal definition proper is a correct definition or it will be an arbitrary definition; and no definition of this kind can commit naturalistie fallacy.2

Arbitrary verbal and verbal definition proper are rightly called to be verbal definitions by Moore. In these definitions, we do not make use of notions or concepts, but make use of only words: Only expressions and concepts are rightly were definitions.

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rightly nitions, use of terms of another. The basis of keeping the distinction between these two kinds of verbal definitions seems to be this: no arbitrary verbal definition is verbal definition proper and vice versa, thouh wrong verbal definition proper can be arbitrary verbal definition. This is precisely because if two expressions express in a communication situation one notion, then they are not arbitrary, but if they are used to refer to one notion arbitrarily in oder to strat a new linguistic convention, then they connot be sdid to have already had some old linguistic convention of expressing the some notion.

In both these kinds of verbal definitions there is no scope to define a notion in turns of othere notions, for in that case they will not remain verbal definitions. It should be noted that when both definiendum and definiens are use to form a sentence, it turns out to be an identity sentence which obviously true by definition, or because of the very meaning of the terms used. If any one defines one notion in trems of other notions, it will not be a verbal definition but a proper definition or analysis according to Moore.

## Definition Proper:

A laxicographer may be interested in defining words to terms of other words, but a philosopher is not much interested in verbal definitions. His interest rests in the definition of notions, not of words. A good example of such a definition Moore thinks is that of a horse:

manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc. etc. all of them arranged in definite relations to one another.<sup>3</sup>

In such a kind of definitions there do occur one or more notions in definiens which are not the very notion which we define. In such a case if both definiendum and definiens are put together, they will not form an identity sentence. For example, "Pleasure is good" is not an identity sentence, for if we deny the sentence it will not be self-contradictory. That is to say the words 'pleasure" and "good" do not express one and the same notion. If this were to be treated as verbal definition, then it will be arbitrary verbal definition, for the words express different notions.

Treating a non-identity sentence to be an identity sentence is a mistake. If we theaton appreciate it is a cc-of we theaton appreciate it is a mistake. If we theaton appreciate it is a mistake. If we theaton appreciate it is a mistake in the control of the cont

sentence, then will be treating two or more notions to be one. (I an not talking about an identity sentence which involves only proper names.) It is certainly a mistake, not in reasoning, but in proper recognition of the nature of a sentence.

It is difficult to know whether "Pleasure is good" is treated as an identity sentence, unless one also says "Good is pleasure". If "Pleasure is good" is an identity sentence, then "Good is pleasure" also is an identity sentence. It is possible that one is not treating "Pleasure is good" as an identity sentence, but a sentence where "good" is the predicate and "pleasure" is the subject, and good is predicated of pleasure. In other words one may admit the possibility of many things being good and still say "Pleasure is good".

Moore also distinguishes between the good and good. It is possible to have many things which are good: pleasure, intelligence etc. are good. Then the sentences "Pleasure is good," "Intelligence is good" etc. are not identity sentences. They will not be self-contradictory if they are negated.

According to Moore if the list of good things is prepared that will not give us notion of good. It will only give us the list of the good things. In otherwords, by knowing how a word is used (not how it is to be used) one cannot know the meaning of that word. This position of Moore appears to go against the w theory of meaning. But in fact it does not. The use theory of meaning maintains that if we know the use of a word, then we know the meaning of it. Knowing the use of a word not only includes the situation under which it is used, but also the possible situations where it can be meaningfully used. By knowing what are the things which are good, we do not necessarily know the possible good things. Unless we know all the possible median ingful uses of a word, we do not know the full use of the work hence we do do not know the full meaning of the word. But the last conclusion is not acceptable to Moore for even if we give the list of all possible good things, what we know is all about the good things but not 'good' itself.

Moore appears to have some strong ground to believe that the list of all possible good things will not give us the meaning of "good". Consider again the sentence "Pleasure is good". 'pleasure and 'good'o are utwo pooling contained of the contai

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ieve that eaning of Pleasure dentified. The same is the case with 'intelligence' or any possible good thing. That is to say the list of all possible good things also will give us least account of what is good.

We may slightly change the terminology of use theory of meaning by maintaining that if we know all the linguistic rules according to which a word is to be used, then we know the meaning of the word. I do not see any reason why this is not acceptable to Moore. Acceptance of this theory will not make him reject his own thesis that by knowing what are the good things we do not know what is it to be good, for he can reasonably maintain that it is one thing to know the meaning of the term "good" and another thing to know which are the good things. If one knows what is to be good, one can also find out what are the good things, but not vice versa.

What Moore wants to say about this kind of definition is not very clear from the example of horse. However, there seem to be two presuppositions which Moore makes: (1) we can bring out the proper meaning of a word by analysing the concept for which the word stands. (2) Understanding a whole is nothing but understanding its parts and the way each part is related to other parts. When one defines a notion, one has to analyse and bring out its parts and their arrangments.

Unavoidable consequences of such a notion of definition are these: (1) we cannot analyse a simple notion and therefore simple notions cannot be defined. (2) Meaning of the words which stand for simple notions cannot be taught through language. One has to learn through sense experience. (3) If any attempt is made to define a simple notion, then it will be a mistake.

It seems to me very obvious that Moore is not talking about an *image* of a horse. The images of a horse are different from person to person, though one can reasonably talk of different parts and their arrangements of an image of a horse. The ideational theory of meaning is quite unsatisfactory and I have no evidence to think that Moore is holding such a theory. Other than that the phrase "parts of a notion" suggests such a heory. Moore is also not talking about a horse i. e. a particular horse, though it makes sense to say that only particular horses which are in Gurantic Rangin Collection, Aridwayginable CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurantic Rangin Collection, Aridwayginable

horses which are in imagined space and time have parts arranged in a particular way.

There does seem to be any other context where we can use the terms "parts" and "whole" in their literal sense. Therefore obviously I make the hypothesis that these terms have been used metaphorically in the example of horse. This is not enough to understand the example quoted. There is one more crucial term to be understood. The term "object" has not been used in the normal sense of the term. Sometimes he equates 'object' with 'notion'. He writes: Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe in real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word.... (etalics mine). Else-where he equates 'object' with 'idea'. He writes: My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for.

It is evident now that he is not talking of "object" in the sense of things in space and time, but about objects of thought i.e. concepts. Indeed an object of thought e. g, "horse" dose not exist in space, though there can be disagreement about whether they are in time in the sense that they can be constructed or formulated and can be forgotten. From this one can argue that "parts" and "whole" which Moore talks of are not used in the literal sense. for no object of thought with which Moore is concrned (i.e. notion) can have part as they do not exist in space. (However, an object of thought can also be in space and time in differed sense e. g. 'the present prime minister of India' can be my object of thought who is in space and time. In such case by the word "object" we do not mean a "notion" but a thing of indvidual.) To put it in Moore's own words : ....if by definition be meant the analysis of an object of thought, only completed objects can be defined .... 8

The phrase "arranged in definite relations to one another also needs to be interpreted. "Head", "heart", "leg" etc. are notions. Thoughts can be arranged, but how to arrange a hear and four legs? Not any arrangement can do, for if arrangement is different, then it can turn out to be a donker. Thoughts can be arranged and rearranged also; there is no find the rule for it. What is this definite relation between head in the heart "PC-0I in Exhip Cornain Custon Representations with the little other little that the relation between the rule for it.

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no rigid ead and her than conceptual, as all the words involved stand for different concepts. A "head of a horse" is also a notion or concept and it dose not refer to any particular head of any particular horse existing in space or time or imagined.

I must confess my inability to understand what Moore is trying to say because of the following question for which I do not see any clear answer. If we talk of conceptual relations, then they must be logical relations, then there does not seem to be any logical relationship between a "head of a horse" and a "heart of a horse". The only way they can be said to have some relationship is that whenever we observe a particul horse in full detail we also observe that it has a head and heart in a particular physical relationship which are different from those of any other animals. If this is the way they are to be related, then the relationship between a "head of a horse" and a "heart of a horse" is empirical.

So far as conceptual relationships are concerned, one can talk of different conceptual relationships. If genus and species have one kind of conceptual relationships, the opposite concepts have another, incompatible concepts have still another. It is not very clear which kind of conceptual relationships Moore is talking about. Would Moore consider "colour" as a complex notion? If so, would he consider "yellow", "green," "blue", etc. which are species of the concept "colour" as parts of "colour"?

There are certain ways of meaningfully talking about a notion being simple or complex: (1) A notion can be said to be complex because it has many instances. This is not the sense Moore is talking about as he admits that both pleasure and intelligence are good eventhough 'good' is a simple notion. (2) A simple notion has no other notion as its parts. There are three possible interpretations of this statement: (a) The notion 'head' can be a part of the notion 'horse', the way Moore talks of. In this sense 'head' can be a part of the notion of 'man' as well. If we replace 'head' by 'horse's head'; then that will be begging the question; we must know what is it to be a horse before knowing what is it to be a horse's head. (b) A notion which cannot be understood in terms of other notions, e. g. 'electron' (presupposing that we do do not talk of parts of an electron. This may be a matter Of-my ignor page in Research Resear

different constituents of electrons, we can treat any one of them as an example). (c) Species concepts can be said to be party of the genus concept. But this is not the sense in which Moore talks of simple notions because the complex notion "colour" can be known without knowing all its species i. e. what is it to be "red" or "green" etc. And in the given example of home "head", "heart" etc. are not the species of the notion of "horse".

II

Perhaps we can understand Moore better if we try to see it in another perspective i. e. what is it that we cannot define. He considers "yellow" and "good" to be simple notions and writes:

My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex.9

The passage consists of the following main points: (1) A statement of fact, that one cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know what yellow or good (2) 'Yellow' and 'good' are simple notions. (3) Only complet notions are definable. One may understand the significance of the first in two ways: (a) One may say that as 'yellow' and 'good' are simple notions, they cannot be explained to other. This may further mean that either these stmple notions are into born or it is developed by every person by sensual experiences. The fact that people differ on moral issues is enough to show that the notion 'good' is not inborn. So far as second alternative to concerned there are two further alternatives: either it is logically impossible to explain these notions to others because of the limit that the existing language or it is logically impossible to develop a language

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later that it is because of this first alternative i.e. because of the limitations of the existing language that some notions are not explanable to others who do not know them, though there will always be some notions, for this or that person at a particular point of time, though not at different times, which cannot be explained (b) One may say that we cannot teach notion to someone who does not know it, is a criterion to know that notion is simple. This consists of two alternatives: with the help of existing language if some notion is not explanable to the one who does not know it, then it is simple; or if there is no logical possibility of explaining it to the one who does not know it in whatever language concivable, then it is simple. The first alternative does not really provide us an infalliable criterion, whereas, the second does. If there are really some simple notions, then it would necessarily follow that it is logically impossible to explain them in terms of constituent notions. If this failure of explanation of some notion is due to the limitation of the language, then it does not necessarily mean that the notion is simple, for it is possible that the notion is complex but we do not have adequate words to stand for their constituents.

III

I think, no one will disagree with me that we can formulate new concepts. Four decades ago,, we did not have the notion of 'electron', 'proton' and 'newtron'. Hare has introduced two concepts to us that of phrastic and neustic. If Moore is not a Platonist, one can reasonably talk of formulating or creating new concepts. One may discover new similarities or resemblance or family resemblances in things and can acquire new concepts. I believe the concept of entailment is a contribution of Moore himself to the world of philosophy. He also recognises this fact to certain extent and writes: "We can, for instance, make a man understand what a chimaera is although he has never heard of one or seen one. You can tell him that it is an animal with a lioness's head and body, with a goat's head growing from the middle of its back, and with a snake in place of a tail." 11

Moore recognises only one way of constructing concepts. He believes that we can construct new concepts only if they are complex and we know their constituents, simple or complex concepts. He further writes: "And so it is with all objects, not previously convergebackers and we have concepted to be defined and they are all

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complex; all composed of parts, which may themselves, in the first instance, be capable of similar definition, but which must in the end be reducible to simplest parts, which can no longer be defined." 12

There is also another way of constructing a concept. Consider again the concept of horse. 'Head' is a part of horse. Head has other parts as well. If we analyse a head, we get brain, skeletion etc. Brain also is constituted of different parts: auditory, memory etc. If we have to set a limit some where, it can be for one of these reasons: (1) We cannot perceive any smaller part than X of a brain and therefore X can give rise to the simplest possible concept C. (2) We do not have any other concepts which constitute the concept C.

I will examine now, the first alternative. This alternative makes the same presupposition which Moore also makes that all simple concepts can be acquired only through sense experience. If this presupposition is made, then we can reasonably say that we cannot perceive horses and have the concept of horse unless we have acquired the concept of head, heart etc. If the procedure of learning a concept is same, both in the case of 'horse' and 'horse's head' or any other simple concepts which constitute the horse, I do not see why a person can only learn the simple concepts through sense experience and why not a complex 33 well. Such a position has to face the following problems: (1) la the first place this position goes against the fact that we can also learn the whole without harming about the parts. For example, I can learn what it is to be a transister without learning its different parts. (2) In the second place, the concept of 'simple' becomes relative. (3) What makes me to acquire only simple concepts by perception of things and what hinders from acquiring a complex concept through perception without formulating simple concepts. If it is possible to derive even a complex concept from experience, then it is a complex concept for any when it for one who has derived the concept of head, heart etc. earlier to his formulation of the concept of horse, and it is simple to one who has derived only the concept of horse. The same point can be made from the fact that two persons different capacity to different capacity to perceive something. Foa example, my 1550. capacityctoospersomothing Girlesskthancthation (same others.

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y visual s. If so. the smallest particle which others can see with their normal eyes cannot be seen by me. That is to say, if a concept is simple to me because I am not able to see further resemblances in the smallest particles, then that concept will be simple for me, and to others it is complex if they can visualise the parts of those particles and are able to formulate other concepts which form the parts of the so called simple concept of mine.

All those who deny that concepts are necessarily derived from sense experience will disagree with Moore. For them, it will be possible to have a concept first and to have the species of that concept later on. It was possible for us to have the concept of atom earlier to the cocepts of electron, proton etc. This is to say that what we are saying when we say that a concept is simple for us is that at present we do not possess concepts which are the parts of the concept. But, we do not rule out the future possibility of fourmulating other concepts which constitute the parts of so called simple concepts; which is to admit that there are no concepts whatsoever which are absolutely simple. We can talk of simplicity of a concept only with reference to time and person.

It is not very interesting to investigate those theories of concepts which believe that the formulation of a concept is partly because of one's own preeption and partly because of one's own mind. Whatever position they hold, they will not be in a position to prove that there are concepts which are absolutely simple. If Moore also holdes that certain concepts are simple for some and complex for others, he will not be able to make a case for the naturalistic fallacy. If he admits that some notions are simple for period of time and they can turn out to be complex when we formulate further concepts, then Moore the possibility of a definition of even admit simples in due course of time, and thus the force of the charge of the naturalistic fallacy is considerably reduced. Nevertheless, I am fully aware of the fact that Moore's charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy is not only based on the simplicity of good but on the more significant that good is a non natural property and that the 'naturalistic ethics' violates this distinction between natural and non-natural properties. But I have not considered the cogency or otherewise of Moore's claim CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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on this point in this paper and I hope to consider it in one of my subsequent papers.

Department of H. S. S. I. I. T. Bombay- 76

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#### NOTES

- 1. The word "notion" means the same as that of "concept".
- In fact naturalists, hedonists etc. can be charged as giving arbitrary verbal difinition or verbal definition proper incorrectly.
- 3. Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica, (London, N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 8.
- 4. PE, p. 9.
- 5. PE, p. 7.
- 6. The term "idea" is used in more than one senses: Some mean by "idea" an image. There is another use of the word "idea" which is prevalent in Idealistic School. They mean by "idea" a universal, which is nothing but what Moore calls "notion" or in the modern terminology it will be a concept.
- 7. PE, p. 6.
- 8. **PE**, p. XIII.
- 9. PE, p. 7.
- 10. Hare, R. M.: The Language of Morals, (Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 18.
- 11. PE, p. 7.
- 12. PE, pp. 7 & 8.

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## A DOCUMENTARY NOTE ON SUICIDE IN ANCIENT INDIAN LITERATURE

Every society has to take note of the phenomenon of suicide and so it assumes significance in law and social philosophy. It will be interesting to see the form it took in history particularly in ancient India. This may throw light on the concept in its development and the present form that it has assumed, and may help clarify issues which are socially, legally and morally of consequence. An attempt is made in this paper to give a documentary note on suicide in ancient India.

The word suicide has its origin in the word suicidium. It means the act of self-destruction. Its determining factor is the intention of the agent; if he willfully brings about his own death, he commits suicide, irrespective of the method he chooses for this purpose, or the motive underlying his self-destructive action. Depending on the intention for ending one's life different words are used for denoting the act of suicide. Samādhi, Nirvāṇa, Ātmaghāta are some of the words found in the philosophic literature of India for denoting the act, which is committed through different intentions of the actor. The end result, that is, self-destruction however is common of all these varieties. From this point of view samādhi of Ramachandra in the water of the sacred Śarayu or the samadhi of Jnaneshvara, or Johar or Sati, would become suicide.

Ancient Indian literature has discussed the different philosophical aspects of suicide as well the sanctions to follow if 'suicide' is to be committed for example, suicide committed at certain places and under special circumstances had some religious significance and there was certain philosophy behind it. Thus Stietencron distinguishes suicides committed in ancient India into two types: ordinary suicide and religious suicide. He considers suicide, committed by whatever method, which has no other object than to abandon this life, as an ordinary suicide. Religious suicide, according to him, is one which is considered and committed as an act which is meritorious in itself and for which a certain procurate way and the constitution, Haridwar

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religion for the very sake of this reward. He cites wilful self. immolation of a faithful wife or sati as an example of this type because it is by this death alone that the wife would reach Patiloka, the world where the deceased husband is waiting for her.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in ancient India we come across two lines of thoughts on suicide. One, strongly condemning the suicids behaviour; and the other, advocating suicide under special circumstances or at certain places.

Iśavasya Upnisad declares that those who take their lives reach after death the sunless region, covered by impenetrable darkness.3

The Vājasaneyi samhitā states that whoever destroy their selves reach, after death, Asura world that is shrouded in blinding darkness4.

Vasistha Dharmsutra denies any death rites to him who kills himself by whatever means he chooses to use, and prescribes centain penances if somebody disregards this rule and performs the last rites out of affection.5 It further adds that even the mere thought of suicide is to be attoned for by prayascitta. The Visnu smrti treats persons committing suicide in the same way as degraded ones (patita): both cannot receive the purifying water.6

Parāśara strongly condemns suicide and maintains that if a man or woman commits suicide by hanging through extreme pride, or extreme rage or through affliction or feat, he or she "is consigned to the darkness of a hell for sixty thousand years, which is full of blood and fetid pus".7 He further ordains that "no period of uncleanliness should be observed in respect of such a violent death". The rite of cremation is denied to the corpse of a suicide, no tears should be shed for, nor and libation of water should be offered unto (the sprit of) a suicide If people cremate the corpse of a suicide they would regain their personal cleanliness by practising a tapta krecha Vratam (penance observed in order to purify one's body in accordance with Sastric injunctions). If they happen to be Brāhmanas they should feel Brahmanas and make the gift of a cow to regain their clenliness.

Manu says that no oblations are to be offered for the benefit of the souls of those who kill themselves.9

Yama Smriti, besides condemning the act of suicide, lays down the punishment for such condensation and the act of such order

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lays ordains that when a person tries to do away with himself by such methods as hanging, if he dies, his body should be smeared with impure things; and if he lives, he should be fined two hundred paṇas; his friends and sons should each be fined one paṇa and then they should undergo the penance laid down in the śāstra. 10

The Ādiparva of the Mahābharata states that one who commits suicide does not reach blissful worlds. 11

Kautilya strongly condemns the suicide and declares a severe punishment for such persons. He states, if a person, under the influence of passion or anger, or a woman infatuated by sin, were to kill himself (or herself) by means of a rope, a weapon or poison, he should cause them to be dragged with a rope on the royal highway by a candāla. There is to be no cremation for them nor oblations by kinsmen. If however, some kinsmen were to perfom for them the rites in connection with the dead, he should meet with the same fate afterwards, or should be abandoned by his relatives.<sup>12</sup>

Now we consider the view as given in ancient Indian literature where the suicide has been permitted under certain circumstances or recommended on certain places. These are the exceptions to the general rule of reprehension of suicide.

Jābāla and Kathaśruti Upanisads state, "a sannyāsin, who has acquired full insight, may enter upon the great journey, or choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning, by fire or by a hero's fate.<sup>13</sup>

Manu and Yājñavalkya opined that a man, guilty of Brāhmana murder, be allowed to meet death at the hands of archers in a battle who knows that the sinner wants to be killed that way as a penance. The other method for him is that he may throw himself head downwards in fire. Aparārka quotes texts of Brahmagarbha, Vivasvat and Gārgya about an householder (he) who is suffering from serious illness cannot live, or who is very old, who has no desire left for the pleasure of any of the senses and who has carried out his tasks may bring about his death at his pleasure by resorting to mahāprasthāna, by entering fire or water or by failing from a precipice. By so doing he incurs no sin and his death is far better than living, and one should not desire to live vainly (without being able to perform the duties laid down by the śāstra). 15

The Brahmapurāna advocates suicide by fire, or falling from CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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the top of a mountain by the ardent devotees of siva for oblaining successful post-mortuary existence. 16

Atri declaired, "if one be old (beyond 70), if one cannot observe the rule of bodily purification (owing to extreme weakness), if one is so ill that all medical help is discarded, and if one in these circumstances kills oneself by throwing himself from a precipice of into fire or water or by fasting, mourning should be observed for him for three days and śrāddhā may be performed for him."

At extremely holey places like Prayaga, Benaras, Kuruksela and Amarakantaka, persons were allowed to end there lives.

Rgveda maintains that they reach heaven, who take bath in the confluence of two rivers-white and black (that is, Ganga and Yamuna); and they, attain immortality, who, the wise people, abandon their body there. 13 The Vanaparya of the Mahabharata extols such deaths at prayaga. 1) The Salyaparva states, "who ever abandons his body at Prthudaka on the northern bank of the Sarasvati after repeating Vedic prayers would not be troubled by death thereafter.20 The Anusasanaparva states that if a man knowing Vedanta and understanding the ephemeral nature of life abandons life in the holy Himalayas by fasting, he would reach the world of Brahma.21 Whoever dies in the Ganga, whether willfully or unintentionally, goes after death to heaven and does not see hell.22 A man who, knowingly or unknowingly, willfully, or unintentionally dies in the Ganges, secures on death heaven and mokṣa.23 He who abanbons his life in this tirtha ( kāśi ) in some way or other does not incur the sin of suicide but secures his desired objects 24

The Linga Purāna recommends suicide at Kurukṣetra. The Matsyapurāna eulogises the peak of Amarakantaka by stating "whoever dies at Amarakantaka by fire, poison, water, or by fasting enjoys the pleasures. Moreover, he who throws himself down (from the peaks of Amarakantaka) never returns (to samsāra). 26

We come across several methods for committing suicide. The most common were exhaustion, fasting, falling, burning, drowing, and cutting one's limbs.

Suicide by exhaustion is mahāpatha or prasthanyatra and is known to us through mahāprasthanikaparva of the Mahābhārata. Five Pāndaxas and Draupadi had adopted this method. Throwing Policide Domain. Guruku kangredolietion, Handwar

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oneself from the moutains like Himalayas or Amarkantaka was common. Padma Purana states that a person who dies by hanging head downwards over a fire and drinks its flames, gets a reward of stay of heaven for 100,000 years, and afterwards a rebirth as agnihotrin. Drowning oneself at the confluence of Ganga and Yamuna or in any holy river was also followed. Cutting one's throat at the confluence of Ganga and Yamuna was certainly meritorious.27

Thus we see that suicide was approved in ancient India specific circumstances and at certain holy places. The philosophy behind such approval was the attainment either of Moksha or heaven.

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#### NOTES

- 1. H. von Stietencron: "Suicide as a Religious Institution", pp. 7-8, Bharatiya Vidya, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 1 to 4, 1 to 7.
- 2. Ibid, 1 p. 8.

In ancient Indian literature the words used for suicide were atmahatya, atmatyaga, tanutyaga, and dehatyaga. Out of these expressions some acquired a differentiated meaning from the early centuries of the christian era onwards. Atmahatya and atmatyaga, the original words for suicide, continued to be used, when suicide was disapproved of, when it was considered as a sin. But tanutyaga and dehatyaga, two euphemistic words meaning to abandon the body, which could be applied to natural death also, gradually came to be used in connection with suicide only when the writer approved of it, when it was considered meritorious, when no sin was thought to be involved.

- 3. Isha Upanisad, III.
- 4. Vāj. Sam. 40. 3.
- 5. Vas Dh. S. 23, 14, 16.
- 6. Vismr. 22. 56.
- 7. Parașara, IV, 1. 2.
- 8. Ibid, 8.
- 9. Manu, V, 89. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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- 10. Yama Smriti, 20-21, translation by P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastr, Vol. II, Part II, p. 924.
- 11. Mahabharata, Adiparva, 179-20.
- 12. The Kautilya Arthasastra, 4-7-25-27, translation by Kangle, K. P., published by University of Bombay, p. 316-17, 1963.
- 13. Schrader, F. O., The Minor Upnisads, i, pp. 39, 390 ff, Madras, 1912.
- 14. Manu, XI, 73; Yai, 248.
- Vide P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, p. 926, Vol. II, Part II,
   B. O. R. I., Poona, 1941.
- 16. Brahmapurāņa, 262-63.
- 17. Atri, 218-219, translation by P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, p. 959, Vol. III, BORI, Poona, 1946.
- 18. Rgveda, Khil Sukta, 10.75.5.
- 19. Mbh. 85.83.
- 20. Mbh. 39.33-24, translation by P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasasia, p. 925, Vol. II, Part II, BORI, Pune.
- 21. Mbh. 25.62-64.
- 22. Kurma Purāņa, I. 37-39; Padma Purņāa, I. 44.4.
- 23. Padma Puraņa, V. 6055.
- 24. Skanda Purāņa, Kāśīkhanda, 22.76.
- 25. Matsya-purana, 186.28-33, translation by P. V. Kane.
- 26. Matsya pnrāṇa, 186.34-35, translation by P. V. Kane.
- 27. Vide Stietencron, suicide as a religious institution, p. 19, Bhataiya Vidya Vol. XXVII, Nos. 1 to 4, 1967.

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## MONISM, PLURALISM AND THE LOGIC OF CRITICISM

## 1. Adventurism as Cultural Metaphysic<sup>1</sup>

The history of culture is the history of the ways of life people have chosen for themelves. It is in the differences in these ways that we my read the record of the great ideas that have presided over each culture and have provided people with some measure for their humanity. Presiding over and guiding the conduct of life for many people in western culture is a "philosophy of life" whose guiding themes may be described as follows.

The only realities are those presented to the senses. These relities are invariably singular in nature. To attempt to interpret these presentations in terms of concepts or other abstractions is held to be illegitimate, for abstractions and (immediate) realities are held to be mutually exclusive. If we are to know the real, we must divest ourselves of all intellectual tools and plunge headlong into the flux of becoming. The universe, so it is held, is in one continual flux. This flux is filled with a multiplicity of unpredictable events and stimuli. What is real is not the actual, but the actual-for-me? As we find it, reality is irreducibly singular, fresh, spontaneous, unhabitual, immediate. Our lives are but temporary and arbitrary unities which endure only for a while and then are here no more. Hence the perpetual vanishing of experiences, and the always immenent vanishing of the sel is the core issue of life. Life is transient and experienced rea lities are constantly dissolving before our eyes. Wisdom, if there be any, is understandable only as authenticity; as making the most of the array of temporary realities which comes our way. Before life is snatched away from us, we should seek to enjoy as many realities as we can. There is no permanent or enduring reality. All that is is relative and transitory. The end of life cannot be beyond the present moment: it is the present moment and its enjoyment.

Paradigms of meaningfulness are thus impulse and spontaneity. When one knows that life is enternal or non-transitory, one 6 not concerned to crowd as many sensations as possible into one's years. For the Adventurist, on the contrary, each individual I.P. Q...5 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar is a wanderer: 'You go your way, and I'll go mine,' is the summit of wisdom. If there is no repetition, no continuity, then the value of this moment increases—and since there is no ultimate retribution in life, one may live as one wants. And if life is unique, then we should value fleeting things for they can never be again. Life is beyond good and evil, beyond form and judgment. One is thus relieved of traditional duties and obligations. Life is drifting with the stream—unanchored. And this need cause no fear, for since the "way" is everywhere, one cannot get lost. Beyond the now, there is no end in life. Purposelessness is the only purpose.

The mood, the stance, the posture toward the world arisculated above is what I mean by Advanturism here. It is a "philosophy" not so much clearly articulated as deeply felt. For it is brought into being not so much as the result of reflective thought as the result of the failure of reflective thought to provide any consistent guides for the conduct of life which can be held with trust and applied with honesty. As for Nietzsche, so for many people today: where the absolutes have gone, there only may relativism come in to fill the gap. It is a philosophy held to by people of all kinds of moods, positions, and needs. Some affirm it with joy, others with sadness; some are pleased by it others are sad and forlorn; to some it gives courage, while to others it gives only grounds for despair. But whatever the feeling that accompanies its adoption, there is a certain lifelessness and incredulity that underlies the philosophy for while it may be clear that absolutism is false, it is not clear that Adventurism is true, and nagging doubts about this seem to be present wherever the stance is adopted. And that, after all, is all to the good for the most important thing about any person is the attuitude he takes toward the world, the face he presents to life. We must therefore take this philosophic posture seriously, but along with those who see no alternative to it, we need also to ask if is true.

Even though life is rarely if even simple, many people seem to prefer to have their fundamental options cast in terms of dichotomies: adventurism or absolutism, pluralism or monism, realism or idealism. As a result, those who adopt and adventurist stance see the only alternative as absolutism, and if absolutism just will CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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not do, then our only alternative is—Adventurism. Part of the purpose of this article is to challenge the dichotomising tendency and to consider some additional alternatives. In particular, the position of Adventurism will be developed as coherently as possible, and will then be subjected to a critique which avoids such dichotomies. Because of its persistent hold on so many people in our culture, Adventurism deserves to be taken seriously, and deserves to be critisized in terms other than those which result when it is simply opposed to its contrary, monism or absolutism.

The position outlined as Adventurism above seems to entail three basic beliefs which guide the conduct of the lives that accept

it: subjectivism, scepticism, and hedonism.

By subjectivism I mean the view according to which the only meaningful utterances are about a subject and its feelings, preceptions, thoughts and so on. We all learn the basic distinction between subject and object early in life. In our own culture, this distiction has played the role of a fundamental classificatory matrix. Through its use, we have come to identify objectivists as realists, naturalists, and believers in trans-personal truth. Subjectivists, on the other hand, are idealists, perhaps mystics, certainly illusionists, and are those who believe that there are no truths which hold beyond the boundaries of the individual self. Faced with this dichotomy, Adventurists adopt subjectivism and deny any truth whatsoever to objectivism. Not only is it the case that all utterances have a subject as a necessary ingredient, but also all utterances tell us nothing about "the world" but only something about a subject and his own unique world. Language, we may respond, is based on and presupposes trans-personal and intersubjective unities of meaning (concepts): if, then, Adventurism can be asserted, it can only be asserted through the use of concepts which by definition are extra-subjective. Rather than close the door to Adventurism, this argument merely leads its adherent to say, with Cratylus or Bergson, that reality, the really real, cannot be asserted at all, and if one should attempt to articulate it conceptually one is attempting to do what is ultimetely impossible. Adventurists speak because it is convenient to do so, and when an Adventurist speaks he knows that he is making Verbal reference only to his own experience, and "means" only what he experiences. Language may thus bridge the gap between one individual and another; it cannot transcend the individual.

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This can be further clarified by considering the epistemological scepticism of the Adventurist. Consciousness is regarded as prima. rily sensational, factual, physical: the body is both its condition and its source. This being so, we attribute meaning to life by the way we use, the way we are, our bodies. What is here-and-now is real; what is merely remembered or abstracted from the here. and now cannot be real. It follows that spontaneity is more basic than order, and judgments of value reducible to opinion In interpersonal relations, charisma wins always over argument and the powers of the body, including the emotions, win out over any intellectual judgment. Severally, these imply that ideals or aims which transcend the present moment are regarded as illusions abstractions. Rather than hold that life consists in a continuous or ordered series of steps leading to fulfillment and meaning Adventurists hold that life is merely one damned thing after another leading to one final thing (death ) after which there is no other. Consequently, the positing of goals, and the sustained pursuit of ideals are rejected as worthless. Adventurists thus erect the sovereign individual into the sole cognitive bearer, and reject out of hand any and all extra-subjective claims to knowledge.

Adventurists are also Hedonists. If there is no knowable object of value, then each individual is free to assign value to whatever object or set of objects encountered in his experience. The quality of value is thus not endurance or universality, but vitality, intensity, and pleasure. As a consequence, a life-style founded on this view of value involves a multitude of activities crowding one's day and exhausting one's night. And since there is no necessity, one needs to be faithful only to one's own life.

## II Toward a Critique of Adventurism

As we all know only too well, trying to argue an Adventurial out of his position is just about impossible. Many people might just feel that it's better just to walk away from any encounter with an Adventuring with an Adventurist, sadly shaking one's head and hoping perhaps that "time" will lead him to see the light and change his ways. Argument, after all, presupposes minimal agreements holding between two people; where these agreements are lacking, there is no use to argument For the sake of clarity, let us call the confidence of clarity, let us call the confidence of clarity.

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with value more Adventurist an irrationalist<sup>2</sup>, and his opponent a rationalist. Now, one of the things one finds out when talking to an Adventurist is that he despises the rules of argument that the rationalist places on him-and as a result rejects argument completely. Rather than either walk away from an argument with an Adventurist, or make the rules too hard for him to accept, I'm going to attempt to consider some of the strategies of argument that may be used, and to reject most of them as unreliable.

It is usual to oppose the position articulated as Adventurism by arguing that it implies disorder and solipsism both of which are inimical to the development of true humanity which comes only where there is order and association. That is, the one unity. order, continuity, are opposed to the many, disunity, disorder, discontinuity. For those who are fond of thinking in dichotomies. this is the usual strategy of argument. The rationalist will uphold order and accuse the Adventurist of disorder, while conversely. the Adventurist who prizes disorder, will oppose the order of the rationalist. Among other problems that may obtain in such a strategy, the most telling one is that the affirmation or negation of one side of a dichotomy has rarely solved anything-ever. Every so-called "perennial problem" of philosophy and of intellectual life generally takes the form of a dichotomy. One-many, freedomdeterminism, idealism-realism; and further, there has never been a single instance of a sound and cogent argument supporting one side or the other of one of these dichotomies. Furthermore, the argument between the Adventurist and the rationalist is really not an argument between mutually exclusive camps, but is rather one of a family quarrel. Adventurists are pluralists in the sene that they affirm that each individual is the judge of what is real, but the real is of one kind only-sensational. The Adventurist is thus a pluralistic monist. The rationalist, on the other hand, opposes this pluralistic monism by advancing a non-pluralistic monism; that which is real is enduring, permanet, and is true for all people. A further aspect of this strategy is that it is just too simple. It operates on the basis of a dyadic or two-pronged thought-tool, assuming uncritically that the world can easily be divided into two items opposed to each other, and it also assumes with contemporary logic that there are two and only two truthvalues; if one side is false, the other may be true; or, to put it more strongly, in Public Romains Gruekut Kangri Rollegtions Haddwanlse. And

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since neither defender of the two sides of the dispute is likely to hold that his side may be false, this logic of criticism leads to little more than self-congratulation combined with arbitran negative passion.

A different strategy of criticism is the one adopted by thinker such as Hegel or Peirce. This is a logic of synthesis. Enlarging on the logic of two truth values, it holds that where two views are contrary to each other, both are likely to be false when taken singly. The only way to solve the problem is to reconcile the two opposing positions by arranging them within a larger and more inclusive context and thus being able to show that they are continuous rather than discontinuous from each other. While we may all agree that the peacemakers are blessed, this strategy is still more on the side of the rationalist than the Adventurist for while it grants the Adventurist a place in a wider scheme of things, the rule whereby the reconciliation is achieved is a rationalist one (i. e. order, continuity) through and through. So while an Adventurist might feel an initial attraction to someone using this kind of strategy, he soon realizes that the logic of synthesis is worse for his case than a dyadic logic-for a logic of synthesis is like a stacked deck of cards; rather than being opposed by a single alternative, the Adventurist here is opposed not only by the negation of manyness, to use Hegel's schema, which is the rationalist order, but he is also opposed by the universal" which is a rationalistic sleigh of hand.

A logic of inclusive disjunction with two basic axioms seems to me to be a better strategy: (1) the one, order, continuity, may be as much a fundamental trait of reality as is the many, discontinuity, manyness, and both "concepts" of these two fundamental traits are disjunctive unities within the set of traits that reality may have, and (2) any synthesis of the one and the many is itself not a "higher reality" but merely another disjunctive unity among other disjunctive unities. Given the first axiom, if follows that there are many "fundamental" traits of reality none more fundamental than any other. Thus, for instance, there may be some traits of reality which just simply are best characterized in terms of an Adventurist ontology. Adventurism which erects the here-and-now to paradignatic status among the traits of reality is not negated or opposed, of synthesise of the disjunctive unities.

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which in their turn take some other trait as fundamental to reality as a whole. On the other hand, the second axiom assures us that there is a unity of the plurality of possible disjuncts.

Let us consider this logic of inclusive disjunction as applied to Adventurism. Contrary to Adventurists who assert that it is alone the genuine pluralism, upholder of manyness, it is necessary to note that there are several kinds of pluralism. There is, first, the pluralism of a single kind, and second, the pluralism either of no kinds or of all kinds. Opposed to these two forms of pluralism may be the monism of identical and not multiple exemplifications (i. e. absolute monism), as well as the monism of multiple but not identical exemplifications (i. e. personalism). It is clear that both monism and pluralism, and in this case, Adventurism and its contrary, are pluralistic and monistic in one way or another; that pluralism does not exclude monism, nor monism pluralism. Hence neither pluralism nor monism can be reduced to the one or the many.

Contrary to those Adventurists who assert the pluralism of a single kind (e. g. atomism) and who might want to reject any ontology which claims that reality is not simply the here and the now, there does not seem to be anything in Adventurist principles which excludes there being immediacies or selves which transcend the sensual present. If this is denied, then either the pluralistic or the monistic side of Adventurism will have to be given up. If on the other hand, the Adventurist accepts the claim that there may be immediacies which transcend the present moment, then it is legitimate for the Adventurist to admit realities beyond the here and now, and modes of cognition other than localized and particularized ones.

If we can agree that life is becoming without denying either that what becomes may be not only immediate but permanent, or that the nature of becoming itself may not be characterizable in terms much like those in which opponents of Adventurism would argue, then perhaps we can also agree on a series of steps which an Adventurist needs to be able to go through in order to accept the legitimacy of the two axioms of the logic of criticism used to criticize it here, namely, (1) the first step is the felt Adventurist one that the real is singular; (2) second that the real is singular;

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same kind or nature in all cases; (3) third, that these differen kinds of singularities may form a unity; and (4) fourth, that each kind of singularity has a place within an adequate view of reality. The motives which incline one to this series of steps are two. First, if Adventurism is a genuine pluralism, then it must accept the existence of different orders of reality, or of realities which are not singular in nature, or if singular, are not sensuous singularities only. And second, if Adventurism is not to degenerate to a monism of multiple exemplifications, it must accept the notion that the realities which are share location in an order, have a place or position in a wider view of reality-wider than the Adventurist's initial claim that the real is and only is what is here and now. By considering the notion of position and its categories, these claims can be substantiated.

We can distinguish eight basic categories necessary to make sense of the notion of position: relation, powar, method, economy, order, duration, limitation, and satisfaction.4

(1) Relation. To place an object, be it physical, mental, or otherwise, we must first of all understand its relations to other things, and there must exist other things of different kinds. We must assume that the thing to be placed has certain essential or defining characteristics which make it that thing and none other, and we must recognize the fact that part of the nature of that thing may in fact be the series of possible or actual relations it has to other things.

The characteristics of relation as a category of place are several. Relations exhibit strength; that is, if there is no difference between the things related, to the things placed in relation to other things, then none of the two or more things exhibit any strength, any individuality of being. Placing requires the strong relations of difference rather than the weak relations of identity or sameness. Relation also requires joining; for if there is no joining, no fit of one thing to another, there is no placing but merely haphazard conjunction. That is, relations of place must exhibit pattern, togetherness and repetition. For if a relation of place is not repeatable, then the objects connot bo placed but simply assigned to a place in an empty logical series.

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transi spont social exhibi times. thing placed can so be placed only because it exhibits definite powers or capacities. If all things had the same power, the same definitivity, then nothing could be placed for all things would exhibit the same repetitive characteristics, the same nature. To say that things to be placed must exhibit definitive powers is to say that things exhibit their own sense of specificity, their own sense of restraint, their own uniform or deliberate posture. And this is to suggest that things placed are subject to growth and decay of powers, may precede or proceed from other things, and endure even amidst change.

- (3) Methodic. To be able to place a thing we must be able to count on the methodic or procedural aspects both of the thing to be placed as well as of the act of placing. This implies that placing presupposes context; that without a multiplicity of methods which work with things according to their own integrity, of things and contexts, an abundance of things of different characters. It presupposes, in other words, plenitude of being.
- (4) Economy. Things are economical. That is, they exhibit balance, modesty. When things are placed that does not mean that they may not suffer a diminuation or accentuation of their powers at different times. A wooden chair piled amongst other chairs in a basement suffers diminuation, while a chair which is for a while desk, chair, stool, ladder, perhaps even firewood, suffers accentuation, except in the last case when it suffers extinction also. A thing out of place, without use, is not allowed to exhibit its powers, is not related, has no powers, and thus has no economy-it is a superfluity of being.
- (5) Order. To place is to order. Order is not relation; where relation presupposes integrity and pattern, order presupposes prior relation. Order presupposes and conditions the harmony of the whole, induces tolerance amongst things, and opens up the receptivity of things to each other.
- (6) Duration. Whether the nature of a thing is to be transient or of greater temporal spread, whether its nature is spontaneous, fresh, solitary, momentary, or steady, habitual, social and lasting, all things exhibit duration—they last. They exhibit their definitive temporality. Things endure for their given times.

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which constitutes an apportionment of properties. Things must be limited qua things, specifiable, else they are not, and cannot be or participate with other things.

(8) Satisfaction. Things have their own identity. When things are placed, they exhibit the satisfaction which comes both from their recognition of the propriety of their place, and from their humility at being placed appropriately.

With these categories in mind, we can now consider the Adventurist position.

An Adventurist seems to want to claim that all things in the world are one kind, belong to one order, one system : all things are transient and particular; to be is to be a transient particular. The real is without relation, without continuity, bearing to repetitiveness. If we consider such claims in light of the categories of place, we can further elaborate this view as saying that: (1) either all things exhibit the same strength or that each thing exhibits its own strength; (2) either that all thing exhibit the same posture, the same definitivity, or that all things have their own individual definitivity; (3) either all things may be treated alike or that things are different one from another, (4) either that all things exhibit the same character or that the characters of things differ; (5) either that all things are ordered in the same way, or that each thing is ordered according to what it is; (6) either that all things exhibit the same temporal durationsensualized immediacies—or that things exhibit the temporality of their own individual natures; (7) either that all things share the same properties, or that they are different; (8) either that all things share the same satisfaction, or that they depend for their satisfactions on what they are in and of themselves.

Let us assume an Adventurist would uphold one side of each disjunct over the other; all things exhibit the same strength, the same posture, the same manner of being, the same character, the same order, the same duration, the same satisfaction; or the contrary.

The logic of Adventursim faces a severe contradiction at this point. For if it is the case that relations are "unreal", then it is impossible to assert the sameness of things in any respect. Furthermore, to uphold singularity over universality as to uphold

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501, P Denev difference over sameness, and this attempt to uphold difference cannot involve holding that all things are alike.

If, on the other hand, an Adventurist holds that all things are different; that all things exhibit their own peculiar strength, posture, character, temporality, and so on, we come closer to the essence of the position. But if the assertion of difference is not to be a universal and thus illegitimate-statement, it must be empirical, it must involve experiential discovery of the nonsameness of things. And in this case, some recognition of the fact that, to negate the first side of each disjunct, not all things exhibit the same strength, posture, temporality, and so on. And this sort of recognition is already to move beyond a strict Adventurism. For once it is admitted that not all (real) singular things exhibit the same posture, etc. it must also be admitted that not all things are of the same kind. And once it is admitted that things may differ in their essential properties, then we have already admitted that being has different senses, that to be is not to be an immediate particular, only.

To be an immediate particular is thus to be one kind of being amongst others. To be cannot be defined in terms of the here and now only. Thus Adventurism is a philosophy based on one mode of being, but is not a complete philosophy or a complete ontology. Just as immediate particulars are to be seen as one kind of being amongst others, so Adventurism is to be seen as one kind of philosophy amongst others. If we use a dyadic logic, we would be want to claim that either Adventurism or its negation may be true and one false. A Triadic logic would claim that both may be true. A logic of exclusive disjunction holds that while the doctrine of Adventurism as well as that of its negation, as well as that of their synthesis may be all true of being, these are but three aspects or modes among others: Adventurism is as 'true' of its mode of being as others are of theirs. All philosophies thus share a place in a wider order than they would be able, by their own principles, to grant.

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#### NOTES

- 1. Adventurism is a name I have given to a philosophical type which be exemplified by Nietzsche and others. See my "Reason and Political Authority," Journal of Value Inquiry, VII, 4, Winter, 1973, 43-56,
- 2. The term "rationalist" is used only at this point to identify an opposed of the Adventurist. Both the terms rationalist and irrationalist are as longer adequate for describing positions; for one thing, the term rationalist is more eulogistic than either descriptive or normative. Elsewhere have argued that there are many ways in which we may reason about the world, that the Adventurist has his own legitimate view of the role and function (and nature) of reason, and thus that the term rationalist is merely a term of agreement for that view of reason that the person in question prefers. See article in note 1, and "Varieties of Philosophical Reason," Philosophical Studies (Ireland), 1976.
- 3. For a defense of this claim, see Justus Buchler, The Main of Light, New York: Oxford, 1974, Ch. 6.
- 4. For a development of the categories in terms of which these eight categories of position are legitimated, see "Varieties of Philosophic Reason," note 2 supra. See also "Arithmos," in Philosophic Research and Analysis, Spring, 1976.

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## THE LOGIC OF DECISION\*

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
The term 'logic of decision' may be used in several senses. At first, it may mean a single set of reasons for a particular decision. For example, suppose a man, M, decides to vote for A rather than for B and gives a reason for this decision that A is more liberal than B or A will offer him more services than B, then we may say that M has a logic of decision. But suppose, again, that M is ultimately persuaded by C to vote for B rather than for A on the ground that B belongs to M's close relations, or caste or community although he is neither liberal nor is he to offer any services to M. Then also it will be said that M has a logic of decision. In these two contexts the term 'logic' means a set of reasons which may be valid or invalid but which must be convincing to the decisionmaker. He may have any reasons for his decision or he may decide irrationally and later on give any reasons for his decision. So the question arises, should logic be used in this sense of a set of reasons? Obviously logic is more than a set of reasons and to use it in this sense is a very narrow use of the term 'logic'. Moreover, this use is also fallacious for it may raise a set of fallacious reasons to the status of logically valid reasons. All reasons are not logical deductions although all logical deductions are reasons. Moreover, if this use is permitted, M can have more than one logic of decision and these logics may be mutually contrary if not contradictory. So the use of the term 'logic of decision' in the sense of a set of reasons, cooked or conceived ad libitum is an abuse of language.

Secondly, the logic of decision may mean a principle on the basis of which decision-makers, more often than not, exercise their decision. Such principles have been advanced by Bayes, von Neumann, Savage, Hurwicz, Shackle ond others. The principle of maximum expected value, minimax loss principle, maximum gain principle, minimax regret principle and Hurwicz's pessimismoptimism index criterion are some of the rules that have been suggested as the plausible criteria for decision. The discovery of

The paper was read and discussed in the U. G. C. Seminar held at Philosophy Department, University of Allahabad, Oct. 8, 9, 1979. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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these decision criteria has doubtless exhibited the fact that there are rules of decision which are followed knowingly or unknown ingly and which make decision making a rational state of affair But none of these decision criteria is universally applicable although all of them are involved in local decision-making, So attempts have been made, particularly by Chernoff and Milnor. to arrive at certain desiderata which fulfil decision criteria Chernoff's 11 axioms and Milnor's 10 axioms<sup>1</sup> are the two important attempts for stating a set of requirments for reasonable criteria On the basis of these requirements it has been found that none of the above mentioned decision criteria is satisfactory. So if the term 'logic of decision' is used in the sense of decision criteria it will not include the axiomatic treatment of these criteria which is obviously more logical than the framing of a decision criterion that is derived more or less from intuitions, conjectures or trial and error methods. Logic does not deal with how to reason or decide: it deals with the correct reasoning or deciding. Its function is the verification or falsification of reasons that are given. At any rate the logic of decision is not an application of the logic of scientifie discovery in the field of social sciences or decision-making. Furthermore, even the axiomatic treatment or Chernoff and Milnor requires further abstraction and generalization inasmuch as it has a logical bearing on the principle of insufficient reason which has been variously interpreted in the literature on decision theory. It is not impossible to show that the axioms testing decision criteria are deducible from the principle of insufficient reason which appears to have the same status in the logic of decision as the Laws of Thought have in the general field of logic. So even the axiomatic treatment of decision criteria cannot be identified with the main domain of the logic of decision, although it is doubtless a part of this logic. The full scope of the logic of decision can now be represented in the following four-tier model.



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Now this four-tier model includes all decision judgements that are made under uncertainty or risk. Furthermore, if we use a disjunction at its apex, i.e., we add some more principle or principles along with the principle of insufficient reason, it can include even those decision judgements which are made under certainty. Savage's doctrine of sure things principle or strong Independence Assumption is one such principle.

Thridly, R. C. Jefferey who has written a book entitled The Logic of Decision has used the term in the sense of "a framework within which one can study the relations among various possible belief, value and desirability functions and between these and policies for decision-making"2. For him this framework is "normative in much the some way as deductive logic" and is put forth "as a useful representation of some very general norms for the formulation and critique of belief and decision."3 He has, by and large, developed his concept of the logic of decision from the Bayesian account of deliberation and excluded from it such disciplines as statistics, inductive logic and ethics. What makes his concept too narrow is the exclusion of inductive logic from it. He has made it an application of symbolic logic and forgotten that the logic of decision is more linked with inductive logic then with deductive logic. A number of logicians especially I. Levi, J. Hintikka and H. E. Kyburg have come forward who have studied the problem of decision-making from the stand-point of inductive logic. They have discovered a new domain of inductive logic which is called local induction, and applied decision theory to the problems of inductive logic. Three major accomplishments in this field are listed by Willaim K. Goosens. They are as follows:4

Decision theory can be applied to the problem of evaluating hypotheses in a manner which is compelling.

Hypotheses can be accepted in such a way that closure conditions are satisfied.

The concept of an epistemic interest can be clarified and defended.

These researches are logically more significant than Jefferey's reduction of the logic of decision to a form of deductive logic. Moreover, Jefferey has elucidated the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility by means of elementary

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logical operations such as denial of conjunction and disjunction. His elucidation is significant in the sense that it has represented the Bayesian theory in a logical form that can be understood by the students of logic. But he has used the term 'the logic of decision' in a limited sense and for a limited purpose. His elucidation has not made any significant development of the logic of decision itself. It seems that for him the logic of decision is an extension or application of deductive logic. But decision is more than deductive reasoning and the logic of decision is not an extension of deductive logic. Nicholas Rescher rightly points out that "theoretical logic alone is not in a position to tell us more than that one must make choices: it will not—indeed cannot—tell us what particular choices are to be made."5

Fourthly, Nicholas Rescher himself thinks that the logic of decision is an applied logic. He calls it "epistemic methodolog" which uses the tools of theoretical logic with due extra-logical supplementation to render them capable of resolving factual issue and sketches at a high level of abstracts and generality of the epistemic considerations that bear upon the rationally warranded determination of the trnth-status of propositions concerning decision making. In short it deals with preferability judgements and the rules that govern them. Now it will be found that Nicholas Rescher has used the logic of decision in an ambiguous sense. His concept when analysed will yield the following elements.

ralization, (ii) use of the rules of deductive logic along with extra-logical considerations to resolve the factual issues and (iii) a rational or logical treatment of preferability judgements. As the first of these elements suggests, the term 'logic' has been used in a very general sense of concept formation. The second elements makes the logic of decision an applied logic and the third element gives it a new domain of preferability judgements. In fact Nichols Rescher has tried to survey the whole field of the logic of decision But his survey is only a description. It is not definition in a much as it does not indicate the essential nature of the logic of decision and mixes its essential nature with the non-essential ones. So there is still a scope for determining the nature of the logic of decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision in the logic of decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision in the logic of decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision. Thus we come to the fifth view: the logic of decision decision. Gurukul kangir Collection, Haridwar

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the conditions of certainty, uncertainty or risk. In order to elaborate this view we have to classify some concepts that have gathered around it.

#### II

A question is raised whether the logic of decision is deductive logic or inductive logic. The logic of decision is the logic of uncertainty in as much it deals with decisions that are made, more often than not, under uncertainty. So it resembles the logic of chance and/or the logic of probability. To classify it as deductive or inductive is, therefore, wrong. But if one were forced to do so it would be true to identify it with inductive logic. But it should not be then supposed that no rule of deductive logic is applicable to it. In fact the logic of decicion goes beyond the dichotomy of deductive and inductive logic in asmuch as it uses the techniques of both of them. Jeferey has shown how the rules of deductive logic can be applied to it. Further when Nicholas Rescher says that "preferability judgments are not somehow extracted ex nihilo by wishful thinking, but are themselves conditioned by prior knowledge or postulation."6 he means that the logic of decision involves both a deductive and an inductive process. Present decisions are determined by past decisions which are themselves determined by still more past decisions and so on and so forth. In this way decision involves a regressus ad infinitum which may not be invariably false. Men learn from their past experiences when they deliberate. So learning and deliberation are not incompatibles. Analogical reasoning and simple induction are not ruled out from the decisionary effort.7 Hence it is evident that the logic of decision employs both deductive and inductive logic.

### III

Another question which is significant to our discussion is whether the logic of decision is pure or applied. If by pure logic we mean the logic of Pure Reason, then the logic of decision is not pure because it is the logic of practical reason. But if we accept that preference is alethic, i. e., truth-oriented and is distinguishable from the affective sort of preferences, then the logic of decision which deals with the truth-oriented preferences is pure logic C-As author for fact, where the logic of decision which deals with the truth-oriented preferences.

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human act that has three elements, the formal, the psychic and the inferential. The main task of the analyst of expectation is a Shackle says, to fuse them satisfactorily.8 Now who is this analyst of Expected Value? Is he an economist? Is he a logician Perhaps he is both. The homo eaconomicus is a rational or prudent man. He is a rational decision-maker and the logic of decision deals with his rationality. But as he is not a Robinson Crusoe but a social man his decision is confronted, countered supplemented, rewarded or defeated by other homi nes aeconomics so his decision is not unilateral. It is either bilateral or multilateral. So the logic of decision has to take an objective view of decision-making in a social context and study the rationales of not only individual choices but also those of social choices, the rules that govern them and the criteria that confirm or falsify them. The main function of the logic of decision is to judge the truth-status of the reasoning that is involved in all the three elements of decision-making. It is both pure logic and applied logic rolled up into one. In so far as it deals with preferability judgments, the truth-values of preference not-preference and indifference and the various types of order relations and decidability, it is undoubtedly a kind of pure logic. But when it applies the rules of deductive and inductive logic to the discussion of these and other related problems, it becomes, a kind of applied logic. It combines probability with desirability and herein lies its uniqueness that distinguishes it from the logic of probability. It is the concrete logic of human situations.

IV

A question, again, may be raised: What is the relation between the logic of decision and the Decision Theory? Are the two identical? Or are they different from each other?

It is well known that decision theory has two main branches, normative decision theory and descriptive decision theory. The former has been formulated in classical economics, statistic, ethics, game theory, welfare economics and political theory while the latter has been advanced in experimental studies, surveys of voting behaviour, social psychology and political science. Some philosophers have also studied decision theory while point of view and given rise to cognitive or epistemic decision

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theory. Now all these ramifications of decision theory are not the same as the logic of decision. The normative decision theory is closely related to deductive logic whereas the descriptive decision theory is related to inductive logic. But the whole decision theory is related to logic in the same way as natural sciences are related to logic. It is a theory of social sciences. Just as natural sciences have a logic, social sciences have also their own logic.

The logic of decision is a preliminary form of this logic. It is uniting the social sciences on theoretical plane and initiating a meaningful dialogue among them. The interdisciplinary character of decision theory is a mark that shows its link with logic. If this link is properly developed, it will be found that there is a logic of decision which is the ratio cognoscendi of the decision theory that is the ratio essendi of the logic of decision.

The problem of decision has two philosophieal ramifications, ethical and logical. Our concern here is only with the logical one which is probably more important than the ethical one in asmuch as ethical problems have logical parameters, and the pleasure-value or preyas or utility which is more pursued by the people of secular interests than the summum bonum or Śreyas which is the main ethical value, can better be studied by logical tools than the ethical ones. As logic is the grammar of thought, the logic of decision is the basic tool for all decision-makers. No decision theory can ignore it in asmuch as it gives clarity, precision, consistency and completeness to it. The truth-status of preferability judgments and the mode or decidability aud inferability are some of the important topics that are studied by the logic of decision. The criteria that have been evolved to test the principle of decision, as for example, Milnor's criteria or Chernoff's Axioms of optimal set are the contributions of logic to the theory of decision. Moreover, the present discussion over the Principle of insufficient reason as the basic principle of all axiomatizations of decision criteria is doubtless farragut with great logical significance. In formulating the principle of insufficient reason or complete ignorance we may get hints from the vast development of the principle of ajñana in Advaita vedanta. At any rate it is evident that the logic of decision is different from decision theory which is to be reconstructed, modified and evaluated in its light.

### V

The logic of decision is the logic of practical reason. Decision making is a central psychic event where knowing, feeling and willing are fused into one. The decision-maker has to think about the various possible acts, the events and the consequences of the act. He has to prepare a consequence matrix "What will follow if I do this? What will follow if I do not do this? In this way a prudent man should first consider the alternatives and their consequences and then decide to do or not to do a particular act."10 This is the piece of advice given by a poet to the king Bhoja. It enjoins to take a stock of the consequences or to look before leap. Thus every decision is preceded by deliberation. But as Knight says "decision process involves a lot of irrelevant mental rambling ..... it is not reasoned knowledge but judgment, common sense or intuition There is doubtless some analysis of a crude type involved but in the main it seems we infer largely from our experience of the past as a whole."11 Marshal holds that decisions are guided by trained instincts rather than knowledge. 12 So most of the real decisions of life are based on the reasoning of a tenuous and uncertain character. They are, more or less, intuitive judgments or unconscious inductions. One of the striking features of these judgments is their liability to error. The logic of decision which is the real logic of ordinary conduct plays here an important role : it tries to minimise the errors and the uncertainties that are likely to beset decisions. It will be a fruitful study to investigate into the various fallacies that vitiate preferability judgments.

Furthermore, it investigates into the calculus or matrix of utility which is the power of things to satisfy conscious wants. The formal logicians have designed desirability functions and related it to belief functions. In this way they have developed a theory of probability judgment which is different from a prior or mathematical probability judgment on the one hand and from empirical or statistical probability judgment on the other. All the same this logic of practical reason is still a neglected branch of logic and the efforts are being made to reduce it to either of the probability logics. But conduct is forward looking and the basic problem of knowledge is prediction. So decisions need a new logic that extends the frontiers of formal ways to the

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domain of conduct. This logic, as we have discussed above is not an applied logic, for it has its own logical relations and principles of inference which are lacking in the domain of formal logic. Predictive inferences, quasi-entailments, expectations and likely conclusions are some of the new types of inferences. Similarly order relations like transitivity and symmetry have new meanings and problems in decision situations. All of them are peculiar to the logic of decision. This logic is nearer to Indian conception of logic according to which the removal of uncertainty is the main aim of logic.13 Further the principle of insufficient reason tries to sort out knowledge from ignorance and thereby make human knowledge as far as possible reliable and predictive. Whether we should call this knowledge as true or certain or probable, or realiable, or simply as plausible is a point of further debate. For ordinary decision-makers they have, by and large, the same connotation. But the logicians do make a distinction among them and maintain that the logic of decision has more concern with the plausibility-values than any other truth-values. In this context it is significant to note that the ideal of the logic of decision is neither truth nor certainty nor probability.

### VI

An example of reasoning in decision: To give an example of reasoning involved in decision I take prisoner's dilemna. Two men are arrested for an armed robbery. The police are convinced that both are guilty but they lack sufficient evidence to convict either. So they put the following proposition to them and then separate them:—

If one man confesses but the other does not the first will go free and the other will get the maximum sentence for 10 years. If both confess, they will both get light sentences for 5 years. If neither confesses, they will both be imprisoned for vagrancy with a total sentence of 1 year each.

What will each prisoner decide? Let us take the first prisoner. What will he decide? The Police are convinced that both prisoners will confess, although it would be better for both if neither confessed. Why are the police so convinced? Here is

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the argument: Let P<sub>1</sub> and P<sub>2</sub> be the first prisoner and the second prisoner respectively. The alternatives for p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub> are:

D		15 ale:
P <sub>1</sub> Not Confess	P <sub>2</sub> Not Confess	Confess (10, 0)
Confess	(1, 1) (0, 10)	(5, 5)

The probability matrix for p<sub>1</sub> is as follows:

Not confess	25	
	•25	.25
Confess	.25	.25
		. 23

Taking acquittal as most desirable, i. e., as 1 and conviction for 10 years' imprisonment as — 1 and one year's sentence as — .1 and 5 years' sentence as — .5 the desirability matrix for P<sub>1</sub> is as follows:

Not confess 
$$-\cdot 1$$
  $-1$  Confess  $1$   $-.5$ 

Now expected desirability on not-confession

$$= (-.25) \times (-.1) + (.25 \times .1)$$
 by multiplying and adding the entries in the first row of the two matrices.

$$= - \cdot 025 - \cdot 25 = - \cdot 275$$

And expected desirability on Confessing

$$= (.25 \times 1) + (.25 \times -.5)$$
 By multiplying and adding the entries, in the second row.

$$= + \cdot 25 - \cdot 125$$
  
=  $+ \cdot 125$ .

Now according to Bayesian principle the maximum expected value is to be selected. Obviously + ·125 is more than - ·215. Therefore confession is preferred to non-confession. Hence the first prisoner will confess. Similarly it can be proved that the second prisoner will also confess. So the police are rightly convinced of the fact that both prisoners will confess.

Now the reasoning that has been used above can be abstracted as follows:

Probability matrix can be taken as

Desirability matrix can be taken as

 $\begin{array}{ccc} d_1 & & d_2 \\ d'_1 & & d'_2 \end{array}$ 

The multiplication of the two matrices is

 $P_1d_1 p_2d_2 \ P'_1d'_1 p'_2d'_2$ 

By addition of the first row we get  $P_1d_1 + P_2d_2$  which is  $-\cdot 275$  in the above case. By addition of the second row we get  $P'_1d'_1 + P'_2d'_2$  which is  $+\cdot 125$  in the above case.

The rationale of this calculation is the familiar practice in the game of gambling that associates probability with monetary gain or loss. The prisoner's dilemma indicates that the best decision could not be taken by the two prisoners simply because there was no co-operation between them or because the one was totally ignorant or uncertain of what the other was really going to decide. Had they co-operated with each other they would have preferred not to confess. This shows that group decision in such situations is more rational than individual decision. But individuals often take decision under uncertainty, so the prisoner's dilemma fully illustrates the reasoning that is involved in solving the decision problem under uncertainty. It is an example of two person non-zero sum non-co-operative game. What the prisoners decided was the most satisfactory, though not the best, for them under the conditions of uncertainty. In this way logical decisions may not be the best but are the most satisfactory ones under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty. So the logic of decision is not concerned with the best decision; its concern is only the most satisfactory decision which is available in any given situation and the most satisfactory decision may be regarded as the most rational decision.

## VII

The reasoning that is involved in decision-making may be termed in a majority of cases, as nomic inference. There are many current rules of conduct in every society. People generally seek guidance from these rules which have been established by inductive reasonings of several generations. They apply them to their situation and get a satisfactory conclusion. Take for example the

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prisoner's dilemma. Here a prisoner may think in the following

A man who seeks the uncertain and leaves the certain, actually spoils both. 14 Therefore what is certain, should be preferred to what is uncertain. Now if I choose the certain, there are to positions. First if I confess, at best I shall be acquitted or a worst I will get a sentance of five years. And if I do not confes at best I shall get a sentence of one year or at worst I shall ge a sentence of 10 years. When I choose between the best situations. I have to confess and if I choose between the worst situation. again I have to confess. Therefore I must confess.

Here the prisoner makes an analysis of his situations which are best and worst. Then he makes a comparison between the best situations on the one hand and between the worst situations on the other hand and finds that in either circumstances he must confess. Now the danger in confessing is only to get a sentence of years. But the danger in not confessing is to get a sentence of 10 years. So a greater evil is to be avoided by choosing a lesser one. This conclusion is also confirmed by the rule that the prudent men give up the half where there is a possibility to loose the whole or by the rule that the golden mean should be preferred.

The above reasoning has been elegantly presented in the logic of decision in terms of probability function and desirability function. But when it comes to be represented in the ordinary language of common people, it is based, as we have shown, on certain rules of conduct. These rules may not be universally applicable or valid. But they are valid to some types of relevant human situations and this is the reason why they are proverbially used and propagated by the common genius of the people. A prudent man must learn as many of them as possible, for this learning yields the most important set of instrumentalities or tools for decision-making But it should not be forgotten that these tools are only the rules of thumb and that they cannot take the place of the logic of decision which deals with a set of sophisticated rules for decision-making and develops the criteria for testing them. These rules of thumb. however, indicate an important feature of the logic of decision that its reasoning is, by and large, nomic inference which may be taken mid-way between deductive logic and inductive logic as it makes inferences from quasi-universal rules to particular propo-

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sitions or relevant consequences. But the rules of thumb themselves require a logical treatment for their consistent exposition and the analysis of the principle that are hidden behind them.

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### NOTES

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- 12. Quoted Op. Cit. p. 211.
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## SOCRATES ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

The Apology and Crito provide us with an excellent framework in which the issue of disobedience is raised. Socrates is a conscientious citizen and as such he does not want to take society and laws governing it lightly. Though he recongnizes the value of social living, but at the same time he cannot ignore the dictates of his Conscience, which to him is the seat of divine command and as such the source of duty, morality and justice. The dictates of Conscience have a higher validity for him. Even his general habit of obedience to laws is itself in conformity with his Conscience. But if what the laws command were to come into conflict with the demands of Conscience, it is obvious that it is not the former which would have the claim to supremacy, but the latter

It is more of a rule rather than exception that most men cherish some values, which are put on a higher level by them than their obligation to the laws of the state. In addition to Conscience, some other sources of this type of values have been: Morality, Reason, Justice or Voice of God. For the sake of convenience, we may denote this set of values by 'HV' (Higher Values). On the contrary, there are some values, such as 'social stability', 'law' and 'order', which an individual cherishes because of his being a member of a political society. These are necessary for the fulfilment of his basic needs. The political society is rather instituted for the realisation of these values and to accomplish this purpose, it works with a legal structure. If it is to work and yield the benefits which the individual citizens except from it, then the latter must obey the laws of the state. We can denote this set of values by 'SV' (that is, State-Values). Since the individual as a citizen enjoys certain benefits and privileges in the political society, he has certain obligations towards the society of which he is a member. As a citizen, if an individual breaks the law, he is required to undergo certain designated penalties. A man who says, 'I do not obey the law nor do I accept the punishment' shows highly anarchistic tendencies, implying subversion of law, which if widespread, would ultimately ruin the state. This, however, is a consequence

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which reasonable men would wish to avoid. Even the values designated as 'higher' by men are achievable only in a nonanarchic state. For instance, if there are anarchy, social disorder, constant fear of death and lack of security, the realisation of 'HV' would be highly doubtful or even impossible. However, our concept of good or noble living includes a reference to Higher Values, so that it will not be enough to remain satisfied only with the actualisation of 'SV'. For existence, which we consider human as contrasted to mere animal existence, the HV are also needed. The fulfilment of 'SV' meets the material needs of men, whereas the relalisation of 'HV' fulfils their spiritual moral urgencies.

Considering the importance of both, in case there appears a conflict between 'HV' and 'SV', the individual may find himself in a difficult decision-making situation. If he opts forthe former, he finds that this amounts to taking the ground off from under his feet. Besides, choosing 'HV' and sacrificing 'SV' may not even be a clear case of choosing morality over survival for there is the moral worry that as he has been enjoying the benefits of the political society, it would be far from fair for him to neglect altogether the socio-political obligations, which this accrue to him. It seems he must find out some reconciliation between the two conflicting claims.

Looking at the Apology and Crito, we see that this exactly is the kind of dilemma which Socrates faces: What is his situation tion? If we leave aside Crito for the time being and concentrate on the Apology, it seems as if Socrates opts for 'HV' and altogether neglects the 'SV'. For example, he says, '.....I care not a straw for, death, and that my great and only care is low I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing.' This clearly show his willingness to sacrifice his life, if necessary, for the sake of 'HV'. Further, addressing Athenians, he remarks: ... Men of Athens, I honour and love you : but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy ... etc.<sup>2</sup> From these line, it could seemingly be concluded that whenever there is such the conflict be will a like but conflict, he will follow the voice of God or dictates of Justice by this will prove to be a misleading interpretation<sup>3</sup> as we proceed.

The Crito gives as entirely different impression of Sociality CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangn Collection, Haridwar

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position. Here Socrates gives vigorous arguments for the state and laws that one may be led to believe that he holds 'SV' to be supreme, that is, he will obey the Laws even if it means sacrificing his higher ideals. One thing is abundantly clear that even if Socrates is to be interpreted as holding this position, it cannot be on the basis of his fear of Punishment. This is clarified by him in both: The Apology and Crito. Indeed, this position is presented in prison by Crito, Socrates' friend. In this context, Socrates reminds Crito of the benefits that the former has enjoyed from the state as a citizen, and points out his obligations toward it. While convincing Crito about the position taken by him, he talks about his Agreement with the Laws, the education, which the state gave him and the parental care which it al o rendered. These arguments may be erroneously interpreted to conclude that Socrates was an absolutist, advocating unconditional obedience to the state, but a careful scrutiny of facts reveals that such an interpretation is inconsistent with Socrates' theory and practice.

In our view, Socrates rejected both of these extreme positions. The position which seems to form the basis for Socrates' conduct is one which reconciles the two conflicting claims from the realms of 'HV' and 'SV'. His unique resolution of this conflict follows this pattern. As his obligation to the Higher Values necessitates a violation of the state law he disobeys the law (s) and does what he considers to be in accordance with his God's voice. However, the obligations which he has as a beneficiary of the political order and as a citizen, are met by him by his willing acceptance of punishment that the violation of law brings as a consequence. In this way, he manages to preserve both kinds of values from total derelection. In the Apology, we find the disobedience-aspect, whereas in Crito, the other aspect, namely, the acceptance of punishment is brought to focus.

Either of these positions may be interpreted to be the Socratic position. Some philosophers<sup>4</sup> for instance, interpret him to be a champion of absolute obedience. This interpretation of Socratic position may be based on the notions of (a) parenthood and (b) agreement, as presented in the Apology and Crito.

(a) In Crito, Socrates imagines the situation in which he is about to runcaway. The Laws appear before him and remind

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him of the parental care which they took of him: "Well then since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child... etc"5.

Socrates is aware of the fact that as he as a citizen has received many benefits from the state, he is having certain obligations towards it. He further knows that his escape would involve total neglect of those obligations. If he escapes he is proclaimed a destroyer of Laws, as the Laws themselves point out; "Tell us, Socrates, what are you about? are you not going by an act of yours to bring us to ruin-the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies?"6

Here it is pertinent to point out that destruction of laws is considered to be the consequence of Socrates' running away from prison. Socrates does not intend to destroy Laws as they are his 'parents'. He fulfils his obligations towards them by not escaping, that is, by accepting the punisment and thus remaining in prison. If Socrates dishonours the judicial decision by his escape and does not accept the punishment, the law is harmed. A state cannot subsist in which the decisions of law are nullified and are trampled upon by individual citizens.7 That Laws are deemed by Socrates as his parents, from this it could mistakenly be concluded that he is bound to obey them unconditionally, whereas the fact is that all talk between Socrates and the Laws centres round his escape from prison. The Laws are made to say that if Socrates escapes it would mean that he '... pay (s) no respect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer ... running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements of your citizenship which you made with us.'8

(b) The second argument concerns the notion of 'agreement'. Here we want to point out that Socrates can never have an agreement to obey all laws unconditionally, nor any moral man can afford to have an agreement to obey all laws just or unjust right or wrong, and good or bad. What in these circumstances is required is a thorough analysis of 'agreement'.

In Crito the Laws say: 'And was that our agreement with you? Or were you to abide by the sentence of the state? It is clear from the beite remanded by the sentence of the state that refers to the fact of Socrates' escape. The question is whether it is socrates

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agreement with Laws that he would escape punishment if he got it. Clearly, it is not the agreement that he would run away from the punishment that the Laws pronounced against him, and this obviously is the reason that he chooses to stay inside the jail, in spite of being persistently requested by his friend Crito. At every step, we have to keep in mind the context of Socratic escape and the subsequent dialogue with the Laws of Athens, otherwise we are very likely to be misled. The Laws frequently allude to this fact. For instance, they say, 'Or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' The agreement was broken had Socrates escaped. If we penetrate deep and deep into the mysteries of this little dialogue, viz., Crito, we find that the Laws' sole concentration is on this issue. They say: "You. Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us ... And now you refuse to abide by your agreements.10

If the escape breaks the agreement, then non-escape keeps the agreement of Socrates with Laws. What could then be the nature of such an 'agreement'? The only sane agreement, which we can reasonably make with Laws is: Either we obey the law (s) or accept the designated penalties in case of disobedience. The Laws frequently remark this, 'Or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' The 'agreement' then implied that Socrates should not run away from punishmet, once it was given. Thus the 'agreement' of Socrates or of any moral individual to the laws of the state is not that of unconditional obedience. In other words, 'agreement' with laws does not mean that it is an agreement to obey this or that, good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust, or all laws, but it is only a general acceptance and allegiance towards the legal system as a whole. For instance, if we accept and owe allegiance to Indian legal system, then we are not bound to accept the laws which are discriminatory, as Obedience to each and every law is not a part of such an 'agreement'. It is only a general sort of agreement and as a general view of something does not concentrate on any particular, similarly, such agreement in general does not concentrate on this. or that particular case of obedience. Further, this sort of interpretation of 'agreement' would imply unconditional obedience to tyrannies, dictatorships and to the whims of the tyrants, which socrates, as a man of Reason, as a follower of Conscience, as

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a listener of his God's voice, and as a doer of only right, would never accede to. In other words, not only Socrates, but no moral man can accede to any agreements which require blind obedience to law (s). However, if Socrates made an agreement for unconditional obedience then his disobedience becomes incompatible with this sort of agreement. If the 'agreement' were of the unconditional type then by breaking the law but accepting to remain in prison, Socrates could not claim that he was keeping his agreements, because it demands that the individual may not break the law at all. The Laws allude to this fact off and on that the agreement would be broken if Socrates, managed to escape. Whereas the agreement for unconditional obedience is broken regardless of the fact whether he runs away from prison or stays inside. Thus only if we interpret Socrates' 'agreement' with Laws in the way we have indicated above, viz., 'to obey the law (s) or accept the punishment', can we do justice to the Socrates' position?

A careful study of the Apology and Crito reveals that Socrates does only that which his Conscience guides him to do. Obedience to the command of God is for him a necessity. Socrates regarded it to be the command of God that he is to cross-examine people. In this path, even the fear of death could not hinder his pursuit. He says to Athenians: "... either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways,

not even if I have to die many times."11 This is tantamount to saying that no matter what, he would not disobey his God. This loyalty to his Conscience, which revealed to him the Will of God, led him many times to disobey the Athenian Law. Once Socrates refused to obey the 30 Tyrants. As is well-known, in the year 400 B. C., the Athenian democracy was destroyed and an oligarchy of 30 set up in its place by Critiss with the help of the Spartan General Lysander. It was the reign of terror and injustice. The Generals, once, sent for Socrates along with four others, and commanded them to bring Leon from Salamis to Athens, for being murdered, disobedience to which probably entailed death penalty 12 Socrates boldly disobeyed them and went home fearlessly. However, it is not the political authority that he feet authority that he fears, nor disobedience, which may bring death to him, but his only uson schains that he should not do anything that is unrighteous and unholy. 13 is unrighteous and unholy.13

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remark I. P. Q In the context of adhering to state religion, Socrates further disobeyed the Law and what is more, acknowledged it in unambiguous words. The charges against him ran: "... Socrates is a doer of evil, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth, and does not receive the gods whom the state receives, but has a new religion of his own." 14

In Athens of Socrates' time, Apollo and Zeus and other such ends were ragarded as the state-gods. Though Socrates was a religious man, yet his conception of 'God' was quite different. Thus although he believed in divinity, he did not believe in the 'state-divinities'. He says to Meletus, '... only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods.' Not only he believes in other gods, but he also teaches the youth not to believe in the 'stategods' but to believe in his own gods. Socrates himself says to Meletus, 'I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowedges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead.' Meletus swears by Zeus, 15 which is different from the gods Socrates believes in. Not only Socrates believes in gods but he also believes that his gods are higher than the gods, any of his accusers believes in.16 Thus staying true to his own conception of 'gods', Socrates committed disobedience to the laws concerning state-gods. It is amply clear from the instances cited above that the force of Socrates' argument in the Apology and Crito is directed not against disobedience but against escaping from Prison, and thus escaping from the punishment.

Punishment may be accepted in various ways. Somebody may stay inside the jail and yet he may really not accept the punishment. This unacceptance of punishment may be evidenced in his behaviour. For example, he may sit for a fast-unto-death in jail protesting that injustic has been done in his case and that he has not accepted the punishment morally though physically he is in prison. Socrates' acceptance of punishment was both-moral as well as physical. In no way, he seems to have interfered with the attempts which might have put him into prison, when the opportunity to escape, he refused and finally with making any fuss about it drank the hemlock. Wondering at Socrates' calm acceptance of punishment, Crito

remarks:

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... I wish I were not myself so sleepless and full of sorrow I have been watching with amazement your peaceful slumbers ... never did I see anything like the easy tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.17

To sum: To follow one's conscience, to disobey laws which are considered unjust rather than give blind obedience to all laws, to accept calmly penalties which go with such a disobedience to desist from harming others, these then are the features worth noticing in the Civil Disobedience of this man of rare honesty and integrity.

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R. D. Dixit

### NOTES

- 1. see Jowett, B. (ed.): The Dialogues of Plato, Oxford 1964, Volume I. the Apology, p. 357; and also p. 353. The Apology and Crito ru respectively between pages 341-66 and 371-84.
- 2. ibid., p. 354; Cf. also Crito, pp. 372, 374.
- 3. Even in the quotation given above there is the reference 'I honour and love you', which can be taken as a clue to the fact that Socrates is not only worried about his morals but he also cherishes a certain sense of manhood and citizenship which he cannot afford to neglect altogether.
- 4, E. g. see Martin, Rex: Socrates on Disobedience to Law', the Review of Metaphysics, Sept. 1970, p. 22.
- 5. Jowett, p. 380.
- 6. Ibid., p. 379.
- 7, Ibid.
- 8. Ibid., p. 382.
- 9. Ibid., p. 379.
- 10. Ibid., p. 382.
- 11. Ibid., p. 355.
- Socrates himself remarks: 'For which I might have lost my life, bid, not the power of the might 12. not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards came to an end., ibid.
- in the same place, p. 357. 13.
- 14. Ibid., p. 348.
- For all details see, pp. 350-1. 15.
- 16. Ibid., p. 360.
- Ibid., pcc-371n Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar 17.

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formal ( parts in Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol VIII, No. 1, Oct. (1980)

# THE CONCEPT OF 'BEAUTY' AND SOME PROBLEMS OF AESTHETIC APPRAISAL

I propose to consider the view that beauty is a unique aesthetic quality. I take Harold Osborne (The Theory of Beauty: Aesthetics and Criticism and Aesthetics History) as a representative of those who hold this view. It derives its viability from G. E. Moore. I shall try to argue that a unique aesthetic quality cannot provide the basis of a general theory of aesthetic judgment.

There is a theory of value which points to some quality which is intrinsic, in varying degrees, in all excellent works. This concern with some unique aesthetic quality has had enormous influence in the plastic arts where 'significant form' is perhaps its most vivid incarnation. It has been less important in literature, where discursive content makes it more difficult to choose a suitable quality. It is also a fact that a clear example of such a theory is not easy to find. Such qualities may be natural ones, or they may be mataphysical and the subject of a special intuition. It was invented to explain something quite concrete about painting. The formal coherence of a painting is often quite independent of the character of its subject matter. In some paintings the lines and masses seem to have no intelligible order at all, while in others the scene depicted might be much the same, but the structure seems to cohere, to have some kind of inner logic of its own. But this 'structure' is only analogous to the architectural sense of structure in which something is actually supported, or the grammatical sense in which structure refers to the relations of parts of speech in a natural language. It refers to no natural set of structures and yet it is not an arbitrary notion, for it can be recognized by anyone with any experience of art, and general agreement about the formal properties of a painting is often reached. Nor does this mean shape, for a painting may be full of shapes of all kinds or have a distinct pattern of some shape and still be completely chaotic from a formal point of view. It is a notion that after careful consideration is identified with the formal elements in a work of art—with the arrangement of its parts into a coherent whole. Beauty is, in fact, the property of CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Handwar

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Two sets of issues are raised here: the first concerns the character of definition of beauty as an objective property, the second concerns the use of this concept in formulating general principles. But to say what form is brings on rather misty language.

The value theories that refer to qualities inherent in things can be called uniquely aesthetic theories, while naturalistic ones are usually conserned with the whole of our experience. A possible exception to this is the most famous of all the inherent aesthetic qualities, for 'beauty' applies not only to works of art, but to things existing in nature as well, and beauty has been traditionally regarded as the object of perception by the senses. St. Thomas says quite simply that beauty is what is pleasing to the senses, and Santayana connects pleasure with objects in defining beauty as 'Pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing'. Neither of these, of course, need be limited to works of art, and as statements about a uniquely aesthetic quality they need much expansion and qualification.

Osborne believes that the purpose of aesthetics is to provide the general principles for making correct critical judgements, and that coming to an understanding of the notion of beauty is to be carried on in two ways: first, by examining the states of mind involved in the appreciation of beauty in works of art, secondly, by examining the objective properties in works of art which are connected with this mental state. This latter is the search for the true nature of the 'objective beauty-property' -- which is identified with the formal elements in a work of art, the arrangement of its parts into a coherent whole. Beauty is, in fact, the property of being an organic whole for perception. Normally it is a whole of great complexity and intricate organization. The greater this complexity of elements organized, the greater the beauty.

Two issues are raised here: (a) the character of the definition of beauty as an objective property: and (b) the use of this concept in formulating the general principles of aesthetic judgement<sub>CC-0</sub>. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Beauty is said to be the function of 'configuration' and of the kind of configuration which is called 'organic unity'. This organic unity is a 'configuration such that the configuration itself is prior in awareness to its component parts and their relations according to discursive and additive principles'. It is apprehended 'synoptically' as a single complex whole of multifarious and intricately related parts. This synoptic apprehension is such that it demands a heightening of consciousness.

Two difficulties arise at once.

- (a) This is a limiting of the word 'beauty' which might exclude much that we normally call beautiful. We often speak of an autumn afternoon, of a landscape as beautiful. They are not objects of art with an organic unity. Osborne might say that the synoptic apprehension of them at any given moment gives them such a unity as to be classified as beauty. But if synoptic apprehension is the test, it is in this case no more than the cutting off of a certain bit of experience by the focus of attention. We do this with a great many things that are not beautiful.
- (b) Secondly, there are many organic wholes, such as complex machines which are apprehended synoptically prior to their component parts, or such as organisms themselves. In fact, by this test, most objects and situations are apprehended synoptically. This difinition rests upon a specialised notion of perception which cannot in fact be limited to the cases for which a claim is made.

Another problem arises with the quantitative measure of the amount of beauty present in terms of the degree of complexity of the organic whole. This quantitative measure of beauty fails to account for the fact that we may find a work more beautiful than another, but still a lesser work. Or, we may find the less complex whole more beautiful than the more complex one. Beauty' is not the only appraisal word-we can call a work of art great without calling it beautiful. It is an error to think that beauty can be measured in terms of the number of elements organized in an organic whole. We might on occasions find a bhajan by Kabir more intensely beautiful than a far more complex work, say, a khayal recital. And in doing so one need not deny that the latter is the 'greater' work. Or in looking at a small Chinese jade bowl one may find its perfection of form far more CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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beautiful than the Ajanta mural, although the latter may have a more complex sort of unity. We do not measure beauty in terms of the complexity of elements organized, nor do we always call the greatest work the most beautiful.

For the concept of beauty to do what Osborne wishes it to do, it would have both to apply to everything that we might wish to call beautiful and to comprise every important quality we might wish to attribute to great works of art, that is, even formal quality that is concerned in making the work great. And this would make of beauty such a comprehensive term that if would not be much of a guide to those fine discriminations needed in aesthetic judgements. Unless, of course, a sort of quantitative measure of beauty could be applied, and this is exactly what Osbrone wishes to do. Like I. A. Richards he wishes to calculate to measure works comparatively on a scale which determines how much beauty work of art have by a quantitative measure of how many elements they co-ordinate in some organic whole This would not only rule out many of the qualitative distinction which criticism normally make, but criticism would then become something of the calculating scientific sort of activity from which it might be thought that Osborne was trying to rescue it by development of pure and exclusive aestheticism,

Even if the concept of beauty itself could be shown to be the unique aesthetic quality, it is meant to be, it is hard to see how would provide the body of principles by which a correct judgment might be secured. There are no ready-made formulae for turning the individual qualities of art into the appropriate measure of for mal elements. There would have to be some general descriptive of teria which acted as such formulae and it is quite impossible to see how they could exist except by inventing them anew for each word of art to be judged and for each work to set its own conditions this way would make nonsense of general principles. The connections between tions between the individual characteristics of the work of art and the aesthetic quality would have to be worked out in each case, and the individuality of particular works would make general formulation impossible. tion impossible. As a unique aesthetic quality 'beauty' has provided neither an explanation neither an explanation of the essential nature of works of art por the foundation of a science of judgement.

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must rely heavily on ostensive demonstration. It is hard to give much sense to the notion 'significant form', to define it clearly, to say why some forms are significant and not others. It is much easier to point to a canvas, point out specific characterististics of the way colours and lines are organized and say, 'This is what I mean, this painting has it, that one over there does not. ' And the comparative merit of these two works may be shown by this diffierence. In literature formalism has no such recourse to direct demonstration. Most literary formalists have been concerned with the setting up and enforcing of rules for various literary compositions. Sometimes the connections between value and any given set of rules may be clear enough. For example, some sonnets may owe heir intensity and depth of emotional impact to the consciousness and elegance of their form. But an excessive concern for rules leads to the preference for a current work over an obviously great one. Many sonnets can be written exactly according to the rules and still be very bad ones.

Another effect of an excessive respect for form and for the rules which govern various forms is shown in the attempt to write in complex but unnatural forms which are derived from theories of prosody. While this has often been one of the pleasures of poets, they have seldom invoked it as a serious concern.

This has been a brief examination of the view that a unique aesthetic quality can provide the basis of a general theory of judgment. I have tried to show that this claim cannot be maintained. The reasons for its falure are those which weigh against the possibility of any general theory of judgment. It seeks to reduce the basis of critical judgement to a simple quality - a quality either in ourselves, in our experiences of works of art, or inherent in the work itself. This runs counter to both our common sense and to all critical practice. To be concerned either personally or professionally with works of art is to recognize their diversity and uniqueness and to recognize the conditions that make these inevitable. The common quality in the use of the word 'beautiful' will be almost as remote and elusive as those of the word 'good'. Although 'beautiful' may have a less general meaning, any common characteristic will be as hard to find. When philosophers or philosophical critics thought that they were naming the parts of good or the varieties of the beautiful, their error consisted not in the misuse of the predicate, but

only in thinking that something, some common quality was named by it. And, in so far as they thought that the discovery of that part. cular thing was the key to the making of correct judgements, they have ignored both the individual character of the works themselves, and the entire history of critical practice. Whatever the status of the chosen quality may be, (natural, formal or metaphysical,) the error that concerns critical practice the most, is simply that of insisting on any single criterion of judgement, or attempting to reduce a complex of activities to a single simple principle, This has long been one of the most awkward features of aesthetic theory and whatever the interest or claims of the particular principle chosen, this error of the simple criterion must be pointed out on its own account.

There are several motives which lead to this demand for the simple criterion. One is perhaps a psychological need to feel that such things as the 'good' or the 'beautiful' are all of one piece, a desire for conceptual neatness and economy. For example, Osbome needs to distil the essential common element in all beautiful things. Connected with this too is the desire to make a judgements certain: this has always required making them matters of calculations.

Behind these attitudes are two sets of assumptions: (a) that the simple criterion can fulfil a multiplicity of demands: and (b) that the act of judgement is a single unequivocal act, a clearly set apart logical movement. Simple criteria are never in use and could never perform the variety of tasks demanded of judgement. There is no one act which is itself a judgement. Judgements are not only made through a variety of linguistic means and with an assortment of diverse standards, purposes and presuppositions, are not made in any one grammatical point or in any one logical move; they are made through a variety of linguistic means with assortment of standards, purposes and presuppositions. they are made through the accumulation of certain tones, a series of decisions, different points of view, complex attitudes. It might be said, of course, that this complex and elusive process might be only the gardual orientation of the mind towards a central guiding principle, but I do not think that the gradual emergence of attitudes con by he hald the same of the s des can be held to be evidence for the existence of simple criteria. Such an attitude might very well be the complex product of many considerations, all of which are evident in the final judgement.

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Another reason which points out the fact that use of simple criteria impoverishes the language of criticism is its necessary limits. Simple critria limits our language in calling a thing good or bad. To desire to limit the classes of reasons that can be given is to misunderstand the nature of criticism and of aesthetic reasoning generally. Aesthetics is not deductive reasoning about general principles or an empirical search among beautiful objects for the quintessential nugget of aesthetic substance. Aesthetics is a reason giving activity, an explanation involving many kinds of language and explanatory models, feelings, preferences for the many characteristics of the various sorts of things that we accept as being worke of art. There should neither be limits to the sort of reasons we can give, nor rules to govern our choice of explanations. These choices are essential. They spring entirely from the content of our meeting with the work of art. These choices depend on what aspect of a piece of art we find exciting, what critical issues may call our attention to, or simply, what disagreement it may bring up with a friend. Wittgenstein said that reasons in aesthetics are of the nature of further descriptions. In a sense this is true in that we call attention to more and more features of works of art in giving reasons for our opinion of it. The more complex or disputed the issue the more features we will try to distinguish to support our point of view. My only qualification is that this cannot mean description in any narrow sense, (especially in the limited sense which describing has to have when philosophers speak of 'descriptive' as opposed to 'evaluative' language. ) but description used in a non-exclusive sense such as vivid, balanced, profound etc.

The constant mixing of descriptive and evaluative force in terms used by critics is one of the most constant features of critical language as a whole. Even reason giving in aesthetics is carried on in such a way. Any intelligible picture of critical judgements must discard the notion of criteria finding for that of reason giving. The word 'criteria' is useful enough and might be kept, but what must be discarded is the search for the quintessential element, whether you call it naturalistic or formal. The method of criticism involved in the use of such criteria if they existed, would be the holding of a work up to an invisible yardstick or geiger-counter it would be artificial and pointless.

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Richards and Stevenson and many after them have made division of the uses of language which might refer to aesthetica and morals. They have shown that in certain circumstance we cannot support conclusions in one kind of language with argument derived from another kind. But in the language of criticism, description and judgement are inextricably mixed. The very words the critic describes with are such that they effect a judgement. Such words as 'clear', 'coherent', 'dull' etc. all describe in a normal way and at the same time make a judgement. The connection between judging and describing is often so close that the two could hardly be stated separately. To consider in these circumstances how statements of value are or are not derived from those of fact would be absurd, to point to the inextricable mixing of the two is to show that this neat division of two types to language has only a limited usefulness.

It is not important either to describe how it is that aesthetic reasons and arguments support aesthetic judgements, for in any normal logical sense they do not support them at all. Rather, they explain them : they make it clear what it is that we mean by our judgements and are the answers to a repeated "why?" When we argue about aesthetic matters we are not moving from hypothesis to conclusion or in any other formally logical way, but we show, point, compare, draw attention to, and generally try to make others see what it is that we mean by offering alternative descriptions or suggesting different ways of looking at a particular work. Our judgements are not arguments, but rather are elucidated by a variety of remarks of possibly many linguistic types. We do not appeal to anything except to the education and experience of other individuals, and we try to present complex objects of art to them in a certain light. The successful argument does not point to rules, does not follow any particular logical path, but it is often the one in which we characterize skilfully, show connections some one had not seen and make them aware in ways in which they had not been aware. How this works is best shown through presenting something of the variety of judgements that critics actually make.

Visva-Bharati Santiniketan. Ratnabali Bhattacharys

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# THE VAISESIKA CATEGORIES: A LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

I have straightaway rendered the Vaisèsika term Padartha as "category". For, as I shall try to show in the course of my argument the Vaisèsika doctrine of padarthas runs parallel to the Aristotelian doctrine of "categories" in all essential respects It is important to note right at the outset that the parallel is not to be carried beyond Aristole. For, in the course of the development of philosophical thinking, the term "category" has freed itself of its original setting and yet has retained its specific significance. Such is not the case with the Vaisèsika term padartha.

Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta states the doctrine in a categorical manner as: Substance (Dravya), Attribute (Guna), Action (Karma), The General (Sāmānya), The Individual (Višeṣa), Inherence (Samavāya), Absence or Non-Existence (Abhāva) are the seven padārthās. The Tarka-Samgraha statement is chosen here to enunciate the doctrine as it alone seems to me to be faithful to the original thought. The last two words of the statement viz. "seven categories" (sapta-padārthās) carry the sense: The seven as mentioned are the categories. In other words these categories are posited. The manner of Annambhatta's statement has a point, and that is to elucidate the Vaišeṣika doctrine as such, whereas, other statements of the doctrine as, for example, in the sapta-padārthā of Sivāditya, seem to add a gloss to it, often thereby depriving it of its rigour.

This loss of rigour in the statement of the doctrine is seen in two ways. Wherever the statement of the doctrine posits the padārthās themselves, the list of the padārthās (either six or seven) is not qualified by "only". But such statements as use descriptive names for the padārthās e. g, upādhayaḥ as in saptapadārthi, the list is made to end with the restrictive "only". This difference is brought out clearly in the Nīlakanthi a commentary on Tarka-Samgraha. It says that the padārhās are the ways in which the signification of differences is determined. The elucidatory commentary Bhāskarodava is even more explicit. It describes the padārthās

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as upādhayah but takes care to explain that these predicative names signify 'extreme othernesses' (anyatama-vantah) and for this reason are called padārthās. It goes further and assents explicitly that the 'seven' is not a qualitative determination, but relates to our apprehension of the specific character of the differences. The Dīpikā comment of Annambhatta follows this cue and says: The "seven" speaks for the scope of the othernesses and adds that this seven-fold determination of othernesses should be spoken of more positively as the seven types of distinctnesses (vyavachchēdāh).

The Vaisesika system uses the term 'padārtha' in a technical sense. Sanskrit scholars generally seem to be averse to rendering the term, 'padārtha' as 'category'. The doctrine of the 'padārthās' is a characteristically Vaisesika position, and the adoption of the term by the other systems of Indian thought only results in divesting the position of its strict significance, as will be seen later. The fact that each school takes a different stand regarding the number and also the names of the padārthās should be reason enough to have to draw a line between the notion of the padārtha and the specific doctrines based on it. It is imperative to attempt to determine the notion first.

The Dipikā alone seems to make the point that the "padārtha" is in the first instance 'a name' in the sense of a designating term (abhidhèya); and that the characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) of a padartha is that it can be named (abhidhèyatvam). It is but obvious that the reference to names here is not to proper names eg. "Annambhatta". While speaking of designating terms it is important to note the distinction between two ways of designating. Elementary logic speaks of uniquely descriptive names, eg. "the author of Tarka-Samgraha" as designations (abhidhana). Such descriptive words are meant to identify individuals and are closer to proper names in their denotative capacity. The Dipikā has in mind a still another way of naming, where the name signifies a notion. It is a way of naming with a view to determining the meaning of the term used. The padarthas are called "abhidheyas" and not "abhidhānās". Abhidhānās are descriptive names given to things already identified as individual. The implication of the term "abhidheya" is that the things, rather the notion it names, is not yet distinctively apprehended and that it is the naming that is both to signalise and to signifyrital kingoulded propagation mark

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the two apart by speaking of abhidheyas as designating or significatory names and of abhidhanas as designations or significant names.2 The point of the distinction lies in the intended reference in the two terms, the implied reference, in 'abhidheya' being to the function of naming, whereas in 'abhidhana', it is to the result achieved. If the term 'abhidheya' can be granted to have a distinctive connotation, then it should follow that to describe the padarthas as "a list of namable objects" or "as a classification of knowable things" as seems to be the common practise, is to say the least, a misleading way of explicating the notion. A 'namable object' or a 'knowable thing' are blanket terms which could be used of everything that in any manner forms a part of our conscious experience. Neither expression permits an exclusive application, and least of all to padarthas. The padarthas are names, but not of what in ordinary paralance is called 'things' or 'objects'. It is even more important to note that the list is not a classification either.

It is a point to note that neither Nilakanthi nor the Dipika both of which explicate the notion of the padarthas by the conception of a 'name' speaks of 'objects' but only of 'terms' (padās). Besides each of them makes it clear that the name aspect is only an explicatory conception, not the main part of the notion. The Nilakanthi remarks: the name for a term (padaabhidheya) is an additional mark of a padartha and it is intended to remove a shortcoming if any such is involved, in naming the padarhas originally under seven heads by virtue of their forms such as dravya3 etc. The Dipikā breaks up the aterm 'padartha' into two constituents, viz. Pada (a term) and artha (meaning) as standing in a genative relationship. And it immediately adds that "the meaning of a term" is only the etymological sense of the term 'padartha'. The sense of the "only" is: the Padarthas in their basic distinctions are apprehended independently of any such connection with the term 'pada' and 'artha'. The point of these denials of Nilakanthi and the Didika could be construed as: the Padarthas are objective distinctions and are not to be reduced to the linguistic or conceptual modes of our understanding. It is unfortunate that none of the other Nayya-Vaishesika commentators seems to have persued either of the two points made by Nilakanthi and the Dipika, viz. (i) the Padarihas name distinctions and (ii) the Radarthas are names of terms.

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The first postion implies a definite metaphysical standpoint. The explication of this point depends upon an analysis of the concept of 'being'. In both these respects the Vaisesika and the Aristotelian systems show a parallelism. Any kind of a doctrine of categories is singularly absent in any systm of thought that goes under such names as materialism or naturalism on the one hand and idealism or spiritualism, and phenomenalism reductive metaphysics, i. e. a way the other. For, of thinking which reduces diverse types of being to some one order, can strictly speaking have no place for the doctrins of categories, as names for the distinct modes of being. Reductive metaphysics reads the world in terms of "plurality" only and seeks a principle of unity that would explain away the plurality. This way of thinking, by and large, suffers from the fallacy of oversimplification and for that reason ends up by separating the reality it finds from the world of experience. But, for a philosophy which would find the reality within the world of experience, "diversity" is a fact which is basic to plurality. It is not suggested that the metaphysics of plurality and of diversity always remain apart. Yet, in spite of the fact that historically they coalese in different periods in various degrees, they remain characteristically different in their logic. Plato and Aristotle who stand in a historical relation to, offer a good illustration. It is Aristotle who advocates the doctrine of categories, being concerned with the problem of "becoming", i. e. with the way a thing comes into being, and not Plato, who is concerned to find "pure being" and finds it to be one absolutely. The doctrine of categories is possible, rather it is essential to a metaphysics which takes its stand on the fact of diversity. It therefore needs a concept of 'being' which admits of diversity. And both Vaisesika and Aristotle are seen to devote quite some attention to determining the meaning of the term "being".

The Vaiśeṣika system draws its title from its main principle, viz. 'viśeṣa' i. e. 'distictness' which leads Prof. Ninian Smart to describe it as "Distinctionism". It begins with a statment of the Padārthās; for the principle of distinctness makes it necessary to name the things that stand out in their diverse modes of being Kanāda is explicit on the point of distinctness. He equates the knowledge of first principles (tatva jnana) with Harlawaeapacity to

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comprehend the diverse Padārthās named, in their similarities as in their differences, by virtue of the distinct nature of each.

Both the Vaisesika and Aristotle distinguish different senses of the term "being", differing somewhat in their approach though. Aristotle appears to start negatively, in that he arrives at his doctrine in the course of an attempt to remove the ambiguities of the term "being". The Vaisesika speak of, or rather straightaway proceed to classify, the senses of the different words signifying "being". This is so, perhaps because Sanskrit has the advantage of being able to use the word "being" unambiguously in its nown form and in verbal or predicative form, and can even use the two together significantly. Aristotle feels called upon to clarify the different senses of the word "being" for common usage allows the word to be used in the sense of, "real", "really", "true", "truly", "is" "being", and "things" in order to name the ways in which "things are". In Greek, "is" (esti), "being" (on or to on), "beingness" (onsia) and "beingly" (ontos) form a consanguine group, so that "Socrates reals wise" or "Socrates reals a man", in place of "Socrates is wise" or "Socrates is a man" are genuine expressions in Greek<sup>5</sup>. This information enables us to see that the predicative "is" is central to the meaning of "real" or "reality" and no unwarranted transition is involved in shifting from the one to the other. Further, it reduces the gap between the "true" and the "real". For "true" is a fairly common meaning of "real" in spoken or written Greek, so that "true" can be made applicable to things and objects, although it applies primarily to propositions6.

The ambiguity is even greater in English: for English admits two forms only of the verb "to be", viz. the present participle being and the verbal expression is and these two forms have to carry the sense of the abstract noun reality, and the adverb really and even of the adjective real. It is obvious that the two sets of words do not belong to the same stem, with the result that in English one can hardly see that real and reality are simply the adjectival and the nominal forms of to be (einai) and that is in turn presents the verbal from of real or reality.

The doctrine of categories brings up yet another ambiguity in "being co-0. In pthre Oxford chans lations cole drains to the works the

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participle form "being" (to on) is translated as "what there is" or "what exists", whereas the plural "ta onta" is translated as "things that are" or as "existing things". Such a translation is felt to be unsatisfactory for it happens to divorce the plural from the singular. Even so, this in itself does not appear to me to be ground enough for an objection. For the participle "being" (to on) and the plural noun (on ta) do not stand on the same footing, not in the Categorea at least. The plural noun is used of "things that are", in the sense of objects in the world of experience, that is to say, of things like, "man", "ox", "winged" etc. Whereas the participle noun "being" is said to run parallel with "unity" and they both in their distinct sences are said to be predicates of absolutely everything8. It is of "being" in the sence of "things that are" (ta onta), such as "man", "aquatic" that Aristotle asks the question, "what are things in themselves"? For these things can be said "to be": i) in an accidental sense and ii) by their own nature i. e. "essentially". The list of categories is his answer to the question, what are the essential kinds of beings as evidenced in things? It is the different senses of 'essential being' that are called the "categories" or the "figures of predication "9.

The Vaisesika explication of categories is connected with their technical use of the term "aratha" in the sense of 'object'. Used in this special sense the term stands for: "substance" (dravya), "attribute" (guṇa), and "action" (karma). Praśastapāda lays down that the name "artha" is to be used of these three only. It is the presence (upasthiti) of these three that is indicated by the term "artha" What is meant by 'presence' here is: that they belong with "sattā" i. e. they stand for the order of existence. For this reason Kaṇāda had at one stage granted only these three categories. It is Gautama who extends the use of the name "artha" to all perceptible substances and qualities. Is

The Vaiśeṣika sūtrās not only name the padārthās in terms of 'sattā' but they also attempt to determine the meaning of the word 'sattà'. V. S. (1.2.7) defines "sattā" in terms of "sat" "sat' is the prsent participle of the verb 'asa' (to be). But 'sat' ges used as a genuine noun, i. e. as a name that is a pointer word. And it needs to be rendered in English as "the real" in keeping with its nominal status, raither that Kabyi (Releathstruction) "reality"

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as is done generally. In this sense 'sat' is the concept of the metaphysician. He can use it in a non-committal way, and take up his own stand for naming and describing what to him is 'the real'. The word 'sat' needs no further embellishment with the adjective "parā" meaning 'supreme' as in the case of other words conveying the sense of being or knowledge, like 'parā-sattā', 'Para-samānya', or 'Parā-vidyā'. The word 'sat' also has a settled meaning in language as 'good' and in that sense functions as an adjective with a normative or evaluative connotation. 'Satya' (the truth) is a noun formed from 'sat' with the meaning 'having the property of being 'sat'". "Satya" stands for "truth" as for "true being", i. e. for 'truth in knowledge' as for 'the real'. 'Truth" (satya) is defined by Pāṇini as that in which, the seer of the truth, the seer of the truth, the object and the perception of truth connot be conceived in another way. 15

Further, as can be seen from V. S. (1.2.7) the "sat" is to be judged as "sat". Vātsyāyana too includes the perception of the "sat as sat" in the definition of a principle.16 According to this sutra that which stands judged as "sat" or the "real" in substance, attribute and action is to be called "satta". Viśva nath elaborates the point a little more in his Bhasa Parichheda as: What the Vaisesikas call the "para-satta" or "para-samanya" is the "way of being" (vritti) as dravya' guna and karma. Thus "sattā" stands for the generality of different modes of being and can be said to signify the order of existence in general. This view is borne out by the further critieria laid down for determining the meaning-cum-application of the word. They are two. The first is: a direct apprehension (pratyaya) of it as "sat" and the second is: the dealing with it in the same manner (vyavahāra) the expression of the apprehension in language being classed along with the latter. The Bhasya to V: S. (1.2.4)17 addas that the criteria are based on the ground of the distinctness i. e. the irreducibility between substance, attribute and action. The next V. S. (1.2.8) lays down that there is no "satta" other than in these three forms.

An earlier sūtra, V. S.  $(1\cdot 2\cdot 4)$  has used another verbal noun in the definition of  $satt\bar{a}$ , viz. " $satt\bar{a}$ " is: "to be in being"  $(bh\bar{a}va)$ .  $Bh\bar{a}va$  is the abstract noun from the verb "bhu" meaning "to be", or rather " $to_0$ corposite perian between the season of a rather to be I. P. Q....8

in time" or "becoming." The verb "as" (to be) changed to "bhū" to express the sense of "to come to be." Thus Salla can be said to stand for the general order of existence, while "bhaw" signifies the being in the sense of the 'actuality' in that order. The word "bhāva", like "sat" is used more as a genuine noun than as an abstract noun. "Bhava" in this context stands for the necessity towards actuality involved in the nature of 'being'. The conception is elucidated as: that which is only to be followed up i. e. to be affirmed in its way of being, (anuvritti), and not as being a separable (vyā-vritti). Hence "bhāva" gets no special name. It is further explained by Vyavritti as the affirmation (paratva) only and no negation (aparatva) of satta.13. The bhasya simplifies the conception of "bhava" as the being itself of the reals, i.e. of all that are "sat". "Bhava" is said to belong to all the objects (arthas). "Bhava" expresses: "there are all these objects."

"Sat", "Sattā" and "Bhāva" expresses: "there are all there objects." "Sat", "Satta" and "Bhava" form a gradation. Su stands as expressed; it signifies "Sat iti" i. e. "that it is". In other words " sat " stands affirmed independent of any predicative or ākhyayiki concept. Hence the assertion, "sat iti" is called knowledge or a true apprehension.19. "Sattā" stands for the order of existence and admits of a feature, viz. distinctness in the modes of being. The distinct types are given their names like "dravya" etc. but the order stands expressed in its generality only, as the affirmation of its being. For this reason it is expressed by the abstract noun "paratva" and not by a verb as already seen "Bhāva" the elucidatory concept of "sattā" can be expressed by an existential predicative expression, viz. "vidyate" i. e. "I is." "It is" expresses the occurrent aspect of being. However as applicable to Sattā it is still affirmation in general and there fore admits of no distinctive name.21 A name presupposes and abject of object of a specific character because of which the distinction between the general and the individual can go with a name. the distinction is said to appear with dravya, guna and karman for their distinctive modes of being.

This brief lingiustic survey could be said to set out in perspective the metaphysical background for a doctrine of categories, at it marks the paraflelis probetween the whistochian and the Aristotlian

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doctrines. Such a doctrine implies a three tiered view of "being" viz.: i) "sat" (the real) corresponding to what Aristotle calls "being qua being", ii) " sattā" in the sense of the order of existtence corresponding to what Aristotle calls "the essential way" in which things "are" and (iii) lastly the individual things such as, "man", "aquatic" or "the pot" or "the garment". doctrine of categories in both these systems is metaphysical only to the extent to which they grant the notion of the real. For they do not raise it into a doctrainaire system. This kind of, what may be called, an open notion of the real, alone can grant the order of existence to be a distinct conception or a distinct level of knowledge. Another equally imporant feature of this conception of the real is that, it denies to individual things, taken in their individual settings even the right, so to speak, for the order of existence in its generality. In this its last feature it is non-empiricist in its outlook. The kind of metaphysics involved in a doctrine of categories is rationalistic realism. It maintains that the order of existence is marked by diversity, and the categories just name these diversities. Western thought succeeds in preserving this emphasis on diversity, for Aristotle embodies it in his logic. In the Indian tradition, the Nilakanthi Bhāskarodayā explication of the categories as expressing distinct differences or "extreme othernesses" (anyatama-vantah) fails to make its mark under the overpowering influence of the Nyāya con ception of "upādhi" i. e. a dependent or conditioned determination. For the same reason, the point that the padarthas are names gets lost sight of.

Aristotle arrives at his list of categories from more than one angle. We have already considered his approach to the problem from the side of things. The other approach is linguistic. He distinguishes expressions in language into "simple expressions" i.e. names and "composite expressions" i.e. predicative expressions and declares that "expressions which are in no way composite, singify: substance, quality, relation, time, position, state, action or affection". From the side of things these same names are called "figures of predication". The seeming opposition, perhaps more so in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars, between categories as "types of being" and categories as "figures of predication" should disappear when the two conceptions are bridged over by the conception of the "types of meaning" 23. Aristotle speaks of the three interchangably of Aristotle's air approach kan is clinguist francour verbal.

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He considers "names" and a name is a term (pada) and not ju a word. Both words and terms are connected with meaning essentially, but in different ways. A word, singly or in a group is called a 'term', only when it is used to make a statement with. A term therefore is defined by its function, as either the subject or the prediction. cate. i. e. as either the naming or the attributive or descriptive expression in a statement. A word is a symbol and means what it stands for by a linguistic convention. A term means by way of its syntactical function and hence is said to singify rather than to mean. The Nilakanthi and the Dipika speak of the padarthas a names for terms and as the meanings of terms respectively, most probably purposefully. For, Vatsyāyana gives a clear statement of the nature of a term i. e. a 'pada'. A word (in Sanskrit) in its inflectional form only is to be called 'a pada' and divested of its inflections it ceases to be 'a pada'.24 According to Vatsyayana the basic inflections are two, viz. naming (nāmiki) and describing i.e. stating something about the subject named (akhyā yiki)25. The purpor of a pada is the apprehension of its significance, as for example, the term "cow" can signify the individual or the species or the form." That is to say, the same word means differently according as it is used either as subject or as predicate or in a still more abstract sense even. The manner in which a term is intended is by and large understood in language communication. But if, what a term signifies is to be explicitly expressed, it could be readily observed that the mode of signification can be indicated only by using it as the predicate of the term used as a naming expression. The name of a term is on a different footing than the name of a thing as already seen. The former is a designative name while the latter is a referential or a pointer name. The two kinds of names function differently in statements. Hence it could be maintained that categories as names of terms could be expressed predicatively only On that score the Aristotelian "figures of predication" do not in any way differ from the padarthas as pada-abhidheyas, i.e. as namb of terms or even as meanings of terms.

It needs to be stressed that Aristotle himself describes the categories as "figures of predication" and not as 'predicated although the categories have generally come to be spoken of as "first predicates". It is of "being" and "unity" that he word "predicate", but qualified as "universal, "in the sense of "predicates of

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not the same thing with either these universal predicates or with predicates in the ordinary sense i. e. attributive predicates. The latter express specific determinations of their subjects in judgments. Amongst the terms used attributively of a subject, general nouns, eg. 'man', 'pot' and adjectives, eg. 'wise', 'blue' function as class terms in a way in which verbs and adverbs cannot. In his logic of inference Aristotle takes into account only the classaspect of predicates. It is most probably by some misunderstanding of Aristotle that the Vaisesika padarthas are sometimes explained as 'a classification of things'. It needs to be emphasised that the conception of classification is incompatible with a statement of distinctnesses, for all classification amounts to a unification in terms of some coommon character. Even apart from this consideration, the notion of a category can. not be rendered by the conception of a class. The word 'class' is used primarily of empirical concepts. All common or general nouns eg. 'table, 'sparrows' are class-words. Similarly, 'red', 'great' may be used in the sense of 'red things' or 'great men' i. e. to stand for classes. Our understanding of the class word or the general noun like the ones mentioned above arises in the course of our experience of individual instances of the kind. The conception of class depends upon the notion of quality as characterising and the notion of the individual as in some way characterised. The class comprises of members which need to satisfy some coommon quality or qualities. The members of a class are characterised by similarity in respect of that quality or qualities which makes them fall under the same class.

The class word is primarily the name of a common character which for ordinary purposes is used to name both the class of individuals or the individuals in the class. Logically speaking the class word is a description i. e. it is a predicate which is applied to the individuals. For this reason it is not necessary for us to have observed every individual in a class. Modern logic represents a class by a function, in the manner, " $\phi$  x". In the expression  $\phi$  x', ' $\phi$ ' is called a predicate variable, i. e. it is a symbol which stands for any description or a predicate, i. e. any mode of characterisation: and 'x' is called an individual variable i. e. it is a symbol which stands for any individual. To illustrate, the class 'sparrow' is represented by the function '3x' in which 'S'

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stands for the predicate 'sparrow' and 'x' stands for the thing or things which satisfy the description 'sparrow'. In this way the class 'sparrows' stands for all the values of the function 'Sz' The members of a class show a common character, for they are

A category word eg, "substance" is not a class word like 'man' or 'sparrow'. The category word 'guna' (attribute) even is not a class word like 'sound' or 'colour'. etc. For, the types of objects distinguished in a category are marked by diversity, unlike the members of a class which are marked by a common character. Each of the nine substances listed by Kanāda is distinguished by its own characteristic marks (laksanās) yet, they are all named 'dravya'; for each is apprehended as being of a pattern, a pattern which is judged to be the same irrespective of the varying character of the objects. A category is the same name used of diverse types of objects displaying the same mode of being. The class concept is adequate to explain plurality, but diversity needs another concept to account for it and that is the concept of a category. A list of categories is therefore a list of diversities. In the first instance the diversities are only named, for names mark differences in a way in which no other expressions do. A name implies a counterpart, which is not a contradictory, in the form of 'the other' or 'another'. Hence categories come primarily to be presented as names. That they are designating names is an account of the category names. That designating names stand for patterns, or forms, distinguishes them from denoting names which stand for things. The Vaisesika thinkers expressly refer their categories to sattā, the order of existence as distinguished from the things in the world like, 'pots' and 'garments'. Judging by Vātsyānana's account of terms and the Nilakanthi-Dipikā comments how the padarthas are to be construed, the Vaisesika padarthas could well have been described as 'figures of predication' as in Aristotle.

30-34 Dr. D. D. Sathye Marg, Girgaum, Bombay-40 004.

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#### NOTES

- 1. Bhaskarodaya. p. 10.
- 2. A. B. Tarka Samgraha, p. 73.
- 3. Bhāskarodayā. p. 10.
- 4. V. S. 1.1, 4.
- 5. See: Vlastos: Degrees of Reality in Plato. p. 1. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle.
- 6. Ibid p. 2. 3. Ibid p. 1.
- 7. See : Owen : Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology p. 69 in the same work.
- 8. Topica. 12723—Works of Aristotle, Oxford.
- 9. Ibid 12116-19.
- 10. V. S. 8.2.3.
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. Ibid.
- 13. Ny. Ko. p. 76
- 14. "para" is the feminine form of "para".
- 15. Sarv. D. S.—Panini. P 309 lines, 255-56.
- 16. Vatsyayana's introduction to Gautama Sutras p<sup>2</sup>.
- 17. V. S. (1.2.4).
- 18. Ibid Vi.
- 19. Vātsyāyana's introduction to Gautama sutras. p. 2.
- 20. Bh. Gi. 16.II.
- 21. V. S. (1.2.4).
- 22. V. S. 1. 2. 5.
- 23. Categorea 1625 Works of Aristotle—Oxford.
- 24. G. S. 2. 2.60—Ny. Ko. p. 461.
- 25. Ibid.
- 26. Ibid.

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## HEGELIAN IMPACT ON DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF MORAL OBLIGATION

In his essay, "John Dewey in Search of Himself", L. R. Ward strongly argues that Dewey was never actually a Hegelian. Dewey perhaps thought he was one, and that he sincerely believed it say from 1877 to 1885. "Then he began to have doubts about his committment to Hegelianism. By 1905 it was clear to all that Dewey was not a Hegelian. Using a simple distinction in another connection by Dewey between what one conventionally says is good art and what one really enjoys and really believes is good art. we would have to say that Dewey, influenced and somewhat denatured by Hegal, never was and never could have been a Hegelian."2 This interpretation is certainly subject to grave doubts for at least two main reasons. First, Dewey's testimony that he was a Hegelian in the early years of his life should not be underestimated. We should at least take what he says into serious consideration, for his attraction to Hegel's philosophy was not merely accidental or necessary; it was also subjective. Hegel supplied for him "a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subjectmatter could satisfy. It is more than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that early mood."3 Second, despite Dewey's gradual drift from Hegal, who left a permanent deposit in his thinking,4 he retained, almost unyieldingly, Hegel's fundamental insight that the world is a living organism and that no basic element or feature of it can be fully grasped except in its relatedness to the world: "the sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression-or, rather, they were an inward laceration. My earlier philosophic study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hardand-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me."5 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

I am inclined to think that this is not the only insight which has lingered in Dewey's later thought from his Hegelian period; and one could discuss this question in some detail elsewhere. Here I am anxious to stress that so much of Dewey's analysis of moral experience in general, and of moral obligation in particular, has remained Hegelian in character. In what follows I intend to focus attention on the basic elements of moral obligation in Hegal and Dewey. The premise which I hope to defend is that Dewey's conception of moral obligation is essentially Hegelian in nature.

## I. Hegel's Conception of Moral Obligation

#### 1. Conditions of Moral Obligation

Hegal rejects the view that the basis of moral obligation is an external source or power, e. g., God, the state, public opinion, the church, etc.6 He insists that the individual as a rational, free, moral being is the ground of obligation. In the Philosophy of Right he argues that in order for an act to be moral it must be free, reponsible, and purposeful; it must also promote the well-being of man both as an individual and as a universal nature.7 In what follows I shall briefly discuss the conditions of moral action in general and then proceed to a treatment of the basic ingredients of Hegel's concept of moral obligation.

An act cannot be moral unless it can be imputed to a moral agent; but it cannot be imputed to a moral agent unless he can be responsible for it; and he cannot be responsible for it unless it springs from his will. Thus an act is not moral unless it is performed by a free will.8 But man is finite. He is not always aware of all the forces which act upon him, nor can he foresee all the consequences of his action. For the action is an external, public event; as such, it is "a prey of external forces which attach to it something totally different from what it is explicitly and drive it on into alien and distant consequences." Thus (1) an action has a large number of consequences; (2) we cannot precisely determine which of these consequences are accidental and which are necessary. Accordingly we cannot hold a man responsible for those consequences of his action which are beyond his purpose, i. e., foreknowledge and control This is the first right of the moral will; it "is the right to know."

But, again we should But, again, we should not view the consequences of the moral action as compeliated action as something external or indifferent to the action itself;

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for they are the outward form of the purpose which the moral agent has before his mind in the process of moral reflection. They are not, in other words, merely consequences, for they belong to the action itself, and the action becomes actual through them. This is why the dicta "Ignore the consequences of action" and "Judge actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and good" are abstractions of the understanding.11

The purpose which the moral agent seeks to realize takes the form of an isolated event; its truth, however, is universal.12 Thus purpose expresses the universal side of action, viz., intention. It expresses the general disposition or character of the individual. Accordingly the action of a man must not be viewed piecemeal, discretely, but as moments in the realization of the self as a whole. Intention is the soul of action. Thus an action is not moral unless two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the agent should explicitly know and intend his action; that is, the action should, as I said earlier, spring from his subjective will; (2) the action should be viewed as willed, i. e., purposed, by the agent. Moral consciousness, Hegel thinks, should recognize this fact as a right of the moral will; it is the right of intention.

Intention, then, is the subjective condition for the realization purpose, and purpose is the external objectification of intention. It is also the condition of subjective satisfaction and freedom. As the universal character of action intention is the architect of realized purpose: "the fact that this moment of the particularity of the agent is contained and realized in the action constitutes subjective freedom in its more concrete sense, the right of the subject to find his satisfaction in the action."13 But in acting the self does not merely satisfy immediate or concrete ends; it also satisfies its general aims or ideals. The satisfaction of these aims is welfare or happiness. There must be room in moral conduct for individual satisfaction, and moral consciousness should recognize this as another right of the moral will; it is "the right of the subject's particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other words, the right of subjective freedom."14 Recognition of this right is the pivot of the difference between the classical and modern periods. It is best expressed in Christianity; here it has become "the organizing principle of a new form of civilization."15 Yet it is expressed narrowly when, in some movements, love, conscience, eternal salvation of the indi-

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The right to particularity, however, is not morally valid unless self acts freely; hence it cannot makec laims which are inconsistent with its universal moral nature: "this moment of universality, posited first of all within this particular content itself, is the welfare of others also, or, specified completely, though quite emptily, the welfare of all.."16 Thus the promotion of the well-being of others is an essential factor in the realization of the self as an individual, It would, consequently, be a mistake to judge the rightness or goodness of an action primarily on the basis of a 'moral intention' behind it. Intention is not enough; we should realize what we intend: "in magnis.. voluisse sat est is right the sense that we ought to will something great. But we must also be able to achieve it, otherwise the willing is nugatory. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green."17

## Ground of Moral Obligation

We have so far seen that from the standpoint of purpose the will seeks to realize a particular, immediate end; and from the standpoint of intention it seeks to realize itself as a general moral nature. These two standpoints do not adequately reveal the true moral aspect of the will. This aspect is fully revealed when the will also aspires to actualize itself as a universal; for only in this aspiration can it attain its complete freedom. To do this the will should identify itself with absolute goodness. It is here in this relation to the highest good that we find the source and locus of moral obligation.

As the highest object of desire the good is the principle of the will; it is the ultimate standard of moral distinction and evaluation. It is the "Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will. In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the contingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superseded, though at the time they are still contained and retained within it in their senses. The good is thus freedom. is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world."

Abstract right and Abstract right and personal well-being can not be the principle of the will, for the good is its substance; it is the universal which determines purpose and leave the substance; it is the universal which determines purpose and action. Thus when personal well-being culti-being culti

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respo seen is th itself loose from the good it loses its character as right. But "welfare without right is not a good. Similarly, right without welfare is not the good; fiat justitia should not be followed by pereat mundus." Personal well-being cannot, on the other hand, be neglected or ignored by the good, for the good would remain abstract, and consequently empty, unless it is actualized through a particular will: "consequently, since the good must of necessity be actualized through the particular will and is at the same time its substance, it has absolute right in contrast with the abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare." 20

Now since the good is the universal principle of action and does not as such contain any determinate content, it is the onus of the particular will to translate its essence concretely. Indeed the subejctive will has dignity and value only in so far as its intention is in harmony with the essence of the good. Thus as abstract Idea the good remains an ideal to the subjective will. In this way the will stands in a definite relation to the good; and "the relation is that the good ought to be substantive for it, i. e., it ought to make the good its aim to realise it completely, while the good on its side has in the subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality". Thus (1) since the good is an object of the will, and since it is its universal essence, it is the duty of the will to seek and realise it in its action, and (2) since the good qua duty is abstract it should be done for its own sake. But what is one's duty? How can we realize the universal essence of duty in actual conduct?

Hegel advances two guidelines for the determination of concrete duties; one should (1) do what is right, and (2) promote his as well as the general well-being of others. The concrete realization of good, however, passes in three stages. First, the moral agent should know and will the good as a particular. Second, he alone should determine the goodness and the sort of consequences implied in the act. Third, he should specify the quality of the act "as infinite subjectivity aware of itself". This inward specification of the good is conscience. Before I proceed to an analysis of conscience as the faculty of moral obligation I should here streess that in the process of moral evaluation the agent assumes full responsibility for the judgement which he makes. This, as we have seen earlier, is the right of insight; "the right of the subjective will is that whatever Pithis Dometic Gunice Kanyald eshall Hardson by it as

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good, and that an action, as its aim entering upon external objectivity, shall be imputed to it as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, in accordance with its knowledge of the worth which the action has in this subjectivity. "23 But although the moral agent is to be held responsible for his act only in so far as the (1) freely chooses the act, (2) knows, intends, purposes the Act, and (3) succeeds in the empirical evaluation of the factual elements of the concrete moral situation, still this does not mean that he cannot be wrong in his judgement; for against the right of insight and self-determination there stands another right, viz., the right of reason qua objective. This is the right to be objective in the assessment of the moral situation. And what decides the validity of the moral judgement in such cases is reason as such; for "whoever wills to act in this world of actuality has eo ipso submitted himself to its laws and recognized the right objectivity." 24

#### 3. Feeling of Moral Obligation

When Hegel speaks of considence he does not mean a faculty of moral sense, or some kind of moral monitor or voice, naturally or divinely implanted in human nature, by means of which we discover what is right and wrong and then act accordingly. He, rather, means the tendency of the individual to will that which is absolutely good, not merely abstractly but also concretely. Apart from the concerte determination of the good, conscience is only the "formal side of the activity of the will, which as this will has no special content of its own."25 At this level it is an infinite, abstract self-certainty; it is, in other words, the general feeling that one ought to realize the good in his action. True considence, however, is "the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-conscious ness to know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory, to give recognition only to what it knows as good, and at the same time to maintain that whatever in this way it knows and will is in truth right and obligatory."26 Thus conscience is the absolute subjective, inward certainty in which a person translates, concretely determines, the universal content of good in the moral situation; or, put differently, it is action in accordance with duty, action which does not realize this or that duty, but knows and does what is concretely right and good.

Conscience, then, is a reflective, deliberative faculty. The moral agent cannot deleting the what what whe kapping for deleting the first

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knows the various elements which constitute the moral situation within which the act will take place: his emotions, values, beliefs, sentiments, interests, desires, awareness of social reality, etc.. Knowledge of these and similar elements extends, in short, "backwards into thier conditions, sidewards in their associations, forwards in their consequences." This knowledge, however, is incomplete, and the conscientious mind knows this fact; yet at the moment of decision it acts in so far as it knows. And though the knowledge is incomplete it is under a given set of circumstances sufficient, because it is the mind's own knowledge. This is perhaps why Hegel repeatedly insisted that for its own part conscience "finds its own truth to be in the direct certainty of itself."

But, second, the moral agent should assess the factual elements of the moral situation in terms of the moral law: that is, what ought to be done should conform to the moral law as such. This law does not come as an external alien command but as an expression of the agent's universal moral nature; for in moral reflection he determines, intuits, the moral aspect of the prospective act, and this in view of what the law prescribes. How ? As a universal moral consciousness the self is the principle of action; it is an ultimate essence. And as conscience "it lays hold of its explicit individual self-existence (Fürsichsein), or its self."30 In this twofold role, i. e., as a universal nature and as a concrete reality, the self comprehends and translates the fact of action which it encounters into a concrete moral content; here the distinction between the universal and the particular is resolved, for "the agent's own immediate individuality constitutes the content of moral action; and the form of moral action is just this very self as a pure process, viz., as the process of knowing, in other words, is private individual conviction."31

Thus conscience is the unity of subjective knowing, i. e., conviction, with the universal content of the law. But we can establish whether individual conscience conforms to the Idea of Conscience only after the act is performed, i. e., after we examine the sort of good which the act has realized. What is morally right or obligatory, however, is that a particular individual should realize in his act the good which the moral law prescribes. Thus conscience, or the judgement of moral obligation, can be true or false. It is

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false inasmuch as it fails to promote the true good and yields to the inclinations, desires, or interests of the moral agent : "what is known as duty is carried out completely and becomes an actual fact, just because what is dutiful is the universal for all self-conscious. ness, that which is recognized, acknowledged, and thus objectively is."32 Three consequences follow from this account of conscience, (1) What ought to be done is not something imposed upon the agent from outside; for in the process of moral evaluation the moral agent adopts the moral law as his own, as issuing from his own will. (2) In any situation of duty there is only one right, or correct, judgement of moral obligation; for the judgement is based on and refers to the various elements which constitute the moral situation. These elements are facts which the agent confronts immediately. (3) Although the judgement of obligation, e. g., "I ought to do X", is normative, in the sense that it prescribes a certain course of action, 'ought' is not merely a feeling, a concept, or a metaphysical reality of some sort, nor is it an empirical element, an 'is', which is discovered in the process of moral reflection. It is rather the consciousness, the certain knowledge, that a course of action is right, and that it would, if performed, realize the highest amount of good This consciousness is what arouses in the moral agent the feeling of moral compulsion. In Hegel's words: "the particular subject is related to the good as to the essence of his will, and hence his will's obligation arises directly in this relation."33 Thus as a moral phenomenon 'ought' originates in the process of moral evaluation It is a unique reality creatively made in response to a moral problem which faces the moral agent in the concrete situations of life 'Ought', then, cannot be reduced to an 'is', for it is what guides modifies action; it is the basis of the normative aspect of the judge ment of moral obligation. It is not, moreover, an essence of a command imposed upon the agent from outside; yet it is incontinuable ivable apart from the objective, factual elements of the moral situation; these elements are its basis and raison d'etre.

Again, it is not, as I insisted earlier, some kind of reality super added to the moral situation; for if this happens (a) this reality would, as a principle of duty, be indifferent to the well-being of the moral agent as an individual, (b) the moral act would not be an act of self-determination; it would not, consequently, be a morally responsible act. Thus moral collection at the moral of the mor

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feeling of compulsion which we experience when we discover that a course of action is morally good. It is this knowledge which creates the moral claim, i. e., ought, and consequently the feeling that the act ought to be done.

#### II. Dewey's Concept of Moral Obligation

#### 1. Ground of Moral Obligation

From what has been said so far we can formulate four main propositions which are crucial to Hegel's concept of moral obligation. (1) The moral agent is a rational, free, self-determined being. (2) The good is the ground of moral obligation; that is, promotion of the good concretely is what warrants the feeling of moral obligation. (3) The judgement of moral obligation is an intelligent, reflective act. (4) 'Ought' refers to the feeling that the moral agent is obliged to perform a certain act; and the conviction that the act is right, and that it would realize the intended good. is conscience. Now I intend to show that these four propositions constitute the basic elements of Dewey's concept of moral obligation. I am aware that the method as well as the conceptual equipment which Dewey employs in his analysis of the concept are to a measurable extent different from the ones which Hegel employs. What I am anxious to stress, however, is that the Hegelian logic and insight into the meaning of obligation substantially linger in Dewey's formulation of the concept. This is perhaps why it is possible to say that Dewey's conception of moral obligation is Hegelian in character.34

Dewey holds that the idea of right is in principle independent of the idea of good; a morally good act, e. g., is not ipso facto right. Yet it is hoped that right acts are conducive to some good or satisfaction. Essential to the idea of right, however, is the element of demand or exaction; that is, the Right contains the idea of authoritative claim, and only when this claim is present can a good act become right. Thus the good usually attracts us, but the right is that which asserts that we ought to be drawn by some object whether we are naturally attracted to it or not. Accordingly right acts are obligatory, and their authority is independent of our wishes or inclinations. But what is the source or ground of this authority?

Like Hegel, Dewey rejects the view that the ground of obligation is an external power or agency like, the state, social opinion, I. P. Q....9 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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God's Word, the church, etc., for at least three reasons; (1) the principle of duty, and consequently of the moral act, would be indifferent to the moral agent, i. e., to his desires, interests, goals, or natural tendencies; (2) an act done out of fear of an external authority is not autonomous and, consequently, not moral, for "mere compulsion has no moral standing;" (3) "We split man into two disconnected parts if we say that there is a law or principle of duty which has nothing to do with our natural impulses and purposes and which yet is supreme over them." On the contrary, Dewey insists, (1) an act of moral obligation is autonomous; (2) the principle of duty or right is social in character:

It requires no further argument to show that obligation is at once self-imposed, and social in its content. It is self-imposed because it flows from the good, from the idea of the full activity of the individual's own will. It is no law imposed from without; but is his own law, the law of his own function, of his individuality. Its social content flows from the fact that this individuality is not mere capacity, but is the capacity acting, and acting so as to comprehend social relationships.<sup>38</sup>

It is thus erroneous to believe that an account of moral oblight tion is inadequate if we do not locate its basis in a divine or transcendental domain. That is, the term 'moral' does not derive its meaning from reference to a divine or transcendental reality but from consideration of the principle and end of action: "the first step in ethics is to fix firmly in mind the idea that the term moral dos not mean any special or peculiar kind of conduct, but simply mean practice and action, conduct viewed not partially but in connection with the end which it realizes."39 To violate this principle would be to commit the fallacy that moral action means something other than action itself. For example, a child may be obliged by parents to perform a certain act. The obligation may arise from an arbitrary will: but it does not have to proceed from such a will It may conceivably proceed from the very nature of the relations and condition of his family. As such, the obligation does not he child upon the child as an arbitrary or despotic command, but as the expression of the value or general good which is essential to material and spiritual existence of the family. In this atmosphere which inspires trust the child responds willingly and respectfully CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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; (1) the the command of his parents even though the performance of vould be the prescribed duty may be contrary to his most felt wishes or ts, goals, Isires. Thus, "because of inherent relationships persons sustain external one another, they are exposed to the expectations of others and oral, for the demands in which these expectations are made manifest."40 plit man Right, then, is only a general term which refers to "the multitude f concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. and pur-Is authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy of their contrary, instistencies."41 Thus if we view the moral law as divorced from ous; (2) the existential condition of men it would not have an intrinsic impact upon the life of the individual; it would not express or satisfy his desires, interests, or ideals. It would, in short, render conduct non-moral in character. But how do we determine the rightfulness of concrete acts; or the specific claims and demands imposed by society or the state? What is the relationship between aconcrete law or injuction and the general idea of right? In other words, what is the principle by which we justify acts of obligation?

The question is important because law and lawfulness are not accessarily identical with a given law. The latter is always quesionable, for it "is but a special means of realizing the function of law in general, namely, the institution of those relations among men which conduce to the welfare and freedom of all."42 Thus although the concept of right is an independent moral category this concept does not by itself contain or show what is right concrelely. Accordingly in determining the lawfulness or rightness of a even rule or course of action we should appeal to a higher principle; and this principle, Dewey contends, is the common good. Indeed he idea of right as such expresses this good: "In principle, therefore, light expresses the way in which the good of a number of persons, beld together by intrinsic ties, becomes efficacious in the regulation of the members of a community."43 This position is based on the assumption that man is basically a socio-cultural being. He cannot we apart from society. His desires, interests, aspirations, prefelences, general outlook upon life, or values are largely the result social education. His life, in other words, is possible only in a locial milieu. The same applies to individuality: "the human being an individual because of and in relation with others. vise, he is an individual only as a stick of wood is, namely, as Patially and numerically separate."44 CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Rights and obligations express the interests of the members of the of society, not as isolated but as social human beings. The aguide express, in other words, the common good of those members which are held by intrinsic ties. For example, "the legislater judge, assessor, sheriff, does not exercise authority as his prince was inv possession, but as the representative of relations in which men share. He is an organ of a community of interests and purposes ready n This is not to say, however, that conflict may not arise between already established rights and obligations or newly legislated on is made and what should be right or obligatory. When such config which of arises the criterion by which we decide objective right and oblin act. In tion is the common good. The claim which Right imposes ought to that "even if the thing exacted does not appeal as his good uprincipl the one to whom it is addressed, he should voluntarily take it tole a good; that, in short, it should become his good, even if he der translation not so judge it at the time. This element of the 'should' or 'out like He is what differentitates the idea of Right from the Good. But does not cut the idea wholly loose from that of the Good, in what 'should be' is that an individual should find the require conduct good."46 prescrip

#### Feeling of Moral Obligation

Man does not possess a unique faculty, e. g., conscience, which he should legislates or determines acts of moral obligation. According of the l 'ought' does not justify itself; i. e., one does not know beforehan he prize what he ought to do in a given moral situation. Men feel object minded to behave in a certain way simply because of the practical, att upon h social relations and demands amongst which they find themselve action Corresponding to these relations and demands there grows in the reflection individual individual a sense of obligation. At first this sense is connected to Do with definite personal, family, or social relations. But as the interpretation of Dew vidual matures morally a general sense of obligation develops the territory framework to the territory distinction from any particular situation."47 It becomes perform on the principle of acts of duty. This sense is in a way a gently lization from the various concrete acts of duty which he has perfermed during his area in a way a bring his a way a brin med during his moral growth; it is, in Hegel's terms, a tendent to seek and realized to seek and realize the good concretely. It generates in the vidual an attitude or discontinuous vidual an attitude or disposition to look for or cope with new most situations. In Public Day

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The sense of obligation is not final in its judgement; it is primarily he member sings. The aguide or working hypothesis to solve the moral problem at hand. ose member lisums up the judgement of past moral experience: of how previous e legislate moral problems were solved; what sort of satisfaction or frustration his prive was involved in the solution of each problem; the effect of such which moral solutions on the community; etc. Thus it does not have a purpose ready made answer for each new moral situation, primarily because ise below each moral situation is always changing and novel. The answer sislated on is made possible by a reflective consideration of the factual elements ich configuration and the consequences of the and oblin set. In this process the moral agent translates, determines, what imposs; ought to be done concretely in terms of the moral law as the supreme nis good ti principle of moral goodness; he translates, so to say, the universal ake it to the character of the law into concrete content, i. e.; judgement. This if he do ranslation is not a mystical or unconscious act; it is an empirical, or out intelligent, deliberative activity.43 This is exactly why Dewey, od. But like Hegel, held"(first) that the 'ought' always arises from and falls Good, in back into the 'is', and (secondly) that the 'ought' is itself an 'is' the 'is' of action."49 The 'ought', first, arises in the course of moral reflection because it is not given as a ready made reality or rescription. It is determined creatively, concretely. In this determination the moral agent sees to it that the good which the prospective act will realize is not only personal, individual good; ence, which he should also judge it as a common good: "if the claim is, then, according of the kind which he himself puts forth, if it serves a good which beforehas he prizes for himself, he must, in the degree in which he is fairfeel of minded, acknowledge it to be a common good, and hence binding ical, adu upon his judgement and action."50 Second, 'ought' is the 'is' of themselve action because the elements as well as the conditions of moral ows in reflection are empirical in character, i. e., because the act and its connecte consequences are public events. But how does 'ought', according s the in to Dewey, arise from the factual elements of the moral situation? velop "The term 'ought' does not refer to a metaphysical or some sort of omes he conceptual reality, but to the feeling that a person is obliged to Perform a certain act. The feeling is aroused when the person knows, discovers, that a specific course of action is right, i. e., promotes the general good concretely. This is the very essence of conscience.51

Like Hegel, then, Dewey holds that (1) autonomy is a necessary condition for moral obligation. That is, one cannot be morally

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obliged to perform an act unless he can be responsible for it and he cannot be responsible for it unless he is the author of the act—or, put differently, unless the act springs from his will Promotion of the good in the life of the individual and society the ultimate principle of moral obligation. (3) The judgement of moral obligation is a deliberative, purposeful act. (4) 'Ough' is creatively formed in the process of moral reflection; it refers to concrete feeling of moral obligation. This feeling is aroused in the moral agent when he discovers that a certain act is right. This if we take into consideration seriously Dewey's acknowledgement of his Hegelian heritage, and especially the close similarity between them of the (a) logic and (b) insight into the meaning and a ground of moral obligation, we should then entertain the plausible claim that Dewey has fundamentally retained Hegel's novel intuition of the essential nature of moral obligation.

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Michael H. Mittu

#### NOTES

- 1. L. Ward, "John Dewey in Search of Himself," The Review of Politics Vol. 19, No. 2, 1957. See also J. Maritain, Moral Philosophy (No. York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), Chapter 14, and J. Rainelle Introduction to Intelligence and the Modern World (New York: The Modern Library, 1954).
- 2. "John Dewey in Search of Himself," pp. 208-209.
- J. Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in The Golden Al of American Philosophy, edited by C. Frankel (New York: Godf Braziller, 1960), p. 389.
- 4. Ibid., p. 391.
- 5. Ibid., pp. 389-390.
- 6. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind translated by J. Build (New York: The No. 1) (New York: The McMillan Co., 1961 pp. 81-86; History of Philosoft translated by Holden translated by Haldane (London, 1892), Vol, III, pp. 362, 403 ft.
- Thus I disagree with W. A. R. Ley's assessment that, for Head self-realization is "filling in the control of th self-realization is "filling in the blank scheme of some undefined, purely general self." On the control general self. "On the contrary, Hegel does stress in the Philosophy of Right and The Rhoten and the Philosophy of the Rhoten and the Philosophy of the Rhoten and the Rhote Right and The Bike name lague will Mandri Datied to on the Philosophia act morally

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Hegel, I, purely asophy of morally except in a state where what is determined concretely by means of law and custom; (2) no act is moral unless it (a) expresses the will of the moral agent and (b) satisfies his interests as a concrete reality. See also G. W. E. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp. 38 ff.

- 8. Philosophy of Right, pp. 79 ff.
- 9. Ibid., p. 80.
- 10. Ibid.
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. Ibid., p. 81.
- 13. Ibid., p. 82.
- 14. Ibid., p. 84.
- 15. Ibid.

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- Ibid., pp. 84-85.
- 17. Ibid., p. 252.
- 18. Ibid., p. 86.
- 19. Ibid., p. 87.
- 20. Ibid.
- 21. Ibid.
- 22. Ibid., p. -253.
- 23. Ibid., p. 87.
- 24. Ibid., p. 88.
- 25. Ibid., p. 91.
- 26. Ibid.
- 27. The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 652.
- 28. Cf. Ibid.
- 29. Ibid., p. 648.
- 30. Ibid., p. 649.
- 31. Ibid., pp. 648-649.
- 32. Ibid., p. 651.
- 33. Philosophy of Right, p. 89.
- 34. In developing this section I have made use of some passages from my essay, "Dewey on Moral Obligation," which will appear in the 1976 Winter issue of The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy.
- 35. J. Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winst, 1960), p. 68.
- 36. Ibid., p. 68.
- 37. Ibid.
- 38. J. Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics in the Early Work of John Dewey, edited by J. A. Boydston (Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), Vol. 3, p. 336.

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- 39. Ibid., p. 342.
- 40. Theory of the Moral Life, p. 69. On page 175 of the same work Dewey writes: "moral conceptions grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life." See also Outlines, pp. 320-323.
- Human Nature and Conduct (New york: The Modern J. Dewey, 41. Library, 1930), p. 326.
- 42. Theory of the Moral Life, p. 79.
- 43. Ibid., p. 81.
- 44. Ibid., p. 80.
- 45. Ibid.
- Ibid., p. 82. 46.
- 47. Ibid., p. 85.
- 48. See Ibid., pp. 132-136.
- J. Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice," The Early Works of John 49. Dewey. Vol. III, p. 105.
- Theory of the Moral Life, p. 83. 50.
- 51. Ibid., pp. 132 and ff.

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### GANDHIJI AND THE INDIAN INTELLECTUALS

The view that Gandhiji failed to influence the intellectuals in this country and therefore whatever reform or awakening he sought to bring about, did not have a stable objective foundation and could not make a permanent impact on conditions in this country is a very common one - not only on the part of those who are considered intellectuals, but also in their own way among many of Gandhiji's followers and admirers. This was my experience, when I and some others made efforts to introduce two papers on 'Gandhian Thought' among the many subjects to be chosen voluntarily by students going for the B. A. Examination. We found that both the academicians and several others known to be Gandhi's followers joined in the argument that there was not either enough matter or suitable method in Gandhi's theoretical contribution to social thought, to justify its inclusion in our courses as one of the subjects of study. Gandhi himself often used to say that he had no philosophy of his own, and all that he wished to teach was best expressed in his life "-"in what I have done and what I have avoided doing'. Besides, I am always open to be convinced by those who differ from me and shall then willingly change my position". This was of course sincere, but this is all perfectly rational and it should not lead us to conclude that if studied properly Gandhi's teaching will not yield a reasonably consistent and original, profound and definite philosophy of social life.

The problem before us, is not whether Gandhiji was an intellectual — he never made any such claim — but whether the intellectuals of the country tried to understand what he had to say, point out its deficiencies if any, and suggested suitable correction and, on the other hand, if there was anything of value in what he was saying and doing, they considered it to be their duty to put it in such a way as the common man would understand — and suggesting ways and means of developing it on proper lines. Actually, in one sense, all that Gandhi said is ancient truth and all great men have said or meant it and certainly no one will say that they all gave to humanity something essentially irrational or contrary to fact. Yet taken as a whole, I think no thinker or man of action had so explicitly expressed these ideas or tried to live them in the context of

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a very wide social life — involving international relationship in a world which was today vaster than ever before, and one in a sense in which it could never be before.

Let us consider how far the intellectualist is justified in igno. ring Gandhi's utterances and contributions as being unsuitable for intellectual analysis and comprehension. It is true that being a man of action and depending essentially on an appeal to emotion Gandhi did quite often say things which can not stand the test of of reason. But we must distinguish bewteen the contents-between what he wished to say and his manner of saying it. If the contents themselves are subjective and can not ensure support from common experience, or if the conclusions which he draws from his premises are illogically drawn and cannot be validly inferred from his premimises, then certainly it would be impossible and not worthwhile to approach his teachings intellectually and understand what he had to say. We find however that if we try to shift the essential from the unessential in his utterances and action, we find that his basic premises are not subjective and do have a foundation in common experience and the conclusions which he draws from his premises do logically follow from his premises.

Let me briefly outline what I think are Gandhi's substantial assumptions or starting points. Gandhi holds that man is a part of nature (and the individual a part of society) and that he must therefore live as far as possible in harmony with nature and society. Gandhi holds that in spite of many weaknesses and deficiencies man is essentially good and is amenable to persuasion. This proposition of his has been declared to be invalid, for man, it is said, is a mixture of good and bad impusles. I am of the opinion that this criticism ignores the fact that Gandhi was a shrewd and truthful observer of his own and other people's deficiencies and mistakes and has very cheerfully pointed out the dangers. When, therefore, he nevertheless advances the proposition that man is essentially good, he does so at a deeper level, i. e. at the level at which Socrates and Aristotle described man as essentially rational. Such a statement merely means that the distinguishing characteristic of man is his resaon, and that, provided he makes the effort, it is possible for him to make it the dominant constituent of his personality and succeed in being a wise man. That is exactly what Gandhi means when he describes man as being essentially good. And Gandhiji

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as well as Aristotle can claim support in common experience. If we look at our common social life we shall find that we normally behave to each other on the assumption that man is good-That is how the family as an institution has become a permanent aspect of our social life. Not only within the family but with our friends, colleagues and other members of our social group we do normally and naturally use persusaion, affection, self-sacrifice as the proper methods to persuade them to our view. Of course, there are quarrels within the family and within various social groups or between them, but nevertheless the family lasted as a permanent institution in our social life only because although members of family have often quarrelled, their normal attitude to each other is of mutual trust, confidence, affection and frequent subordination of one's own interest to that of other members of the family. This is so even with regard to the larger groups of which too we are members and the groups themselves like families, although they do quarrel, are normally, friendly and cooperative. This natural development has, it is true, been complicated by the fact that deceit and violence have often been resorted to, and they have left behind characteristic aftereffects - but even so the general direction is to-words better mutual understanding and trust.

To say that the intellectuals of our country failed in appreciating the importance of Gandhi's point of view and utterances does not mean that every little detail of what he said or did was valid. Gandhi was not hismelf an intellectual nor learned. Many of his opinions as for instance, in medical matters, about diet etc., are not objectively valid and in exceptional circumstances he himself departed from them and did not seek to unterfere with the habits of his colleagues like Maulana Azad or Pandit Nehru. persons on whose personal liberty he made inroads directly and indirectly were the members of his Ashram, Kasturba and a few others very intimate and who could be described as in some way as his wards. In substance, the Vratas he laid down as necessary for a true satyagrahi or a member of his Ashram are not irrational and as goals to be pointed out or the direction to be indicated for those who desire to serve the public, they are valid. Of course, Gandhi was a very shrewd person and knew the weaknesses of human nature so well that he did not altogether reject those who could not fulfill all his tests and made use of all the human material available to him for the manifold activities involved in national awakening CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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and the fight with British domination of which for nearly three decades he was the most outstanding leader indeed without a peer. Although Jinnah, Ambedkar and Savarkar were never under Gandhi's influence and each in his own way contributed towards the well being of those who followed them if we take an overall view, the first place among nation builders must nevertheless go to Gandhi.

Speaking before the philosophy faculty of the Gujarat University some years ago, I stated that basically Gandhi's faith that in spite of his imperfections and lapses man was essentially good and is therefore best approached through persuasion and not through force or deceit was similar to the faith of Socrates and the definition of Aristotle that man was a rational animal. They knew how frequently man is liable to err and be governed by passion. All that they mean is that Rationality is the distinctive charactertisic of man and that if he so determines he could be throughly rational i. e. wise and that to improve his lapses in any field we must in the first place appeal to his Reason and try and make him more enlightened. Men, said Socrates, are never deliberately wicked—they are wicked when they do not know the nature of their actions a position which Christ too stands for. Professor C. N. Patel, the Assistant Chief Editor of the Complete Gandhi Works Series being published at Delhi, who happened to be present, raised a difficulty in this connexion. He said that Gandhi himself used to say that he had failed to convert the Indian intellectual, that his appeal was to the heart and we find that as compared with the earlier national leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji, Ranade, Tilak, Gokhale, Gandhi was able to bring in the large masses of the country in the national movement for he appealed to emotion rather than try to argue with them and convince them of the correctness of his programme of national regeneration.

During this visit to Ahmedabad, I had the opportunity of meeting Shri Shankerlal Banker who was Gandhi's companion during his first imprisonment in 1921 and was all along very closely comected with one item of Gandhi's programme namely the encouragement of Khadi and other village industries. During the chat with him and also in his book Reminiscences of Gandhi he has made mention of one particular incident which according to him showed that Gandhiusleademaithetheuntamprandeultimately persuaded

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others to his side by overpowering them with his kindness and love and good nature. The incident referred to was that at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee a resolution regarding the death of Gopinath Saha, a revolutionary from Bengal, was moved along with an amendment sponsored by Deshbandhu Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru, praising his noble and courageous patriotism was being discussed. Gandhiji opposed the amendment and after a stormy debate succeeded in defeating the amendment by a narrow margin. Gandhiji felt very sad to find that friends and colleagues for whom he had great respect and whose patritotism was un-questioned should differ from him on so fundamental an issue. On being told by Maulana Shaukat Ali, not to worry and assuring him that Das and other leaders of his way of thinking could easily be defeated. Gandhiji explained 'What is the use of that? It is clear that I have not been able to win the hearts of these dear and distinguished friends— this shows how far I am from my cherished goal I still am'. Shri Banker proceeded to tell me that in the end it was Gandhiji's love for these friends which converted them and they came completely under his sway in the following years. Professor Patel also felt that if Gandhiji was really guided by Reason, he would not have stuck to Hinduism which he knew and admitted had many imperfections and tolerated such evils as untouchability, and that he as a rationalist, would have openly accepted a Universal Religion which, while accepting the good points of all religions, rejected what was irrational in any of them. Gandhi as a matter of fact did say that all religions were equally true but that all had imperfections. He nevertheless said that he himself was a staunch Hindu.

To take professor Patel's argument first: I do not think that as a rationalist Gandhi would have been justified or rationally required to start support a new and universal religion instead of Hinduism. A rationalist does not and need not maintain that the past should be given up but only that it should be corrected. Completely ignoring the past would have been the cutting off of the tradition and the momentum which continuous tradition gives. Like Gandhi, Swami Vivekanand was also a universalist, because he told the followers of other religions not to adopt Hinduism, but to follow their own religion with sincerity and devotion. 'If you do that you are already Hindus in your own way'. For Hinduism truly understood is like the vast ocean into which all rivers flow.

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Although, thus a universalist — Vivekanand was proud to describe himself as a Hindu and a Vedantin. And it is as such that the Ramakrishna Maths devoted to human service came to be established. As a matter of fact, a narrow view of rationalism such as is frequently held at the present time would even disallow the acceptance of a universal religion, for there is no proof of God or perhaps even spirituality in the sense in which there is proof of matter. The statement of Professor Patel that Gandhi often used to say that he has failed to convince the Indian intellectuals and could not reach their hearts, is true, but what he really meant was that he could not with arguments convince them, such as they appreciated but the fault could be theirs and not necessarily his. As Shri. Shankerlal Banker told me, although—leaders of the Congress like Das and Nehru at first expressed their differences from Gandhi. in the long run, both of them and many others like them too were prepared to follow Gandhi without hesitation even when they happened to differ. Pandit Nehru has in fact quite often said that there were many occasions when he differed from Gandhi about the line of action to be taken in a particular situation. He goes on however to add that having expressed his differences, he nevertheless accepted Gandhi's lead, because it was his experience that while Gandhi's arguments would not convince one - the actual sequence of events as they happened would invariably show that Gandhi was right. This statement when carefully understood shows that Gandhi in his own unconventional, unscholarly, nontechnical manner managed to arrive at the correct conclusion and must therefore be considered to be in substance and essence a rationalist, although he himself would say that he followed his inner voice and the dictates of his heart. It would be interesting from this point of view to consider the mutual relationship of Gandhi and many other contemporary leaders chiefly those belonging to non-congress parties. The liberal leaders as a group adopted during Gandhi's times an attitude more of observers than actors on the Indian national scene, and naturally their statements could not be considered to be on the same plane as those of Gandhi who was the central leader of the new national awakening. But one notes that the doyen of the liberal leaders — the Rt. Hon'ble Shrinivas Shastri, had in spite of difference in politics, a unique regard and gave special consideration to Gandhi's views. So did Sri Tej Bahaduro Sapung Danathanukerninga tollibera Hafader.

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three prominent exceptions were those of Jinnah, Ambedkar and Savarkar. It was indeed unfortunate that they and Gandhi could not discuss matters of permanent national interest in a free and friendly manner. It seemed that Gandhi's personal magic had no effect on any of them and somehow they seem to have developed a kind of allergy to Gandhi. But if we remember that other congress leaders — like Nehru, Rajaji and Subhash also failed to establish any real understanding with any of the three leaders, it was not Gandhi's inadequacy as a rationalist but something else — in the situation that prevented mutual understanding between him and the leaders.

To judge how far it could be said that the intellectuals found it impossible to incorporate and utilize what Gandhi stood for and taught, let us turn to the two main messages which Gandhi sought to give to Indians in order to secure independence. The first was his constructive programme. This constituted as we all know in requiring all Indians to be self-reliant and mutually friendly and helpful. From the various items chosen in the constructive programme, it is clear that Gandhi must have given deep thought to this matter. The first and much criticised item was the spinning and weaving of Khadi and wearing Khadi clothes. As a matter of fact, any serious thought about Khadi reveals that, to Gandhi, it represented the essentials both of the spirit of Swadeshi and the establishment at least in some part of our life of equality among all Indian citizens. Gandhi was very keen that the spinning of Khadi should form part of the annual subscription one had to give to enrol as a member of Indian National Congress. He thus meant that everyone who calls himself a congressman, adopts Swadeshi and regards himself as one among his fellowmen and is prepared to take some personal trouble every day to show that he seriously values both the acceptance of Swadeshi and the establishment of equality among all his countrymen. The other items of the constructive programme - 'removal of untouchability', 'Hindu-Muslim unity', 'Prohibition and Nai Talim' are all such as could be defended rationally as essential constituents of genuine nationalism and are in no way subjective or just a matter of sentiment.

This is also true of the other part of the programme which Gandhi put forward. That was his non-violent, non-cooperation and civil disobedience if necessary. This also is a perfectly rational CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

programme for an unarmed nation like India to adopt to press its demands. After all, the British rule here was possible because at all levels Indians agreed to carry out the orders issued by their English superiors. If the village patil and the police constable, and the revenue clerk did not carry out their work, the administration would necessarily collapse. That the British with a small army and some thousands of officers could smoothly run the administration of such a large country was due to the fact that the Indians accepted them as rulers and carried out their orders. If this cooperation was reduced and more and more withdrawn, the British rulers would be helpless. Also as regrads the laws enacted by the rulers, if one or the other of them was regarded as essentially unjust or partial it should be broken, and punishment awarded for the breach willingly accepted without any use of force on our part. If this was done as far as possible, gradually the British domination here would loosen its grip and people would learn to be courageous and peaceful, and mass demonstrations of our dissatisfaction with the British rule would humiliate the British in the international world and bring moral pressure on them. With both the parts of Gandhi's programme being followed the British grip on us was bound to loosen and as actually hapenned, after the second world war the British themselves would realise that it was better to part with power gracefully and keep India as a friendly nation in the Commonwealth, instead of straining its strength to rule such a vast mass of discontented population when in the changed world conditions, Britain itself had become a second grade nation and needed urgently to attend to its commerce and secure the daily needs of life of its own population by putting in maximum work This as we know is what actually happened in 1947.

I for one am quite certain that the Indian intellectuals did not do their duty with regard to Gandhi's teachings and activity. They had of course every right to criticise it, but they kept it at an arm's length, pronounced that what he was saying was so to say 'out of court' for reason. Even if Gandhi by some of his utterances and ways seemed to disclaim that he had any interest in the intellectuals, indeed lectuals' judgement — the intellectuals had every right to go into what he said and preached and consider its reasonableness and see how far and with the said and see how far see how far, and with what modifications, the nation could benefit from his programme and should have declared their support for him to the extentibly owned and kaction collab, if what Gandhi was

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saying was merely subjective fancy, the goals he set totally out of reach for men, or he was illogical even in drawing conclusions from his premises - only then ignoring him was justified and not otherwise. Taken as a whole the programme which Gandhi gave to the nation was essentially correct - in fact it was only all the older programmes of Indian nationalists in a wider and deeper synthesis adapted to the needs of the changing times in which India and the world were passing. As regards the wider, moral and religious stand of Gandhi too on which in his opinion his political programme was based - in substance, the same may be said and I feel that if the intellectualists had played their proper part, the Swaraj which dawned in 1947, would have been a less vitiated gift and the citizens and their leaders would have better learnt to carry out their responsibilities as citizens of a Free India - much better than they have done during the last thirty years. All over the world some of the topmost intellectuals and men of science had realised the unique value of what Gandhi stood for and suggested for overcoming the deadlock which our civilisation has reached and any serious effort by Indian intellectuals to understand and communicate what Gandhi was saying would have been welcomed all over the world as well as helped national progress.

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Oct. (1980)

# ECONOMICS OF NEED AND ECONOMICS OF WANT A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

In common parlance we often use the words want, need and satisfaction. Many a time we use the words, want and need as if they were synonymous. Sometimes, however, we do recognize that they do not always mean the same thing. Let us try to understand what is conveyed by the uses of the words want and need. Let us consider the two sentences:

- 1. I want X, and
- 2. I need X.

Perhaps in these cases it may not be possible to point out the difference in the use of the words want and need. But now consider the two other sentences:

- 3. I want rice, and
- 4. I need food.

Are these words now used synonymously1?

When I use the word, need, it should denote some kind of necessary relation between the organism, i. e., myself and a certain entity or commodity. The doctors, e. g., may say that my body needs certain balanced food, that it needs some calories in the form of proteins, carbo-hydrates, fat, vitamins etc. It is immaterial what form they assume or in what form they are given to me. Need then is concerned on the one side with the requirements of the organism and on the other side with the objects required. Like knowledge it requires an object (and in this context a physical object ) which would satisfy the requirement of the organism. Of course, this object need not exist or be present at that particular moment. Let us contrast this use of the word, need, with the use of the word, want. Just as the word, need, 'behaves' like the word 'know' similarly the word, want, behaves like the word, feel or believe. When I feel that there is something, (unless the word feel is used in connection with sensation), the existence of the Object at that or any other time is not ensured. Similar is the case so far as the behaviour of the word, want, is concerned. My wanting X dees in the threal mans utruthe existence of X

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at that or any other moment. If I say I want a flower of Bakavali, it does not follow that there is the flower of Bakavali. The word, want, thus has its emphasis on the subjective side; I can certainly use the word, want, without there being anything to which the want refers. If a person who 'wants..' is free, he can imagine anything by way of want. It is this 'freedom' of man which gives rise to the possibility of infinite wants. This is not possible in regard to needs. No doubt man's needs can increase but they cannot increase beyond a certain proportion. I can then say that need operates in a certain range. Again just as I can say, I need X. similarly, I can also say that Rama, Hari or Krishna needs X. This is possible because need is a relation between an object and the organism.2 In fact it appears to me that I should be able to use the word, want, primarily, only with 'I' the first person singular pronoun. Just as we can only say loosely that he knows something, and we can only primarily say, 'I know..', in the same way I can also say that in the strict sense of the term I can use the word want as in the sentence 'I want X' but not as 'he wants X'. In the same way as I stated earlier, I am free to have my wants, I may either want something which exists or I may just imagine something and say I want it.

Like the use of the word, want, the use of the word, satisfaction, also must be carefully understood. It is true that we do use the word, satisfaction, in such sentences as Ram, Hari and Krishna were fully satisfied. But in the primary sense of the term the word satisfaction, also goes with 'I', and only because we also believe in communication that we are able to transfer this use to a third person and thus make the objective use of the word possible.

My observation regarding the use of the word, want, and satisfaction leads me to a very important corollary: man's wants can never be satisfied. Satisfaction of the one want would lead to another want and satisfaction of that want would lead to another want and satisfaction of that want would lead to a third want and finally a stage would come when there would at least be one want which would be dissatisfied, however great our resources may be. Satisfaction of need would behave altogether in a different way. It would of course depend on the availability of resources. But with sufficient resources it should be possible to satisfy our needs. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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Want is a subjective notion and it may indeed be admitted that such subjective notions and ultimate non-satisfiability of such subjective 'notions' lead to man's intellectual progress. It may also lead to discoveries and inventions and through man's untiring effort make that which is imaginary develop into that which is actual.

But just as wants could be about imaginary things they could also be about objects or commodities which become available to a person who wants them. Wants under such conditions may mean the present non-availability but the possible availability. Imagine that I want a particular thing, which is not available with me, then if my want is so intense, I might make every effort to fulfil my want by getting the thing from a person who has it. This may be by any of the four means: (!) I may, e. g., request him to give it to me, (2) I may buy it from him, (3) I may steal it from him, or (4) I may even force him to give it to me.

All these four alternatives have an important implication in man's life and under certain conditions all these four cases could be cited as cases of exploitation. In fact all these cases could also be true in the case of need. But they are more obvious and manifest in the case of wants. In the case of need the operation would take place within a certain range.

Before I proceed further it may be pointed out that although wants are private, there could be similar wants of different people. And unsatisfied people who are not in possession of objects of their wants may create an organization in order that a possibility is created for the satisfaction of their wants. Thus, what is true of an individual may by some transference be also true of an institution or of an organization of individuals like a company or society or even of a state.<sup>3</sup>

In order that our wants are satisfied we will have to persuade or force others, by some of the means mentioned above. It is possible for me, e. g., to say, 'Give me a certain thing as a gift'. It is also possible for me to steal something. Since the first thing is irrelevant for the purpose and the second one is not generally regarded as respectable I would turn my attention to the remaining two alternatives, i. e., taking a thing by force and buying a thing. Although taking a thing by force is again not regarded as respectable, when one nation resolves to force against another nation, at

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ast be ources a diffesoursatisfy least in the patriotic logic of that nation, the move is regarded as respectable. This is what is known as war. The remaining alternative is that of buying. Ordinarily, it is difficult to believe that even in buying there is exploitation. But when barter was replaced by money economics, the possibility of such a thing became more evident. This is, of course, not to say that in pre-monetary, i. e., in barter too, this kind of exploitation was altogether absent. In fact, at individual level, a more needy person can always be exploited by a person who possesses or owns the commodities needed. It is also possible that the person with superior power may exploit a person without such power. One can, e. g., quote the cases of bonded labour or 'bigar'. But in monetary economy the exchange can provide for a more sophisticated form of exploitation.

It is this form of exploitation which has become very important. Buying has another side, called selling. In money economy in order for me to satisfy my wants, I am required to create money. I do it by selling my goods, my commodities, to others. My commodities are naturally the products of the natural resources available to me and the labour. I have put on it. But when I sell my commodities to others I want more price than the cost of my labour and the raw material. If I succeed in selling my commodities to others at a higher price then the difference between my sell price and my cost price is my profit. Perhaps I have over-simplified the concept of profit. But let me clarify a point. What I now call a finished product (commodity) has passed through a number of previous processes such that the finished product became the raw material at the next stage. Thus what I call the cost-price of my commodity, may itself be a selling-price at some stage, and what I call my raw-material may itself be a finished product which would include this profit. The manufactured goods at one stage may act as a raw-material for some other stage. However, on account of my skill if I am able to sell my commodity at a price higher than my cost-price I have succeeded in getting profit. And to that extent I have been able to exploit my buyer (also my workers). It is, however, possible that the buyer may have sometimes uper-hand and I would have to sell my good without profit or even in loss. If I own some perishable goods and if the buyer can wait for some time, he can dictate to me the price at which he might buy my goods. However, coming to the problem of wants, if my wants are ever increasing, in bushadorhaiveGutokuhkareniseollerylonesallises, so that I

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vin or may be able to satisfy my wants. Thus, the logic of wants and the logic of satisfaction of wants are invariably and necessarily connected with the logic of creating more resources. These resources can be created in the following ways. Either I have to increase my natural resources directly or through labour or I must somehow get greater profits. All these three separately or jointly mean expansion.

Corresponding to my wants there must also be the wants of others. If I am to sell my commodities to others, others must need them or want them. If others need them, the problem is relatively But if others really do not need them, it will be necessary to create a feeling in them that they really want them, that without them their life would not be civilized or would rather be miserable. That is, in order for getting my wants satisfied, I must be able to create in others corresponding wants for my commodities. This is building or finding out markets. Sometimes political power can be utilized for creating such markets. In order to give protection to one particular kind of goods, it may be possible to increase duties on some other goods and make it impossible for the purchaser to buy any other goods except our own. If our proposition is that wants are infinite and that we must make an attempt to satisfy them, that progress, culture and civilisation depended on our possibility to satisfy them, it would follow that our markets must increase and expand, that they must be controlled by us and that we must get more profit in the process of selling our goods and reduce the margin of others in profit in buying the goods that we require from others for satisfying our wants. All this is the logic of exploitation.4

Before I proceed further, it is necessary to draw attention to as to how the words, want and satisfaction, came to be used. Both these words, as I have said earlier, properly belong to Psychology. But the Hedonist began to use them in Ethics. A human being has to have wishes, wants, desires and if these are fulfilled he gets satisfaction also. Normally we use the word satisfaction in this sense. Every fulfilment or completion of our act leads to satisfaction. Nay, every stage of completion and fulfilment is also accompanied by satisfaction. But the question is whether satisfaction is just an accompaniment of the end for which we are striving or it is the end in itself. The hedonists plead that satisfaction or pleasure is the end in itself and it is for the sake of pleasure that

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we strive. This concept of pleasure as an end, however, creates several difficulties and paradoxes. Two of them are well-known in the history of ethics. : (1) If pleasure is the end how are we to measure pleasure quantitatively? Can we have a pleasure calculus? In such a case the source from which we derive pleasure becomes unimportant and as was said in the 19th century ethics, a puskin would become as good as poetry. In that case value would have no significance at all. (2) To avoid this, people like Mill, also, talked of qualiatative pleasure. But then the problem would be to find out the criteria as to what kind of pleasure would be better. If we take pure pleasure qua pleasure, it will be difficult to find out such criterion or criteria. The difficulty is that in our language we are continuously using the words in different senses. Thus we use the word pleasure in its abstract sense ( When it cannot have plural), as also in its concrete sense (when it has a plural). When we use the word pleasure where it allows a plural number, we are not talking of pleasure as such but are talking of things which are pleasant. If we succeed in getting things which would result in our pleasure, it is not the pleasure—the abstract pleasure that we have obtained or for which we are striving, it is the object (which results in pleasure) for which we are striving. And, the object and its accompaniment pleasure (abstract pleasure) cannot be separated. The abstract notions are separable only when their substrata are different. But a characteristic and the substance or object which has this characteristic cannot be separated. They can only be distinguished. So it would be unreasonable to talk of the characteristic alone without any reference to the substratum or the end of which it is the characteristic. Moral philosophers of 20th century, even if they advocate pleasure as an end, do not advocate the abstract characteristic as an end.

It may be pointed out here that the word, satisfaction, which the economists are fond of, is a twin of pleasure. But while the word pleasure in its plural can be used properly and significantly in a moral theory the word satisfaction cannot be so used. We cannot say satisfactions<sup>5</sup> just as we can say, pleasures. the concept of satisfaction will not allow degree of satisfaction Similarly although economists talk of more or less units of satisfaction this also is, strictly speaking, absurd. A satisfaction calculus with additive properties cannot be so introduced. the dangers which authorises annot be so introduced. pleasure

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derived from any source would be of the same kind, would arise in the case of satisfaction also. Thus the greater amount of satisfaction of one man on this logic would be preferable to the lesser amount of satisfaction of many men. Once you talk of satisfaction as the only criterion for understanding moral or economic notions (and in laissez-faire economy and in utilitarian ethics this has happended) and once this principle is allowed, we have given licence to exploitation. Although we start with the principle, 'everyone to count for one and none for more than one', one becomes more important than the other and begets a right to exploit others. In its worst form it leads to egoism in ethics and imperialism and dictatorship in economics and politics. But the economists want to measure their concepts in terms of satisfaction. Their primary law is the law of utility and this is based on wants and their satisfaction. In this economics the concept of consumption naturally becomes primary and all other concepts become subservient to it. The economic theory as has come down to us exhibits all these traits. It is individualistic in nature, it is consumption based and is developed to work out finally the theory of capitalism and imperialism. Other instruments of economics like production, exchange, distribution or banking become secondary to this original theory of consumption, utility and consumer's surplus in terms of satisfaction. It means unrestricted freedom and competition for individual. One who survives this competition alone Survives

The economic theory based on needs has a different logic and It develops differently. It is indeed true that like wants needs also have a tendency to increase but the increase of needs is dependent on resources that are available. It is not primarily concerned with satisfaction although the word satisfaction may be used by the protagonist of the theory. I am not sure who used the word, need, first in this context. Perhaps Rousseau had this word in his mind but his English translators have used the word want instead. The word need finds its justification in the communist dictum-'Everyone to work according to one's capacity and to receive according to one's need'. The theory based on need is likely to be a matter of fact and would not be concerned with airy and flimsy notions like that of satisfaction. Man's needs certainly increase and what are luxuries and comforts today tend to become necessaries to-In fact this is what is called increasing the standard of CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar morrow.

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living. It should be and is the object of social thinkers to increase the standatd of living of all and remove the disparity between the workers and masters. When Marx wanted to remove the chains of the working class his aim was to strive for the increase of standard of living in the working class, that even if equality of standard was not attainable, equitability in the standard should be aimed at and worked out. Unfortunately the socialist and the Marxist thinkers were again and again confronted with the notions developed by laissez-faire and capitalist economy and they were also forced to use the language of the capitalist economy. I think Marx's use of the word 'Surplus value' is one such use. I believe, although a communist would not agree with me, that Marx used this expression because he was using the capitalist language for expressing his thought which was, of course, anti-capitalist.

In the economics of need there is no room for infinite needs man does not have infinite needs and if they increase they increase only to a certain extent. Cave man was e.g., living in a cave. A modern man may construct a building. Both need a shelter. The modern shelter may have more conveniences. The hunter man was eating the hunted meat without cooking it, the modern man cooks it. The hunter and the savage were eating the fruit available to them. The modern man does agriculture. Man's needs increase no doubt. But they are dependent on resources available, i. e., they are dependent on production, unlike the theory of wants which is based on consumption. And production depends on actual resources and the labour. The economics based on needs, therefore, will not lead to capitalism and imperialism. Man's initiative need not here be used for exploiting others (although the exploitation is not ruled out).

At this point let me say something about the duel nature of man. He is an individual as well as a man in society. His society may increase or decrease but his social dimension cannot be ignored. His rationality, morality and possibility to live are, to my mind, some aspects of his sociality, on the contrary his happiness emotionality and taste, belong to his individuality. His rights are the manifestation of his individuality. His duties and obligations which to my mind arise through the primitive feeling of owing, belong to his sociality. When a person does something which published and candulination different and the cannot be

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regarded as exploitation. But when one uses the instruments which belong to his individuality, in social sphere the inevitable result is exploitation. Sometimes individuality and sociality may be grouped together but the mere contact of these two eliminates sociality and the individuality that remains may be used to rob others of their freedom in all its forms. I may point out here that the word exploitation is also used in two senses. When we use it in the context of resources it merely means use. When we it in the context of man such that if it is used to one's own advantage it is exploitation proper. In the history of man find that exploitation of this second kind is a dominant factor and if the welfare of all human beings is to be kept in mind then this feature which cannot be completely ignored has to be kept in control. The economics of wants does not control it, and with the introduction of money, although the economists talk of satisfaction alone, the satisfaction is either equated or is integrated with such notions as profit, interest, dividend, rent

When we talk of man we should talk of one universal man as belonging to one human race. That will be the ideal. But unfortunately on account of geographical, political, racial divisions and on account of the individual or socio-individual factors man is divided into several groups and as a matter of fact one group or individuals in the group may try to dominate over the others. In the groups themselves there may be fractions which may dominate over the others. In fact, it is this tendency which leads sometimes to what is known as leadership. However, in the interests of the welfare of man ( and this is equally true whether we are talking of the whole human race or a particular human society ) the gap which arises on account of the domination of individual factors over the social, should minimize. The ideal situation would be that there should not be any exploitation. The other possibility is that one man exploits everyone else. We will have to find out the mean between the two where neither the individual factors nor the social factors suffer. The first thing will be to satisfy the needs of all; only when there are still some resources left we can think of comforts and luxuries. Need is a social element because it is common to all men. It has to be given preference over wants. If there is plenty then certainly wants which are of course due to individual choice could be tolerated and even encouraged. The problem of CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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pes be human kind is that there is not such a plenty of resources such that each one can take whatever he wants from the 'ocean of nector'. As a matter of fact it will be interesting to note that even hedonism has got individual as well as social sphere. In its individual sphere it pleads for pleasure but in its social aspect it talks of good and maximum happiness of the maximum number. The Hedonist did it in this way because although there are individual and social factors the utiliterian philosopher was governed by the logic of imperialism. If individuality and sociality are detached from the imperialistic logic although it may not be possible to distribute them according to man's desires and wants, it will be possible to work out the resources that are available to man and distribute them amongst mankind present and future.

Deptt. of 'Philosophy Poona University Poona-7.

S. S. Barlingay

#### NOTES

- 1. Of course, it is possible to say 'I need rice' and 'I want food', and it may also be admitted that in our actual use we go on using the words need and want indiscriminately.
- 2. When I use the word want, as in Ram, Krishna or Hari wants X, I am in fact, using the word, want, as if it was synonymous which need. On the contrary when I talk of wants which are subjective and dependent on the freedom of the man (which also makes them infinite) it would not be possible for me to determine wants in such an objective manner.
- 3. It will be interesting to point out here that communists regard the state as an instrument of coercion of a certain class.
  - 4. The logic of needs is different.
- 5. Pleasures mean things which produce pleasure; satisfactions do not mean things which produce satisfaction.
- 6. When for example we go from bare needs to comforts. It may, however, be noted that we have already, started using the word, need, in a different way.

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Oct. (1980).

### REVIEWS

The Hindu Personality in Education: Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo: Cenkner, William: Manoher Book Service, New Delhi.

Education is a practical activity, says William Cenkner. Indian education, he continues, besides being an activity is a process of National Progress. In his book, *The Hindu Personality in Education*' Cenkner highlights the substantial contributions of Tagore, Gandhi and Aurobindo, to this process of progress.

Cenkner has systematically analysed the spiritual development, thought and educational theories of these three international figures. In his conclusion he gives a comprehensive and succinct study of the religious personality reflected in their educational systems.

The 'Relational Personality' of Tagore, says Cenkner, was moulded by the religious, socio-political and literary transformations which took place in the India of his days. Besides these Cenkner defines the strong influence exerted by the Brahmo Samaj and Raja Ram Mohan Roy on the Tagore's entire family. These factors nurtured the 'poet, philosopher and prophet', till he became 'a symbol and an institution'.

'Experimental Personality' is the term used by Cenkner to describe Gandhi. It signifies the process of experience and experimentation which shaped Gandhi's personality. The author speaks of Aurobindo's personality as being Psychic and rightly so as with Aurobindo we step into the sphere of the supra-intellectual, the supermind and the Divine conscious force. Cenkner describes the two psychic experiences that Aurobindo had as a boy, which greatly influenced his spiritual evolution.

Examining the principles underlying their educational theories, Cenkner talks of Tagore's Ananda Yoga — the aesthetic path which achieves growth in consciousness. He also speaks of the poet's religious consciousness which is the love relationship between the universal self and the individual self. Cenkner defines the Karma Yoga of Gandhi and the Integral Yoga of Aurobindo. Here he CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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unconsciously draws a contrast between Gandhi the practical humanist and Aurobindo the mystic who sought to integrate Man and God through purification and meditation.

Expatiating the educational theories of Tagore, the writer emphasises Tagore's dissatisfaction at the existing system of schools as 'it had not the completeness of the world'. Tagore's cardinal principle of education, says Cenkner, is the 'freedom of creative self-expression'. The author refers to it as a 'wholistic education' one which coordinates all cultural resources. He also speaks of Tagore's aspirations for a curriculum that is 'activity centred' and not 'subject centred'.

Coming to Gandhi, Cenkner emphasises the former's idea that the school is the extension of home, hence there should be a continuity in language and culture, between home and school. Besides character building is the fundamental enterprise of Gandhian school and through this the evolution of a non-violent personality.

On the other hand, Cenkner portrays Aurobindo, whose normative principles are, first that nothing can be taught; second that the mind has to be continually consulted; and third that one must work from the near to the far. Cenkner clearly delineates the practical realities in the ideals and systems of Tagore and Gandhi and the mystical vision of Aurobindo.

The chapter on 'Praxis and Significance' deals with the influence the educational systems of the three personalities had on contemporary and future life. He further highlights the success of the institutions set up by them. Besides Tagore's Shantiniketan and Shriniketan, the apex of his educational endeavours was the establishment of Visva Bharati. Gandhi's experiments were conducted within the ashrams. Cenkner talks of initial reluctance that people showed in accepting the Wardha Scheme. He feels that at no point did it become a national movement.

Cenkner depicts Auroville as a project established by Aurobindo, but which was sustained by the inspiring spirit of the Mother. Similarly, says Cenkner, the Mother played an important role in the conception and execution of the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education.

The concluding chapter deals with the religious personality as teacher. CC Tagorous Gandhi Candul Kangobiolection stablished a pattern

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lity ern of living alike for the teacher and the taught. Yet says Cenkner, each had a different approach and fulfilment

Cenkner's work is comprehensive and analytical. It presents the development of the Man, the evolution of his thought and philosophy, the significance of his achievement and above all, the towering personality of the Man, superseding all his achievements.

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T. S. Devadoss.

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Kant's Criticism of Metaphyics, W. H. Walsh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975: pp. x + 265, Price: \$11.95.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is somewhat like Everest in that it invites conquest simply because it is there. Walsh's attempt to meet this challenge is very much to be commended. His analysis is thorough; it is plain talk, honest and straightforward and conveys the impression that the author is fully conversant with Kant's writings. In reducing Kant's epistemology to the modern idiom he has given not only a strong but at the same time a most informative presentation of his chosen subject.

Categories for Kant are pure intellectual concepts and we are given no higher principle beyond the logical forms of judgement from which they are derived. But fairly early in his book Walsh goes to some lengths to criticize Kant's contention that categories of the understanding should be formal in their origin, although to be meaningful they must apply to an objective world. Walsh at this juncture shows not a little conviction as well as courage in his forthright assertion that the supposed link between the forms of judgement and categories as put forward by Kant is only a hollow pretence. The implication is that the categories that declare for the whole of experience should be able to claim for themselves more than a purely logical relationship in their derivation. If categories are designed to be applicable to the phenomenal world, the time factor, for example, should in some way have been with them from the start, and one apparent reason is that if the entry of time is delayed it must have been delayed from some previous time.

In the Transcendental Deduction the problem Kant set for himself was to formally demonstrate how the categories which he had listed are indispensable to any kind of experience in the phenomenal world. Kant's proof simply takes the form of the contrapositive; he is saying that from experience we are led to categories, so that to negate these categories would be to render experience impossible. What seems to have been overlooked is that in any deduction that pretends to be formal the matching of concepts to experienced phenomena is not permissible and constitutes no less than a form of the naturalistic fallacy. And to say that we I. P. Q... 11

are talking about experience in general will scarcely help matters because abstract experience is not the kind of experience with which Kant at this point is concerned.

If, according to Kant's general position, the objects of experience are phenomena, knowledge cannot apply to such phenomena in strictest certainty; the relationship can only be one of contingency if the known objects are in some way contingent. It follows that we cannot be certain of Kant's Transcendental Deducation itself because we can never be thoroughly convinced that the knowledge which relates to the sensible world is true knowledge. In any case, categories in a priori knowledge should already be well comprehended by the mind, and it is not altogether clear why they should require experience to support them in demonstrating their validity. Unless for Kant a priori cognition in the form of categories is an hypothesis, which it is not, proof is hardly called for because no proof beyond the established a priori status of the categories should be required. Walsh himself goes so far as to suggest that Kant often writes as if he were doing little more than describing for us the course of human cognition, and if this is so we are given only a poor substitute for what purports to be a proof of cognition in terms of categories designed to be universal for all knowledge. In the intense concern to show that pure concepts of our minds are essential for sensible intuition, it is as if nature herself could not be trusted to make or remake the things and events that are already there for us to experience.

In readily admitting that talk in the First Analogy about a a substratum which allegedly represents time in general is at best unsatisfactory, Walsh is not alone in trying to make sense of this part of Kant's epistemology. The salient point about the First Analogy should be that if in experience we are able to know only appearances, we can never hope to obtain categorical certainty that the substance of experience is unchanging. Walsh attempts to sidestep the issue by speaking of a substance that is permanent, but which nevertheless exists in unending transformations. This in spite of Kant's phrase 'unchanging in its existence' at B 225, with direct reference to substance. And similarly for the Second Analogy, if we know events only as phenomena rather than absolutely, we should not be able to say that one event necessarily determines another to report the participant of Capacitant Capacit

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the assertion that 'in Kant's phenomenal world necessary connection holds, 'but its ambiguity apparently escapes him, for this very statement yields a deterministic assessment of events of which we are nevertheless permitted only apparent rather than certain know-Kant must know that even nature herself never is in a completely finished state, that nature never keeps up, as it were, with all contingencies of the creative process and that causation must always leave a residue that is open for further determination. Nature's freedom, in some respect at least, is surely free apart from man's understanding of it, whereas Kant posits in mankind an understanding that is able to fully determine natural phenomena. But if nature does not legislate even for herself in the absolute sense. it can hardly be the case that man legislates absolutely for nature, even though we do try to select an environment that we believe will be to our greatest benefit. That the human understanding should declare for a strict determinism for happenings in the natural world is simply inconsistent and wrong, not only for Kant's philosophy, but for any philosophy.

Walsh assumes the role of apologist or severe critic at various crucial points as circumstances seem to warrent. In his thorough discussion leading up to and including the Third Antinomy, the objection is quite well made that intelligible causation for Kant occupies a position that can only be said to be gratuitous. When human reason is given free rein, as the story goes according to Kant, we are driven to contradictory conclusions concerning the conditions of experience. The solution, as Walsh reminds us, is to accept Kant's transcendental idealism where the ideas of reason are said to be only regulative, designating not objects, but ideals. Indeed, for his solution to the Third Antinomy, Kant has moved into the moral realm, which Walsh considers to be hardly fair-At best it is irrelevant to the issue. What the solution amounts to. in effect, is to say that moral precepts may justifiably be drawn into an epistemology which set out primarily to deal with the natural world. It leads us to believe that, in spite of the deterministic conclusions reached in the Second Analogy, an intelligible cause arrived at through an evaluation of man's own freedom is not incompatible with the laws of nature herself.

From a consideration of man's freedom we are led to the moral proof for God's existence. Consistent with the distinctly humani-

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A. W. J. HARPER

stic approach taken in the Dialectic, Kant has it that God is real only for the man who can claim to be moral. As Walsh is probably right in emphasizing, this bit of practical deliberation constitues no actual proof at all, for it is only a comforting personal belief. So he is inclinded to write off the moral proof. But it follows as a corollary to this 'proof' for the existence of God that the force of moral obligation as felt by the individual consciousness may be inductively generalized into a universal moral law as we proceed from the instances of man's moral awareness up to God's creativity. A universal law of autonomy, therefore, taken as an extension of our own sense of obligation, reaches to the assumption of a law embracing all activity, natural as well as human. We are able to say this simply because of the fact that it is an autonomous law. The moral proof establishes the existence of a lawmaking God eternally fashioning a universal and objective law that encompasses all classes of activity.

There should be little need, however, to underplay the predicament in which Kant finds himself, namely, that an autonomous law for all activity must mean that no other law under it can be strictly determinate for action. If the pure practical reason is subject to universal law and on that account has invoked God's moral law, then a fortiori pure reason should also have known of this universal autonomy. But it is too late; Kant in the Analytic has already declared for an exact determinism under the category of causality. If the universal law covers all natural phenomena, the events of nature should come under the regulative rule of reason rather than within the bounds of the understanding which allegedly allows no freedom. Walsh suggests that Kant saw the difficulty involved and tried to rectify matters somewhat in the Second Critique where he talks of 'extending' the categories of pure reason, provided that they do not become cognitions for speculative knowledge. The problem of how it is possible to extend a priori categories beyond their original fixed status is not dealt with.

The issue resolves itself into a paradox, where practical reason, as one special kind of reason, breaks out, as it were, into a freedom of its own making; in the case of human consciousness the only recourse is to accept the intervention of the human will. The fact recourse is to accept the intervention of the human will. The fact that we have arrived at the point of free will in consciousness neverther.

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less does not entitle us to establish a domain of reason which is entirely separated from the natural realm. Much less can freedom in consciousness be legitimately extended to give us knowledge of freedom in the noumenal world, a world about which we lack knowledge entirely. While Walsh charitably grants that Kant's theory about the regulative role of the ideas of reason somehow concerns a 'notion of system', he is ready to concede that Kant at least must have come to realize that in this general area there is still a problem to be met with concerning the ordering of nature over and above that which was handled in the Analytic. We find it not hard to agree.

Finally, Walsh does not avoid the pertinent question of how, if human knowledge must be tied to sense-intuition, the intellectual insights of the Analytic are arrived at. However, after mounting what would appear to be a strong case for some telling criticism, Walsh disappoints with the rather weak observation that Kant might have been prepared to allow an element of the contingent within pure reason after all; it could be that even his a priori categories are based only on fact rather than on necessary fact. Indeed Walsh has remarkably little to say concerning Kant's heavy dependence upon the a priori. It is somewhat strange, nevertheless, that if mankind is able to attain only to phenomenal knowledge at best, one philosopher is entitled to make as much use of transcendental knowledge and to spend as much time with the a priori as Kant has seen fit to do. Kant's critical analysis of the knowing process resolves itself into a transcendental logic largely of his own invention, a development of which Professor Walsh is by no means unaware, and one which he is unwilling to accept without qualification.

London, Ontario, A. W. J. Harper Canada

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# INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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### Books Received

- 1) The Problems of Mysticism: Nils Bjrn Dvastad: published by him at Scintilla Press (Norway) Oslo (1980): pp. 368.
- 2) Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls: Ed. M. Nagatoni, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson, E. C. Dimock Jr.: D. Reidel Publishing Company (Dordrecht: Holand): 1980: pp. xi + 267.
- 3) Mrgendragama: Michel Hum: Institute Françaus D' indologie, Pondichery: 1980: pp. ix + 386 + v.
- 4) The Life and Teaching of Geshe Rabten: B. Allan Wallace: London, George Allen and Unwin: 1980: pp. vi + 204.
- 5) Hindu Social Philosophy: S. Gopalan: Wiley Eastern Ltd., New Delhi: 1979: pp. ix + 293.
- 6) Philosophical Discussions: Suresh Chandra: Prakash Book Depot, Bareily: 1979: pp. xiii + 208.
  - 7) To be Good: Satyanarayan P. Kanal: Secretary, Dev Somaj, Chandigarh: 1980: pp. V + 154.
  - 8) Civil Disobedience, a Philosophical Study: R. D. Dixit: GDK Publications, Delhi: 1980: pp. xi + 104.

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### Indian Philosophical Quarterly

The Constitution of the proposed Indian Philosophical Quarterly Association is given below. It is to be implemented as early as possible. As per the provisions in the Constitution the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly Association is to be formed. In pursuance with the relevant clause relating to the formation of that body certain elections have inevitably to be held. With a view to facilitating the formation of the Executive Committee the Permanent Institutional Members and the Institutional Annual Members are very earnestly requested to communicate immediately to the Indian Philosophical Quarterly office their nominee on the General Body of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly Association. They are also separately being requested to do the needful in the matter.

A proforma of the nomination paper, to be filled in, is printed below the Constitution of the Association. Those members of the IPQ Association, as per the provision of the constitution, are desirous of becoming members of the Executive Committee of the Association are requested earnestly to fill in the Nomination Form and return it to the IPQ office so as to reach us by the end of January, 1981. Nomination forms received thereafter shall not be considered to be valid.

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An esteemed co-operation of the concerned members is very earnestly soliciated so as to facilitate the implementation of the Constitution of the Association.

Editors

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### UNIVERSITY OF POONA

## INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY ASSOCIATION

### CONSTITUTION

# Memorandum of Association AND

### RULES AND REGULATIONS

### (A) Memorandum of Association

- 1. Name: The Name of the Association shall be 'Indian Philosophical Quarterly Association' (IPQ Association for short), hereinafter referred to as the IPQ Association.
- 2. Office: The Office of the IPQ Association shall be in Pune, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune —7.
- 3. Aims and Objects: The Aims and Objects of the IPQ Association shall be:
  - (1) To advise and assist in the Management of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly. (However, the Editors of the IPQ will be free to use their own discretion in the execution of all their IPQ work).
  - (2) To advise and assist in securing Scholarly and Financial Assistance, as necessary, for the IPQ.
  - (3) To provide facilities for the preparation of Articles for the IPO.
  - (4) To hold and assist in holding Annual Sessions of the IPQ Association at suitable places and times.
  - (5) To organise and assist in organising Seminars, Symposia, Discussions, Work-shops, Refresher Courses etc., where-ever desirable and possible.
  - (6) Generally, to do and assist in doing all such things as are conducive to the organization, management and working of the IPQ and the IPQ Association.
- 4. Membership: All Individual and Institutional Annual Subscribers, Individual Life Subscribers, Institutional Permanent Subscribers, Student Subscribers and Non-Subscribers Persons admitted as members in an honorary capacity shall be Members of the IPO Association under their respective categories.

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The following conditions shall govern their Membership.

- (1) Individual and Institutional Annual Members:

  Individual and Institutional Annual Subscribers of the IPQ shall be Individual and Institutional Annual Members of the IPQ Association only during the year of their subscription. The renewal of their subscriptions will automatically renew their Membership of the IPQ Association.
  - (2) Individual Life Members: Individual Life Subscriberrs of the IPQ shall be Individual Life Members of the IPQ Association.
- (3) Institutional Permanent Members: Institutional Permanent Subscribers of the IPQ shall be Institutional Permanent Members, of the IPQ Association and each will have the right to nominate one Representative of the Institution's choice as a Member of the IPQ Association. Such a Nominee shall cease to be a Member of the IPQ Association as soon as this nomination is withdrawn by his Institution.
- (4) Student Members: Student Subscribers, who will be only Annual Subscribers, will be Student Members of the IPQ Association.
- (5) Honorary Members: Persons, who are not subscribers of the IPQ and yet are admitted by the Executive Committee to the Membership of the IPQ Association in an Honorary capacity during suitable periods of time, will be Honorary Members of the IPQ Association during these periods (Such members will not be Members of the Executive Committee).
- (N. B.: The Subscriptions to be paid in by the four above categories (1) to (4) of Members of the IPQ Association will be according to the Schedule approved by the *Poona University* on the recommendation of the University's IPQ Advisory Committee).
- 5. General Body: (a) All the Members of the IPQ Association will constitute the General Body of the IPQ Association.
  - (b) The General Body will have (i) its President, elected by the Body in its Meeting for a period of two years, who will CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

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preside over all Meetings of the Body, during his period of his Office, and (ii) its *Two secretaries* will be the Two Secretories of the Association's Executive Committee, as per clause 6 (A) (2) below:

- 6. Executive Committee: (A) Composition: The Executive Committee of the IPQ Association shall have in all 15 (fifteen) members (who will be Members of the IPQ Association), as follows:—
- (1) The Chairman to be elected by the Members of the General Body of the IPQ Association from among its Members, who will ordinarily preside over all meetings of the Committee, the tenure of his office as Chairman to be three years, and no Chairman to hold this office for more than two consecutive terms.
  - (2) Two Secretaries, one of them from among the Editors of the IPQ and the other from among the IPQ Association Members, and both to be nominated by the Poona University on the recommendation of the University's IPQ Advisory Committee.
    - (3) Four Members to be nominated by the Poona University, two to represent the Pratap Centre of Philosophy, Amalner, and two to represent the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona.
- (4) Three Representatives to be elected by the Individual Life Members of the IPQ Association, from among themselves.
  - (5) Two Representatives, to be elected by the Representatives of the Permanent Institutional Members of the IPQ Association, from among themselves.
  - (6) Two Representatives to be elected, one by the Individual Annual Members (from among themselves), and one by the Institutional Annual Members (from among themselves), of the IPQ Association.
- (7) One Student's Representative, to be elected by the Students Members of the IPQ Association from among themselves.
- (B) Tenure of the Membership of the Executive Committee:

  The Tenure of the Membership of the Executive Committee will be three years. No Member shall be on the Executive

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Committee for more than two consecutive turns. This rule, however, shall not apply in the case of the Secretaries of the Executive Committee.

## 7. Editors and Consulting Editors :

- (1) There shall be Two Editors for the IPQ, from among the Members of the IPQ Association, one among them being from the University Philosophy Department.
  - (2) There shall also be Consulting Editors for the IPQ, consisting of Indian Experts in Philosophy from among Members of the IPQ Association from Maharashtra and outside.
  - (3) The Editors and Consulting Editors will be appointed by the Executive Council of Poona University and the Executive Committee of the IPQ Association respectively; and the period of Office for them will be three years: but they will be eligible for re-appointment.
- 8. No Individual Rights to Any Member: No Member of the IPQ Association, the Office-holders or others, will have any personal rights whatever over the Property or Funds of the Association.

### (B) Rules and Regulations

- 1. Powers and Functions of the General Body: The Powers and the Functions of the General Body of the IPQ Association, of which there shall be at least one Meeting per annum shall be:—
  - (1) To regulate and control the General Policy of the Association and to give general directions thereabout to the Executive Committee.
  - (2) To receive and review, in the Annual Meetings of the Association, the annual Statements of the Reports and Accounts (Audited and Certified) of the Association submitted by the Executive Committee.

(3) To elect from among its Members, its president, and also the Members of the Executive Committee, including its Chairman.

mittee places before it for its consideration.

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2. Powers and Functions of the Executive Committee: The Powers and Functions of the Executive Committee of the IPQ Association of which there shall be atleast one Meeting per annum, shall be:—

- (1) To hold Annual or Special Sessions of the Association.
- (2) To implement the General Policy directions given by the General Body, as per Clause 1 (1) above, under the Rules and Regulations.
- (3) To appoint (subject to the ratification of the Executive Council of University) one of the Editors and Consulting Editors. One of the two Editors would be appointed directly by Poona University Executive Council.
- (4) To hold and conduct Seminars, Symposia, Discussions, Workshops, Refresher Courses etc.
- (5) To arrange for the Printing and Publication of the papers. and Reports of Seminars, Symposia, Discussions etc. through the IPQ.
- (6) To raise the necessary Funds for the Association and to manage and keep Accounts of the same.
- (7) To consider and formulate the General Policies of the Association regarding the management and carrying out its business, and to place them before the General Body for its consideration and approval.
- (8) To place before the Annual Meeting of the General Body of the Association the Annual Statements of the Reports and (Audited and Certified) Accounts of the Association, the Annual Budget and such other matters as in its discretion it thinks fit to place before it, for its consideration and approval.
- (9) To exercise, on behalf of the Association, all powers of Association.
- (10) To delegate any of its powers to the Secretaries.
- (11) To admit, if and as necessary, some Non-Subscribers of the IPQ, for suitable periods of time, as *Honorary Members* of the IPQ Association.
- (12) Generally, to do all such things, on behalf of the Assoceiation are incidental and conductive to the attain-

ment of the Aims and Objects of the Association or any of them as set out above, in 3 of the Memorandum of Association.

- 3. Powers and Functions of the Editors and Consulting Editors:

  The powers and Functions of the Editors and Consulting Editors will be as follows:
- (1) The Editors will have complete freedom of discreation in their Editorial Work, and will be wholly responsible for the management of the IPQ, by inviting, securing and editing, printing and publication of Articles and Reviews in the IPQ, with the available advice and assistance of their Consulting Editors and other Colleagues.
  - (2) The Consulting Editors will, mainly, assist the Editors (i) to edit the the Articles and Reviews for the IPQ, and by (ii) suggesting to them suitable subjects for new Articles and suitable Contributors for those Articles for the IPQ.
- 4. Powers and Functions of the Secretaries: The Secretaries of the IPQ Association shall manage all the rouine and other Business of the Association according to the Provisions made in that behalf and according to the powers delegated to them by the Executive Committee, and will have the authority to use their discretion in all their work, as and when necessary.
- 5. Property of the IPQ Association and Its Management: The following are the provisions for the Association's Property and its Management:
  - (1) The Property of the Association includes (i) the Associations Liquid Funds and (ii) the Books, Furniture and any other materials purchased by the Association from time to time: and this property will vest in the Executive Council of Poona University as its Trustee, no Member Individual or Institutional having any right on it. The Secretaries of IPQ Association will look after the protection and care of the Association's Property.
  - (2) The Sources and Amounts of Liquid Funds of the Association will be:
  - (i) Rs. 10,000 per annum, which the University has Corovided Formathe White Established Funds

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for the IPQ. The Interest per annum accruing to the University from the Fixed Deposits of the IPQ, to be made available to the Association by the University for the implementation of the Aims and Objects of the Association. The Association will have the authority to raise Additional Funds from other sources from time to time. (iii) The University may give an annual grant of Rs. 2,000/- to the association.

- (3) The Association's Funds other than the IPQ funds shall be kept in a Nationalised or Scheduled Bank and the Bank Accounts of these will be kept in the name of IPQ Association and will be jointly operated, on its behalf, by the Two Secretaries of the Association, who will also keep Accounts of the same. However from the IPQ funds also, the University, on the recommendations of the Editor (appointed by the University) may sanction certain amounts for annual expenditure of the association.
- Change in the 'Memorandum of Association' and the 'Rules and Regulations':—

The General Body of the IPQ Association shall have the power to make any changes in the provisions in the 'Memorandum of Association' or the 'Rules and Regulations' of the Association, considered suitable and desirable for the progressive realisation of the Association's Aims and Objects, in a Meeting of the General Body, on the recommendation of the Secretaries of the Association to be made through the Executive Committee.

7. Provisions or Change in them to operate after the University's Approval:—

The provisions in the IPQ Association's Memorandum of Association and 'Rules and Regulations' or any *Changes* made in them will operate *only* after the University's approval of them.

# INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY ASSOCIATION

### NOMINATION FORM

FOR

MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

THE IPQ ASSOCIATION

(NAME IN CAPITAL LETTERS)  a candidate for a membership of the Executive Committee of IPQ Association as a representative of Individual Life-Mem Representatives of Permanent Institutional Members/Individual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Mem Students Members* of the IPQ Association. I also declare the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.  Name:	
(NAME IN CAPITAL LETTERS)  a candidate for a membership of the Executive Committee of IPQ Association as a representative of Individual Life-Mem Representatives of Permanent Institutional Members/Individual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Mem Students Members* of the IPQ Association. I also declare the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	hereby offer myself a
Representatives of Permanent Institutional Members/Individual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Mem Students Members* of the IPQ Association. I also declare the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	(NAME IN CAPITAL LETTERS)
Annual Members/Representatives of Institutional Members/Individual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Mem Students Members* of the IPQ Association. I also declare the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	a candidate for a membership of the Executive Committee of the
Annual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Mem Students Members* of the IPQ Association. I also declare the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	Representatives of Property of Individual Life-Members
the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	Representatives of Permanent Institutional Members/Individual
the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are bin on me.	Annual Members/Representatives of Institutional Annual Members/
on me.	Students Members* of the IPO Association. I also declare that
on me.	the provisions in the Constitution of the Association are hinding
Name:	on me.
Name:	
	Name:

CANDIDATE'S SIGNATURE

Address :---

Type of Membership of the IPQ Association-

# SIGNATURE OF THE POLLING OFFICER AND OFFICE STAMP OF THE ASSOCIATION

\* Please strike out what is not necessary

Note:—Candidature is not required to be proposed and/or seconded.

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Contributors are requested to submit Two Typed Copies of their articles / reviews (preferably not more than 10 pages double-space typing) and also to provide relevant notes and references at the end of their contributions. Editorial decision about the publication of articles will normally, be communicated within two months. If an article cannot be included in the Quarterly, it will be returned only if necessary postage is enclosed with the articles. Contributors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.

EDITORS

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writers' affiliations.

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